OPINION
GOLDBERG, Justice.In 1983 the Rhode Island General Assembly enacted the Victim’s Bill of Rights, codi-fled in G.L.1956 chapter 28 of title 12. Three years later, the delegates to the 1986 Constitutional Convention ratified article 1, section 23, entitled “Rights of victims of crime,” as an amendment to Rhode Island’s Constitution. It is significant that neither the legislation nor the amendment provides for monetary damages in the event that officials charged with notifying crime victims of their rights fail to do so. Hence this case presents for our consideration a novel legal issue: does a cause of action for monetary damages accrue against state or municipal officers, in either their official or their individual capacities, when these officers fail to notify crime victims of their statutory and/or constitutional rights?2 Although we remain sympathetic to crime victims and in no way condone the officials’ failure to notify victims of their rights, we are of the opinion that the Legislature, and not this Court, is the proper branch of government to address the plethora of issues presented by this type of situation. Accordingly we affirm the judgment of the trial justice to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
I
Factual History3
On August 1,1992, Robert J. Bandoni (Robert) was operating a motorcycle in the town of Coventry with his wife Lorraine as his passenger. The Bandonis’ evening, however, was tragically cut short when they were struck by a truck operated by Robert *583L. Richardson, Jr. (Richardson). Lorraine was thrown clear of the wreckage and suffered only minor injuries. Unfortunately, Robert sustained serious injuries, including a shattered left leg and pelvis. Richardson was arrested at the scene and charged with driving while intoxicated. A subsequent chemical analysis confirmed that Richardson’s blood-alcohol content was more than twice the legal limit. Thereafter, on August 5, 1992, Lorraine contacted the Coventry police to give a statement concerning the accident. It was at this time that Lorraine requested and received assurances that she and Robert would be kept apprised of the pending criminal case against Richardson. As the Bandonis would later learn, however, the criminal case against Richardson proceeded quickly and without their knowledge.
On August 12, 1992, Richardson was arraigned in the Third Division District Court and charged with one count of driving while intoxicated. Later, on September 23, 1992, also without the Bandonis’ knowledge, Richardson appeared at a pretrial conference where he negotiated a plea bargain whereby he was permitted to enter a plea of nolo contendere to a reduced charge of “reckless driving and other offenses against public safety.” Richardson’s sentence included one year’s unsupervised probation with no loss of license, and a $250 contribution to the Victims’ Indemnity Fund, and he was ordered to pay court costs.
In preparation for a civil lawsuit against Richardson, the Bandonis retained counsel to investigate and pursue their claim. It was at this time that the Bandonis first learned that the criminal case against Richardson had been resolved without an opportunity for them to address the court. Pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 45-15-5, the Bandonis filed a claim with the town of Coventry, arguing that town officials had disregarded their statutory and constitutional duties by failing to have advised the Bandonis of their rights as crime victims. After the town council rejected this claim, the Bandonis filed a two count complaint, later amended to three counts, against the town of Coventry, the State of Rhode Island, and the agents of these entities, (collectively defendants), asserting that had they been advised of Richardson’s court dates, they would have, inter alia, objected to the plea bargain and requested restitution from Richardson.
Counts 1 and 2 alleged a common law negligence theory against the state and the town for defendants’ failure to notify the Bandonis of the pending criminal ease against Richardson. In addition, Count 3 set forth that a cause of action for monetary damages emanates directly from article 1, section 23, of the Rhode Island Constitution. Following the submission of memoranda, the trial justice granted defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
On appeal the Bandonis proceed under both negligence and constitutional deprivation theories to recover monetary damages for defendants’ failure to notify them of their rights as crime victims. In doing so, the Bandonis propose that they be allowed to conduct a mini-trial in which they would address a Superior Court trial justice and present the victim’s impact statement that they should have been able to present at Richardson’s pretrial conference. The Bandonis argue that if after hearing their statements the trial justice determines that a reasonable District Court judge would have ordered restitution, then such amount would be the measure of their damages. We, however, respectfully decline to recognize either claim.
II
Negligence Claim
The Bandonis argue that they have established a prima facie case of common law negligence by demonstrating that both the Victim’s Bill of Rights legislation and the victims’ rights constitutional amendment place affirmative duties on defendants to ap*584prise crime victims of their rights. The Ban-donis contend that defendants’ inexcusable failure to comply with these duties constitutes a breach requiring monetary damages to compensate them for their injuries. We do not agree. Among the statutory rights allegedly violated were G.L.1956 §§
“12-28-3. General rights. — (a) * * *
(15) To be informed by the prosecuting officer of the right to request that restitution be an element of the final disposition of a case.”
“12-28-4.1. Right to address court regarding plea negotiation.—
(a) Prior to acceptance by the court of a plea negotiation and imposition of sentence upon a defendant who has pleaded nolo contendere or guilty to a crime, the victim of the criminal offense shall, upon request, be afforded the opportunity to address the court regarding the impact which the defendant’s criminal conduct has had upon the victim.”
“12-28-4.3. Pretrial conferences — Misdemeanors in district court.—
(a) In all misdemeanor eases heard before the district court, the victim of the alleged criminal offense shall be afforded the opportunity to address the court during the pretrial conference' * * *. At the pretrial conference, the victim shall be afforded the opportunity to explain the impact which the defendant’s criminal conduct has had upon the victim and to comment on the proposed disposition of the case.” “12-28-5.1. Restitution.—
When the court orders a defendant to make financial restitution to the victim of a crime of which the defendant has been convicted or to which the defendant has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, a civil judgment shall automatically be entered by the trial court against the defendant on behalf of the victim for that amount.”
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that when the language of a statute is unambiguous and expresses a clear and sensible meaning, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and obvious meaning. See, e.g., Wayne Distributing Co. v. Rhode Island Commission For Human Rights, 673 A.2d 457, 460 (R.I.1996). Furthermore, when a statute establishes rights not cognizable at common law, that statute is “subject to strict construction.” Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I.1996).
In this case the Bandonis concede, as they must, that a duty requiring crime victims to be notified of their rights did not exist at common law. Indeed, in Rhode Island it was not until the enactment of the Victim’s Bill of Rights in 1983 that these rights first became cognizable. See P.L. 1983, ch. 265, § 1. Furthermore, the Victim’s Bill of Rights is entirely devoid of any provision providing for civil liability because of an official’s failure to inform crime victims of their rights. Since the General Assembly did not establish a cause of action in negligence, the Bandonis essentially ask us to create a private cause of action by judicial rule. “We have long held, however, that the creation of new causes of action is a legislative function.” Accent Store Design, Inc., 674 A.2d at 1226; Ferreira v. Strack, 652 A.2d 965, 968 (R.I.1995) (citing Kalian v. People Acting Through Community Effort, Inc. (PACE), 122 R.I. 429, 432, 408 A.2d 608, 609 (1979)). Therefore, in the absence of such a provision, we must exercise our judi cial restraint in declining to divine the Legislature’s intent. See In re John, 605 A.2d 486, 488 (R.I.1992) (“because the statute does not plainly provide for a private cause of action, such a right cannot be inferred”); Knutson v. County of Maricopa, 175 Adz. 445, 857 P.2d 1299, 1300 (Ct.App.1993) (refusing to create a cause of action in negligence where prosecutor failed to notify a crime victim of a hearing pursuant to a court rule); Bruegger v. Faribault County Sheriffs Department, 497 N.W.2d 260, 262 (Minn.1993) (holding that since no common law duty required officials to inform crime victims of their right to receive financial compensation, and because the Legislature failed to provide a remedy, no cause of action exists). This is particularly true when, as here, the General Assembly was well aware of the issue of noncompliánce, *585see § 12-28-7,4 had numerous opportunities to provide for a cause of action, see, e.g., P.L.1994, eh. 187, § 1, and yet did not provide crime victims with a cause of action,
To inject a judicial remedy at this time into a statute that plainly does not contain a remedy, particularly when there is no evidence to suggest that the Legislature had intended to create a cause of action, “would be interpretation by amendment.” Rhode Island Federation of Teachers, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Sundlun, 595 A.2d 799, 802 (R.I.1991). In the event the Legislature should choose to create such a remedy, there is no question that it has the capacity to do so at any time. See id. But it is not the function of this Court to act as a super legislative body and rewrite or amend statutes already enacted by the General Assembly. See id.; Ellis v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 586 A.2d 1055, 1060 (R.I.1991); New England Die Co. v. General Products Co., 92 R.I. 292, 298, 168 A.2d 150, 154 (1961).
