*582Dissenting Opinion by
CATHELL, Judgein which BELL, Chief Judge joins.
I dissent. It is difficult to disagree with such a well-written, comprehensive opinion on general land use principles that has so much in it with which I agree. However, because it also has holdings in it with which I disagree, I shall overcome the difficulty. As to the determinative questions presented to this Court, I believe the relevant statutory interpretations made by the majority, and the ultimate decisions here rendered, are wrong.
I first, and primarily, dissent from the majority’s holding that conditional zoning, as contemplated by the 1970 Enabling Act and subsequent local statutes, was not, and is not, intended to apply to conditions that limit uses within districts. The majority essentially asserts that the enabling act that authorizes local governmental entities to pass statutes permitting “conditional zoning,”1 was designed to permit only those conditions that would not result in limiting the uses that are otherwise permitted in a new classification. The majority states:
“As the Court of Special Appeals correctly pointed out, however, in Bd. of County Comm’rs of Washington County v. H. Manny Holtz, Inc., 65 Md.App. 574, 582-83, 501 A.2d 489, 492-93 (1985), conditional zoning which acts as a limitation as to otherwise permissible uses is not permitted under Art. 66B.”2
*583First, as I shall later discuss, the Court of Special Appeals was not correct in respect to that statement in Manny Holtz. This Court in Attman/Glazer P.B. Company v. Mayor and Aldermen of Annapolis, 314 Md. 675, 686, 552 A.2d 1277, 1283 (1989), has already expressly declined to adopt the Court of Special Appeals’ reasoning in Manny Holtz as to the scope of the statute. In Attman, we pointed out the trend away from a prohibition of conditional zoning, but noted that we were not adopting the Manny Holtz reasoning the majority now adopts. We said in Attman, 314 Md. at 686 n. 8, 552 A.2d at 1283 n. 8, that:
“Conditional zoning, once roundly condemned, appears to be in the ascendency. In Maryland, the concept has evolved indirectly through the use of various zoning devices such as planned developments, and has found at least limited favor with the state legislature. See Article 66B, § 4.01(b) permitting a county or municipal corporation to impose certain conditions at the time of zoning or rezoning land under certain circumstances. See also People’s Counsel v. Mockard, 73 Md.App. 340, 343-45, 533 A.2d 1344 (1987); and Bd. of Co. Comm’rs v. H. Manny Holtz, Inc., 65 Md.App. 574, 579-86, 501 A.2d 489 (1985)(holding that § 4.01(b) of Article 66B authorizes the imposition of conditions applicable to structural and architectural character of the land and improvements thereon, and does not authorize conditional use rezoning). We need not, and do not, offer an opinion concerning the intermediate appellate court’s interpretation of the scope of § 4.01(h).” [Emphasis added.]
Interestingly, the majority opinion on page 544-45, states: “it is clear that Maryland now approves of at least limited conditional zoning.... As we pointed out in Attman .... ” Attman does not support the present position of the majority. Nor does it support the relevant parts of Manny Holtz.
Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals’ Manny Holtz offers no precedential support, at this level, for the position of the majority. As I shall indicate, there is absolutely no prior support for the majority’s position that the conditional zoning *584permitted by the statutes cannot be used during classifications to apply limitations on uses.
The majority also states in respect to the charter amendment issue:
“Although we shall conclude that no rational argument can be made to suggest that the language in Art. 23A, § 9(c)(1) refers to plans other than those of the pre-annexation zoning authority, a plain meaning approach does not yield this conclusion as the ready answer.”
In my view, it is sophistry to posit that a contrary rational argument cannot be made to the majority’s position, and in the same breath admit that the plain meaning of the language of the statute does not support the majority’s position. On top of that, the majority also states that: “The language of the clause is arguably ambiguous. As written there are two possible plain meaning interpretations of the language.” Both statements are, in my view, clearly wrong. The position of the majority depends on what the word “or” is. In this respect, in my view, the majority adopts a ‘Clintonism’ of the highest order.
I. Arguments
I first address the conditional zoning issue.
Part A. Conditional zoning
The majority, in essence, states that to hold that the statute permits limitations as to uses, would adversely affect the uniformity or consistency of uses within a classification that is required, generally. I fail to perceive, utterly, how limiting a use, so long as the use to which the property is limited is a use otherwise permitted in a district, affects the uniformity of a district.3 The history of the conditional zoning law of this *585state, prior to the enactment of the enabling act that permitted conditional zoning, is directly and completely contrary to the majority’s position as to use conditions. The prior conditional zoning cases exclusively involved instances where the conditions related to use limitations. It was exactly those cases, where the Court had disapproved conditional zoning as to uses, that caused the 1968-69 Maryland Planning and Zoning Law Study Commission (Commission) to recommend to the Legislature, and the Legislature to adopt, the enabling act permitting conditional zoning. If the prohibition on conditional zoning relating to limitations on uses was intended to survive the 1970 amendment and remain a prohibited practice because it adversely affected “uniformity” requirements within the districts, the 1970 amendment is completely meaningless. The pre-existing case law already so provided. Additionally, in Maryland, conditional zoning in respect to use limitations was what had been, and the only thing that had expressly been, prohibited by the prior Maryland cases. Nothing in the case law prior to the passage of the 1970 enabling act, or in the legislative history of the act, supports the position of the majority, that the intent of the Commission, and ultimately the Legislature, was to permit conditional zoning only as it relates to non-use matters. That is what the law already provided. There is absolutely no pre 1970 legal authority in Maryland for the position the majority now takes. The Maryland cases prior to that point in time relating to conditional zoning generally involved conditions as to uses.4
*586Although there was a suggestion of conditional zoning in the earlier Wakefield case,5 the earliest “conditional zoning” case, certainly the most cited (and quoted) conditional use case in Maryland, appears to have been the case of Baylis v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959), although it can also be argued, as the majority posits, that it was a case of contract zoning. In reality, it was both.
