concurring:
I write separately only to state that we are not presented in this case with the issue whether ordinary work-related causes, such as personnel decisions and the departmental processing of compensation claims, are compensable under D.C.Code § 4-616 (1981), as aggravation of an earlier on-duty injury.
The decision of the Police and Firefighters’ Retirement and Relief Board was based in part on its conclusion that Allen’s mental condition resulted from a history of non-duty related physical illnesses, “arguments with department officials regarding sick leave status and personal frustrations as a result of administrative sick leave denial. It is a culmination of these difficulties which are the predominant causal effects of [Allen’s] mental condition.” The Board further concluded that “[t]he evidence of record clearly shows a progression of mental decline which simply became more acute when [Allen] was denied pay status sick leave. [Allen] has failed to carry the burden of proving otherwise.”
This court has denied compensation for aggravation only when it was caused by extrinsic circumstances completely unrelated to employment. See, e.g., Morgan *1233v. District of Columbia Police and Firemen’s Retirement and Relief Board, 370 A.2d 1322, 1325 (D.C.1977); Stoner v. District of Columbia Police and Firemen’s Retirement and Relief Board, 368 A.2d 524, 529 (D.C.1977). So far we have not been presented with the circumstances that would require us to decide whether to follow a trend in worker’s compensation toward granting compensation for psychological disorders that have been caused by stressful workplace occurrences in the first instance. E.g., Kelly’s Case, 17 Mass.App. 727, 462 N.E.2d 348 (1984), aff'd, 394 Mass. 684, 477 N.E.2d 582 (1985) (emotional injury as a result of a transfer or layoff, although economically justified and handled properly, is compensable injury); see generally, 1B A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law § 42.24 (1985). Nor, in the instant case, are we presented with a record that properly raises the question whether such workplace occurrences would constitute aggravation within the meaning of section 4-616.
I agree with the majority opinion that Allen did not establish any “preexisting (and service-related) psychological injury or illness which might have become disabling because of the subsequent events,” namely the treatment of his claim by the police department, and, hence, that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the Board’s decision. Accordingly, although the decision does not indicate that the Board expressly addressed the issue whether “administrative aggravation” is compensable under section 4-616, its factual findings that Allen had not met his burden of proof and that he had suffered from a “mental decline which simply became more acute” would preclude recovery on the basis of this alternative theory.