Therefore, whatever the merits of the Ban-donis’ claim may be, we are of the opinion that principles of judicial restraint prevent us from creating a cause of action where a duty to apprise crime victims of their rights did not exist at common law and where our Legislature has neither by express terms nor by implication provided for civil liability. See Accent Store Design, Inc., 674 A.2d at 1226. See also Knutson, 857 P.2d at 1300-01; Bruegger, 497 N.W.2d at 262. Having concluded that a cause of action for damages does not lie in negligence, we next address the Ban-donis’ second argument that a cause of action may be derived directly from the victims’ rights amendment itself.
III
Constitutional Tort Claim
In 1986 delegates to the Constitutional Convention amended Rhode Island’s Constitution to include article 1, section 23, entitled “Rights of victims of crime.” This amendment, like its previously enacted statutory counterpart, appears to ensure that victims are entitled to receive financial compensation from the perpetrator of the crime and are to be given an opportunity to make a victim’s impact statement before the court. Today twenty-eight other states have enacted similar provisions,5 each guaranteeing its crime victims constitutionally protected rights, while other jurisdictions, including the Federal Government, are presently debating similar constitutional amendments. It is significant, however, that none of these state constitutions, including Rhode Island’s, explicitly provides a cause of action for damages in the event that officials who are charged with informing crime victims of then-rights fail to comply. Instead these states are split with approximately one-half expressly providing that an official’s noncompliance will not result in a cause of action for damages and/or the right to vacate an otherwise lawful conviction,6 and the other half *586falls into a category in which their constitutions, like Rhode Island’s, are either silent on this issue or have left an enforcement provision to the discretion of their Legislatures.7 Since neither Rhode Island’s Constitution nor its Victim’s Bill of Rights legislation expressly provide a cause of action for damages, the Bandonis aver that this Court should recognize a constitutional tort action directly from article 1, section 23, of the Rhode Island Constitution for the reasons articulated in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).
A. The Bandonis’ Constitutional Tort Argument
In Bivens the United States Supreme Court created a cause of action for damages as a result of federal officials’ violating a citizen’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, despite the fact that neither the United States Code nor the Fourth Amendment expressly provide for such a remedy. Id. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005, 29 L.Ed.2d at 627. Analogizing the present case to Bivens, the Bandonis argue that this Court should create a state Bivens action for the injuries suffered as a result of state and municipal officials’ failure to notify them of their state constitutional rights.8
Before reaching the Bandonis’ claim, however, we must first address the threshold question of whether article 1, section 23, is self-executing; in other words, does the victims’ rights amendment supply “ ‘a sufficient rule by means of which the right given may be enjoyed and protected, or the duty imposed be enforced * * * [or does] it merely indicate[] principles, without laying down rules by means of which those principles may be given the force of law[?]’ ” Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 403, 21 S.Ct. 210, 212, 45 L.Ed. 249, 251 (1900).9 Because we con-*587elude that article 1, section 23, represents the latter Davis principle, we find it unnecessary to reach the second question concerning whether this Court should recognize a cause of action for damages derived directly from the victims’ rights amendment.
B. Is Article 1, Section 23, Self-Executing?
Article 1, section 23, Rhode Island’s victims’ rights amendment states:
“A victim of crime shall, as a matter of right, be treated by agents of the state with dignity, respect and sensitivity during all phases of the criminal justice process. Such person shall be entitled to receive, from the perpetrator of the crime, financial compensation for any injury or loss caused by the perpetrator of the crime, and shall receive such other compensation as the state may provide. Before sentencing, a victim shall have the right to address the court regarding the impact which the perpetrator’s conduct has had upon the victim.”
To determine whether a particular constitutional provision is self-executing, many jurisdictions begin their analysis with the standard adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Davis, supra:
“ A constitutional provision may be said to be self-executing if it supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the right given may be enjoyed and protected, or the duty imposed ma.y be enforced; and it is not self-executing when it merely indicates principles, without laying down rules by means of which those principles may be given the force of law.’ * * * In short, if complete in itself, it executes itself.” Davis, 179 U.S. at 403, 21 S.Ct. at 212, 45 L.Ed. at 251-52. (Emphasis added). See, e.g., Shields v. Gerhart, 163 Vt. 219, 658 A.2d 924, 928 (1995).
From this model additional standards have evolved to facilitate the determination of whether a particular provision is self-executing. Among those that we find helpful are the guidelines recently enunciated by the Vermont Supreme Court:
“First, a self-executing provision should do more than express only general principles; it may describe the right in detail, including the means for its enjoyment and protection. * * * [Second, o]rdinarily a self-executing provision does not contain a directive to the legislature for further action. * * * [Third, t]he legislative history may be particularly informative as to the provision’s intended operation. * * * Finally, a decision for or against self-execution must harmonize with the scheme of rights established in the constitution as a whole.” Shields, 658 A.2d at 928 (citing Convention Center Referendum Committee v. Board of Elections and Ethics, 399 A.2d 550, 552 (D.C.Ct.App.1979)). (Emphasis added.)
Using the Vermont Supreme Court’s standard to outline our discussion, we are of the opinion that since article 1, section 23, expresses only general principles, and does not supply a sufficient rule of law by which even these general rights may be enjoyed, protected, or enforced, we must conclude that this provision is not self-executing.
1. The First Criterion
The first criterion requires us to consider whether the victims’ rights amendment articulates specifically enforceable rights, including the means by which these rights may be enjoyed or protected, or whether it merely espouses general principles. See Shields, 658 A.2d at 928. The Bandonis concede that the first sentence of the victims’ rights amendment is only a general statement of principle containing neither concrete rights nor a means by which these rights may be enjoyed or protected. The Bandonis assert, however, that specific fundamental rights are articulated in the remaining two sentences of the amendment and consequently, the amendment is indicative of a self-executing provision. We must disagree.
*588In determining whether the first criterion is satisfied, we scrutinize the amendment for detail and precision. See Convention Center Referendum Committee, 399 A.2d at 552. Upon doing so, we are struck by the amendment’s broad scope and utter lack of any means by which these rights may be enjoyed, protected, or enforced. We focus on two factors.
a. Article 1, Section 23, Mirrors the “Legislative Purpose” Provision
When delegates to the Constitutional Convention gathered in 1986, the Victim’s Bill of Rights legislation was three years old and had been already amended to provide crime victims with fourteen (now fifteen) general rights. See P.L.1985, ch. 411, § 1. Furthermore, the 1986 version of the Victim’s Bill of Rights provided in explicit terms the means by which some of these rights could be protected and enjoyed. For example, one general right guaranteed crime victims the right “to address the court prior to sentencing in those cases where the defendant has been adjudicated guilty following a trial,” § 12-28-3(11), but, § 12-28^4 provided the precise means by which this particular right may be enjoyed, stating that the victim’s statement be made “prior to counsel for the state and the defendant making their sentencing recommendations,” and before the defendant is permitted to exercise his or her own right of allocution. See § 12-28-4. See also § 12-28-4.1 (extending similar right to crime victims when the defendant has pleaded nolo contendere or guilty to a crime). Another general right, although enacted after the 1986 Convention, guaranteed that victims be informed of their right to request that restitution be an element of the final disposition. See § 12-28-3(15). However, § 12-28-5, which was in force prior to the Convention, provided that upon the defendant’s conviction of a felony, a civil judgment shall automatically enter in favor of the victim conclusively establishing the defendant’s liability. Furthermore, this section also required the court to notify the victim at his or her last known address of the entry of a civil judgment in his or her favor and inform the victim that he or she must establish proof of damages in an appropriate judicial proceeding. See id.
In spite of the fourteen general rights set forth in § 12-28-3, as well as the more specific means that other provisions of the Victim’s Bill of Rights statute established, all of which were enacted prior to the 1986 Constitutional Convention, the framers elected to model article 1, section 23, after the much broader Legislative Purpose provision of § 12-28-2. Indeed, the language utilized in article 1, section 23, is almost identical to § 12-28-2, in which the General Assembly declared its intent to ensure that crime victims are treated with dignity, respect, and sensitivity, and whenever possible, receive financial compensation from the perpetrators of the crimes, and that the crimes’ impact on the victims be brought to the courts’ attention.
