Concurring Opinion
Hunter, J.I believe that under the recent opinions handed down by our Supreme Court concerning dismissal of causes as referred to in the opinion of my associate Judge Pfaff that this court can only interpret said opinions as above set forth, i.e.,
“That a court has no inherent or common law power to dismiss an action except for lack of jurisdiction and that an involuntary nonsuit may not be ordered in the absence of _ statutory authority:” State ex rel. Hurd v. Davis (1949), 227 Ind. 93, 84 N. E. 2d 181; Wayne Pump Co. v. Gross Income Tax Div. (1953), 232 Ind. 147, 110 N. E. 2d 284; State ex rel. Terminix Co. of Ind. v. Fulton C. C. (1956), 235 Ind. 218, 132 N. E. 2d 707.
That trial courts are empowered to establish rules for their own government and for conducting their business cannot be denied. Burns’ Ind. Statutes §4-313, §§2-4718-19; 7 West’s Ind. Law Encyclopedia, Courts §41, p. 435 as quoted in the above opinion.
Upon examination it is readily apparent that Rule 3 of the Noble Circuit Court as set forth in the opinion above is an arbitrary rule that would destroy the substantive rights of the litigants, thus it should be noted by the bench and bar of this state that we are not here confronted with the question of a dismissal or involuntary nonsuit for want of prosecution under a local court rule that would protect the substantive rights of litigants by, for example, (1) the publication or posting of a civil delinquent list; (2) by notice, actual or constructive, to the party adversely affected thereby; (3) by holding actual judg*368ment of dismissal in abeyance for one or more subsequent terms of court or a stated period of time; and (4) granting a reasonable time thereafter in which to reinstate said cause.
It would seem that a local court rule containing such safeguards would not be in violation of the constitutional rights of litigants and would in effect require diligence on the part of counsel and litigants and prescribe a positive duty to move meritorious cases to conclusion. If necessary it would seem that some relief might be extended by an enabling rule of our Supreme Court.
I believe that trial courts should have some control over the “old dog cases” that have stagnated and clogged their dockets for long’ periods of time for reasons that are beyond and outside the knowledge of the trial court and unless the courts do have some control over such delinquent actions we would be saying in effect that such negligence, procrastinations, delays and laches in the pursuit of the prosecution of their causes of action must be rewarded.
In most jurisdictions the right to dismiss for lack of prosecution is recognized as an inherent right of the trial courts. The justification for such control over trial dockets and the disposition of causes is clearly and succinctly stated in the case of Sweeney v. Anderson, 129 Fed. 2d 756, 758 (C C A 10th, 1942).
“The elimination of delay in the trial of cases and the prompt dispatch of court business are pre-requisites to the proper administration of justice. These goals cannot be attained without the exercise by the courts of diligent supervision over their own dockets. Courts should discourage delay and insist upon prompt disposition of litigation. . . .”
*369We judicially know that under decisions in Indiana prior to 1949 and subsequent to the 1881 statute, i.e., §2-901, Burns’ 1946 Replacement, supra, quoted above, the Supreme and Appellate Courts of this state had repeatedly stated “that a party to a cause may be co negligent of his own interest in connection therewith that the court, both by virtue of the common-law and under its inherent powers, may dismiss a cause of action for leant of prosecution” (my emphasis). Blickenstaff v. Cowgill (1915), 58 Ind. App. 378, 106 N. E. 376. This conclusion was upheld in Baltimore & Ohio and Chicago Railroad Co. v. Eggers (1894), 139 Ind. 24, 26, 38 N. E. 466; Cabinet Makers Union v. City of Indianapolis (1896), 145 Ind. 671, 44 N. E. 757. It would appear that these cases have either been overruled or distinguished without reference thereto by the explicit and exact language of the opinions in State ex rel. Hurd v. Davis, supra; Wayne Pump Co. v. Gross Income Tax Div., supra; and State ex rel. Terminix Co. of Ind. v. Fulton C. C., supra.
It would seem that if the rule as expressed by the latest opinions of our Supreme Court and as quoted in the above opinion is to be strictly followed there would be no way to clear the trial court dockets and an ‘old dog’ cause once filed must remain there “ad infinitum” sans statutory authority to dismiss.
Note. — Reported in 188 N. E. 2d 286.