Mr. Bond, one of the plaintiffs in this matter and a Negro, was refused his seat as a member of the House of Representatives of the General Assembly of Georgia. He was a Representative-elect, having been duly elected by the voters of House District No. 136 for the session of the General Assembly commencing January 10, 1966. This was a special election for a one year term made necessary by the reapportionment decision of this court. Toombs v. Fortson, N.D., Ga., 1965, 241 F.Supp. 65.
On the first day of the session, at which time Mr. Bond and other members of the House were to take the oath of office, Mr. Bond was asked to step aside because of challenges to his qualifications having been filed by seventy-five of the two-hundred-five members of the House. After the other members were sworn, including seven Negro representatives, petitions protesting the seating of Representative-Elect Bond were referred by the Speaker of the House to a special committee designated to hear the contest. This committee, after a hearing, recommended that he not be seated. This recommendation was accepted by the House and he was denied his seat by a vote of one hundred eighty-four to twelve.
Dr. King and Mrs. Keyes, the other plaintiffs, seek along with Mr. Bond to represent the citizens and voters of House District No. 136 as a class, and it is affirmatively alleged that they are Negro citizens of House District No. 136 and that they are registered voters. They allege that there are common questions of law and fact affecting the civil rights of Negroes to vote and to have members of their race represent them in the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia. It is undisputed that Dr. King and Mrs. Keyes are residents of the district, but it is also undisputed that Dr. King is not registered to vote in the district but in the House District No. 132.
The defendants are the Speaker of the House, the Speaker Pro-Tern, several members of the House representing the membership, certain officers of the House, and the Secretary of State of the State of Georgia. Jurisdiction for declaratory and injunctive relief is asserted under 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1343(3), 1343(4), and 2201; and 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971(d), 1983, and 1988. Three-Judge District Court jurisdiction was premised on 28 U.S.C.A. § 2281 by a claim that the provision of the Georgia Constitution which permits the members of the House to judge the qualifications of its members, and House Rule 61 which embodies the same provision are unconstitutionally vague, or were unconstitutionally administered with respect to Mr. Bond.
The additional causes of action set forth in the complaint were refined by briefs into claims that Mr. Bond was barred from membership because he was a Negro; that the action of the House denied him his First Amendment right to free speech; that he was denied procedural due process as guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; that he was denied substantive due process in that there was no rational basis for the action of the House; that the House resolution barring Mr. Bond constituted an ex post facto law and a bill of attainder; and that the House action deprived the residents of the House District No. 136 of a republican form of government, equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the right as Negroes under the Fifteenth Amendment to vote. The prayer is that defendants be enjoined from excluding Mr. Bond from membership in the House.
The defendants, by motion, have denied the jurisdiction of the court. Additionally, in the alternative, they have *336moved to dismiss Dr. King and Mrs. Keyes as plaintiffs. They have also answered the complaint. It was stipulated that a final judgment might be rendered on the pleadings, the stipulated facts and such other evidence as was introduced on the hearing of this matter. We thus proceed to final disposition.
The facts which gave rise to the challenge to Mr. Bond stem from a statement issued on January 6,1966 by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, an organization active in the civil rights field. Mr. Bond is and was Communications Director of this organization. After the statement was issued, Mr. Bond, upon inquiry, advised the news media that he supported the statement in its entirety. He added that he admired the courage of persons who burned their draft cards; that he was a pacifist who was eager and anxious to encourage people not to participate in the war in Viet Nam for any reason that they might choose; and said that as a second class citizen he did not feel that he should be required to support the war in Viet Nam.
The SNCC statement follows in full:
“The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee has a right and a responsibility to dissent with United States foreign policy on an issue when it sees fit. The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee now states its opposition to United States’ involvement in Viet Nam on these grounds:
“We believe the United States government has been deceptive in its claims of concern for freedom of the Vietnamese people, just as the government has been deceptive in claiming concern for the freedom of colored people in such other countries as the Dominican Republic, the Congo, South Africa, Rhodesia and in the United States itself.
“We, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, have been involved in the black people’s struggle for liberation and self-determination in this country for the past five years. Our work, particularly in the South, has taught us that the United States government has never guaranteed the freedom of oppressed citizens, and is not yet truly determined to end the rule of terror and oppression within its own borders.