The fact that § 12-28-2 does not provide a procedural means by which crime victims may enjoy or protect their rights is not surprising since these means are provided by other sections of the Victim’s Bill of Rights. However, the fact that the framers chose to model the victims’ rights amendment from the broad contours of § 12-28-2’s Legislative Purpose provision, knowing full well that other sections within chapter 28 contained more specific rights as well as the means by which these rights may be enjoyed and protected is highly persuasive to our conclusion that article 1, section 23, espouses only general principles and is therefore not self-executing.
Our conclusion is supported by even the most rudimentary comparison of § 12-28-2 with the victims’ rights amendment. Section 12-28-2 provides in its entirety that
“In recognition of the responsibility of the community to the victims of crime, the general assembly declares its intent to ensure:
(1) That all crime victims are treated with dignity, respect, and sensitivity at all phases of the criminal justice process;
(2) That whenever possible they receive financial compensation for their injury or loss from the perpetrator of the crime; and
*589(3) That the full impact of the crime upon the victim is brought to the attention of the court.”
After comparing this section to the victims’ rights amendment,10 the only discernible difference is that article 1, section 23, is expressed in mandatory terms.. This factor, however, does not influence our conclusion since a constitutional provision may be expressed in mandatory terms and still not be self-executing. See 16 Am.Jur.2d. Constitutional Law § 98 at 486 (1998).
The dissent concludes that article 1, section 23, establishes specific individual rights and points to the last sentence of section 23 for support. This last sentence provides,
“[b]efore sentencing, a victim shall have the right to address the court regarding the impact which the perpetrator’s conduct has had upon the victim.”
To support this self-executing conclusion, the dissent notes our supposedly “conspicuously ] omi[ssion of] this latter right [in our conclusion] that the constitutional framers ‘chose to model’ the victims’ rights amendment after the broader Legislative Purpose provision of the Victim’s Bill of Rights Act, which (unlike article 1, section 23) neither places a specific right to address the court in the hands of a victim nor details when this right may be enjoyed.” However, a closer inspection of the “General rights” provision, if not the “Legislative Purpose” provision itself (“the general assembly declares its intent to ensure: * * * (3) That the full impact of the crime upon the victim is brought to the attention of the court”11), § 12-28-2(3), reveals that crime victims had already been given the right to address the court prior to sentencing three years before article 1, seetion 23, was ever ratified. See § 12-28-3(11), as enacted by P.L.1983, eh. 265, § 1 (“To be afforded the right to address the court prior to sentencing in those cases where the defendant has been adjudicated guilty following a trial”). See also § 12-28-4 (providing the precise procedures by which crime victims can exercise their right to address the court before sentencing). Therefore, contrary to the dissent's assertion, article 1, section 23, provides crime victims with no additional rights beyond those promulgated by the General Assembly in 1983.
b. Framers’ Failure to Provide Crime Victims with a Remedy
Furthermore, we note that the victims’ rights amendment does not expressly provide a cause of action for damages. While the absence of a remedy does not ipso facto defeat the Bandonis’ contention that article 1, section 23, is self-executing, it is an additional indication that the victims’ rights amendment does not provide a sufficient rule by which the rights given may be enjoyed or protected. See Shields, 658 A.2d at 929. The Ban-donis’ argument that the true intent of the framers was to provide a cause of action for damages would be more persuasive were we presented with evidence demonstrating that the framers simply overlooked the issue of noncompliance or enforcement. On the contrary, while drafting the amendment the framers had the benefit of considering § 12-28-7. This section provides that “[f]ailure to afford the victim of a felony offense any of the rights established by [the Victim’s Bill of Rights] shall not constitute grounds for vacating an otherwise lawful conviction, or for voiding an otherwise lawful sentence or parole determination.” Section 12-28-7. *590Clearly this section raises the specter of noncompliance.
It is equally apparent that not only could the framers have provided for an enforcement mechanism, they in fact debated doing so and in the end declined to provide such a provision in article 1, section 23. An early version of a proposed constitutional amendment, which was not ratified, contained the following provision:
“SECT. 2. ENFORCEMENT OF SUCH RIGHTS. A victim of crime whose complaint is filed in and brought before any Court of the State of Rhode Island shall have the independent right to sue at law, in equity or by any other proper proceeding to compel compliance with the aforesaid rights provided in Section 1 of this Amendment and the Court hearing such suit may in its discretion allow said victim bringing such suit to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee.”
Another version of a proposed amendment (Resolution 86-140), was sent to the Committee on Style and Drafting, stating that “[t]hese rights shall be enforceable by the victims of crime and they shall have recourse in the law for any denial thereof.” The committee, however, struck out this last sentence, and Resolution 86-140 was subsequently ratified to become article 1, section 28.
The Bandonis ask us to ignore the final version of article 1, section 23, arguing that notwithstanding the fact that the enforcement provision was struck down by the Committee on Style and Drafting, the framers’ intent was eminently clear that a crime victim should be able to enforce these rights through a cause of action for monetary damages. But in order for this argument to have any merit, we would have to disregard our well-established rules of construction, which provide that “[ejvery clause of the constitution * * * be given its due force, meaning, and effect, and [that] no word or section can be assumed to have been unnecessarily used, or needlessly added,” City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 45 (R.I. 1995), or unnecessarily omitted. Instead we must assume that the framers carefully weighed and considered the words in each clause and intended those terms to imply a definite meaning. See id.
Like the Bandpmos, the dissent also looks beyond the clear and unambiguous words of article 1, section 23, and directs our attention to the Constitutional Convention’s history wherein the dissent contends the framers “in fact intended for victims to have enforceable rights in the courts.” Because the dissent purports to have reached this conclusion after having examined primary sources, we find it necessary to respond in detail to offset any suggestion that we have taken liberties with the historical record in this case. We simply view the following historical events in a different light, colored by long-standing and traditional precepts of constitutional interpretation.
The dissent contends that Resolution 86-140 was resoundingly approved (minus the language providing for á remedy, of course) “only after the delegates were assured that the style committee’s changes were made only ‘for the economy of language.’ ” As we shall demonstrate, however, neither the record in this case nor the case law the dissent cites actually supports this theory.
First, we have great difficulty agreeing that the Committee on Style and Drafting “altered” the text of Resolution 86-140 but only “for the economy of language.” To demonstrate our point, we have reproduced the changes (both additions and deletions) that the Committee on Style and Drafting made to Resolution 86-140 after its initial passage on the floor of the Convention. As demonstrated below, whatever the reasoning for the committee’s changes may have been, the rationale of “economy of language” is not cogently supported.12
*591“Sec. 24. VICTIMS’ RIGHTS. — All persons -within this "State who-ar-e A victims of crime shall, as a matter of right, be treated by agents of the state with dignity, respect and sensitivity during all phases of the criminal justice process. Whenever possible^Such persons shall be entitled to receive, from the perpetrator of the crime, financial compensation for their any inju-riesy or losses caused by from the perpetrator of the crime, and shall receive such other compensation as the state may provide. They Before sentencing, a victim shall have the right to address the court regarding the impact which the perpetrator’s conduct has had upon the victim. These rights shall be enforceable by the victims of crime-and they-shall recourse in the law for any denial thereof.”
Likewise, it is equally apparent that the deletion of the last sentence expressly providing that crime victims “shall have recourse in the law” and substituting for it the clause “such other compensation as the state may provide” is nothing short of a substantive alteration. Thus, it is not only the deletion of the language providing for “recourse in the law for any denial” of rights that is of moment to our analysis but also the inclusion of the language “and shall receive such other compensation as the state may provide.” (Emphasis added.) Practically speaking, it is impossible for the Bandonis to “receive such other compensation as the state may provide,” as article 1, section 28, contemplates, because the state itself has not provided for “such other compensation.” On this issue even the dissent acknowledges that the state “has not acted to give victims remedial protection when they are deprived of their [rights].” Other courts are in accord with this reasoning. For instance, in State v. Rodrigues, 68 Haw. 412, 629 P.2d 1111, 1114 (1981), the Hawaii Supreme Court construed the phrase “as provided by law” in its constitution “as a direction to the legislature to enact implementing legislation.” See also Wann v. Reorganized School of District No. 6 of St. Francois County, 293 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo.1956) (the phrase “as provided by law” “lays down only a general principle and directs the legislature to provide the rules by which the general right which it grants may be enjoyed and protected. In other words, it is clear that subsequent action by the legislature is contemplated to put the provision into operation”). (Emphasis added.) We are of the opinion that considering the framers’ decision to provide crime victims with “such other compensation as the state may provide,” knowing that neither the Constitution nor the General Laws provide crime victims with such other compensation, the real separation-of-powers violation that the dissent alludes to would be for this Court to create a remedy.