Property owners sought to have their property in Baltimore City rezoned to a classification that would permit the property to be used as a “funeral home or undertaking establishment.” The then current classification of the property in the district in which it was situated prior to the reclassification did not permit funeral homes. The local Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals recommended approval of the reclassification provided that certain restrictions be placed on the use of the property in the new district classification that limited its use to a funeral home. This recommendation was, in essence, a recommendation for conditional zoning imposing a limitation on use — not a yard type limitation. The Planning Commission recommended disapproval for several reasons, including that an ordinance that permitted reclassification, but only by restricting the property to funeral home use, would be “special privilege legislation” and that “legislation should not be based upon trades or conditions.”
The ordinance that was subsequently adopted, while reclassifying the property, required as a condition that the property owners enter into a recordable agreement (such an agreement under certain circumstances might also be characterized as contract zoning), creating use restrictions running with the land that , bound the owners and their successors to use the *587property only as a funeral home. Such a restriction, required by governmental officials, limiting uses is conditional zoning however it is created, either by contract or by it being simply imposed. Thus, in Baylis, the provision constituted both contract and conditional zoning. The condition at issue in Baylis was clearly a condition as to uses, as opposed to other types of conditions, i.e., yard, height, density, etc. (commonly in variance law referred to as “yard variances”). The agreement was also to provide that at any time the property ceased to be used as a funeral home, it would revert back to its previous classification. The conditions attached to the rezoning were attacked as ultra vires. We held:
“There is authority to the effect that reasonable conditions and restrictions may be imposed by a board in connection with a special exception or variance, at least where the power to do so is express, or may fairly be implied.... But these considerations disappear when we deal with a reclassification involving a revision of the comprehensive plan and a change in the district or zone by the legislative body.... Moreover, the Council, under the Enabling Act and Ordinance, has set up districts for Residential Uses, and First Commercial Uses. If it were permitted in special cases to allow inconsistent uses in such districts, it would destroy the uniformity required by Sec. 2 of the Enabling Act.
“... [tjhere seem to be three chief reasons for the rule stated in these cases:6 that rezoning based on offers or *588agreements with the owners disrupts the basic plan, and thus is subversive of the public policy reflected in the overall legislation, that the resulting ‘contract’ is nugatory because a municipality is not able to make agreements which inhibit its police powers, and that restrictions in a particular zone should not be left to extrinsic evidence.
“In terms of zoning, the primary objection is the effect of permitting additional districts which have little or nothing in common and are unlike the basic zones.” Baylis, 219 Md. at 168-70, 148 A.2d at 432-33. [Emphasis added.] [Footnote added.]
Accordingly, Baylis is the first Maryland case that involved conditional zoning; it involved conditions as to uses — “inconsistent uses.” The problems the Baylis Court discussed as resulting from conditional uses, are, in all relevant aspects, similar to the problems the majority discusses- in the case at bar. Baylis can be said to stand for the proposition the majority adopts today. If the subsequent statute authorizing conditional zoning had never been passed, the majority’s position here might be precedentially correct. However, by adopting the pre 1970 law in spite of the 1970 statute, the majority is resurrecting a dinosaur.
The 1968-1970 Maryland Planning and Zoning Law Study Commission, in making its recommendations to the Legislature that ultimately resulted in the current statutory authorization for local governments to conditionally zone, was fully aware of the application of conditional zoning to “uses.” In fact, the only Maryland case mentioned in the Commission’s report, albeit in its' contract zoning aspect, was Baylis, the then seminal case in respect to conditional zoning as to uses.
Just a year after Baylis, Rose v. Paape, 221 Md. 369, 157 A.2d 618 (1960), became the second case in Maryland to squarely address, and then reject, the concept of conditional zoning in the pre 1970’s era. The Court there described the proposed rezoning:
“[T]he Board undertook to make the rezoning of the appellants’ strip along the east, south and west sides of Rose *589Haven Harbor conditional upon (a) the approval of counsel for the objectors and (b) a limitation of the uses which would otherwise be permissible under a Light Commercial classification. The latter condition was also sought to be made applicable to the harbor itself, whether that was sought to be done as a matter of original zoning or as a matter of rezoning.” Rose, 221 Md. at 376, 157 A.2d at 622.
We held that:
“Zoning powers in Anne Arundel County are derived partly from Ch. 388 of the Acts of 1947, as amended, and partly from §§ 10-37 Article 66-B of the Code of Public General Laws (1957 Ed.). In neither of them ... do we find any power vested in the Board to attach special conditions to resolutions rezoning properties from one classification to another, or establishing original zoning, which are not applicable generally to all properties in the given classification in which the property in question may be placed.” Id. at 375-76, 157 A.2d at 621-22.
Rose, as is evident in its conditional zoning aspect, concerned “use” limitations or conditions.
Pressman v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 222 Md. 330, 160 A.2d 379 (1960), involved several rezonings to new classifications that would permit the construction of shopping centers. In respect to some of the reclassifications we noted:
“Two of them ... dealing with Tract One were approved by the Planning Commission on condition that Food Fair and Stewart’s enter into an agreement [contract zoning] with the City relating thereto.... The Agreement itself recites that its execution was a condition to the approval of the Commission. ...
“These ordinances ... were passed in April, 1959.... None of them make any reference to the Agreement. We think it reasonable to suppose that its purport was known to the City Council.
