*777Opinion
HALLER, J.In this case, we are asked to interpret the word “blade” as used in Penal Code1 section 626.10, subdivision (a), which outlaws the possession of various knives and other weapons on school campuses. Specifically, for purposes of this case, the statute outlaws possession on a school campus of a “knife having a blade longer than 2 1/2 inches.” (§ 626.10, subd. (a).)
Factual and Procedural Background
On April 18,1994, Rosalio was a student at Poway High School. A friend of his threatened another student with a knife, which was part of a leather-man’s tool. Rosalie’s friend gave him the leatherman’s tool. The assistant principal of the school called Rosalio to the office after he learned that Rosalio had the leatherman’s tool. Rosalio took the leatherman’s tool from his backpack and handed it to the assistant principal. Rosalio was arrested for violation of section 626.10, subdivision (a).
On May 25, 1994, the district attorney’s office filed a petition in juvenile court alleging Rosalio came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 by virtue of his unlawful possession of a butterfly knife on a public school campus in violation of section 626.10, subdivision (a). The petition was subsequently amended to strike the word “butterfly.”
At trial on June 24, 1994, the leatherman’s tool was received into evidence.2 When the court measured the knife part of the device, the court found the sharpened portion of the knife was two and one-half inches long. However, the court also measured the entire length of the knife—that is, “the metal piece that is exposed from the base of the knife to the tip of the knife”—and found this length to be two and five-eighths inches long. This latter measurement thus included an unsharpened area, which is part of the same piece of metal that makes up the sharpened portion and which is exposed when the knife is in an unfolded position.
After taking the matter under submission, the court rendered its decision on July 1, 1994, finding the “blade” of a knife for purposes of section 626.10, subdivision (a), is the “metal portion that extends from the handle *778when opened.” Using this interpretation of “blade,” the court made a true finding that Rosalio was in violation of the statute—having had in his possession a knife with a blade longer than two and one-half inches—and sustained the petition.
At the disposition hearing on August 5, 1994, the court granted probation on specified terms and conditions, including drug testing.
Rosalio filed a timely appeal, contesting the juvenile court’s order declaring him a delinquent minor (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602).
Discussion
This case boils down to one question: did the juvenile court use the wrong blade measurement in determining Rosalio had possession of a knife with a blade longer than two and one-half inches in violation of section 626.10, subdivision (á)? In other words, at issue is the meaning of “blade” in the context of the statute.
Section 626.10, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part: “Any person, except a duly appointed peace officer . . . who brings or possesses any dirk, dagger, ice pick, knife having a blade longer than 2 1/2 inches, folding knife with a blade that locks into place, a razor with an unguarded blade, a taser, or a stun gun, . . . any instrument that expels a metallic projectile such as a BB or a pellet, through the force of air pressure, CO² pressure, or spring action, or any spot marker gun, upon the grounds of, or within, any public or private school providing instruction in kindergarten or any of grades 1 to 12, inclusive, is guilty of a public offense, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison.”
As we articulated in People v. Lopez (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 897, 901-902 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 649], the fundamental rules of statutory construction are well settled: “In construing a statute, the task of the court is to determine and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. [Citations.] The court begins with the language used. [Citation.] The court attempts to give effect to the usual, ordinary import of the language and to avoid making any language mere surplusage. [Citations.] ‘The words must be construed in context in light of the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear. . . .’ [Citation.] The statute ‘must be given a reasonable and commonsense interpretation consistent with the apparent purpose and intention of the Legislature, practical rather than technical in nature, and which, when applied, will result in wise policy rather than mischief or absurdity. . . .’ [Citation.]”
We begin with the words of the statute. The statute states it is illegal to bring or possess on a school campus “any . . . knife having a blade longer *779than 2 1/2 inches . . . (§ 626.10, subd. (a).) Therefore, the measurement of the blade establishes criminality under this provision. The issue thus turns on the definition of blade. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1968) page 229 includes the following definition of blade: “the cutting part of an instrument.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1981) page 138 defines blade as “[t]he flat-edged cutting part of a sharpened tool or weapon.” If one were to rely on the dictionary definition of “blade” for the common, ordinary meaning of the word, then it would appear that the blade of Rosalio’s knife consisted solely of the sharpened part since that is the only portion that is used to cut objects.
The Attorney General argues, however, that since “knife” is commonly defined as a tool consisting of a blade and a handle (see, e.g., American Heritage Dict, of the English Language, op. cit. supra, at p. 724), “blade” as used in section 626.10, subdivision (a), is not restricted to the sharpened portion but rather “anything that is not handle is blade.”
Assuming that “blade,” as used in the statute, is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations, we properly move beyond the statutory language to use of extrinsic aids to determine legislative intent. (People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1008 [239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154].) These extrinsic aids can include “the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, . . . and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.” (Ibid.)
As we shall explain, post, the most probative of these extrinsic aids in this instance is the statutory scheme.