To support the conclusion that article 1, section 23, is self-executing, the dissent relies on two textually identical secondary sources for the proposition that the framers intended to mandate enforcement “while leaving specific provisions or mechanisms to the determination of the general assembly and the courts.” However, simply stated, these two sources incorrectly cite to the Constitutional Convention’s Judiciary Committee report. Indeed, the report only states its resolve “to mandate enforceability while leaving the creation of specific provisions or mechanisms to the General Assembly.” See Report of the Judiciary Committee Relating to Victims of Crime Resolution (86-140) at 5. Not once throughout its entire report does the Judiciary Committee ever mention, or even imply, that the creation of specific provisions or mechanisms should also be left to the courts. The record simply does not support this conclusion.
In addition we also have trouble accepting the dissent’s conclusion that Resolution 86-140 was approved “only after the delegates were assured that the style committee’s changes were made only ‘for the economy of language.’ ” Our review of the Convention proceedings finds no such “assurances,” promises, or even any inquiry from the floor about the modifications to Resolution 86-140. Instead our inspection finds only a reading of the proposed amendments with Resolution 86-140 being introduced by the words that “[t]his resolution on vietim[s’] rights was redrafted for the economy of language and it now reads as follows.” From this single sentence the dissent surmises that delegates received explicit assurances that Resolution *59286-140 was modified only for the purpose of economy of language and that no other substantive changes were made. On the contrary, when the Convention president introduced Resolution 86-140, he prefaced the voting by stating:
“Essentially, this adds a section to the constitution requiring that victims of crime shall, as a matter of right be treated by the agents of the State with dignity and respect and sensitivity during all phases of the criminal justice process. Such person shall be entitled to receive from the perpetrator of crime financial compensation for any injury or loss caused by the perpetrator of the crime and shall receive such other compensation as the State may provide. Before sentencing a victim shall have the right to address the court regarding the impact which the perpetrator’s conduct has had upon the victim. That is Resolution 86-140, as amended.” (Emphasis added.)
Moments after the president’s reading. of amended Resolution 86-140, delegates overwhelmingly passed this version of Resolution 86-140 (without the recourse in law language) by a margin of ninety-three to one.
However, even if the delegates did receive explicit assurances as the dissent suggests, statements by individual legislators or framers are not to be given talismanic significance. See Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 268, 106 S.Ct. 1834, 1840, 90 L.Ed.2d 248, 257 (1986). On this point we find the recent opinion of the First Circuit Court of Appeals in State of Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685 (1st Cir. 1994), to be particularly instructive.
In Narragansett Indian Tribe the First. Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with the question of whether Congress intended the newly enacted Indian Gaming Regulatory Act to repeal the jurisdiction granted a decade earlier in the Rhode Island Claims Settlement Act, thereby subjecting the Narragansett Indians to the civil, criminal, and regulatory laws of the State of Rhode Island. In a manner reminiscent of the dissent’s two-pronged approach, the state in Narragansett Indian Tribe argued (1) that the preliminary version of the gaming act contained a provision safeguarding the settlement act’s grant of jurisdiction from implied repeal (safeguarding provision) and (2) that despite the fact that the safeguarding provision was deleted prior to the gaming act’s final passage, Rhode Island’s Senators received explicit assurances from the bill’s sponsor and floor manager that the settlement act’s grant of jurisdiction would not be repealed. Id. at 698. The record supports the state’s assertions and establishes that the following colloquy took place on the floor of the United States Senate:
“Mr. PELL. * * * In the interests of clarity, I have asked that language specifically citing the protections of the Rhode Island Claims Settlement Act (Public Law 95 — 395) be.stricken from S.555 [the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act]. I understand that these protections clearly will remain in effect.
“Mr. INOUYE. I thank my colleague, the senior Senator from Rhode Island [Mr.. Pell], and assure him that the protections of the Rhode Island Claims Settlement Act (P.L. 95-395), will remain in effect and that the Narragansett Indian Tribe clearly will remain subject to the civil, criminal, and regulatory laws of the State of Rhode Island.
“Mr. CHAFFEE. Mr. President, I too would like to thank the chairman [Mr. Inouye] * * *. The chairman’s statement makes it clear that any high stakes gaming, including bingo, in Rhode Island will remain subject to the civil, criminal, and regulatory laws of our State.” 19 F.3d at 698. (Emphases added.)
Despite the explicit assurances in Narragansett Indian Tribe, the First Circuit had little trouble rejecting the state’s claims since “[i]n the game of [constitutional] interpretation, [constitutional] language is the ultimate trump card.” Id. at 699. Likewise, in the case at bar, we too have little trouble rejecting the purported assurances raised by the dissent. The simple, and indeed unmistakable, fact is that when the constitutional framers decided to add article 1, section 23, to our Constitution, they did so by means of an exercise that requires putting pen to pa*593per. As the First Circuit articulated in rejecting an argument similar to the dissent’s:
“Once Congress has spoken, it is bound by what it has plainly said, notwithstanding the nods and winks that may have been exchanged in floor debates and committee hearings. After all, it is not the proper role of legislators to use unwritten assurances or side arrangements to alter the clear meaning of agreed language. And the judiciary must stand as the ultimate guarantor of the integrity of an enacted statute’s text.
“In sum, once Congress has spoken, a court cannot override the unambiguous words of an enacted statute and substitute for them the court’s views of what individual legislators likely intended. Any other rule imports a virulent strain of subjectivity into the interpretive task and, in the process, threatens to transfer too large a slice of legislative power from Congress to the courts.” 19 F.3d at 699-700.
In order for us to give primary effect to the contemporaneous words of one individual’s planned remarks moments before a final vote on Resolution 86-140, we would have to turn a blind eye to our well-established rules of constitutional construction, which states that it is presumed the language in an enactment was carefully considered before it was finally adopted and “that when words in the constitution are free of ambiguity, they must be given their plain, ordinary, and usually accepted meaning.” Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 45. This we shall not do.
Furthermore, our conclusion that the Committee on Style and Drafting made substantive amendments to Resolution 86-140 is buttressed by a source none other than the dissenting opinion. On the one hand the dissent insists the resolution was redrafted solely for the purpose of “the economy of language” and “was not intended to alter the substantive meaning of Resolution 86-140.” However, on the other hand, the dissent bases the conclusion that article 1, section 23, is self-executing on the ground that it establishes “a specific individual right” to address the court prior to sentencing. This specific individual right, however, was not in the original version of Resolution 86-140 and only found its way into the final version after the committee “altered” the text for “the economy of language,” changes that the dissent has already told us were “not intended to alter the substantive meaning of Resolution 86-140.”13
2. The Second and the Third Criteria
Turning our attention to the second and the third criteria, we note that the text of the victims’ rights amendment does not contain an express directive that the General Assembly act to implement the amendment. Although the lack of a mandate would ordinarily tip the scales in favor of a conclusion that article 1, section 23, is self-executing, we do not consider the lack of a mandate surprising, considering the general nature of rights articulated in the victims’ rights amendment. See Shields, 658 A.2d at 929. In addition, after examining the historical records memorializing the 1986 Convention, we are left with the undeniable conclusion that the framers intended to leave the enactment of an enforcement provision to the General Assembly.
