ORIGINAL ACTION
GIVAN, Chief Justice.Relator brings this original action challenging the respondent court requirements concerning the posting of a cash deposit bond for release pending prosecution.
Relator stands charged in the respondent court with the crime of Battery, a Class C felony. The respondent court set bond at $5,000, a figure which relator does not challenge; however, the respondent judge has placed three conditions on the posting of the statutory ten percent cash bail. See Ind.Code § 85-83-8-8(2). The conditions are: 1) the bond be posted in the name of the defendant; 2) the bond be considered a personal asset of the defendant; and 8) the bond be available for payment of court costs, fine, restitution and necessary attorney fees. It is relator's position that the conditions placed by the respondent judge are a violation of the above statute and that they are a violation of his right to bail.
We find nothing in the statute prohibiting the respondent judge from requiring that the bond be posted in the name of the defendant or that the bond be considered a personal asset of the defendant. Ind.Code § 35-83-8-8(7) provides: "Impose any other reasonable restrictions designed to assure the defendant's presence in court." There can be little doubt that requiring the defendant to post his own money rather than the money of a friend might very well be an additional assurance that he will appear for trial. The requirement by the respondent court that the bond be available for payment of costs, fine, restitution and necessary attorney fees in no way impedes the defendant in his ability to post bond.
The amount of money necessary to effect a cash bond posting is ten percent of the *1114original bond. The judge's restrictions do not impinge the State's right to retain ten percent of the amount posted as an administrative fee. The requirement of the respondent court simply declares that the remaining cash posted, which is an asset of the defendant, be treated as such and that it be subjected to the debts of the defendant incurred as a result of the litigation. The action of the trial court in this regard is tantamount to the placing of a lien upon the assets of a litigant to secure payment of just debts.
We hold the conditions placed on the ten percent cash bond by the respondent judge in no way violate the statute or the constitution. The conditions are entirely reasonable and are in no way an impingement upon the rights of persons charged with a crime in that court.
The petition for a writ is denied.
PIVARNIK and DICKSON, JJ., concur. SHEPARD, J., dissents with separate opinion in which DEBRULER, J., concurs.