The relator has filed a petition for an alternative writ of prohibition and mandate herein against the respondent judge of the Jackson Circuit Court. We issued an alternative writ requiring the respondent judge to show cause and his authority for restraining the relator, Christopher D. Moritz, .from *56acting as prosecuting attorney in the 40th Judicial Circuit of Indiana in connection with a criminal case then pending in the Jackson Circuit Court before respondent judge, entitled “State of Indiana v. Beatrice Oliver, No. 6656.”
The defendant in the criminal case in the respondent trial court had previously filed a petition to restrain and enjoin the relator, Christopher D. Moritz, from acting as prosecuting attorney on the ground that he was not qualified to assume the duties of prosecuting attorney because he was not admitted to practice law in the State of Indiana.
The trial court and this court take judicial notice of those attorneys who have been admitted to the bar of this state. There is no dispute as to the fact that the relator, Christopher D. Moritz, is not and never has been a member of the bar of this state.
The respondent trial judge, John M. Lewis, sustained the motion prohibiting the relator from any further participation as prosecuting attorney in the criminal case. We can understand the dilemma confronting the trial judge. He chose to sustain the motion in order to avoid a claim of reversible error by the defendant, in the event this court should finally determine that the relator was not qualified as a prosecuting attorney to represent the State of Indiana in a criminal case. Even though this court should rule to the contrary and hold that the relator was entitled to participate as prosecuting attorney in said cause, still the defendant could not claim error which he had invited by the motion which he filed and urged upon the court. Thus the trial court was wisely attempting to avoid any error in the record in the event that a long and expensive trial were to take place.
*57The trial court filed a response in this case alleging that it had the jurisdiction, and duty to rule on the motion presented to it. We may not in this action of prohibition determine the merits of that motion. We can be concerned only with the matter of jurisdiction, namely, did the trial court act beyond its jurisdiction in ruling on the motion presented to it? In our opinion, the trial court had the jurisdiction to rule on such a motion. The mere fact that it could err in such a ruling does not deprive it of jurisdiction and, as a result, be the basis of a writ of prohibition from this court. A trial court many times in criminal cases has to rule upon constitutional questions, and, on occasions, questions relating to the competency of an attorney to represent a defendant. The court certainly has jurisdiction to rule upon such matters and we may not, by writ of prohibition, control such rulings. It is well settled that extraordinary writs of mandate and prohibition are not to be used by litigants as a substitute for other remedies or to raise questions of alleged error committed by a trial court reviewable on appeal. State ex rel. Durham v. Marion Circuit Court (1959), 240 Ind. 132, 162 N. E. 2d 505; State ex rel. v. Brennan, Judge (1952), 231 Ind. 492, 109 N. E. 2d 409; State ex rel. Allison v. Crim. Ct. of Mar. Co., etc. (1958), 238 Ind. 190, 149 N. E. 2d 114.
This court improvidently issued an alternative writ, which is now vacated and set aside and held for naught and the permanent writ is denied.
Since an emergency exists for the prompt disposition of this question, the clerk is directed to certify this opinion forthwith to the trial court.
Landis and Achor, JJ., concur; Jackson, C. J., dissents with opinion; Myers, J., dissents with opinion,