“We ourselves have often been victims of violence and confinement executed by United States government officials. We recall the numerous persons who have been murdered in the South because of their efforts to secure their civil and human rights, and whose murderers have been allowed to escape penalty for their crimes.
“The murder of Samuel Young in Tuskegee, Ala., is no different than the murder of peasants in Viet Nam, for both Young and the Vietnamese sought, and are seeking, to secure the rights guaranteed them by law. In each case the United States government bears a great part of the responsibility for these deaths.
“Samuel Young was murdered because United States law is not being enforced. Vietnamese are murdered because the United States is pursuing an aggressive policy in violation of international law. The United States is no respecter of persons or law when such persons or laws run counter to its needs and desires.
“We recall the indifference, suspicion and outright hostility with which our reports of violence have been met in the past by government officials.
“We know that for the most part elections in this country, in the North as well as the South, are not free. We have seen that the 1965 Voting Rights Act and the 1964 Civil Rights Act have not yet been implemented with full federal power and sincerity.
“We question, then, the ability and even the desire of the United States government to guarantee free elections abroad. We maintain that our country’s cry of ‘preserve freedom in the world’ is a hypcritical *337mask behind which it squashes liberation movements which are not bound, and refuse to be bound, by the expediencies of United States cold war policies.
“We are in sympathy with, and support, the men in this country who are unwilling to respond to a military draft which would compel them to contribute their lives to United States agression in Viet Nam in the name of the ‘freedom’ we find so false in this country.
“We recoil with horror at the inconsistency of a supposedly ‘free’ society where responsibility to freedom is equated with the responsibility to lend oneself to military aggression. We take note of the fact that 16 percent of the draftees from this country are Negroes called on to stifle the liberation of Viet Nam, to preserve a ‘democracy’ which does not exist for them at home.
“We ask, where is the draft for the freedom fight in the United States ?
“We therefore encourage those Americans who prefer to use their energy in building democratic forms within this country. We believe that work in the civil rights movement and with other human relations organizations is a valid alternative to the draft. We urge all Americans to seek this alternative, knowing full well that it may cost them lives — as painfully as in Viet Nam.”
On the same day a newspaper reporter asked Mr. Bond for his views on the subject of the burning of draft cards. He stated that he would not burn his own but admired the courage of those who did.
During a taped interview with a representative of the media, Mr. Bond, after endorsing the SNCC statement was asked why he endorsed it, and his answer was as follows:
“Why, I endorse it, first, because I like to think of myself as a pacifist and one who opposes that war and any other war and eager and anxious to encourage people not to participate in it for any reason that they choose; and secondly, I agree with this statement because of the reason set forth in it — because I think it is sorta hypocritical for us to maintain that we are fighting for liberty in other places and we are not guaranteeing liberty to citizens inside the continental United States.”
When asked if he thought his views were at variance with the duties that might be required of him as a Representative in the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, Mr. Bond replied:
“Well, I think that the fact that the United States Government fights a war in Viet Nam, I don’t think that I as a second class citizen of the United States have a requirement to support that war. I think my responsibility is to oppose things that I think are wrong if they are in Viet Nam or New York, or Chicago, or Atlanta, or wherever.”
These facts were introduced before the House committee hearing the challenge. Mr. Bond was represented by counsel at the hearing and testified. He reaffirmed his adherence to all of these statements at the hearing and stated that they were still his views. There was no evidence then nor at the hearing before this court that Mr. Bond had receded in any way from his views. However, by way of explanation, he did state to the House committee that he had never suggested or advocated that anyone burn his draft card. He stated his willingness and desire to take the prescribed oath to support the Constitution of the United States and the State of Georgia.
The petitions challenging Mr. Bond which were before the special committee of the House contain several grounds, including the contention that Mr. Bond’s actions and statements gave aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States, and also violated the Selective Service laws, 50 App., U.S.C.A. § 462(a) and (b), *338and tended to bring discredit and disrespect on the House of Representatives.
