While I concur in the result, I respectfully disagree with the reasoning of the majority. My conclusion is that the specific statutory proscription of Education Code section 489071 against prior restraint applies to student journalistic endeavors and not to a movie prepared by students as part of or in conjunction with school curriculum.
The decision by the board of trustees (Board) found:
“The authoring, editing, and videotaping of a video project is plainly analogous to the selection, rehearsal, and performance of a school play, which has been likened by the [federal] courts to the selection and use of curriculum, and when such a video is produced as part of a classroom activity, as here, this Board finds that such a video constitutes curriculum or ‘instructional material,’ notwithstanding student authorship.
“Even if the video is construed to be an ‘official school publication’ subject to Education Code § 48907, this Board concludes that the Board has the authority to determine, within the confines of Education Code § 48907, whether profanity is educationally suitable in a classroom project such as the one at issue. . . .”
On the motion for summary judgment, the Board stated: “Melancholianne is a ‘school-sponsored,’ student-authored video.”
*1331The student-Plaintiffs stated: “For purposes of this motion, this Court may assume the video Melancholianne is an official school publication.” In its order granting summary judgment for the Board, the court stated: “The Separate Statements were compared and plaintiffs’ [students] proposition that, for purposes of this motion, the film was produced as part of the film arts class was accepted.”
The briefs of the parties are plainly distinct in their positions. Appellants contend that section 48907 gives them the right to show “Melancholianne” whether or not the film is an official publication. Respondents contend that section 48907 does not give students the right to distribute “Melancholianne” regardless of whether it is an official school publication.
I conclude section 48907 applies to the general speech rights of students but the film is not an “official school publication.”2 Therefore, the restriction against prior restraint of “official school publications” does not apply. For this reason I do not concur that the analysis of the majority based on journalistic standards applies since that analysis assumes this is an “official school publication.” However, I do not find that the free speech assurance of section 48907 precludes the school action taken here because this is a curriculum decision—not a restraint on free speech generally.
In other words, there are different rules depending on the context of the speech. For example, there is speech outside of school curriculum—the general speech rights of students on campus that do not involve the school or lend the imprimatur of the school to the speech. There is a statutory provision for speech in “official school publications.” And, there is speech in the context of curriculum. I maintain that section 48907 does not address speech in the context of curriculum. Apparently, the majority’s position is that student speech outside the context of “official school publication” is not subject to any form of restraint even in the context of curriculum. I respectfully cannot agree, particularly when the speech, because of the manner of dissemination, bears the imprimatur of the school. In my view, section 48907 pertains to free speech outside the context of curriculum and to *1332official school publications. The majority decision reaches far beyond a film. It may well bear on any efforts by schools to decide what they teach and how it will be taught, what may be performed at school functions and how it will be performed. Thus, I do not view respondents’ action here as prior restraint in the context of general student expression encompassed by section 48907.
“Melancholianne” Is Not an “Official School Publication" Within the Meaning of Section 48907
Regarding statutes, our goal is to apply the statute as closely to legislative intent as possible. In determining legislative intent, statutes are generally analyzed using a three-step process:
(1) The language is given its plain, ordinary meaning. If the meaning is without ambiguity or uncertainty, the language controls, and no further interpretation is needed. (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299].)
(2) If the meaning is not clear, the legislative history of the statute and the historical circumstances of its enactment are used to ascertain legislative intent. (Iverson v. Muroc Unified School Dist. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 218, 223 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 35]; Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1112, 1127 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 231, 864 P.2d 502].)
(3) If the first two steps fail to reveal clear meaning, we apply reason, practicality and common sense to the language. (Lampley v. Alvares (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 124, 128-129 [123 Cal.Rptr. 181].)
Plain, Ordinary Meaning
Section 48907 states: “ ‘Official school publications’ refers to material produced by students in the journalism, newspaper, yearbook, or writing classes . . . .” (Italics added.) The terms used in the statute clearly refer to written materials only.
