Indianapolis City ordinance provides that premises in a Class U-3, or business district, may be used for drive-in or curb-service establishments when on a lot determined by the Board of Zoning Appeals, after public notice and hearing, to be so located that such building, structure or use will, in the judgment of the Board, substantially serve the public convenience and welfare, and will not substantially or permanently injure the appropriate use of the neighboring property.
Appellee Schahet petitioned the Board for such a determination, and the Board made a determination in his favor.
The court below reviewed the decision by certiorari and found and adjudged that it was legal in all respects, and affirmed the same.
Appellant says that there was no evidence before the Board from which the Board could determine that the lot was so located that the proposed building and use will “substantially serve the public convenience and welfare, and will not substantially or permanently injure the appropriate use of the neighboring property.” Appellant further argues that the Board was required to make findings of fact and did not do so.
The relief sought by appellee Schahet was an exception pursuant to the terms of the Zoning Ordinance and not a variance, although sometimes the two terms *99have been used indiscriminately. 101 C. J. S., Zoning §271, p. 1034; §272, p. 1037; Am. Jur. Zoning §196, p. 1046 Anno.; 168 A. L. R. 13, p. 20.
It is not necessary to show that “practical difficulties” or “unnecessary hardship” would result if the exception is not granted. The conditions permitting an exception are those which are found in the ordinance itself. Keeling v. Board of Zoning Appeals (1947), 117 Ind. App. 314, 69 N. E. 2d 613, 101 C. J. S. Zoning §273 p. 1037.
Appellant takes the position that the Board was required to make a special finding of the facts upon. which is based the granting of the exception, and cites in support thereof, decisions of this court and our Supreme Court dealing with various administrative bodies. In each of these cases a statute dealing with such bodies specifically required a finding of facts. There is no such statute involved here. Burns’ Stat. §53-777 formerly required that;
“The board shall keep minutes of its proceedings ... prepare findings ...”
It was amended in 1951 to eliminate any reference to findings. Appellant has presented no authorities, and we have found none in this state indicating that a special finding of facts is required in the absence of a statute. Further argument is made, as we understand it, that the failure to make special findings is a violation of constitutional requirements as to “due process”. Appellant’s brief is such that we do not consider the argument to be a cogent and specific one, nor are any pertinent authorities cited, and a constitutional question, in our opinion, is not presented. Had a question been duly presented of rights guaranteed by the state or federal constitutions, then *100this court would have been without jurisdiction to decide the same. The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction as to such matters in appeal from courts. Burns’ Stat. §4-214. We recognize that in trials by-courts, general findings are made more often than special findings. The fact that general findings are made instead of a special finding of facts does not prevent a consideration on appeal as to whether the decision is sustained by sufficient evidence. As a matter of fact, the decision of the Board does not appear in the briefs herein. Appellant has set forth under the heading of “Finding of Board of Zoning Appeals”, what appears upon examination to be merely a letter of notification from the Executive Director of the Board to the attorney for appellee, Schahet, advising of the action of the Board at its meeting.
At the hearing before the Board, evidence was introduced to the effect that the real estate involved here is located at the southwest corner of West 16th Street and Tremont Street in Indianapolis, and was zoned for business. It was being used as a used car lot. Directly across the street to the north was a bar and restaurant and there was a grocery store west of that. Across the street to the east was a bakery and adjacent to that was “The Pole” drive-in. West of the property there was an alley and then a parking area and service station. A sketch of the proposed building, a plat plan of the area, and photographs of the area were placed in evidence along with the consents of two property owners. There was also evidence on behalf of appellee Schahet that the proposed structure would be a modern glass and masonry structure with the ground blacktopped and property *101surfaced, and fenced, and that the city Traffic Engineering Department generally approved the lay-out.
Appellant’s evidence, the weight of which, and the credibility of the witnesses being for the board to determine, was to the effect that to grant the exception would cause an increase in traffic with accompanying noise and there might be a police problem involved in “car-hopping” among young patrons of the establishment if an additional drive-in was permitted in the area. The owner of the bakery testified that another drive-in in the area would adversely effect his business. One householder testified that he thought the proposed drive-in, would cause a depreciation in the values of his property and surrounding property, but we are unable to tell from the evidence as set forth in the briefs just where his property is located.
In the case of West Hartford Methodist Church v. Zoning Bd. of Town of West Hartford (1956), 143 Conn. 263, 121 A. 2d 640, there was involved a regulation similar to the ordinance involved here. The Zoning regulation permitted the Zoning Board to grant an exception in certain cases, but only if, in the judgment of the Board, that the public convenience and welfare would be substantially served and the appropriate use of neighboring property would not be substantially or permanently injured.
The court stated;
“These conditions set up a test for the guidance of the board, and since the validity of the test has not been challenged, we shall assume that it is sufficiently definite to be a valid delegation of legislative authority.. .”
“The first condition of the test is that public convenience and welfare will, in the judgment of the board, be served. ‘Public -convenience’ is not used in a colloquial manner. It is not synonomous with ‘handy’. The word ‘convenience’ connotes that *102which is suitable or fitting and ‘public convenience’ refers to what is fitting or suited to the public need.” See Abbott v. Public Utilities Commission, 48 R. I. 196, 186 At. 490. The term ‘public welfare’ cannot be precisely defined. Sometimes it has been said to include public convenience, comfort, peace and order, prosperity, and similar concepts. . . . Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, Mass., 128 N. E. 2d 557, 561.”
Considering, as the trial court was required to do, the evidence most favorable to the decision of the board, including the present use of the property in question, its proposed use, and the use being made of neighboring property, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that the board acted unlawfully, arbitrarily or unreasonably. The evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding that the proposed structure or use will substantially serve the public convenience and welfare and will not substantially or permanently injure the appropriate use of the neighboring property. Keeling v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra.
. There is some discussion in appellant’s brief about the variance of a building-line requirement. We find no mention of such matter anywhere in the briefs except in a letter written by the Ex- - ecutive Director of the Board. What if any action the board was requested to take or did take along this line does not appear, and no question is presented as to this.
Judgment affirmed.
Pfaff, J., concurs.
Kelley, P. J., concurs in result.
Bierly, J., dissents with opinion.