“The resolution of the Commission ... relating to the Agreement was, in substance, as follows:
*590‘That this Commission’s action of approval is based upon an agreement ... providing ... if it is subsequently determined that this project cannot be carried out as substantially proposed and in the event the City takes action to repeal the rezoning ordinance to the end that the property will revert to its present existing uses [conditional zoning], the transferees will not interpose objections to the passage of the repeal ordinance.... ’
“... No matter how moderate, reasonable or even desirable these conditions may be we find no authority for their imposition by the Planning Commission. The State Enabling Act (Code 1957), Art. 66 B, Sec. 7(g)(4) authorizes a zoning board (except in two counties) to ‘approve buildings, and uses limited as to location under such rules and regulations as may be provided by ordinance of the local legislative body,’ but no such authorization extends to the Planning Commission....
“... A purported grant of rezoning might be invalid because actually based upon conditions destructive of uniformity of zoning, even though the rezoning ordinance itself made no express reference to such conditions.” Id. at 341-44, 160 A.2d at 384-86. [Alterations added.] [Emphasis added.]
As can be seen, Pressman also involved conditional zoning relating to uses, and was rejected, at least in part, because the Court felt that the conditions imposed were “destructive of uniformity of zoning.” The same argument the majority makes in the case sub judice.
The main condition imposed on the rezoning in the case of Carole Highlands Citizens Association, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Prince Georges County, 222 Md. 44, 46, 158 A.2d 663, 664-65 (1960), was a “prohibition against the erection of a gasoline station on the premises zoned C 2 [as in this case, a clear condition as to uses].” (internal quotation omitted) (alteration added).7 We found the prohibition to be a *591then impermissible conditional zoning. Although we found that the allegations of conditional zoning in Town of Somerset v. County Council for Montgomery County, 229 Md. 42, 181 A.2d 671 (1962), had not been proven, the conditional zoning there alleged also related to uses. My research indicates that there are no other pre 1970 Maryland cases of this Court relating to conditional zoning. All of the pre 1970 cases were cases involving conditions limiting the otherwise permitted “uses” for certain property.8
Thus, in respect to conditional zoning, the only situation with which the 1970 Commission Report was concerned arose out of prior zoning cases that exclusively involved limitations on uses, which is exactly the issue in the case at bar. The Commission, to the extent it believed that it was addressing prior Maryland cases relating to conditional zoning, and when suggesting a need that the case law be modified by statute, of necessity, had to be referring to conditional zoning as to use conditions. There were no prior Maryland cases that had *592been decided based upon any other types of conditions attached to rezonings. Moreover, the controversy over conditional zoning, both prior to the 1970 statute, and since, has, related to conditions affecting uses.
In that respect, commentators have spoken as to the subsequent erosion of the prohibition against conditional zoning. In her article, Moving Toward The Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L.Rev. 957, 981-86 (1987), Judith W. Wegner addressed the issue:
“Thus, this Article adopts the neutral term ‘contingent zoning’ to describe all types of individualized rezoning arrangements, instead of the more traditional dichotomy ‘contract’ and ‘conditional zoning’ or the more recent references to ‘unilateral contracts’ or ‘concomitant agreement zoning.’ A final conclusion follows from the first two: To the extent that contingent zoning arrangements run the gamut between involuntarily imposed conditions and bilateral agreements, all are potentially affected by the presence of a bargaining process....
“Other courts, including many of the more recent cases, have upheld contingent zoning in the face of charges of per se invalidity. These courts have concluded that traditional zoning legislation provided ample authority, and that textual restrictions designed to guide the implementation of other types of zoning simply did not apply....
“... Contingent zoning merely promotes more finetuned accommodations, instead of all-or-nothing rezoning decisions, thereby facilitating compromises designed to approximate all interested parties’ expectations.” [Footnotes omitted.] [Emphasis added.]
Some states, either by case law or statute, have approved of some level of conditional zoning that are particularly illustra*593tive. The cases include Sweetman v. Town of Cumberland, 117 R.I. 134, 151 n. 4, 364 A.2d 1277, 1288 n. 4 (1976), where that state’s Supreme Court stated, in relevant part:
“This court has not passed upon the validity of conditional zoning either before or after the enactment of the provision here which expressly authorizes it. Although both Arc-Lan Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 106 R.I. 474, 261 A.2d 280 (1970), and Nicholson v. Tourtellotte, 110 R.I. 411, 415, 293 A.2d 909, 911 (1972), involved conditional zoning, in each instance we expressly declined to rule whether the practice was valid.”
Then, in the body of its opinion, the court stated:
“First, imposing differing conditions on the property in the same land-use category is not a wholly arbitrary differentiation per se. Owners of property in the same land-use category are not necessarily ‘similaily situated’ so that they must be treated identically under the equal protection clause. The particular use of one parcel, by virtue of the property’s location, may have a greater impact on surrounding properties than that of another parcel in the same zoning district. In addition, two parcels may have been classified at different times when the needs of the municipality differed. Different pieces of property may also have physical characteristics which differ enough to require some minor differences in use restriction, while still permitting the land to be placed in the same general category.” Id. at 151-52, 364 A.2d at 1288-89. [Emphasis added]
Finally, the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated:
“In Nicholson v. Tourtellotte, 110 R.I. 411, 293 A.2d 909 (1972), this court, while not reaching the issue of the validity of conditional zoning, noted the position of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington that
i “ * * * An amendment to a zoning ordinance and a concomitant agreement should be declared invalid only if it can be shown that there was no valid reason for a change and that they are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, and have no substantial relation to the public health, *594safety, morals, and general welfare, or if the city is using the concomitant agreement for bargaining and sale to the highest bidder or solely for the benefit of private speculators.” ’ Id. at 415, 293 A.2d at 911.