Where the meaning of the language is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be applied literally. “Melancholianne” is a video production; thus, it falls outside of the statute’s definition of “official school publications.”
Legislative History
If there is question regarding the clear meaning of the language, further analysis is necessary. Here, the legislative history of section 48907 reveals the same result as above.
*1333Prior to section 48907, the law regarding students’ freedom of expression was embodied in section 10611. Section 10611 read: “ ‘Students of the public schools have the right to exercise free expression including, but not limited to, the use of bulletin boards, the distribution of printed materials or petitions, and the wearing of buttons, badges, and other insignia, except that expression which is obscene, libelous, or slanderous according to current legal standards ....’” (Bright v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 450, 452, fn. 1 [134 Cal.Rptr. 639, 556 P.2d 1090].)
No specific reference was made to official student newspapers, which quickly led to controversy. In response, the California Legislative Counsel (Counsel) issued an opinion in 1974 concluding that section 10611 protected student expression in official student newspapers. This opinion is embodied in section 48907.
The only difference between sections 10611 and 48907 is the inclusion of material concerning “official school publications.” Although the inclusion was the direct result of controversy over school newspapers, the Legislature chose to include not only newspapers, but also material produced in journalism, yearbook or writing classes. Clearly, other communicative devices were considered however, the Legislature chose only to include the written word.
Further evidence that only the written word was intended to be included in section 48907’s definition of official publication can be found throughout other California statutes. Where the Legislature intended to include multiple media devices, the devices are individually named.
For example, Penal Code section 311, regarding “obscene matter,” states: “ ‘Matter’ means any book, magazine, newspaper or other printed or written material or any picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture, or other pictorial representation or any statute or other figure, or any recording, transcription or mechanical, chemical or electrical reproduction or any other articles, equipment, machines or materials.” (Pen. Code, §311, subd. (b), italics added.) In addition, Business and Professions Code section 651, regarding healing arts, states: “Dissemination of false . . . information . . . by . . . television, radio, motion picture, newspaper, book . . . .” (Italics added.)
Analysis of the above statutes reveals that the Legislature clearly distinguishes written materials from motion picture material.
The jobs of the courts and the Legislature are separate. If audio-visual media, such as videos, are to be protected by section 48907 as official school publications, it is the job of the Legislature to amend the statute and make *1334this intent clear. As such, we are bound by the existing language of the statute, and should conclude that “Melancholianne,” a video, is unprotected by the proscription on prior restraint imposed by section 48907.3
Since I maintain “Melancholianne" is not an “official school publication” as that term is used in the statute, the issue becomes whether section 48907 places any restrictions upon the school administration regarding speech which is not an “official school publication.” Section 48907 does make reference to the free speech rights of students without specific reference to medium. “Students of the public schools shall have the right to exercise freedom of speech and of the press including, but not limited to, the use of bulletin boards, the distribution of printed materials or petitions, the wearing of buttons, badges, and other insignia . . . .” Thus, the statute by its terms acknowledge that students have the right to exercise freedom of speech. Further, there is no question that the Legislature can grant greater rights to its citizens than are provided in the Constitutions of California or of the United States, so long as those rights do not otherwise conflict with constitutional provisions. The question becomes, did the Legislature intend by the general statement just set forth to give greater rights than those constitutionally required? Realistically, section 48907 would be unnecessary if students had the same free speech rights as adults. I suggest that the analysis of this issue lies within the interpretation and history of section 10611 which was the precursor to section 48907 and a reaction to Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist. (1968) 393 U.S. 503 [21 L.Ed.2d 731, 89 S.Ct. 733].
As noted in the majority opinion, the evolution of section 10611 was a response to two federal district court decisions referred to as Rowe I and Rowe II, which interpreted the predecessor sections to 10611, sections 9012 and 9013.