By all accounts the issue of crime victims having the means to enforce their rights was a major topic of discussion and debate. Early versions of proposed constitutional amendments provided enforcement provisions. In addition, public testimony was elicited, urging that a constitutional amendment contain an enforcement provision. Even the Judiciary Committee debated the enforcement issue and concluded “that the lack of enforcement *594provisions in the present statute is a major defect, and * * * therefore, resolved to mandate enforceability, while leaving the creation of specific provisions or mechanisms to the General Assembly.” See Report of the Judiciary Committee Relating to Victims of Crime Resolution (86-140) at 5. (Second emphasis added). Considering the committee’s unanimous conclusion to leave the creation of specific enforcement provisions or mechanisms to the General Assembly, we are not surprised that the final ratified version of article 1, section 23, does not contain a provision enabling crime victims to protect and enforce their rights. By means of the Judiciary Committee’s own words, we find it apparent that absent “the creation of specific provisions or mechanisms [by] the General Assembly” a private cause of action for damages was not intended. See Goldrush II v. City of Marietta, 267 Ga. 683, 482 S.E.2d 347, 352 (1997) (citing State v. Pendergrass, 63 Haw. 633, 633 P.2d 1113 (1981) and DeKalb County v. Allstate Beer, 229 Ga. 483, 192 S.E.2d 342 (1972)).
Although the General Assembly may have failed to heed the framers’ clarion call to enact specific enforcement provisions, the legislative history illustrates that other specific measures have been created to protect crime victims. See generally 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 99 at 487-88 (1998) (“Even if a constitutional provision contains a mandatory requirement that the legislature adopt a particular provision, there is no remedy if the legislature fails to obey such constitutional mandate”). In particular, since the 1986 Constitutional Convention, the General Assembly has amended the Victim’s Bill of Rights on seven separate occasions. Among the amendments three new sections to chapter 28 have been included, namely, § 12-28-4.3, which affords crime victims the opportunity to address the District Court during a pretrial conference regarding the impact that the defendant’s conduct has had upon the victim; § 12-28-5.1, which expands the contours of § 12-28-5 to allow a civil judgment automatically to enter in favor of the victim when the defendant has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere; and § 12-28-10, which establishes the creation of the victims’ services unit. In addition to these newly enacted sections, other provisions of chapter 28 have been revisited and amended to provide additional protection. See, e.g., P.L. 1993, eh. 413, § 1; P.L.1991, ch. 302, § 1.
Despite these measures, however, the General Assembly has failed to enact an enforcement provision even though numerous opportunities have existed to introduce such legislation. The General Assembly’s failure to enact an enforcement provision, coupled with the fact it has elected to preserve § 12-28-7, which addresses the issue of noncompliance, further supports our conclusion that a private cause of action for damages was not intended by either the General Assembly or the constitutional framers.
3. The Fourth Criterion
Finally, our conclusion that the victims’ rights amendment is not self-executing “must harmonize with the scheme of rights established in [our] constitution as a whole.” Shields, 658 A.2d at 928. As the Bandonis correctly point out, there are no provisions in the Rhode Island Constitution relating to crime victims’ rights other than article 1, section 23. Nevertheless, the Bandonis argue that failure to create a cause of action for monetary damages will violate article 1, section 5, of the Rhode Island Constitution.14 The Bandonis contend that this provision provides that whenever there is a recognized right, whether statutory or constitutional, there must also be a corresponding remedy for its abridgment.
This Court, however, has never held that violating a recognized right requires monetary damages. Furthermore, even if we were to conclude that article 1, section 23, is self-executing, this fact alone would not nec*595essarily support a claim for damages. See Figueroa v. State, 61 Haw. 369, 604 P.2d 1198, 1206 (1979); Brown v. State, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 652 N.Y.S.2d 223, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1138 (1996); Shields, 658 A.2d at 930. See also Jennifer Friesen, State Constitutional Law: Litigating Individual Rights, Claims, and Defenses, § 7.05[1], at 7-14 (1995) (court may provide injunctive or declaratory relief, as opposed to the specific remedy of damages). Instead we have stated on numerous occasions that article 1, section 5, forbids the total denial of access to the courts for the adjudication of a recognized claim. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Cumberland Engineering Co., 471 A.2d 195, 200 (R.I.1984) (statute requiring personal-injury claim to be commenced within ten years of the date product was first purchased, regardless of the date of injury, completely denied the plaintiff access to court). In addition, this Court has previously observed that “ ‘[although, in a free government, every man is entitled to an adequate legal remedy for every injury done to him, yet the form and extent of it is necessarily subject to the legislative power.’ In other words, the constitutional provisions are not self-executing, and require legislative assistance.” Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 36, 73 A. 97, 106-07 (1909) (quoting In the Matter of Nichols, 8 R.I. 50, 54 (1864)).
Although we applaud the Legislature and the constitutional framers for their efforts to provide crime victims with specific rights, principles of judicial restraint prevent us from creating a cause of action for damages in all but the most extreme circumstances. The extensive discussion that we have given to this issue alone indicates the enormous danger of judicially creating a cause of action when both the constitutional framers and the members of the General Assembly had the same opportunity to create a remedy and yet declined to do so. Instead we are of the opinion that the creation of a remedy in the circumstances presented by this case should be left to the body charged by our Constitution with this responsibility. See R.I. Const, art. 6, sec. 1 (“The general assembly shall pass all laws necessary to carry this Constitution into effect”). In this forum the myriad complex issues presented by the imposition of liability can be fully debated in public. We are mindful of the difficulty in attempting to impose tort liability on judges and prosecution officers who enjoy immunity, as well as the difficulty in defining the scope of liability for state officials who are responsible for complying with the victim’s rights statute. Notwithstanding the departure from blind adherence to the concept of sovereign immunity, which has been accomplished through both legislation and judicial decisions, the concept of judicial and prosecutorial immunity remains alive and well:
“[T]here has been a decided reluctance in all jurisdictions that have considered the question to impose liability upon the state for cei’tain activities conducted by its agents and servants. * * * It would be unthinkable, for example, to hold the state hable for a wrong decision of its courts or the implementation of a particular state program.” Calhoun v. City of Providence, 120 R.I. 619, 628, 390 A.2d 350, 354-55 (1978).
Thus, even though we acknowledge the prerogative of the Legislature to fashion a remedy for victims who are ignored by the courts or who are treated unfairly by the state’s prosecution officers, we also recognize the complexity inherent in addressing these questions considering the “nearly four hundred years of unbroken adherence to the doctrine of judicial immunity.” Joseph R. Weisberger, The Twilight of Judicial Independence — Pulliam v. Allen, 19 Suffolk U.L.Rev. 537, 547 (1985).
Our holding today, however, should in no way be construed by those charged with informing crime victims of their rights that this Court considers these rights to be inconsequential or that this Court minimizes the importance of the officials’ obligation to comply with the statute conscientiously. Cf. Yang v. State, 703 A.2d 754 (R.I.1997) (parole board acted properly in rescinding its vote after hearing from crime victims). Indeed, the Constitution expresses the will of the people, and failure to abide by its words will surely have ramifications beyond the judicial arena. In addition the day may well come when the Legislature provides some sort of remedy, monetary or otherwise, for this precise scenario. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13-*5964437 (Supp. West 1997) (implementing victims’ rights constitutional mandate by enacting legislation that crime victims have a cause of action for damages).
Under our form of government, however, the function of adjusting remedies to rights is a legislative responsibility rather than a judicial task, and up until the present time the Legislature has not provided a remedy for those instances in which officials fail to inform crime victims of their rights. See Henry, 30 R.I. at 37, 73 A. at 107. The immortal words of Chief Justice Marshall ring true, particularly in this ease: it is “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to [s]ay what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60, 73 (1803). “But inaction upon the part of the legislature, however long continued, can not confer legislative functions upon the judiciary.” Henry, 30 R.I. at 38, 73 A. at 107. Therefore, notwithstanding our appreciation of the efforts of the General Assembly and the delegates to the 1986 Constitutional Convention and our sympathy for the Bandonis, we are of the opinion that if a cause of action for damages that are due to an official’s failure to apprise crime victims of their rights is created, it must originate from the floor of the General Assembly and not from the bench of the Supreme Court.
IV
Waiver and Other Issues Raised by the Dissent
The dissent fervently declares this to be “a dark day for state constitutional law and judicial independence in Rhode Island.” We do not view this opinion as a pox upon the Constitution, however, but simply another step in our continuing duty to objectively construe the grand charter consistently with well-established principles of constitutional construction. Accordingly, and regrettably, we find it necessary to respond to some of the dissent’s comments in order to set the record straight.