The challenge was also on the basis that the statements and views of Mr. Bond disqualified him to take the oath to support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Georgia as is required of a member of the House of Representatives. The theory was that Mr. Bond’s statements were so repugnant to and inconsistent with his oath as to make it apparent that he could not honestly take the oath. This theory presents the central issue in the case.
PENDING MOTIONS
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. Their view is that the determination of the qualifications of a member of the State House of Representatives is a matter which state law vests in the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the House of Representatives, and that the federal questions asserted are insubstantial. They urge that the absence of any substantial question concerning deprivation of federally protected rights indicates that the action of the House is not subject to federal judicial review.
The extent of review under the circumstances will be discussed hereinafter under the merits of the controversy. However, we do hold that the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint. It could hardly be argued that the House could refuse to seat a member because of his race or for any other reason amounting to an invidious discrimination under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 1962, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663. The denial of a seat to a Negro representative-elect would also violate the Fifteenth Amendment. Cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 1960, 364 U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110. We think it follows that the court has jurisdiction over a denial of First Amendment rights by the state, and that the federal rights asserted here are not so insubstantial as to warrant our refusing jurisdiction. The motion of the state to dismiss will be overruled and an order may be presented accordingly.
The defendants also have motions pending to strike the plaintiffs King and Keyes on the ground that they do not have such a direct interest in the litigation as would give them standing. They base their standing on an absence of representation in the House because Mr. Bond was deprived of his seat. The Governor has called an election for February 23, 1966 to fill the vacant seat.1
It is settled that one seeking to challenge the constitutionality of the statute must show that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining some immediate direct injury. Liverpool, N. Y. and P. Steamship Company v. Comm. of Emigration, 1885, 113 U.S. 33, 5 S.Ct. 352, 28 L.Ed. 899; Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Mellon, 1923, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078. Dr. King and Mrs. Keyes have not “ * * * alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues * * *.” necessary in determining constitutional questions. Baker v. Carr, supra.
In a case involving the temporary lack of representation because an United States Senator had been denied his seat pending inquiry into his election and qualifications, Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 1929, 279 U.S. 597, 49 S.Ct. 452, 73 L.Ed. 867, the court said:
“The temporary deprivation of equal representation which results from the refusal of the Senate to seat a member pending inquiry as to his election or qualifications is the necessary consequence of the exercise of a constitutional power, and no more deprives the state of its *339‘equal suffrage’ in the constitutional sense than would a vote of the Senate vacating the seat of a sitting member or a vote of expulsion.”
We are of the opinion that plaintiffs King and Keyes do not have such a direct interest in the litigation as would give them standing to bring the complaint. This is particularly so in view of the fact that the complaint of Mr. Bond alone will resolve every conceivable issue. Moreover, Dr. King is not a registered voter in the House District in question. The motion of the state to dismiss as to these two plaintiffs will be granted and an order may be presented accordingly.
THE MERITS
The contention that Mr. Bond was denied his seat because of his race was resolved adversely to him from the bench during the hearing of this matter. To support this contention it was urged that Mr. Bond was a Negro; that SNCC was a militant civil rights organization ; and that the question of race was inextricably related to each and every statement forming the basis of the challenge. This logic would create license in the name of race. Furthermore, seven Negroes, as stated, were seated on the same day as representatives. Two served on the special challenge committee at the request of Mr. Bond; two Negro senators appeared before the committee as character witnesses for him; and two of the Negro representatives spoke on the floor of the House for him before the final vote. The charge of racial discrimination and thus of denial of equal protection of the law is without foundation in fact.
This ruling also disposes of any claim that Mr. Bond or the citizens and voters of House District No. 136 have been deprived of any right as Negroes under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or under the Fifteenth Amendment. For the reasons stated on the standing question we reject also the contention that the action of the House denied them a republican form of government. This is not even a justiciable issue. Baker v. Carr, supra.
The substantial issue in the case rests on the guaranty of freedom of speech or to dissent under the First Amendment as that amendment has long been applicable to the states under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 1925, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138; De Jonge v. State of Oregon, 1937, 299 U.S. 353, 57 S.Ct. 255, 81 L.Ed. 278. But the inquiry does not end simply on the question of deprivation of First Amendment rights per se. Rather the inquiry must be in the context of two fundamental principles of government: separation of powers and state government under our system of federalism. The right of free speech would not long exist absent a government founded on these principles.