The “ostensible objects to be achieved” by section 626.10, subdivision (a), obviously are to reduce violence and increase public protection on school campuses. Likewise, it is readily apparent that the “evil[] to be remedied” by the statute is the proliferation of weapons on school campuses. These purposes also can be gleaned from the legislative history.
As originally enacted, section 626.10, subdivision (a), outlawed the possession on public school grounds of “any dirk, dagger, knife having a blade longer than 3 1/2 inches, folding knife with a blade that locks into place, or razor with an unguarded blade . . . .” (Stats. 1974, ch. 103, § 1, p. 218.) The legislation, which was passed as an urgency measure so that it could be implemented at the start of the next school year, referred to “widespread violence and use of knives, razors, and similar devices” on public school grounds in explaining why it was necessary for the statute to go into effect immediately. (Stats. 1974, ch. 103, § 4, p. 219.) From this language, it is *780clear the Legislature intended the measure to reduce violence and provide increased protection to people on public school campuses.
The statute was amended eight times, most recently in 1993, when the Legislature, among other things, expanded the list of prohibited knife-like objects to include ice picks, and knives with blades longer than two and one-half inches rather than three and one-half inches. (Stats. 1993, ch. 598, § 4.) According to the Staff Analysis of Senate Bill No. 292 prepared for the Assembly Committee on Public Safety, the list of prohibited knife-like objects was expanded because of reports of a rise in the number of ice picks and knife-like weapons being brought on school campuses that could not be prosecuted under the then-current law-. (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 292 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) July 6, 1993, p. 5.)
The legislative history, however, does not provide much insight into the meaning of the word “blade,” as used in the statute. But an examination of other parts of section 626.10 is instructive and supports Rosalio’s position that a “blade” consists only of the sharpened portion. “A statute must be construed ‘in the context of the entire statutory system of which it is a part, in order to achieve harmony among the parts.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Woodhead, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1009.)
The Attorney General, in advocating its broader definition, argues that all of the metal portion of a knife would penetrate a victim if the knife were used as a stabbing weapon. Therefore, the Attorney General argues the unsharpened metal part, as well as the sharpened metal part, comprises the “blade.” Under this argument, the purpose of banning knives with a blade longer than two and one-half inches would be to eliminate or curtail the presence of stabbing weapons on school campuses.
This argument must fail because the Legislature has explicitly outlawed stabbing knife-like weapons elsewhere in the statute. The list of prohibited knife-like instruments or weapons in section 626.10, subdivision (a), includes dirks and daggers. Significantly, the Legislature recently has provided a definition of “ ‘dirk’ or ‘dagger.’ ” (Stats. 1993, ch. 598, § 4.) Section 626.10, subdivision (h), provides: “As used in this section, ‘dirk’ or ‘dagger’ means a knife or other instrument with or without a hand guard that is primarily designed, constructed, or altered to be a stabbing instrument designed to inflict great bodily injury or death.” Given the extant ban on dirks and daggers, and the rule we should avoid a construction that makes any language surplusage, we conclude the Legislature was referring to “blade” with respect to its cutting function rather than its stabbing function.
This conclusion is in keeping with the ordinary meaning interpretation of the term “blade,” that is, “the cutting part of an instrument” (Webster’s Third *781New Internat. Dict., op. cit. supra, p. 229) and supports Rosalie’s position that “blade” includes only the sharpened portion of the knife. (Accord, Bradvica v. State (1988) 104 Nev. 475, 760 P.2d 139, 141].) It also is consistent with two overriding factual considerations: (1) Rosalio was charged with possession of a knife, not a dirk or dagger and (2) there is no evidence the knife he possessed was “primarily designed, constructed or altered to be a stabbing instrument. . . .”(§ 626.10, subd. (h).) Likewise, it is in keeping with the rule of statutory construction that in interpreting a criminal statute, terms should be strictly construed. (People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 850 [97 Cal.Rptr. 684, 489 P.2d 564].)
“In resolving the ambiguity, we are guided by well-settled principles of statutory interpretation. ‘[W]hen language which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions is used in a penal law ordinarily that construction which is more favorable to the offender will be adopted. [<][] The defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt, whether it arise[s] out of a question of fact, or as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of language used in a statute.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814, 828 [176 Cal.Rptr. 521, 633 P.2d 186].)
For all of the above reasons, we conclude that in determining whether a knife has “a blade longer than 2 1/2 inches,” within the meaning of section 626.10, subdivision (a), only the sharpened portion should be measured.3 Accordingly, we must reverse the true finding.4
Disposition
Reversed.
Nares, J., concurred.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
The leatherman’s tool is a multifaceted gadget that contains, among other things, a knife, a needle-nosed pliers, a file, three screwdriver heads, a leather punch, and a can opener. These various components fold into two handles, which have measures. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 10(d), court exhibit 1, the leatherman’s tool, has been transmitted to this court. We have examined the exhibit. (The exhibit is depicted in the appendix.)
The Legislature, of course, may amend this statute to define “blade” to include the unsharpened portion.
In light of this disposition, it is unnecessary to address Rosalie’s attack on his probation conditions.