“In Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., [ supra,] the United States Supreme Court, in a landmark decision, gave emphatic recognition to the exercise by students of the right of freedom of speech within a public school environment. ‘First Amendment rights, applied in the light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.’ [Citation.] However, these rights of students must be balanced against the *1335rights—indeed the obligations—of school authorities to administer the school and discipline the students. Thus the high court continued: ‘On the other hand, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.’ [Citation.] Tinker then resolved the conflict between these competing rights, declaring that the student may exercise his right to freedom of expression unless the ‘conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others . . . .’ [Citation.] Any regulation prohibiting student expression ‘would violate the constitutional rights of students, at least if it could not be justified by a showing that the students’ activities would materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.’ [Citation.]
“In Rowe I the court struck down sections 9012 and 9013 as void for vagueness and unconstitutionally overbroad and thus restrictive of the First Amendment rights of public school students upheld in Tinker. The Rowe court retained continuing jurisdiction over the matter and opined that ‘a system of prior review may be constitutionally permissible in the secondary school setting.’ The school district involved in Rowe responded to this invitation with alacrity and proposed a set of prior restraint censorship rules for the court’s approval. In its second unreported opinion, filed on February 4,1971 (Rowe II), the court rejected the proposed system of prior restraint as ‘too encompassing and potentially devastating to withstand constitutional scrutiny.’ The court went on to say: ‘It may be that no system of prior restraint in the area of student publications can be devised which imposes a restraint sufficiently short-lived and procedurally protected to be constitutional. What may well be best—although perhaps not constitutionally compelled—is a simple prohibition against the distribution of certain categories of material. This could be coupled with the prior submission of the material to school authorities for informational purposes only, and with reasonable time, place and manner regulations. This straightforward system would allow the unfettered distribution of student publications except in those instances where the content of the material is outside the protections of the First Amendment. In such an instance, the school authorities could prevent distribution by prior court order.’ (Italics added.) The court concluded by inviting the State Board of Education to promulgate statewide guidelines in this area.” (Bright v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., supra, 18 Cal.3d 450, 455-456, 459-460.)
*1336Analyzing the evolution of section 10611 in light of Rowe I and Rowe II, as well as Tinker, our Supreme Court concluded: “Apparently in response to the Rowe decision, the California Legislature in 1971 repealed sections 9012 and 9013 which had banned certain publications from school campuses . . . and enacted section 10611. Undoubtedly aware of Tinker’s strong endorsement of the exercise by public school students of their rights to freedom of speech and expression on the school campus, the Legislature itself proclaimed such rights for California students in section 10611. This right of expression, oral and written, is subject to reasonable time, place and manner regulations but does not extend to certain prohibited expression, namely that ‘which is obscene, libelous or slanderous according to current legal standards, or which so incites students as to create a clear and present danger of the commission of unlawful acts on school premises or the violation of lawful school regulations or the substantial disruption of the orderly operation of the school . . . .’ ” (Bright v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 458, italics added.)
Therefore, I conclude that our Supreme Court recognized that the Legislature intended to ensure to students the same freedoms that were defined by Tinker. They did this by statute in section 10611. However, I find no basis to conclude that they intended any greater rights than Tinker had interpreted under the United States Constitution.
As noted in the majority opinion, however, “Bright invalidated the school’s prior restraint system because section 10611 did not authorize prior restraints. However, the court indicated its decision did not preclude the Legislature from establishing a system of prior restraint in a school environment.”
Because of this, section 10611 was specifically amended to address prior restraint in “official school publications.” Of course, assuming Tinker precluded the type of prior restraint addressed by section 48907, then amending section 10611 was unnecessary. However, it is reasonably clear the Supreme Court did not conclude the Legislature was constitutionally precluded from permitting such prior restraint.
