concurring.
To the extent that the plurality holds that it was improper for the custodians to use the children’s UGMA funds to offset the father’s support obligation, I agree.1 However, because the plurality answers more than asked, I must disagree with other aspects of the opinion.
The opinion begins its analysis with the announcement of a simple and well defined rule: “we hold that a parent’s obligation to support minor children is independent of the minor’s assets.” P. 398. Unfortunately, the plurality proceeds to obfuscate this simple rule by seeking to explain the instances in which a court can take into its consideration the minor’s assets in setting a support order.
The primary source of support for children is their parents. Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974). Either or both parents must support their offspring until they reach majority. Costello v. LeNoir, 462 Pa. 36, 40, 337 A.2d 866, 868 (1975). The obligation of support is independent of the assets of the children. Their assets are only relevant when the parents are unable to meet their responsibility of support, and in those instances where a minor’s assets are utilized to offset the failure of the parent to meet his or her obligation, the parents’ debt is not extinguished. Here, the parents are able, and no more need be said. Each case for support differs as there are different faces. A recitation that purports to cover all possibilities creates more problems than answers.
The issue here is not whether the father is able to support his children; he is. The issue is rather can a father take *410back a gift he gave. The answer must be no, unless a father’s gift is never a gift. See generally Semasek v. Semasek, 509 Pa. 282, 292, 502 A.2d 109, 113 (1985) (McDermott, J., concurring). If one chooses to make a gift to his children, he cannot later take it back by deducting from that patrimony what he owes in support payments.
. I am also in agreement with the plurality’s jurisdictional analysis.