Accord, Pecora v. Zoning Comm’n, 145 Conn. 435, 144 A.2d 48 (1958); Hudson Oil Co. of Missouri v. City of Wichita, 193 Kan. 623, 396 P.2d 271 (1964); cf. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d 118 (1962). See generally Shapiro, The Case for Conditional Zoning, 41 Temp. L.Q. 267 (1968), and the cases cited therein. We assume that in adopting conditional zoning the Legislature also meant to adopt the commonly understood limitations on that power.”
Id. at 152 n. 5, 364 A.2d at 1289 n. 5. And see Collard v. Village of Flower Hill, 52 N.Y.2d 594, 600-01, 439 N.Y.S.2d 326, 421 N.E.2d 818, 821 (1981), where, citing our Baylis decision, the Court stated:
“Probably the principal objection to conditional rezoning is that it constitutes illegal spot zoning, thus violating the legislative mandate requiring that there be a comprehensive plan for, and that all conditions be uniform within, a given zoning district. When courts have considered the issue (see, e.g., Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429; Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automotive Prods. Credit Ass’n., 9 N.J. 122, 87 A.2d 319; Hausmann & Johnson v. Berea Bd. of Appeals, 40 Ohio App.2d 432, 320 N.E.2d 685), the assumptions have been made that conditional zoning benefits particular landowners rather than the community as a whole and that it undermines the foundation upon which comprehensive zoning depends by destroying uniformity within use districts. Such unexamined assumptions are questionable. First, it is a downward change to a less restrictive zoning classification that benefits the property rezoned and not the opposite imposition of greater restrictions on land use. Indeed, imposing limiting conditions, while benefitting surrounding properties, normally adversely affects the premises on which the conditions are imposed. Second, zoning is not invalid per se merely because only a *595single parcel is involved or benefitted (Matter of Mahoney v. O’Shea Funeral Homes, 45 N.Y.2d 719, 408 N.Y.S.2d 470, 380 N.E.2d 297); the real test for spot zoning is whether the change is other than part of a well-considered and comprehensive plan calculated to serve the general welfare of the community. Such a determination, in turn, depends on the reasonableness of the rezoning in relation to neighboring uses — an inquiry required regardless of whether the change in zone is conditional in form. Third, if it is initially proper to change a zoning classification without the imposition of restrictive conditions notwithstanding that such change may depart from uniformity, then no reason exists why accomplishing that change subject to condition should automatically be classified as impermissible spot zoning.
“... If modification to a less restrictive zoning classification is warranted, then a fortiori, conditions imposed by a local legislature to minimize conflicts among districts should not in and of themselves violate any prohibition against spot zoning.” [Citation omitted.] [Emphasis added.]
Ronald S. Cope, in his article “Annexation Agreements—Boundary Agreements: Walking a Fine Line Into The Future—A Map of the Dangers to the Unwary Land Use Traveler,” 17 N. Ill. U.L.Rev. 377, 388 (1977), writes:
“However, we do not believe it to be an absolute precept that any and all conditional rezoning in Illinois is forbidden. Without doubt, there is a suitable and proper place for utilization of the process. Some conditional rezoning may be in the public good, subservient to a comprehensive plan, in the best interest of the public health, safety and welfare and enacted in recognition of changing circumstances. Not all conditional rezoning is onerous, destructive or an abandonment of the power of the zoning agency nor does it stem from improper motives.” [Emphasis added.]
The controversy over conditional zoning prior to 1970, and even afterwards, has almost always focused on conditions constituting limitations on uses in the reclassified district, not “yard” type limitations. The position of the majority, in *596my view, is neither legally nor intellectually supportable by the past legal history relating to the concept.
In the case sub judice, Rockville’s Planning Staffs final report noted that the approved Land Use Plan, part of the city’s 1993 Master Plan, recommended that the subject property be for service industrial uses consistent with the 1-1 District’s uses. Evidence to the contrary has not been brought to our attention. Accordingly, the zoning classification itself is consistent with the relevant city plans and goals. Thus, any use permitted within that district, in my view, would likewise be consistent. Gasoline service stations, the Court is informed, are permitted, as special exceptions, in the 1-1 District.
In respect to the rule that the Court apparently believed to be in effect at the time of Montgomery County v. National Capital Realty Corporation, 267 Md. 364, 373, 297 A.2d 675, 680 (1972),9 we initially stated, “The invalidity of conditional zoning in Maryland is not seriously open to question,” citing Citizens Association, Rose and Baylis, supra. All of the cases cited in National Capital predated the 1970 amendment to Article 66B that, by its express terms, authorized conditional zoning.10 We made no mention of the new 1970 amendment *597that permitted conditional zoning in National Capital. To support our reliance on these prior cases, we stated:
“ ‘The general rule in these jurisdictions in which the validity of such covenants has been litigated is that they are illegal. The basis of such rule is that the rezoning of a particular parcel of land upon conditions not imposed by the zoning ordinance generally in the particular district into which the land has been rezoned is prima facie evidence of “spot zoning”11 in its most maleficent aspect, is not in accordance with a comprehensive plan and is beyond the power of the municipality.
“ ‘Legislative bodies must rezone in accordance with a comprehensive plan, and in amending the ordinance so as to confer upon a particular parcel a particular district designation, it may not curtail or limit the uses and structures placed or to be placed upon the lands so rezoned differently from those permitted upon other lands in the same district. Consequently, where there has been a concatinated rezoning and filing of a “declaration of restrictions” the general view (where the question has been litigated) is that both the zoning amendment and the restrictive covenant are invalid for the reasons expressed above.’ ” National Capital, 267 Md. at 374, 297 A.2d at 680-81 (quoting extensively from 3 Rathkopf Zoning and Planning, 74-79). [Footnote added.]