“For the foregoing reasons, we hold that section 10611 does not authorize school districts to establish systems of prior restraint in respect to the distribution of the prohibited categories of expression delineated in the statute. We do not say that the Legislature could not constitutionally establish such a system in the public school environment. We say only that it has not done so.” (Bright v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. *1337464.) Thus, section 48907 specifically addressed “official school publications” and placed specific limits on the extent of prior restraint that could be imposed on such publications. Accordingly, I conclude that aside from “official school publications,” there is no basis to find that section 48907 confers any greater free speech rights upon students than provided under the Constitution of the United States or of California. In my view, therefore, “Melancholianne” is subject to the strictures that may be placed on student speech dependent on the context—free speech generally or involving curriculum. Likewise, I find no basis to conclude Bright addressed curriculum issues as opposed to speech that falls outside of curriculum considerations. I further conclude section 48907 does not pertain to curriculum except to the extent “official school publication” may be so defined. Therefore, I maintain section 48907 does not preclude the restriction imposed here.
Editorial Review of “Melancholianne” Is Not a Violation of Students’ Constitutional Rights
School officials have the difficult task of maintaining order and discipline in the school setting, while being careful not to infringe upon students’ constitutional rights. Among the most important rights imparted to adults and students alike is freedom of expression, guaranteed by the First Amendment. However, “the constitutional rights of students in the public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults.” (Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser (1986) 478 U.S. 675, 682 [92 L.Ed.2d 549, 558,106 S.Ct. 3159].) The school setting, combined with the relative immaturity of high-school students, produces a special need for scrutiny of student expression.
“[I]t must be recognized that a student may be subject to far more stringent regulations than an adult outside a school environment due to his immaturity and status as a student in a school environment where disciplinary and health problems and considerations relating to safety of minors take on special significance. ‘. . . where there is an invasion of protected freedoms “the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults. . . .” ’ [Citation.]” (Montalvo v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Education (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 323, 330 [98 Cal.Rptr. 593].)
The School as a Public Forum
The Supreme Court has long held that “students and teachers do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate.” {Tinker v. Des *1338Moines School Dist., supra, 393 U.S. at p. 506 [21 L.Ed.2d at p. 737].) “In places which by long tradition or government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the State to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.” (Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn. (1983) 460 U.S. 37, 45 [74 L.Ed.2d 794, 804, 103 S.Ct. 948].)
“ ‘[T]he [Supreme] Court has adopted a forum analysis as a means of determining when the Government’s interest in limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property for other purposes. Accordingly, the extent to which the Government can control access depends on the nature of the relevant forum.’ ” (Clark v. Burleigh (1992) 4 Cal.4th 474, 482 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 455, 841 P.2d 975], citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund (1985) 473 U.S. 788, 799-800 [87 L.Ed.2d 567, 579, 105 S.Ct. 3439].)
The students argue that by showing “Melancholianne” to the public as part of a competition, their activities constituted protected speech under the “public forum” theory. However, the Supreme Court has recognized that “ ‘[e]ven protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times. Nothing in the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of Government property without regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by the speaker’s activities. . . . The extent to which the Government can control access depends on the nature of the relevant forum.’ ” (Clark v. Burleigh, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 482, quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, supra, 473 U.S. at pp. 799-800 [87 L.Ed.2d at p. 578].)
“Public property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication is governed by different standards.” (Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., supra, 460 U.S. at p. 46 [74 L.Ed.2d at p. 805].)
For purposes of forum analysis, the Supreme Court has divided all public property into three categories: (1) traditional public forum, (2) designated public forum, and (3) all remaining public property.
A. “Traditional Public Forum”
A traditional public forum is “a place that by long tradition has been used by the public at large for the free exchange of ideas.” (Clark v. Burleigh, *1339supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 482.) “[P]ublic streets and parks may be the only places that the high court has yet recognized as ‘traditional public forums.’ ” (Ibid., citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989) 491 U.S. 781, 790-791 [105 L.Ed.2d 661, 674-675, 109 S.Ct. 2746].)
“Melancholianne” was neither produced nor exhibited in the public streets or parks; therefore, it does not constitute a “traditional public forum.”
