I respectfully dissent.
The statute by which the land was conveyed to the City requires that the property, or the proceeds of its sale, be used for the sole purpose of building a system of alternate streets to take the place of the Embarcadero Freeway that collapsed during the earthquake. The City maintains that it has complied with both the spirit and the letter of the statute. The majority agrees. I do not. The City maintains, and the trial court impliedly found, that neither the property nor the sales proceeds therefrom are needed for the project for which the property was conveyed nor to repay the $5.6 million loan incurred by the City to complete it. For purposes of this appeal appellant concedes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion as a fact finder.1 In making this concession, appellant has pared the issue down to this single question: Is the City free to use or cause the property to be used for housing? I believe the answer to that question is it may not do so without legislative approval.
The City has structured a long-term lease to a private commercial developer that it maintains is the “sale” referred to in section 72. If so, it is a “sale” *10for approximately five percent of the value of the property. It follows that the City is making a gift of the other 95 percent of the value. The majority concludes that because the project contemplated by the statutory grant has been completed, there is no reason to “read into” section 72 a fair market value requirement. In effect, the majority reads into the section the right of the City to make a gift of the land to a developer for a purpose which, praiseworthy or not, is stunningly different from that purpose for which the land was conveyed to the City.
More than 90 years ago a California court stated the rule followed throughout the country that “where a grant [of real property] is made for a specified, limited, and definite purpose, the subject of the grant cannot be used for another and a different purpose.” (Mulvey v. Wangenheim (1913) 23 Cal.App. 268, 271 [137 P. 1106]; accord, Marshall v. Standard Oil Co. (1936) 17 Cal.App.2d 19, 27 [61 P.2d 520]; see Woman’s Hospital League v. City of Paducah (1920) 188 Ky. 604 [223 S.W. 159, 161-162] and authorities cited). The principle is closely akin to the rule that property dedicated for a specific public use cannot be used for other purposes. (E.g., Wattson v. Eldridge (1929) 207 Cal. 314, 320 [278 P. 236]; Archer v. Salinas City (1892) 93 Cal. 43 [28 P. 839]; Hall v. Fairchild-Gilmore-Wilton Co. (1924) 66 Cal.App. 615 [227 P. 649]; Mulvey v. Wangenheim, supra, at p. 271; 11A McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d rev. ed. 2000) § 33.74, pp. 524-525.) Although not cited by the parties, there is precedent that deals with a situation similar to the one we address here. In 1917 the Legislature granted the City of Venice tidelands within the city’s boundaries to “ ‘be used by said city . . . solely for the establishment, improvement, and conduct of a harbor, and for the construction, maintenance and operation thereon of wharves, docks, piers, slips, quays and other utilities, structures and appliances necessary or convenient for the promotion and accommodation of commerce and navigation . . . provided, that said city, or its successors . . . may lease said lands ... for purposes consistent with ... the requirements of commerce or navigation at such harbor. . . .’ ” (Stone v. City of Los Angeles (1931) 114 Cal.App. 192, 194-195 [299 P. 838].) A dozen years later, after Venice had consolidated with the City of Los Angeles, oil was discovered near the shoreline. The city proposed to lease the tidelands to permit commercial drilling and extraction. A taxpayer successfully sued to enjoin the lease, a conclusion that was affirmed on appeal. The court stated, “In giving to the city of Venice the right to lease this property we do not believe the legislature had in mind or contemplated the leasing of the property for the drilling for and the production of oil . . . nor did it intend that the property be leased for any purposes other than those usually incident to the development of a harbor.” (Id. at p. 203.) The situation here is not appreciably different. The Legislature transferred the property to the City for the sole purpose of facilitating the flow of traffic disrupted by the Loma Prieta earthquake. “[F]or the sole purpose of constructing an alternate system *11of local streets. . . .” the City could either “utilize the Route 480 right-of-way,” or “utilize ... the proceeds from sales of that right-of-way . . . .” (§ 72, subd. (b)(1).) The City has done neither. Instead, the City intends to cause the property to be used in a manner completely unrelated to the problem of vehicular traffic that motivated the Legislature to make the grant. The operative words of section 72 are “sale” and “sole purpose.” These are words of plain meaning, and there is no indication that the Legislature in employing them intended a different meaning. (E.g., Romano v. Rockwell Internat., Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 493 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 20, 926 P.2d 1114]; Stone v. City of Los Angeles, supra, at p. 198.) Indeed, when section 72 was under consideration as Senate Bill No. 181, it was described in the Legislative Counsel’s Digest as follows: “The bill would impose a state-mandated local program by requiring San Francisco to utilize the Route 480 right-of-way, or proceeds from sale of the right-of-way, to construct an alternate system of local streets.” (See Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 181, 4 Stats. 1991 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) Summary Dig., p. 207.)
“In construing a statute, our role is limited to ascertaining the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. (Hunt v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 984, 1000 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 236, 987 P.2d 705]; People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 621 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713].) We look first to the words of the statute because they are the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. (In re J.W. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 200, 209 [126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897, 57 P.3d 363].) If the statutory language on its face answers the question that answer is binding unless we conclude the language is ambiguous or it does not accurately reflect the Legislature’s intent. (People v. Broussard (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1067, 1071-1072 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 278, 856 P.2d 1134]; Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 531, 828 P.2d 672]; see Esberg v. Union Oil Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 262, 268 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 47 P.3d 1069].)” (Palmer v. GTE California, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1265, 1271 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 70 P.3d 1067].) The meaning of the statute was clear enough to the City in 1993, two years after it was enacted. Then, seven different city agencies issued a report addressing the issue raised in this appeal. That report was prepared by the Waterfront Transportation Projects Office and Office of the Chief Administrative Officer in association with the Department of City Planning, Department of Parking and Traffic, Department of Public Works, Department of Real Estate and the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency. The report considered the need for low-cost housing but concluded that “this kind of disposition would clearly conflict with the basic purpose of the land transfer.” (MidEmbarcadero Roadway Replacement Project: Recommendations on Disposition of Broadway Parcels (March 1993) p. 11.) That conclusion was correct and remains so whether or not the City believes that it needs the property for that purpose. The intended use that appellant seeks to enjoin is plainly “another and different purpose” (Mulvey v. *12Wangenheim, supra, 23 Cal.App. 268, 271), and is therefore ultra vires to the Legislature’s grant and to section 72.
In conclusion, because the City has wrongly assumed that the property may be used for any purpose it wishes without the consent of the Legislature, provided only that it is not needed for the one for which it was conveyed, I would reverse.
Appellants’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 9, 2004. Baxter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
There does not appear to be any specific evidence in the record to support the trial court’s implied finding regarding the adequacy of funds to repay the debt from future sales of the other two properties to the police department and the port authority. Nor is it clear to me how transfers of properties from one city agency to another, presumably generating no new money, will enable the debt to be repaid. The point is in any event moot in light of my conclusion that the City has no authority to use the property except in compliance with the express terms of section 72.