At the time of Baylis, the sole Maryland statute that granted power to municipalities to create zoning districts was found in Maryland Code (1957, 1967 Repl.Vol.), Article 66B, Sections 1—Grant of Power and 2—Districts. Section 2 provided, as relevant here, that “All such regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of buildings throughout each *598district.” As the majority notes, this provision remains in Maryland law, now codified as Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol., 2001 Supp.), Article 66B, Section 4.02. Now, however, unlike the Baylis era, there is a specific statute permitting that which Baylis stated was prohibited. Like the unqualified prohibition of our pre 1970 cases, the permissive language of the 1970 statute is also equally unqualified, although the majority seeks to qualify it. So long as local governmental entities adopt proper ordinances, as in my view Rockville has, the Maryland statute was not intended to, and does not, and cannot be construed to, limit the ability of local governmental bodies to attach conditions limiting uses during zoning reclassifications. To me, to construe the amendment any differently is to ignore all applicable precepts of statutory construction. Local governments do not have to permit conditional zoning, but they have the power to do so. And that power is not limited to imposing conditions on yard or area requirements. No intellectually correct construction otherwise is, in my view, possible. There is absolutely no historical support for the majority’s position, nor can it be supported by the canons of statutory construction. Moreover, any jurisdiction that does not want to have conditional zoning can simply decline to pass an authorizing ordinance.
In 1970, subsequent to the Carole Highlands, Baylis and Wakefield cases, the Legislature, granted the power to impose conditions upon rezoning to municipal corporations. It authorized “conditional zoning.” It stated in relevant part:
“(B) The local legislative body of a county or municipal corporation, upon the zoning or rezoning of any land ... may impose such additional restrictions, conditions, or limitations as may be deemed appropriate to preserve, improve, or protect the general character and design of the lands and improvements being zoned or rezoned, or of the surrounding or adjacent lands and improvements, and may, upon the zoning or rezoning of any land or lands, retain or reserve the power and authority to approve or disapprove the design of buildings, construction, landscaping, or other improvements, alterations, and changes made *599or to be made on the subject land or lands to assure conformity with the intent and 'purpose of this article and of the jurisdiction’s zoning ordinance. The powers provided in 401(B) shall be applicable only if the local legislative body adopts an ordinance which shall include enforcement procedures and requirements for adequate notice of public hearings and conditions sought to be imposed.” 12 [Emphasis added.]
The provisions above have remained through subsequent revisions. See Md.Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol.), Art. 66B § 4.01(b). Current subsection (c) (with its several subsections) contains the same provisions first enacted in 1970. See Md.Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol., 2001 Supp.), Art. 66B § 4.01(c). The City of Rockville has apparently enacted ordinances complying with the state statute. Therefore, the present conditional zoning is, in my view, not improper.
Additionally, I believe my position is strongly supported when the available legislative history I refer to is further examined. In 1966, the General Assembly created the Planning and Zoning Law Study Commission to examine the planning and zoning provisions in State law and to make recommendations for changes by 1967. No such report was made in 1967 or in 1968. However, in 1969, the report was finally forwarded to the Legislature. As recommended, a new Article 66B § 4.01 was to be created as a part of a general recodification of Maryland’s planning and zoning provisions. Nevertheless, certain changes were intended to be substantive.
Section 4.01 was clearly an intended substantive change to permit, so long as certain requirements were met, conditional zoning of all types in Maryland, or at least in those jurisdictions to which Article 66B applied, which, through the “zoning” provisions of the Express Powers Act, applied to charter counties as well as municipalities.
*600In respect to the Commission, the records of the General Assembly reflect, in a document entitled “REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1970-PROPOSED BILLS-SPECIAL COMMITTEE REPORTS, VOLUME II, Minutes and Reports of Special Committees to the Legislative Council of Maryland,” that the Commission report was presented on Wednesday, November 12,1969 to the Legislative Council. It was described to the Council by Senator Goodloe E. Byron in relevant part, as follows:
“Under revised Article 66B, counties can have conditional zoning. Further, the Commission has attempted to provide for periodically updating of all plans.
“With the assistance of a research man, the Commission will prepare an analysis and.... A commentary explaining each change as revised Article 66B is in preparation.”
The Commission’s report in its analysis, and the Legislature’s resulting statute, made no distinction between counties and municipalities.
As had the commentators, the commission referred to the changing conception of the utility of conditional zoning. It stated, as relevant to the case sub judice:
“Paragraph 2 of Section j.01 gives to the local legislative body the powers of ‘conditional zoning.’ ‘Since 1960, some courts have recognized that the attachment of conditions to zoning might be a highly desirable means of minimizing the adverse effects of zoning changes. Their decisions reveal a tendency to inject needed flexibility into the American zoning system.’ Shapiro, R.: The Case for Conditional Zoning’ 41 Temple, L. Q 267 (1968) at 287. A distinction should be made between this type of zoning and that commonly referred to as ‘contract zoning. ’ The latter type of zoning was discussed in Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959) where ‘the ordinance made the recldssification conditioned upon the execution of an agreement. ’ Yokley clarifies this distinction in his commentary *601on Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866, 168 N.E.2d 680 (1960) where he concludes that though ‘contract zoning will not be permitted, conditional zoning may be valid if not bargained for in the sense that zoning is granted in return for the condition.’ 2 Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice (3rd edition 1965) 19-11. Therefore, under conditional zoning the usual requirements for reclassification must be met before the powers enunciated in this section are available to the local legislative body. It is believed that this provision avoids previous constitutional pitfalls but still permits the planning commission to provide for orderly development using controls similar to those already found in the subdivision regulations (Section 5.00). Several variations of this provision already exist at the local level, such as the Carroll and Frederick County provisions. ” [Emphasis and quotations exactly as in the Report. See Final Report-Legislative Recommendations, Maryland Planning and Zoning Law Study Commission, December, 1969, pgs 28 and 29.]