B. “Designated Public Forum”
A designated public forum, or “limited public forum” is “ ‘property that the state has opened for expressive activity by part or all of the public.’ ” (Clark v. Burleigh, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 483, citing Intern. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee (1992) 505 U.S. 672,_[120 L.Ed.2d 541, 550, 112 S.Ct. 2701, 2705].) “[T]here are few examples of designated public forums in Supreme Court jurisprudence because the court has rarely—and not at all in the past decade—placed any property in this category.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
C. “Remaining Public Property”
All remaining public property is frequently referred to as the “nonpublic forum.” “[A] ‘nonpublic forum’ is simply public property that is not a public forum by tradition or design.” (Clark v. Burleigh, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 483, fn. 9.)
“ ‘Limitations on expressive activity conducted in this last category of property must survive only a much more limited review. The challenged regulation need only be reasonable, as long as the regulation is not an effort to suppress the speaker’s activity due to disagreement with the speaker’s view.’ ” (4 Cal.4th at p. 483, citing Intern. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, supra, 505 U.S. at p. _ [120 L.Ed.2d at p. 550, 112 S.Ct. at pp. 2705-2706].)
Therefore, I conclude that the rights of the students here rest on a nonpublic forum analysis. In essence, I contend a high school such as this is not a public forum. While section 48907 may give free speech rights, it does so only in the relevant context. In other words, section 48907 confers no greater rights than are provided in the nonpublic forum analysis. In that context, it is long recognized that schools may enforce curriculum standards that preclude certain types of activity. Further, such restrictions do not constitute violations of the First Amendment. The distinction is between *1340speech that is outside of the school curriculum and speech within school curriculum. While section 48907 may address “noncurriculum” speech, it does not in any way address traditional curriculum decisions, at least insofar as those decisions do not involve “official school publications.”
Production of “Melancholianne” Was Part of the School’s Curriculum
Curriculum is defined as “all planned school activities including besides courses of study organized play, athletics, dramatics, club and home-room program.” (See Webster’s New Internat. Dict. (3d ed. 1981) p. 557.)
California has progressed one step further by defining curriculum within the Education Code. Section 51013 states “‘curriculum’ means the courses of study, courses, subjects, classes and organized group activities provided by a school.” Section 51016 further states that “ ‘class’ means an organized group of pupils within a school who are pursuing a particular course, subject or activity.”
The students (appellants) produced “Melancholianne” in conjunction with their school’s “Film Arts Class.” The students worked together to pursue a particular activity; therefore, as defined above, the student’s activities would constitute curriculum.
“[Ejducators’ authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school . . . may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences. [‘JO Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this . . . form of student expression to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school. Hence, a school may in its capacity as publisher of a school newspaper or producer of a school play ‘disassociate itself,’ [citation], not only from speech that would ‘substantially interfere with [its] work ... or impinge upon the rights of other students,’ [citation], but also from speech that is, for example, ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences.” (Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier *1341(1988) 484 U.S. 260, 271 [98 L.Ed.2d 592, 605, 108 S.Ct. 562], fns. omitted.)
“A school must be able to set high standards for the student speech that is disseminated under its auspices . . . and may refuse to disseminate student speech that does not meet those standards.” (484 U.S. at pp. 271-272 [98 L.Ed.2d at pp. 606-607].)
Leeb v. DeLong (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 47 [243 Cal.Rptr. 494] notes that section 48907 gives students greater editorial control over official school publications than students would otherwise have under Hazelwood, As the court stated in Leeb: “If Kuhlmeier were specifically applicable in California, little more would have to be said. But it is not. Section 48907 of the Education Code and California decisional authority clearly confer editorial control of official student publications on the student editors alone, with very limited exceptions.” (198 Cal.App.3d at p. 54, fn. omitted.)
