I concur in the majority opinion in that Orozco, by his conduct, waived the issue of delay in bringing the matter to trial. However, I write separately to set forth my concerns with respect to the statutory scheme as it relates to recommitment petitions.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 6602 provides “[i]f the judge determines that there is probable cause, the judge . . . shall order that a trial be *181conducted.” (Italics added.)1 Unfortunately, the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVP Act or the Act) (§ 6600 et seq.) does not specify a time frame either for conducting the probable cause hearing on a recommitment petition or for the trial on the recommitment petition. (People v. Superior Court (Ramirez) (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1389 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].) Further, the “procedure for extending an SVP’s commitment has not been widely considered by the courts.” (Cooley v. Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 785, 787 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 724].)
However, certain principles are self-evident. It is the People, as the party bringing the recommitment petition, who have the burden to move the case forward. The trial court, in turn, upon determining “that there is probable cause, . . . shall order that a trial be conducted.” (§ 6602, italics added.)
Here, neither the People, nor the trial court, nor Orozco, acted with alacrity. As a consequence, all that has happened on the two recommitment petitions is that Orozco has had a probable cause hearing on the first recommitment petition. Neither of the two recommitment petitions has been tried, and there has not been even a probable cause hearing on the second recommitment petition. Thus, we are presented with the peculiar situation of Orozco’s remaining in custody after having completed the two-year term of his initial commitment due to the pendency of the two recommitment petitions.
What would have been the first two-year term of recommitment expired on May 13, 2003. Meanwhile, Orozco remains in custody pursuant to a finding of probable cause on the first recommitment petition, awaiting trial on said petition, even though he already has completed what would have been the entire two-year term of that recommitment.
Consequently, the trial court will be in the surreal position of conducting a trial on the first recommitment petition after the expiration of what would have been that term of recommitment. What if the jury ultimately determines at the trial on the first recommitment petition that Orozco was not a sexually violent predator? By that time, said recommitment term already would have expired.
To prevent these peculiar circumstances from recurring, these aspects of the statutory scheme need clarification to impose timetables for conducting the probable cause hearing on a recommitment petition and for the subsequent recommitment trial.
*182To reiterate, the People as well as the trial court have their respective responsibilities herein. It is the People’s burden to prosecute their recommitment petition diligently, and it is the duty of the trial court, upon a finding of probable cause, to order a trial on the recommitment petition. The People and the trial court should not acquiesce in indefinite delay of the proceedings. Irrespective of a defendant’s reluctance to proceed to trial on a recommitment petition, the People and the trial court have an obligation to ensure that there is a timely determination of probable cause on a recommitment petition, followed by a timely trial thereon.
A petition for a rehearing was denied April 28, 2004, and petitioner’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 30, 2004. Kennard, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise indicated.