James Madison writing in Federalist No. 47 said with respect to the separation of powers doctrine:
“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”
And from the begining states have claimed and enjoyed the protection of the separation of powers principle as between their respective branches of government. This, to date, has been a part of our federalism.
Georgia adopted the separation of powers principle in its first Constitution. Art. I, Const. of 1777. MeElreath, Constitution of Ga., § 239, p. 229. The Constitution of 1789, Art. I, § XIII, MeElreath, supra, § 314, p. 243, provided that each House of the state legislature would be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members and have the power to expel or punish for disorderly behavior. Similar provisions have been included in every other Georgia Constitution. Ga.Const. of 1798, Art. I, § XIII, MeElreath, § 364, p. *340253; Const. of 1861, Art. II, § IV, Par. I, McElreath, § 484, p. 286, Const. of 1865, Art. II, § IV, Par. I, McElreath, § 585, p. 304; Const. of 1868, Art. III, § IV, Par. I, McElreath, § 709, p. 328; Const. of 1877, Art. III, § VII, Par. I, McElreath, § 882, p. 361.
“Each House shall be the judge of the election, returns and qualifications of its members and shall have power to punish them for disorderly-behavior, or misconduct, by censure, fine, imprisonment, or expulsion; but no member shall be expelled, except by a vote of two-thirds of the House to which he belongs.”
This language is to be compared with Art. I, § 5, Clauses 1 and 2 of the Constitution of the United States:
“Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, * * *(Clause 1)
“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.” (Clause 2)
The Georgia courts have consistently refused to take jurisdiction over controversies having to do with the qualifications of legislators. The Senate or House, as happened to be the case, was deemed to have exclusive jurisdiction under the Georgia Constitution. Rainey v. Taylor, 1928, 166 Ga. 476, 143 S.E. 383; Fowler v. Bostick, 1959, 99 Ga.App. 428, 108 S.E.2d 720; and Beatty v. Myrick, 1963, 218 Ga. 629, 129 S.E.2d 764. This is the general law in this country. Indeed we believe that there is no case to the contrary, federal or state.
Plaintiff recognizes the separation of powers principle as such on both the federal and state levels. He argues however that it exists on the state level only insofar as it does not conflict with the Federal Constitution and must therefore give way to First Amendment rights in view of the vertical application of those rights to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is a correct statement of the law subject to whatever rights were left by the Fourteenth Amendment to the state legislative branches for control of their internal affairs under our system of federalism. We thus must measure Mr. Bond’s freedom to speak in this frame of reference.
Before attempting to resolve this new and substantial constitutional question we must concern ourselves with the threshhold question, not asserted by plaintiffs, of whether the legislature had the power under the state Constitution or laws to bar Mr. Bond. Our distinguished and able Chief Judge is of the firm view that no such power existed. He seems to find the power of expulsion, but limits the power of judging qualifications to those expressed in the Georgia Constitution. We believe this to be a restrictive view, unfounded in recognized authority and not in keeping with our history or the principle of separation of powers.
Judge Story gave the reasons for vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the legislative branch in such cases (Story, Comm, on the Const., Vol. II, § 831, p. 294):
“It is obvious, that a power must be lodged somewhere to judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of the members of each house composing the legislature; for otherwise there could be no certainty, as to who were legitimately chosen members, and any intruder, or usurper, might claim a seat, and thus trample upon the rights, and privileges, and liberties of the people. Indeed, elections would become, under such circumstances, a mere mockery; and legislation the exercise of sovereignty by any self-constituted body. The only possible question on such a subject is, as to the body, in which such a power shall be lodged. If lodged in any other, than the legislative body itself, its independence, its purity, and even its existence and action may be destroyed, or put into imminent danger. No other body, but itself, can *341have the same motives to preserve and perpetuate these attributes; no other body can be so perpetually watchful to guard its own rights and privileges from infringement, to purify and vindicate its own character, and to preserve the rights, and sustain the free choice of its constituents. Accordingly, the power has always been lodged in the legislative body by the uniform practice of England and America.”