Again, the distinction is drawn between curriculum and other contexts for speech. While I acknowledge that “official school publication” may in some instances overlap with curriculum, I find no basis to conclude that all other curriculum, or speech within the context of that other curriculum, enjoys the freedom statutorily conferred on student free speech generally.
Clearly, a school district and school officials must have some authority over materials and activities that bear the imprimatur of the school. Certainly, the district and officials will be held accountable for the programs and principles they espouse and teach.
The School Board Has the Right to Exercise Broad Discretion Over Curriculum
School officials are not powerless with regard to the expression of ideas by students. Given the special setting of the school, the Supreme Court has granted such officials broad discretion over its own affairs.
“[S]chool boards have broad discretion in the management of school affairs. . . . [B]y and large, ‘public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities,’ and . . . federal courts should not *1342ordinarily ‘intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems.’ . . . [W]e have ‘repeatedly emphasized . . . the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials ... to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.’ ” (Board of Education v. Pico (1982) 457 U.S. 853, 863-864 [73 L.Ed.2d 435, 444-445, 102 S.Ct. 2799].)
“[T]he education of the Nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal judges. [Citations.] It is only when the decision to censor a school-sponsored publication, theatrical production, or other vehicle of student expression has no valid educational purpose that. . . judicial intervention [is required] to protect students’ [free speech] rights.” (Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, supra, 484 U.S. at p. 273 [98 L.Ed.2d at pp. 606-607].)
This court has also recognized that school officials are allowed to regulate student speech in specific contexts.
“ ‘[E]ducators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. . . . [S]uch school-sponsored expressive activities [are characterized] as part of the school curriculum ‘so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants .... [E]ducators are entitled to exercise greater control over such activities to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach’ and that ‘readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity.’ ” (McCarthy v. Fletcher (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 130, 145 [254 Cal.Rptr. 714], citing Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, supra, 484 U.S. 260, italics added.)
Thus, as long as a restriction has a legitimate pedagogical concern, school officials may regulate speech in the curriculum context which they consider “inappropriate” given the school setting and maturity level of the students.
Here, appellants demand the use of school facilities without restraint by those held accountable. It is one thing to allow students the right to express themselves. It is quite another to require the school to indirectly endorse the manner in which it is done. All that is involved here is the question of whether the school authorities have the power over their curriculum and their film-making facilities to impose limitations upon their use. I conclude *1343all they must show is a legitimate pedagogical concern. There is no prior restraint exercised here in the constitutional context. There is no right in the first instance for appellants to bend the school curriculum into an unrestricted forum. To say that Bright allows speech without restraint in the curriculum context would deprive the school of any effective authority and would turn curriculum into a public forum. Furthermore, to state that Bright prohibits all restraint on material beyond “official school publications,” including curriculum, would undermine the authority given to school officials acknowledged in McCarthy.
Pedagogical Purpose
As noted, school curriculum choices must be related to reasonable pedagogical concerns.
“The universe of legitimate pedagogical concerns is by no means confined to the academic; as the Supreme Court put it in Fraser, ‘schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order.’ 478 U.S. at 638, 106 S.Ct. at 3165. Sometimes, of course, these ‘shared values’ come in conflict with one another; independence of thought and frankness of expression occupy a high place on our scale of values, or ought to, but so too do discipline, courtesy, and respect for authority. Judgments on how best to balance such values may well vary from school to school. Television has not yet so thoroughly homogenized us that conduct deemed unexceptionable in New York City, for example, will necessarily be considered acceptable in rural Tennessee.
“Local school officials, better attuned than we to the concerns of the parents/taxpayers who employ them, must obviously be accorded wide latitude in choosing which pedagogical values to emphasize, and in choosing the means through which those values are to be promoted. We may disagree with the choices, but unless they are beyond the constitutional pale we have no warrant to interfere with them. Local control over the public school, after all, is one of this nation’s most deeply rooted and cherished traditions. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42, 94 S.Ct. 3112, 3125-26; 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1974).” (Poling v. Murphy (6th Cir. 1989) 872 F.2d 757, 762, cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1021 [107 L.Ed.2d 742, 110 S. Ct. 723].)