It is thus in my view crystal clear13 that conditional zoning is not prohibited in Maryland if local governments comply with the statutory requirements of Section 4.01. Article 66B applies to Commissioner counties and to all municipal corporations. Charter counties, should they choose to do so, have the power to do whatever is permitted under Article 66B. Additionally, there is nothing in the legislative history, including the Commission’s recommendations, that indicates that there was ever any intent during the process to limit conditional zoning so as to continue the prohibition against conditions relating to uses. Certainly, there is no evidence that the *602Commission or Legislature intended to continue a prohibition which the amendment was intended to overrule.
What type of conditional zoning the Law Study Commission was recommending depends upon what types of prohibitions as to conditional zoning the Maryland cases had established. All of the prior Maryland cases where this Court had found conditional zoning to be improper were cases where rezonings had been limited as to uses, not as to “yard” type limitations. The position the majority now adopts, the grafting of its own limitations on the concept of “conditional zoning,” is unsupported by anything the Commission found or did, or by any legislative history or by any proper legal authority. The majority is simply wrong.
Additionally, the Court of Special Appeals, in the present case, erred in relying on Rodriguez v. Prince George’s County, 79 Md.App. 537, 558 A.2d 742 (1989). Rodriguez was correct law at the time it was decided in respect to the statute that court was then construing, even though that statute has now been changed and that holding is not correct in present circumstances, even in that particular county. The Rodriguez court was construing a Prince George’s County ordinance that then permitted a limited degree of conditional zoning. That county ordinance had a provision then found in Prince George’s County Code Section 27-195(c)(2) that, in respect to conditional zoning, stated: “ ‘[i]n no case shall the conditions waive or lessen the requirements of, or prohibit uses allowed in, the approved zone.’ ” Rodriguez, 79 Md.App. at 542, 558 A.2d at 744 (emphasis added). In the case sub judice, the intermediate appellate court, relying on that emphasized provision in Rodriguez, stated the language of a local statute as if it was applicable, generally, throughout Maryland.
As I have indicated, Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol.), Article 66B, Section 4.01(b), “Same—Additional restrictions, conditions, or limitations ” permits local governments to enact ordinances permitting conditional zoning. Pursuant to this subsection of Article 66B, Rockville enacted an ordinance substantially different than the former Prince George’s Coun*603ty14 ordinance construed in Rodriguez. It is now codified as Rockville City Code, Sections 25-126 and 25-127 (Supplement 2000), and reads as follows:
“Sec. 25-126. Grant of local amendment application with conditions-Authorized.
“The Council may impose additional restrictions, conditions or limitations upon the grant of any application for a local amendment to the zoning map pursuant to the authority contained in State law.” (Rockville, Md., Code of Ordinances ch. 25, art. III, div. 2, § 25-126 (2002)).
“Sec. 25-127. Same Procedures.
“(a) Adoption of resolution proposing conditions. If the decision of the Council is to grant a local amendment application, with conditions, it shall adopt a resolution proposing the restrictions, conditions or limitations upon which such application is to be granted.
“(b) Hearing on proposed conditions. The Council shall thereafter hold a public hearing on such proposed conditions, notice of which shall be given as in the case of an original local amendment application and in writing by first class mail to any person who has registered an appearance in writing prior to adoption of such resolution.
“(c) Adoption of ordinance granting with conditions. Following such public hearing on the proposed conditions, the Council may adopt an ordinance granting the application with the additional restrictions, conditions or limitations contained in the resolution required under subsection (a) hereof, or such modification thereof as is not substantially different therefrom. Upon the adoption of such ordinance, the letter and number of the classification of such property on the zoning map shall be followed by the letter ‘C’ to *604designate the zoning classification as conditional, and the number of the ordinance imposing the conditions shall be placed, in parenthesis in the following manner; ‘C-2C (Ord.21-78).’ (Laws of Rockville, Ch. 6, § 6-211)”
The laws of Rockville contain provisions relating to the enforcement of the conditions that comply with the requirements of Article 66B § 4.01(b).15 As can be clearly seen, there is no provision disallowing a condition limiting uses in the Rockville statute.
Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals in relying on Rodriguez, supra, construed the wrong statute in arriving at its determination that the conditional zoning in the case sub judice violated conditional zoning standards because it prohibits uses otherwise permitted in the zoning classification in which the subject property was placed. There is no such applicable limitation in the local Rockville statute. Likewise, that standard in respect to prohibiting uses stated in Rodriguez, was case specific in respect to the local statute and not the applicable State statute, and, thus, should not have been construed in this case as a statewide standard. Article 66B § 4.01(b) (now 4.01(c)) imposes no such specific standard.
Moreover, as we recently stated in County Council of Prince George’s County v. Collington Corporate Center I Limited Partnership, 358 Md. 296, 747 A.2d 1219 (2000), the statutory provision construed in Rodriguez, was modified in response to that case. It, as it was then written, no longer applies anywhere. Section 27-195(c)(2) of the Prince George’s County Code now reads, as relevant to the specific provision at issue in Rodriguez, “except as provided in subparagraph (a)(1), above.” (emphasis in original). The relevant provisions of Section (a)(1) were amended to read: “Whenever an applicant designates a limitation of uses unthin an application, the District Council may approve specific land use types and their general locations ... in accordance with the applicant’s designation, as a part of the approval of the Basic Plan.” *605(emphasis in original). At the present time, the specific Rodriguez standard relied on by the intermediate appellate court does not even apply in the Prince George’s County jurisdiction.