The Supreme Court in Re Chapman, 1897, 166 U.S. 661, 17 S.Ct. 677, 41 L.Ed. 1154, a case involving a senate investigation of the conduct of some of its members, said:
“Under the constitution, the senate of the United States has the power to try impeachments; to judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members; to determine the rules of its proceedings; punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a member; and it necessarily possesses the inherent power of self-protection.”
We believe a state legislative body necessarily possesses this same inherent power of self-protection if the separation of powers doctrine is to have any real meaning on the state level. And self-protection goes to the process of qualifications as well as expulsion.
In Hiss v. Bartett, 1855, 3 Gray 468, 63 Am.Dec. 768, the question concerned the legislative power to expel a member. The Massachusetts Constitution contained no such power but did contain the power to judge returns, elections and qualifications. The court said: •
“The authority to be ‘judge of the returns, elections, and qualifications of its own members,’ does not limit their power; they are judges in other respects, in all respects.”
Art. I, § 5, of the United States Constitution, as noted, provides that each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members. Art. I, § 3 provides that no person shall be a representative unless he meets certain age, citizenship and residential requirements. In the Constitutional Convention there was an attempt to set up affirmative qualifications. During the debate on that draft which was later rejected, Mr. Dickinson of Delaware, opposed the formulation because it would be held to be exclusive. He stated that he was “against any recitals of qualifications in the Constitution. It was impossible to make a complete one, and a partial one would, by implication, tie up the hands of the Legislature from supplying omissions.” Mr. Wilson of Pennsylvania took the same view, saying: “Besides a partial enumeration of cases will disable the Legislature from disqualifying odius and dangerous characters.” (Proceedings in Congressional Record, 80th Congress, First Session, January 3, 1947, Vol. 93, p. 12, Senate debate on whether Senator Bilbo of Mississippi was disqualified.)
By way of a historical precedent, Mr. Bilbo was denied his seat in the United States Senate because, among other reasons, his views regarding the right of Negroes to vote were repugnant to the oath he would be required to take. The Senate did not believe that it was limited to the qualifications expressed in the Constitution.
See Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States, 2nd ed., Vol. I, p. 610, where after discussing in, § 340 the subject of qualifications for membership being determined by Congress, the author states:
“The instances which have been cited make it sufficiently clear that the Senate and House have repeatedly held it to be proper that they should consider whether or not persons should be admitted as Senators or Representatives even though possessing all of the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution for membership and bringing credentials in due form of their election.”
In the case of Senator Reed Smoot of Utah who had been seated but whose *342qualifications to continue as a Senator were questioned, the investigation committee recommended that he be expelled either for reason of his membership in a church that countenanced and encouraged polygamy and united church and state contrary to the spirit of the Constitution, or because he had taken an oath of such a nature and character that he is disqualified from taking the oath of office required of an United States Senator. The question was raised concerning the ability of the Senate to add qualifications other than those enumerated in the Constitution and was answered in the report as follows:
“If his conduct has been such as to be prejudicial to the welfare of society, of the nation, or its Government, he is regarded as being unfit to perform the important and confidential duties of a Senator, and may be deprived of a seat in the Senate, although he may have done no act of which a court could take cognizance.” 1 Hind’s Precedents, §§ 481-483.
This situation is analogous to the Georgia Constitution. There is nothing in it which limits qualifications of a legislator to those expressed therein. In point of fact there is at least one disqualification in the Georgia law which is not contained in the Constitution. Ga. Code, § 89-101, subd. 5, provides:
“The following persons are held and deemed ineligible to hold any civil office, and the existence of any of the following states of facts shall be a. sufficient reason for vacating any office held by such person, but the acts of such person, while holding a commission, shall be valid as the acts of an officer de facto, viz:
******
“Persons of unsound mind, and those who, from advanced age or bodily infirmity, are unfit to discharge the duties of the office to which they are chosen or appointed.”
The qualifications and disqualifications of legislators in the Georgia Constitution are not all inclusive. In sum, we find nothing that would compel the House to seat a member if a reasonable basis, within the context of due process of law as we shall next discuss exists for the denial.
Having assumed jurisdiction, we come then to the main question of whether Mr. Bond was improperly denied his seat, but this question is prefaced by the test to be applied. With respect to the test, we hold that the free speech issue should be resolved in the context of giving effect to the separation of powers principle, and also our system of federalism to the extent that it permits self-government to the states under the supremacy of the Federal Constitution.