Along with the broad discretion over curriculum afforded school officials, the California Legislature created a statute directly related to appropriate expression within the confines of the school setting. Section 44806, entitled *1344“duty concerning instruction of pupils concerning morals, manners, and citizenship,” states:
“Each teacher shall endeavor to impress upon the minds of the pupils the principles of morality, truth, justice, patriotism, and a true comprehension of the rights, duties, and dignity of American citizenship, including kindness toward domestic pets and the humane treatment of living creatures, to teach them to avoid idleness, profanity, and falsehood, and to instruct them in manners and morals and the principles of a free government.”
“A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mission.’ ” (Hazelwood, School District v. Kuhlmeier, supra, (1988) 484 U.S. at p. 266 [98 L.Ed.2d at p. 602].)
Certain language was used throughout “Melancholianne” to “make its point.” While the intent of the students was proper and even laudable, the school administration acted well within its authority in concluding that some of the methods used were not.
“[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, [and] the libelous .... It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) 315 U.S. 568, 571-572 [86 L.Ed. 1031, 1035, 62 S.Ct. 766], fns. omitted, italics added.) Some language has long been categorized as profane by virtue of its lewd and socially inappropriate character. Conduct is also regarded as obscene under some circumstances. Words can describe conduct and be obscene in the constitutional sense. However, words can themselves have lewd and indecent connotations and be “obscene” in the colloquial sense, or profane but not “obscene” in the constitutional sense. I would support this argument by initial reference to Bethel School, supra.
“We have also recognized an interest in protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), we dealt with the power of the Federal Communications Commission to regulate a radio broadcast described as ‘indecent but *1345not obscene.’ There the Court reviewed an administrative condemnation of the radio broadcast of a self-styled ‘humorist’ who described his own performance as being in ‘the words you couldn’t say on the public, ah, airwaves, um, the ones you definitely wouldn’t say ever.’ Id.., at 729; see also id., at 751-755 (Appendix to opinion of the Court). The Commission concluded that ‘certain words depicted sexual and excretory activities in a patently offensive manner, [and] noted that they “were broadcast at a time when children were undoubtedly in the audience.” ’ The Commission issued an order declaring that the radio station was guilty of broadcasting indecent language in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464. 438 U.S., at 732. The Court of Appeals set aside the Commission’s determination, and we reversed, reinstating the Commission’s citation of the station. We concluded that the broadcast was properly considered ‘obscene, indecent, or profane’ within the meaning of the statute. The plurality opinion went on to reject the radio station’s assertion of a First Amendment right to broadcast vulgarity:
“ ‘These words offend for the same reasons that obscenity offends. Their place in the hierarchy of First Amendment values was aptly sketched by Mr. Justice Murphy when he said: “[S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as to step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S., at 572.’ Id., at 746.” (Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser (1986) 478 U.S. 675, 684-685 [92 L.Ed.2d 549, 559-560, 106 S.Ct. 3159].)
In Bethel, the United States Supreme Court approved punishment of a student for using sexual innuendoes during a student speech. The court stated that “it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.” (478 U.S. at p. 683 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 558].)
I do not see any distinction between the language used in “Melancholianne” and its construction as lewd, profane, vulgar and indecent. Apparently, neither does the United States Supreme Court. Further, the words used in the context of the speech here clearly are subject to constitutional restraint unless it may be concluded the Legislature intended freedoms beyond those provided by the Constitution. I see no basis to find such largess. I do not believe anyone could reasonably argue that any of these words could be used without consequence in a classroom or a school function, or directed to a teacher, administrator or other student. The students’ intent to convey the importance of avoiding teen pregnancy is admirable. However, the language used here is neither necessary nor appropriate. Allowing use of such words *1346does not promote morality or advance the basic educational mission. They are, in my view, without constitutional or statutory protection in the context before us.