A. The Waiver
Contrary to the dissent’s assertions that the Bandonis may be entitled to some type of unspecified relief in addition to monetary damages, we conclude that this case has always been an action for monetary damages and has never been anything else. This matter commenced with the filing of a claim by the Bandonis with the Coventry Town Council, seeking “satisfaction each in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND ($100,-000.00) DOLLARS.” The Bandonis requested no other forms of relief. After this claim was rejected, the Bandonis filed a two count complaint (later amended to three counts) in the Superior Court, in which they prayed for monetary damages and “all such other relief deemed meet and just by this Honorable Court.” The dissent seizes upon this boilerplate language for the proposition that we must view the complaint with an eye toward whether the Bandonis are' entitled not only to monetary damages but to some other unspecified type of declaratory or equitable relief as well. This theory has no basis in law.
Appellate courts are especially hesitant to read a particular claim into a complaint’s general boilerplate prayer for relief. See Thomas R.W. v. Massachusetts Department of Education, 130 F.3d 477, 480 (1st Cir.1997) (quoting Fox v. Board of Trustees of State University of N.Y., 42 F.3d 135, 141-42 (2d. Cir.1994)). When faced with questions regarding similar terminology, other courts have held that a general prayer for “such further relief as this court deems just and proper” cannot possibly operate to preserve a claim for damages “where there is no specific request and no evidence to sustain a claim for reimbursement.” 130 F.3d at 480. See also Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (reversing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for, among other reasons, awarding nominal damages when the complaint requested “all other relief that the Court deems just and proper under the circumstances” while stating that the general boilerplate prayer for relief did not save this case from mootness); Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Bodi-Wachs Aviation Insurance Agency, Inc., 846 F.Supp. 677, 686 (N.D.Ill.1994) (no claim for monetary damages when complaint alleged “such other and *597further relief as the Court deems fit and proper”).
Likewise we are of the opinion that with the exception of the specific prayer for monetary damages, the Bandonis’ general boilerplate language is superfluous and simply insufficient to support any claim upon which other relief may be granted. Even with the most generous reading we are simply unable to infer a claim for declaratory or injunctive relief within the four corners of the Bandon-is’ complaint. Consequently it is inappropriate for us to consider awarding the Bandonis “more relief than [they] sought.” Direct Action for Rights and Equality v. Gannon, 713 A.2d 218, 226 (R.I.1998).
Our conclusion is buttressed by one additional fact that cannot be overlooked — the Bandonis simply do not want other nonmone-tary remedies and have resoundingly foreclosed our consideration of other potential remedies on several occasions. In their memorandum opposing defendants’ joint motion to dismiss, the Bandonis prayed for a monetary award while maintaining that “any opportunity to vacate or correct Richardson’s sentence [is now permanently lost] by the attachment of ‘jeopardy.’ ”15 Following the dismissal of their complaint, the Bandonis filed an appeal to this Court. In their Rule 16 statement (now Rule 12A of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure) the Bandonis phrased the issue in this case as a question of whether “there [is] presently recognized a civil action for damages ” when defendants fail to perform their duties as set forth in article 1, section 23, or the Victim’s Bill of Rights. (Emphasis added.) After this case was assigned to the full-argument calendar, the Bandonis submitted a fifty-one-page brief-in-chief, in which they made their request for relief crystal clear by stating that:
“it is certainly within the authority of this Honorable Court to void an illegal act by another branch of government or refuse to give it effect, but it cannot seriously be suggested by these civil defendants that the criminal’s plea and sentence can or should now be voided or given no effect in order to place the plaintiffs back before the District Court to exercise their constitutional rights as the victim of his crime. Nor is it remotely conceivable that the executive branch could, as a practical matter be ‘enjoined’ from, proceeding with the prosecution of criminal cases without proper notification to the victim involved; that would only serve to wreak havoc with an already overburdened judicial system, and could interfere seriously with those constitutional rights guaranteed to criminal defendants. To allow the plaintiffs in this action a ‘remedy’ whereby they might only now address the court as to the impact of the crime after the defendant has been sentenced would defeat the entire purpose of Article 1, sec. 23, which purpose is to guarantee the victim of crime a meaningful voice in the criminal process, ‘before sentencing,’- and an opportunity directly to affect the sentence with his statements as to the impact of the perpetrator’s crime upon him. * * * Money damages are the only adequate and effective remedy in this instance.”
Despite the fact that the Bandonis never requested, raised, suggested, or even mentioned a possible solution short of monetary damages throughout any of the twists and turns of this entire case, and despite the fact that defendants have not written a single word about any other possible relief, at oral argument the author of the dissent sua sponte seized upon this “other relief" theory and surprisingly suggested that a possible remedy available to the Bandonis would be vacating Richardson’s plea, notwithstanding the fact that Richardson was not a party to this litigation. Now the dissent embarks upon a mission to “discern whether plaintiffs may be entitled to any form of relief that a court might be able to award for the legal violation(s) alleged” while faulting the majority for its “unjustifiable conclusion that the *598Bandonis have waived their non-monetary-damages claims,” which “has the unfortunate effect here of truncating the Bandonis’ complaint by foreclosing the possibility of their obtaining any additional relief * * * beyond monetary damages.” However, while vehemently asserting that there may be other avenues of relief available to the Bandonis, the dissent leaves unanswered the question of what other relief may be appropriate. This task is delegated in the first instance to a trial justice of the Superior Court.
We reiterate, however, that the Bandonis are simply not seeking the remedies espoused by the dissent and accordingly two days after oral argument filed a three-page post argument memorandum “in light of certain questions raised by the Court at oral argument as to the issue of damages and/or other remedies.” (Emphasis added.) In this memorandum the Bandonis maintained the course they held since first filing their claim with the Coventry Town Council — that in this particular instance monetary damages are “the only viable remedy.” In an attempt to leapfrog this obvious waiver hurdle, the dissent throws out a carefully selected snippet of the Bandonis’ memorandum, which states that “ ‘[i]t is certainly within the authority of the Court to declare a remedy, short of an action for damages.’ ” Apparently this excerpt is intended to support the dissent’s conclusion that the Bandonis themselves have acknowledged the possibility of other forms of relief and that our conclusion to consider only monetary damages summarily punishes the Bandonis for their forceful advocacy of one particular form of relief. The dissent takes great liberty with this argument.
Indeed, even a cursory reading of the memorandum finds that the Bandonis did state in their opening sentence that “[i]t is certainly within the authority of this Court to declare a remedy, short of an action for damages.” After stating this universal rule, however, the Bandonis proceed to state unequivocally in the next sentence that “[i]n this particular case, however, such a remedy is unavailing, and potentially dangerous.”16 In light of the selectivity of language with which the dissent dismisses what we conclude to be a waiver, we deem it necessary to append the entire unedited post argument memorandum as the Appendix to this opinion. See Appendix A.
Therefore, we are quite comfortable with our conclusion that the only issue before this Court is the question of a viable claim for monetary damages. We suggest that the spice for this argument has been supplied as part of the dissent’s own ingredients. Thus, while providing the meat for this sua sponte soup, the dissent not only endeavors to stir the pot but also to spank the majority with the ladle.
Finally, after creating the illusion that this case is about some unspecified remedies, the dissent fails to do the spade work necessary to plant such a utopian garden. In the penultimate portion of the dissent, where we anxiously searched for the pronouncement of just what these remedies would entail and how they would be enjoyed by the Bandonis, the dissent drops the ball. Rather than venture into the quagmire of constitutional prob*599lems and policy considerations that this any-remedy-possible theory presents, not the least of which concern the double jeopardy clause, the doctrine of res judicata, accord and satisfaction, joinder, the statute of limitations, and judicial immunity, the dissent takes a page from the Constitutional Convention’s own playbook, ducks the issue, and calls upon a single justice of the Superior Court to make the play. The dissent concludes that “these are decisions that should be made in the first instance by the Superior Court.” Rest assured, however, that if the trial justice fumbles or misses the assignment, the play will be subject to review by the same quarterback. Indeed the dissent raises more questions than it answers. To be sure, the ultimate question before this reviewing body is whether the trial justice erred when he ruled that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. But when this Court remands a case for further proceedings, as the dissent would do in this instance, we also have the responsibility to provide adequate guidance to the trial court. The fact that there will be a Monday-morning quarterback available to dissect the game play-by-play is of little comfort to the trial court. Accordingly, for all its efforts the dissent leaves the most important and most difficult question unanswered. What are the Bandonis’ remedies?