^Accordingly, I would answer the first question posed in petitioner’s original brief: “Does a limitation in an annexation agreement restricting certain uses on newly annexed property constitute conditional zoning?” by saying “yes; but, under the circumstances here present, such conditional zoning was permitted.” The lower court erred by relying on the wrong case and the wrong statute to declare the condition imposed in the present case to be impermissible conditional zoning.
In its discussion the majority emphasizes the need for uniformity. While I suggest that uniformity concerns were well known to the Commission when it made its recommendations that resulted in the 1970 amendment, uniformity, while important, is not the conclusive factor in respect to “conditional zoning” under the statute. Any special condition, be it of the use type or the “yard” type, does not, by definition, promote uniformity. But the question really is, if uniformity is an issue in conditional zoning, does conditional zoning destroy uniformity? The Legislature has, in any event, the authority to compromise uniformity principles by statute. In fact, the Legislature can, if it chooses, abolish uniformity principles altogether, so long as it does not violate constitutional provisions in the process. The Legislature can abolish zoning if it chooses to do so. More important, in respect to the present situation, is the fact that so long as the condition imposed does not permit a “use,” which is otherwise prohibited, it cannot cause lessening of uniformity in a district. To limit uses to a permitted use or uses, does not reduce uniformity. Uniformity, in Euclidean zoning, relates not to the quality of treatment of property owners-that is a 14th Amendment constitutional issue. Uniformity in Euclidean zoning relates to keeping uses uniform. To allow a prohibited use vrould reduce uniformity-a permitted use cannot.
*606The first time this Court recognized the existence of the 1970 amendment authorizing conditional zoning by local governments was, as indicated previously, in the Attmem case. I reiterate what Judge McAuliffe, for the Court noted about the Court of Special Appeals’ Manny Holtz limiting interpretation of the scope of the statute: “We need not, and do not, offer an opinion concerning the intermediate appellate court’s interpretation of the scope of § 4.01(b).” Attman, 314 Md. at 686 n. 8, 552 A.2d at 1283 n. 8 (emphasis added). In my view, that is a clear statement that this Court was not then accepting the interpretation placed upon the statute by the Court of Special Appeals.16
In Manny Holtz, the writer of the opinion for the Court of Special Appeals undertook little legislative history surrounding the 1970 amendment and either failed altogether to find, or simply ignored, the Planning and Zoning Law Study Commission report and recommendations. Therefore, the case made no reference to the prior Maryland cases involving rezoning conditions relating to uses that the Commission’s recommendations were intended to change. Moreover, the Court of Special Appeals failed to note the virtual absence of cases prior to 1970 in Maryland, where the decision was based on conditional zoning that did not relate to conditions as to “uses.” All of the cases decided on the then invalidity of conditional zoning had involved conditions as to uses. Even more important, however, is that the writer completely omitted any consideration of the primary provision of the amending statute (Art. 66B § 4.01(b)), choosing instead to rely *607completely on a later ancillary provision in the statute. The Court of Special Appeals, as Judge McAuliffe noted, stated, as relevant here:
“Section 4.01(b) permits local legislative bodies to impose ‘additional restrictions, conditions or limitations’ on the design and construction of buddings and landscaping on the subject or adjacent tract. The plain meaning of this subsection is clear. The language referring to ‘restrictions, conditions and limitations’ applies only to the structural and architectural character of the land and the improvements thereon. ‘Conditions, restrictions or limitations’ on use are neither explicitly provided for in this [latter] subsection nor can they be implied therefrom.” Manny Holtz, 65 Md.App. at 582, 501 A.2d at 492.
As noted in Attman, this Court expressly declined to accept the limiting interpretation, although the majority in the present case strains to join the Court of Special Appeals’ dicta from Manny Holtz, and, in the process, to metamorphose incorrect, previously rejected dicta in an intermediate appellate court opinion, into the law of Maryland. If one reads only the language of the section quoted by the Manny Holtz court without reading the statutory language it leaves out, it might be possible to arrive at that court’s interpretation. Apparently, it is this Manny Holtz misinterpretation that has led the bar to accept the proposition that conditional zoning power under the statute does not apply to use issues. However, perhaps unrealized by the bar (but apparently realized by Judge McAuliffe), The writer of Manny Holtz left out most of the primary portion of the statute. She took the first part of the primary section, deleted completely what it referred to, and then attached the opening provisions of the primary section to a subsequent, completely unrelated, lessor, ancillary part of the statute. She completely changed the statute. In the process the correct meaning of the quoted language was concealed if it is considered in its complete and actual context. I reiterate the full, appropriate language of the section, in proper context, placing emphasis on the language utilized out of context by the Court of Special Appeals in Manny Holtz:
*608“ ‘The local legislative body of a county or municipal corporation, upon the zoning or rezoning of any land ... may impose such additional restrictions, conditions, or limitations as may be deemed appropriate to preserve, improve, or protect the general character and design of the lands and improvements being zoned or rezoned, or of the surrounding or adjacent lands and improvements, and may, wpon the zoning or rezoning of any land or lands, retain or reserve the power and authority to approve or disapprove the design of buildings, construction, landscaping, or other, improvements, alterations, and changes made or to be made on the subject land or lands to assure conformity with the intent and purpose of this article and of the jurisdiction’s zoning ordinance. The powers provided in subsection (b) shall be applicable only if the local legislative body adopts an ordinance which shall include enforcement procedures and requirements for adequate notice of public hearings and conditions sought to be imposed.’ ” Manny Holtz, 65 Md.App. at 581, 501 A.2d at 492 (quoting Md.Code (1957, 1983 Repl.Vol.), Art. 66B § 4.01(b)) [Some emphasis added.]