The situation before us raises no risk of “freewheeling censorship.” “Melancholianne,” a production as part of the school curriculum, was made by Valley High School students to impress upon their peers the hardships of teenage parenthood. School officials were provided a script of “Melancholianne” before the video was produced, and therefore knew exactly the content and language to be used. Specific words constituting inappropriate expression were included in the script, and only those words were sought to be excluded.
In addition, there was no effort to chill the idea to be conveyed by “Melancholianne.” School officials attempted to prohibit conveyance of inappropriate expression to other students and the public. The idea of preventing teen pregnancies was never an issue under attack by school officials.
The implications of appellants’ argument are far-reaching. If the school cannot exercise curriculum control over editing “Melancholianne” to remove words of inappropriate expression, then a school could not bar a T-shirt bearing the same expression from being worn during a school play.
As I have argued, the risk of censorship is that it will inhibit the exposition of ideas. Where it cannot be judged with certainty that specific words may be used to convey an idea as opposed to the general expression of an idea, we are loathe to prohibit the expression of the idea at the risk of hearing offensive words. However, this is simply not the case before us. We do not have a student expressing his or her opinion in the student commons and using inappropriate speech. It would be highly suspect if not patently improper to bar the speech because of fear of the words. The fear may prove groundless and the words, though offensive, may be judged and punished in retrospect with certainty in their utterance. Here, the authorities knew exactly what the words were. They were not only scripted, they were filmed. If such words can be prohibited at all and punished for the utterance, they can be barred when their exposition is certain. In my view, an entirely justifiable curriculum decision was made.
Here, the school authorities tolerated the idea conveyed. They were not, however, required to condone these words by the implied action of allowing distribution of a film.
*1347 Conclusion
Although high school students are guaranteed freedom of expression through the First Amendment, this right is not absolute. School officials have a more extensive right to control expression in the school setting given the students’ age and level of maturity, and the school officials’ desire to teach morality as part of the educational mission. The use of profane or obscene and vulgar language is not an essential part of any exposition of ideas. As such, use of this language under the auspices of the school is subject to appropriate restriction within the context of any other curriculum decision. These authorities simply determined that they would not allow their facilities to produce a film that placed the school’s imprimatur upon words directly inconsistent with the school’s educational mission. I find no fault in this and I see no great constitutional struggle. Allowing the conduct here exposes the school to the entirely justifiable charge that they are endorsing inappropriate language. It is the school’s statutory obligation to deter this conduct, not make a movie utilizing this conduct. With all due respect to my colleagues, Bright simply cannot be reasonably interpreted as equating student speech generally with student speech in the context of curriculum.
On June 8, 1995, the opinion was modified to read as printed above.
All statutory references are to the Education Code unless otherwise indicated.
The majority opinion acknowledges that “the parties have not raised or briefed the issue of whether the video is an official school publication” and adds that “we see no need to decide it.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1320, fn. 4.) The majority then relies upon the third paragraph of section 48907 to conclude that respondents can restrain the showing of “Melancholianne” because respondents can, in the words of the statute, “maintain professional standards of English and journalism.” The third paragraph of the statute appears to expressly apply only to “official school publications.” It also authorizes a “journalism adviser or advisers” to maintain those standards. In this case it is not disputed that the film arts class instructor, Mr. Moberg, was of the view that “the sparse use of profanity in the script was appropriate and good.” It was higher school authorities (respondents) who deemed some of the language used to be inappropriate. It appears to me that the majority opinion in actuality rests upon an assumption that “Melancholianne” is an “official school publication.” With this assumption I do not agree.
The Board actually ordered the disputed language to be deleted from a written script of the video. Although this may seem to place the issue within the realm of the written word (protected to a limited degree by § 48970), it is important to note that the script itself was never intended to be released in any way to the public. The script was merely a precursor to the video.