Finally, in spite of our conclusion that this case does not-represent an appropriate circumstance for this Court to create a remedy judicially, the dissent implies that it stands alongside comfortable precedent. See Bivens, supra; Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914) (exclusionary rule). Although the dissent is correct in suggesting such cases as these represent examples of judicial activism, the Court in these cases followed its enthusiasm to the end by actually defining the precise parameters for the remedies that it had just created.17
B. So-Called Prior Precedent
Additionally the dissent relies on so-called prior precedent from Rhode Island, as well as our sister states, that has authorized a direct cause of action from their individual constitutions. We have little trouble distinguishing this line of reasoning since these cases are not the least bit instructive on the question presented by this case — whether article 1, section 23, of the Rhode Island Constitution provides a direct cause of action. We too can cite a litany of cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that specific provisions of other states’ constitutions either do or do not provide for a direct cause of action {Bivens action). But none of these cases are persuasive to answer the specific question presented by this case, given the fact that Rhode Island’s victims’ rights amendment simply cannot be compared to New York’s equal protection clause, North Carolina’s free speech clause, or Maryland’s due process or search and seizure clauses, as the dissent attempts to do.
Similarly the dissent’s reference to this Court’s prior precedent with respect to takings clause cases suffers from the same infirmities. This distinction is highlighted by two glaring differences: (1) the takings clause is a self-executing provision, see, e.g., Annicelli v. Town of South Kingstown, 463 A.2d 133 (R.I.1983), and perhaps even more importantly, (2) the text of the takings clause expressly provides for a remedy. See art. 1, sec. 16 (“Private property shall not be taken for public uses, without just compensation ”) (emphases added). Therefore, while we sympathize with the dissent’s predicament in espousing what are obviously deeply held beliefs, we recognize the dearth of case law on this significant subject and believe that the Procrustean effort to analogize the case at *600bar to some so-called prior precedent is entirely misplaced.18 It is perhaps for this reason that after much fanfare discussing “issues” that are either premature or not in controversy,19 the dissent finally arrives at what it terms (and we agree) the overarching issue in this case — whether article 1, section 23, is self-executing.
On this issue the dissent concludes that article 1, section 28, is self-executing because (1) the victims’ rights amendment contains the specific right for crime victims to address the court before sentencing, (2) the amendment does not contain a directive to the Legislature for further enabling, (3) the motivating factor behind the victims’ rights amendment was “ ‘the need for greater protection for victims of crime,’ ” and (4) a preliminary draft of article 1, section 23, expressly provided crime victims with a remedy. However, the fact that the 1986 victims’ rights amendment contains a provision entitling victims the right to address the court before sentencing is of little consequence since crime victims had enjoyed this' right since 1983. Furthermore, the fact that article 1, section 23, does not contain an express directive to the Legislature for further enabling is of no aid to the dissent since the Judiciary Committee’s report expressly mandated that the General Assembly (and not the courts) create “specific provisions or mechanisms to implement an enforcement provision.” We also place little value on the undisputed fact that the motivating factor behind the victims’ rights amendment was “the need for greater protection for victims of crime.”
It cannot be disputed that since article 1, section 23, was ratified, crime victims have been afforded greater protections. To illustrate this point, we refer to § 12-28-10, entitled “Victims’ services unit,” which was enacted by the General Assembly a mere one day after the framers ratified article 1, section 23, and is designed to assist victims through every stage of their ordeal. In addition the framers’ desire to arm crime victims with greater protection can in no way be equated, ipso facto, with the dissent’s conclusion that the framers intended for crime victims to have recourse in the law, which is but one way that the General Assembly could increase protection to crime victims. Had the framers actually intended for crime victims to have recourse in the law, they could quite easily have provided for this remedy within the text of article 1, section 23. On the contrary, the framers deleted the very provision, which would have given this precise right to crime victims. Faced with this undeniable fact, the dissent formulates its last-ditch argument that Resolution 86-140 was “altered” but only “for the economy of language.” We have already addressed this argument, and we shall not give it anymore attention than it deserves.
Relying upon these subjective considerations, the dissent incorrectly determines *601that article 1, section 23, is self-executing and, after declaring that “no special factors counseling hesitation” exist, concludes that the Bandonis may be entitled to some type of unspecified remedy. Here again we part ways since we cannot agree with the bold and unsubstantiated conclusion that there are “no special factors counseling hesitation” when the United States Supreme Court itself has observed that “the concept of ‘special factors counsel[]ing hesitation’ * * * included an appropriate judicial deference to indications that congressional inaction has not been inadvertent.” Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 423, 108 S.Ct. at 2468, 101 L.Ed.2d at 381. If this ease stands for no other proposition, it must stand for the fact that a majority of this Court does not view the Legislature’s inaction as inadvertent, and thus this factor alone constitutes a special factor counseling hesitation.
V
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons we hold that article 1, section 23, is not self-executing and that in order for a cause of action for damages to resonate from the deprivation of a crime victim’s rights, the Legislature must create specific provisions or mechanisms as mandated by the framers. The plaintiffs’ appeal is denied and dismissed, and the judgment appealed from is affirmed. The papers in this case are hereby remanded to the Superior Court.
. Following oral argument, the plaintiffs filed a supplemental memorandum urging this Court to recognize a cause of action for monetary damages “as the only viable remedy in this particular instance,” as opposed to other potential remedies discussed during oral argument. With this memorandum we deem the plaintiffs to have waived our consideration of other remedies, and we shall therefore limit our discussion to whether they have stated a cause of action for monetary damages as requested, At this early juncture we note that the dissent refuses to take the plaintiffs at their word and vehemently disagrees with our conclusion on this matter. We shall address these comments infra § IV. A.
. When reviewing a trial justice’s judgment to grant a motion to dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, this Court assumes that allegations contained in the complaint are true and views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See St. James Condominium Association v. Lokey, 616 A.2d 1343, 1346 (R.I.1996). Therefore, this section contains the relevant alie-*583gations that the Bandonis aver in their amended complaint.
. General Laws 1956 § 12-28-7 states:
"Noncompliance not affecting validity of conviction, sentence, or parole. — Failure to afford the victim of a felony offense any of the rights established by this chapter shall not constitute grounds for vacating an otherwise lawful conviction, or for voiding an otherwise lawful sentence or parole determination.”
. See Ala. Const. amend. 557; Alaska Const. art. I, § 24; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1; Cal. Const. art. 1, § 28; Colo. Const. art. 2, § 16a; Conn. Const. art. 1, § 8; Fla. Const. art. 1, § 16(b); Idaho Const. art. 1, § 22; Ill. Const. art. I, § 8.1; Ind. Const. art. 1, § 13(b); Kan. Const. art. 15, § 15; Md. Decl. of Rights art. 47; Mich. Const. art. 1, § 24; Mo. Const. art. I, § 32; Neb. Const. art. I, § 28; Nev. Const. art. 1, § 8; N.J. Const. art. 1, § 22; N.M. Const. art. II, § 24; N.C. Const. art. I, § 37; Ohio Const. art. I, § 10a; Okla. Const. art. 2, § 34; Oreg. Const. art. 1, § 42; S.C. Const. art. I, § 24; Tex. Const. art. 1, § 30; Utah Const. art. I, § 28; Va. Const. art. I, § 8-A; Wash. Const. art. I, § 35; Wis. Const. art. 1, § 9m.
.See, e.g., Nev. Const. art. 1, sec. 8(3) ("[N]o person may maintain an action against the state or any public officer or employee for damages or injunctive, declaratory or other legal or equitable relief on behalf of a victim of a crime as a result of a violation of any statute enacted by the legislature pursuant to subsection 2. No such violation authorizes setting aside a conviction or sentence or continuing or postponing a criminal proceeding”); Utah Const. art. 1, sec. 28(2) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed as creating a cause of action for money damages, costs, or attorney’s fees, or for dismissing any criminal charge, or relief from any criminal judgment”). See also Proposed Amendment to the Constitution of the United States to protect rights of crime victims, H.J. Res. 71, 105th Cong. *586§ 2 ("[N]othing in this article shall provide grounds for the victim to overturn a charging decision, a conviction, dr a sentence; to obtain a stay of trial; or to compel a new trial. Nothing in this article shall give rise to any claim for damages, nor provide grounds for the accused or convicted offender to obtain any form of relief"); SJ. Res. 6, 105th Cong. § 2 (substantially similar).
