I concur but write separately because I find Justice Bedsworth’s analysis of Ruth’s summary judgment motion unnecessarily complicated.
The only issue we need address is whether Ruth owed Andrew a duty of care. Our dissenting colleague and Quigley maintain Ruth’s actions of coming to Andrew’s aid and isolating him from other caregivers created this duty. I would agree with this legal conclusion if the record supported the factual premise. It does not.1
Andrew’s general condition the week before his death and Ruth’s involvement with him during that time are undisputed. Andrew went to restaurants, helped repair the family driveway, and ran various errands. People who saw him, including his orthodontist, verified he did not appear symptomatic until the day he died.
Ruth was with Andrew on Monday, December 14, for a few hours at his house after he went to school. On Tuesday the 15th, Andrew went to school and Ruth did not see him. He stayed at Ruth’s house on the 16th, and although he did not go to school, his symptoms were minimal. Andrew missed school on the 17th and 18th. He slept at Ruth’s home both nights, but spent just part of the day there. Again nothing in the record indicates he was seriously ill at this time. The state of his health is not contested. Simply stated, neither party alleges he appeared to be sick. Andrew left his grandmother’s on Saturday the 19th and ate lunch at a restaurant with his father and sister. Ruth did not see him again that day but visited with him on Sunday, the day he died.
“One who, being under no duty to do so, takes charge of another who is helpless adequately to aid or protect himself [or herself] is subject to liability *1044to the other for any bodily harm caused to him [or her] by [1Q . . . the failure of the actor to exercise reasonable care to secure the safety of the other while within the actor’s charge . . . .” (Rest.2d Torts, § 324, p. 139.)
Ruth was under no duty to exercise reasonable care to secure Andrew’s safety prior to the last week of his life and nothing happened during that time to change this obligation. Andrew was not in need of help at any time he was with Ruth. On Monday, Ruth did nothing more than babysit a seemingly healthy teenager after school. The two had no contact on Tuesday. Ruth was with him on Wednesday. She suggested the Christian Science practitioner be contacted, but that was because Andrew’s teeth hurt.2 He spent part of Thursday and Friday at Ruth’s but again the undisputed facts fail to establish his need for help. Andrew returned home on Saturday. The court did not err in granting Ruth’s summary judgment motion. Quigley failed to establish Ruth owed a duty to Andrew.
Quigley also maintains Ruth’s status as a grandmother, Christian Scientist and health practitioner invested her relationship with Andrew with elements of trust and dependence customarily found in a special relationship. Quigley fails to cite any relevant authority for this position. The two cases upon which Quigley does rely involve defendants who induced or prevented helpless victims from seeking assistance. As I now explain, Andrew was never helpless while in Ruth’s care.
The dissent suggests Ruth contacted the practitioner, but the record fails to support this contention.