There is some authority for such an approach. On the federal level we have some guidance in the case of Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 1929, 279 U.S. 597, 49 S.Ct. 452, 73 L.Ed. 867. That case arose out of the refusal to seat Senator Vare because of alleged corruption in his election. The issue was over whether the District Court could grant relief to a witness who had been arrested by the Senate because he refused to testify at the subsequent inquiry. The Supreme Court pointed out that the Senate was acting within its constitutional powers which were judicial in character and refused relief. It was said:
“Here the question under consideration concerns the exercise by the Senate of an indubitable power; and if judicial interference can be successfully invoked, it can only be upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law. That condition we are unable to find in the present case.”
On the state level, with respect to state elections and thus giving effect to federalism but in no way involving the separation of powers principle, we begin with Wilson v. State of North Carolina, *3431898, 169 U.S. 586, 18 S.Ct. 435, 42 L.Ed. 865. There the governor suspended a railroad commissioner and refused him a hearing. The Supreme Court refused relief, In Snowden v. Hughes, 1944, 321 U.S. 1, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed. 497, a candidate for the state senate alleged that the State Primary Canvassing Board denied him his rights under the equal protection clause by a willful, malicious and arbitrary refusal through a conspiracy to correctly certify the results of a primary election thereby eliminating him as a candidate. He brought his suit in the District Court under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The Supreme Court refused relief on the ground that his case did not rise to the level of invidious, purposeful discrimination cognizable under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The applicable rule of the case is to be found in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, as follows.
“My disagreement with the majority of the Court is on a narrow ground. I agree that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should not be distorted to make the federal courts the supervisor of the state elections. That would place the federal judiciary in a position ‘to supervise and review the political administration of a state government by its own officials, and through its own courts’ (Wilson v. State of North Carolina, 169 U.S. 586, 596, 18 S.Ct. 435-439, 42 L.Ed. 865, 871) — matters on which each State has the final say. I also agree that a candidate for public office is not denied the equal protection of. the law in the constitutional sense merely because he is the victim of unlawful administration of a state election law. I believe, as the opinion of the Court indicates, that a denial of equal protection of the laws requires an invidious, purposeful discrimination. But I depart from the majority when it denies Snowden the opportunity of showing that he was in fact the victim of such discriminatory action His complaint seems to me to be adequate to raise the issue. He charges a conspiracy to wilfully, maliciously and arbitrarily refuse to designate him as one of the nominees of the Republican party, that such action was an ‘unequal’ administration of the Illinois law and a denial to him of the equal protection of the laws, and that the conspiracy had that purpose. * * * ”
Snowden v. Hughes, as well as Baker v. Carr, supra, at least teach that there must be a showing of invidious, purposeful discrimination to give rise to relief under the equal protection clause. Here we have the due process clause and First Amendment rights. We think these cases show that some restraint is to be practiced by the courts in considering state political questions concerning particular offices as distinguished from whole systems such as are prevalent in malapportionment, or racial discrimination. If this premise be correct, then there is room for a balance between the separation of powers principle, a system of federalism and individual rights afforded under the federal Constitution.
Being of this view, we conclude that a reasonable test under circumstances such as are presented in this case would be to assume jurisdiction for the purpose of determining whether Mr. Bond was denied due process of law, either procedural or substantive. Notice, an opportunity to be heard, to be represented by counsel, to testify and to offer evidence and to cross-examine adverse witnesses are envisioned in procedural due process. The transcript of the hearing which was held on the challenge to Mr. Bond demonstrates no absence of due process. It is true that there was no subpoena power but no request for an absent witness was made. We reject the contention that procedural or substantive due process was violated by allowing the challengers to vote. A holding to the contrary would do violence to the power to judge qualifications.
*344As to substantive due process, we conclude that there must be a rational evidentiary basis for the ruling of the House to deny Mr. Bond his seat. The act must not have been arbitrary.
Does the action rest on any evidence which would support the denial ? Thompson v. City of Louisville, 1960, 362 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 624, 4 L.Ed.2d 654, 80 A.L.R.2d 1355; Garner v. State of Louisiana, 1961, 368 U.S. 157, 82 S.Ct. 248, 7 L.Ed.2d 207.