. See, e.g., Mich. Const. art. 1, sec. 24(2) (“The legislature may provide by law for the enforcement of this section”); Neb. Const. art. 1, sec. 28 ("The legislature shall provide by law for the implementation of the rights granted in this section. There shall be no remedies other than as specifically provided by the Legislature for the enforcement of the rights granted by this section”).
. As the dissent observes, the United States Supreme Court has subsequently extended the Bivens action to include a monetary cause of action for violations of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause, see Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979), and for violations of the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980). In the eighteen years since Davis and Carlson, however, the Court has dramatically curtailed its holding in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). See Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) (refusing to extend Bivens actions to Federal Government agencies); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 108 S.Ct. 2460, 101 L.Ed.2d 370 (1988) (declining to imply a Bivens action for alleged due process violations for the denial of Social Security disability benefits on the ground that a damages remedy was not included in the remedial scheme devised by Congress); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 107 S.Ct. 3054, 97 L.Ed.2d 550 (1987) (declining Bivens action while reaffirming Chappell); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983) (refusing to permit federal employee a damages cause of action for alleged First Amendment violation arising out-of an employment relationship on the grounds that civil service damages are available and that Congress is better suited to create new remedies); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983) (refusing to create a Bivens action for enlisted military personnel alleging deprivation of certain rights even though no other remedy available). See also Meyer, 510 U.S. at 484, 114 S.Ct. at 1005, 127 L.Ed.2d at 322 (“In our most recent decisions, we have responded cautiously to suggestions that Bivens remedies be extended into new contexts’ ”); Kelley Property Development, Inc., v. Town of Lebanon, 226 Conn. 314, 627 A.2d 909, 921 (1993) (recognizing the Supreme Court’s retreat); Brown v. State, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 652 N.Y.S.2d 223, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1138 (1996) (same).
.We stress, as the dissent acknowledges, that the overarching question presented by this case is whether article 1, section 23, is self-executing. Until we determine that this provision is self-executing, any discussion concerning the Ban-donis' potential remedies is entirely superfluous *587since, as a matter of law, the victims’ rights amendment does not provide " ‘a sufficient rule by means of which the right given may be enjoyed and protected.’ ” Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 403, 21 S.Ct. 210, 212, 45 L.Ed. 249, 251 (1900). Since this issue is the pivotal question upon which this appeal turns, we are surprised to find the analysis on this point buried in the later portions of the dissent. See infra footnote 19.
. Similar to § 12-28-2, the victims' rights amendment states:
"A victim of crime shall, as a matter of right, be treated by agents of the state with dignity, respect and sensitivity during all phases of the criminal justice process. Such person shall be entitled to receive, from the perpetrator of the crime, financial compensation for any injuiy or loss caused by the perpetrator of the crime, and shall receive such other compensation as the state may provide. Before sentencing, a victim shall have the right to address the court regarding the impact which the perpetrator’s conduct has had upon the victim.” R.I. Const, art. 1, sec. 23.
. Indeed, the reason behind the Legislature’s failure explicitly to provide crime victims with the right to address the court before sentencing may have been nothing more than its realization that in the normal course of events “the full impact of the crime upon the victim is brought to the attention of the court” prior to sentencing, rather than after the defendant has already been led away in handcuffs. Thus the Legislature may have simply concluded that including the words "before sentencing” was superfluous.
. We are constrained to note that had the framers truly intended to alter the text and to do so solely for the purpose of "economy of language,” the framers did so by the narrowest of margins. An examination of the alterations made by the Committee on Style and Drafting reveals that thirty-three words were added to Resolution 86-140, whereas thirty-four words were deleted. Thus the framers accomplished their supposed goal of economizing the language of the soon-to-be article 1, section 23, by a grand total of one word.
. We find it necessary to reiterate the fact that even though article 1, section 23, contains the right of a crime victim to address the court prior to sentencing, this inclusion alone cannot be indicative of a self-executing provision. We state this conclusion firmly and without hesitation since the Victim's Bill of Rights, § 12-28-3, entitled "General rights,” had already provided crime victims "the right to address the court prior to sentencing” three years before article 1, section 23, was ratified. See § 12-28-3(11). (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, as we have previously stated, other provisions that existed at the time of the 1986 Convention already provided the precise procedures by which crime victims may exercise this right. See §§ 12-28-4; 12-28-4.1.
. Article 1, section 5, of the Rhode Island Constitution provides:
“Entitlement to remedies for injuries and wrongs — Right to justice. — Every person within this state ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which may be received in one's person, property, or character. Every person ought to obtain right and justice freely, and without purchase, completely and without denial; promptly and without delay; conformably to the laws.”
. We note that the dissent, "without deciding," does not foreclose the possibility of vacating a criminal defendant’s sentence for the purpose of resentencing after having allowed the victim or victims the opportunity to address the court. We express no opinion upon this proposition and any possible implication of the double jeopardy clause since this is beyond the scope of our opinion.
. In concluding that the Bandonis are entitled to some other unspecified nonmonetary remedies, the dissent refers to Rule 54(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. We simply disagree with the dissent’s suggestion that this rule has any applicability to cases that are dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. General Laws 1956 § 9-1-30(a) is a legislative determination that for most actions brought in the Superior Court at law for monetary damages, the pleadings shall not “contain an ad damnum or monetary amount claimed * * * [but], the complaint shall state that the monetary amount claimed is sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of the superior court.’’ Rule 54(c) provides that the judgment in an action wherein a party is successful in establishing a claim should include the relief to which the party is entitled. Rule 54(c), however, cannot save a claim lacking substantive merit. Moreover, the cases upon which the dissent relies are inapposite. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 66, 99 S.Ct. 383, 387, 58 L.Ed.2d 292, 299 (1978), stands for the proposition that "while a meritorious claim will not be rejected for want of a prayer for appropriate relief, a claim lacking substantive merit obviously should be rejected.” Accord Doe v. United States Department of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1104 (D.C.Cir.1985). None of these cases has any applicability to a situation in which a trial justice, or an appellate court, sua sponte, extends relief that has not been requested or anticipated by anyone.
. It is noteworthy that the judicial remedies we refer to all arose from violations of one of the Bill of Rights. In addition, these judicially created remedies have received their fair-share of criticism. See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 484, 114 S.Ct. at 1005, 127 L.Ed.2d at 322 ("In our most recent decisions, we have 'responded cautiously to suggestions that Bivens remedies be extended into new contexts’ ”); State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 22, 26 (R.I.1982) (Miranda followed by a “thunderclap of criticism"); Note, Taking Back Our Streets: Attempts in the 104th Congress to Reform the Exclusionary Rule, 38 B.C. L.Rev. 205 (1996) (observing Congress’ efforts to modify or to repeal the exclusionary rule).
. We note that our research has revealed one other case, albeit a lower-court case, where a direct cause of action was brought tinder a state’s victim’s rights constitutional amendment. In Leger v. Stockton Unified School District, 202 Cal.App.3d 1448, 249 Cal.Rptr. 688 (1988), the plaintiff brought suit, alleging that the school district failed to protect him from physical assault at school. Among the plaintiff’s legal theories was that the defendant school district violated article 1, section 28(c), of California’s crime victim’s constitutional amendment, which provides that "[a]ll students and staff of public primary, elementary, junior high and senior high schools have the inalienable right to attend campuses which are safe, secure and peaceful.” 249 Cal.Rptr. at 690. Despite presuming all constitutional provisions to be self-executing, the court held that this provision "declares a general right without specifying any rules for its enforcement.” Id. at 691. Consequently this provision was found to be not self-executing.
. For instance the dissent begins its analysis with the question of whether the Bandonis are “victims." For the purposes of review, however, we assume that the allegations contained in the Bandonis’ complaint, including the assertion that they are "victims,” are true, a posture defendants conceded at oral argument. See St. James Condominium Association, 676 A.2d at 1346. In addition the dissent also laments the "decidedly misplaced” reliance on the Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House Inc., 674 A.2d 1223 (R.I. 1996), line of cases since these cases are not applicable to a constitutional type of analysis. Although we recognize that one of the governmental defendants has relied on this line of cases, we stress that our opinion relies on Accent Store Design, Inc. only in the consideration of the Victim’s Bill of Rights legislation.