Dissenting.—I respectfully but strongly disagree with my
colleagues. The attorney-client privilege and the duty to maintain inviolate client confidences are statutory enactments with constitutional implications and are deserving of the strongest protection. It is necessarily the case, *597however, that in some circumstances rights and protections must yield to ensure the preservation of other equal or greater interests. In this case we deal with such circumstances.
On the morning trial was set to commence, counsel informed the court a conflict existed with his client such that he was ethically unable to proceed to trial. Noting such conflict was the result of a communication with the defendant, counsel refused to disclose, to any useful extent, its nature. A second hearing came no closer to disclosing the nature of the conflict. All the while, Aceves has refused to waive his right to a speedy trial.1
Counsel’s reticence and the defendant’s refusal to waive his right to a speedy trial placed the trial court in an unenviable position. The court could refuse to discharge the attorney and, in the event of a conviction, face the certain prospect of an attack based on the claim defendant proceeded to trial with conflicted counsel. On the other hand, the court could abdicate its responsibility to determine an important legal issue and to protect the rights of the accused to a speedy trial by blindly accepting counsel's conclusion a conflict exists. Doing so, however, might well eliminate or compromise other of the defendant’s rights in the event counsel's legal conclusion concerning the conflict was in error. For example, an in-custody defendant such as Aceves would face a long delay of his case with all the detriments inherent in a less than speedy trial.2
None of this is necessary. If one assumes the confidentiality protection exists to assure the defendant is adequately represented, it serves no ultimate interest of the defendant or the criminal justice system to require a court to make a decision as crucial as the discharge of counsel totally ignorant of the circumstances claimed to require it. A wise balancing of the interests involved leads to the conclusion that, at least to a degree, the attorney-client privilege and the duty to maintain confidences must yield to the obvious need of the trial court to have information on which to base a significant legal decision.
This need for a balancing of conflicting rights and interests in the context of the attorney-client privilege was discussed in People v. Godlewski (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 940 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 796].) There, three defendants were on trial for murder. One of the defendants made admissions to his attorney that were overheard by a jail inmate. The statements remained protected by the *598attorney-client privilege but a codefendant argued the privilege should yield to his constitutional right to a fair trial. Significantly, while ultimately rejecting the codefendant’s contention under the facts of that case, the court recognized the need, under extraordinary circumstances, for a balancing of the rights implicated by the attorney-client privilege and other rights in conflict with it. (Id. at pp. 943-950.)
In the present case any compromise of the privilege would be minor. There is no need for a confidence to be released to the world—only to the trial judge, or if appropriate to another judge, in a closed hearing resulting in a sealed transcript. Further, it may not be necessary in such a closed hearing to reveal the confidence; only enough must be shown under the circumstances of the case to sufficiently demonstrate a conflict exists. It is my view counsel’s comments in this case have not reached that stage.
Uhl v. Municipal Court (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 526 [112 Cal.Rptr. 478] (Uhl), is not to the contrary. At the outset in that case the public defender concluded a conflict would exist with an existing client if required to represent Uhl. When the public defender did not elaborate further on the nature of the conflict, the municipal court appointed the public defender to represent him. Uhl sought a writ of mandate to compel the appointment of private counsel. The superior court denied the writ since the public defender did not disclose the nature of the relationship out of which the conflict arose or state that the mere disclosure of the relationship would require a breach in the confidential relationship with the existing client. The superior court required the municipal court hold a second hearing to consider the appointment of counsel. At that hearing the public defender again asserted a conflict and stated the nature of the relationship giving rise to the conflict could not be disclosed without breaching the confidence of the existing client. The municipal court again appointed the public defender to represent Uhl. This time Uhl’s petition for a writ of mandate was granted, directing the appointment of separate counsel. Real party in interest, the People, appealed. (Id. at pp. 528-529.)
The Court of Appeal noted it could find no case raising the question “whether any showing of the facts and circumstances that give rise to the potential conflict or prejudice is required, or whether the court can rely on the assertion of the attorney.” (Uhl, supra, 37 Cal.App.3d at p. 529, fn. omitted.) The court then reviewed at length cases dealing generally with the problem of conflicts arising from the appointment of a single attorney to represent multiple defendants. (Id. at pp. 529-530.)
While admittedly there is some broad suggestion in Uhl that counsel is not required to breach a confidence in declaring a conflict, I take from Uhl only *599the following: Given the particular potential for conflict arising when one attorney represents multiple defendants, a representation by counsel that a conflict exists is a sufficient showing to require counsel’s discharge without further elaboration or inquiry, at least where the claim of conflict is made early in the case. (Uhl, supra, 37 Cal.App.3d at pp. 530-536.)
Under the facts of Uhl, where there is an early report of a situation in which conflict often occurs, a balancing of the interest in maintaining a client confidence may outweigh any competing interest. However, under other circumstances, like those in the present case, it would be a wholesale abdication of judicial authority and an abandonment of a court’s responsibility to protect the rights of a defendant to discharge counsel without an inquiry sufficient to convince the court a conflict exists. I cannot join in such an act.
Indeed, defense counsel requested a stay of the trial over Aceves’s objection and we granted the stay on September 30, 1996, pursuant to a good cause finding under Penal Code section 1382.
The People have argued this case involves gang-related activities in which witnesses’ appearances may be tenuous.