Mr. Bond’s right to speak and to dissent as a private citizen is subject to the limitation that he sought to assume membership in the House. As such he was required to take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States. This is a legitimate requirement. Indeed, the Federal Constitution requires it. Art. VI, § 3. One of the charges against him was that his statements were inconsistent with and repugnant to that oath. Was there any basis for this charge ?
The SNCC statement is at war with the national policy of this country: To make certain that every citizen stands equal before the law; to make certain that every citizen has a fair chance to benefit in the freedom and opportunities and bounties of this country; to export these same principles of democracy to the balance of the world wherever and whenever possible, even to the extent of lending military assistance where self-determination is denied in order that those denied may choose freedom if they so desire. A citizen would not violate his oath by objecting to or criticizing this policy or even by calling it deceptive and false as the statement did.
But the statement does not stop with this. It is a call to action based on race; a call alien to the concept of the pluralistic society which makes this nation. It aligns the organization with “ * * * colored people in such other countries as the Dominican Republic, the Congo, South Africa, Rhodesia * * * ” It refers to its involvement in the black people’s struggle for liberation and self-determination * * * It states that “Vietnamese are murdered because the United States is pursuing an aggressive policy in violation of international law.” It alleges that Negroes, referring to American servicemen, are called on to stifle the liberation of Viet Nam.
The call to action, and this is what we find to be a rational basis for the decision which denied Mr. Bond his seat, is that language which states that SNCC supports those men in this country who are unwilling to respond to a military draft. The fact that the last paragraph calls on them to devote their energies to the alternative of working in the civil rights movement in no way avoids the fact that the organization offers support to men who are unwilling to respond to a military draft. Cf. Gara v. United States, 6 Cir., 1949, 178 F.2d 38.
Mr. Bond was careful to affirm this statement. He went further, and he was more than a private citizen; he was an officer and employee of SNCC and was about to become a member of the House of Representatives of Georgia. He stated that he admired the courage of anyone who burned his draft card. He stated that as a pacifist he was eager and anxious to encourage people not to participate in the war in Viet Nam or in any other war for any reason that they choose, and lastly, he stated that, as a second class citizen, he did not think that he had the requirement to support the war in Viet Nam.
The Congress has the obligation under the Federal Constitution for providing for the common defense of this nation. The Selective Service System is a part of that defense. We are committed in Viet Nam. The Congress approved this course in Public Law 88-408, August 10, 1964, 78 Stat. 384, wherein the president was empowered to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression from the campaign being waged by the “ * * * Communist regime in North Vietnam.” This resolution states that the United States “ * * *345regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.”
Whether Mr. Bond should have been seated was a question which presented itself to the House of Representatives of Georgia under our system. Whether the wisest course was followed is not for us to say. The judgment of the court is not to be substituted for that of the House. Our function is to determine whether he has been denied some fundamental federal right to which he was otherwise entitled. We find and hold that his statements and affirmation of the SNCC statement as they bore on the functioning of the Selective Service System could reasonably be said to be inconsistent with and repugnant to the oath which he was required to take. This suffices as a rational basis for the action of the House. The fact that the statement was otherwise freighted with racial overtones and was at variance with the established national concept of a country accommodating all nationalities and ethnic groups is a part of the basis of our holding only insofar as it relates to the call not to support the Selective Service System.
The charge that the constitutional provision of Georgia authorizing the House to judge the qualifications of its members and the House rule embodying it are unconstitutionally vague is without merit. It follows from what we have said that neither was unconstitutionally applied to Mr. Bond. It also follows from what we. have said that the resolution denying Mr. Bond his seat was not an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder. To so hold in the face of a finding that there was a rational basis for the action of the House would be to destroy the constitutional power of judging qualifications.
All relief is denied and the complaint will be dismissed. Defendants may present a judgment accordingly.
. Mr. Bond is a candidate for the vacant seat and is the only candidate. The qualifications closed on February 7, 1966. The General Assembly will adjourn its present session on Friday, February 18, 1966. There will be no other regular session of the General Assembly during the year 1966.