As the intermediate appellate court used the language it read “... may impose such additional restrictions ... to ... approve or disapprove the design of the buildings.... ” What the statute actually states is “may impose such additional restrictions ... to preserve, improve or protect the general character of the lands ... being zoned or rezoned ... and may reseme the power to approve or disapprove the design of the buildings .... ” (emphasis added).
As can readily be seen, Art. 66B § 4.01(b) actually has two provisions. The first, and I suggest the primary provision, states that local governments in the present: “may impose such additional restrictions, conditions, or limitations as may be deemed appropriate to preseme, improve, or protect the general character and design of the lands and improvements being zoned or rezoned, or of the surrounding or adjacent lands and improvements.” (some emphasis added). It is this section that authorizes general conditional zoning, *609whether it be “uses” or “yard” type conditions. The next section permits that which the first section does not specifically permit. It permits local governments to “retain or reserve the poiver and authority to approve or disapprove the design of buildings, construction, landscaping, or other improvements, alterations, [in the future]” (emphasis added). The Manny Holtz court improperly took the “restriction, condition, or limitation ” language and separated it from what it applied to, and attached it to a section to which it was not relevant in the first instance. The second section permits the reservation or retaining of power in the local authority to, in the future, approve or disapprove “yard” type plans whenever in the future they are presented. This last language has absolutely nothing to do with the granting of the power to impose conditions on a current reclassification. It is totally unrelated to the first section-the section that authorizes, generally, conditional zoning as to uses in present time.
It appears that the writer of Manny Holtz began with the idea that the Legislature in the 1970 amendment should have limited conditional zoning to the conditions she felt appropriate, and, accordingly, interpreted the language of the amendment in that fashion. By joining the two provisions and completely eliminating the language in between, she completely misapplied the statutory language. In order to arrive at the Manny Holtz interpretation of the statute that the writer apparently desired, the omitted language had to be deleted in order to conceal the actual context of the provision. In order to hold as the Court of Special Appeals held in Manny Holtz, the context of the statute had to be ignored. So it was. The majority of this Court, rather than summarily elevating the practice conducted in Manny Holtz to the law of Maryland, should condemn it.
This Court has not heretofore construed Art. 66B § 4.01(b), but, in Attman, we were very careful not to accept the Manny Holtz interpretation. A fair reading of the statute simply does not support the limitations on its language placed there by the Manny Holtz court and that is now being placed there by the majority in this case. In my view the Manny Holtz *610interpretation cannot be supported by the language of the statute, its legislative history, or the prior cases the statute was designed to redress.
People’s Counsel for Baltimore County v. Mockard, 73 Md.App. 340, 533 A.2d 1344 (1987), was also written by the Manny Holtz author. Mockard relies in all relevant respects on Manny Holtz. It fails completely to acknowledge the 1970 amendment, and cites only to one other Maryland case, a case I cited earlier, National Capital. As I have indicated, National Capital was a case decided during the period the 1970 amendment was being enacted and failed completely to discuss that amendment, but cited to the pre 1970 cases when it referred to the general invalidity of conditional zoning. As noted earlier, in National Capital the County Attorney had informed the court that Montgomery County had not authorized conditional zoning. As previously mentioned, our comments in National Capital were dicta in the first instance, and, because of the 1970 amendments which were not brought to our attention, inaccurate when made.
The combination of Manny Holtz and Mockard represents a primary example of how an appellate court makes law, as opposed to applying law. In Manny Holtz, the intermediate appellate court misinterpreted a statute; in Mockard, it relied on Manny Holtz without mentioning the statute that Manny Holtz misinterprets. Thereafter, the intermediate appellate court merely refers to Mockard, and the original misinterpretation of the statute is lost in time. Along now comes this Court, ignores its Attman reservations and describes the Manny Holtz misinterpretation as the law in Maryland. Through this device, the original misinterpretation of the statute can become transformed by case precedent into the law on the issue, unless the misinterpretation is promptly discovered. And that is what the majority is permitting to happen in the case at bar.
Subsequent to Manny Holtz and Mockard, even the Court of Special Appeals has recognized that a fuller analysis of “conditional zoning” might be appropriate. As dicta, in Peo*611ple’s Counsel for Baltimore County v. Beachwood I Limited Partnership, 107 Md.App. 627, 674, 670 A.2d 484, 508 (1995), where, when citing to the series of cases decided under pre 1970 law, it also cites to the post 1970 Manny Holtz and Mockard cases, when it states: “Because it [contract zoning] is the only form of suspect zoning charged by Beachwood in this case, we have confined our analysis to contract zoning specifically and not to conditional zoning generally, a full analysis of which must abide some future occasion.” (alteration added).
The majority in its effort to justify the result, asserts that Rockville’s conditional zoning ordinance does not apply in this case because its ordinance only applies to amendments to the local zoning map. The majority posits that the local map is not being amended because the zoning of the annexed area is original zoning.17
*612The correct issue of whether conditional zoning applies under the Rockville statute is whether the zoning is upon a specific request ie., piecemeal or otherwise. If piecemeal, the Rockville ordinance applies because it is a request for a local map amendment. What the majority virtually ignores is that local zoning maps may be amended during the process of annexation by the zoning imposed on annexed property during that process. Prior to annexation the subject site was not contained within the area laid out by the zoning district map. After annexation the area is contained within the area laid out by the zoning district map. Ergo — the map of necessity has been modified during a non-comprehensive process. The map has been amended upon an individual application.
Moreover, there was a petition for zoning in this case. The brief of appellant points out specifically: “When the petition [for annexation] was filed the property was zoned I-2 (Heavy Industrial) pursuant to the Montgomery County Zoning Ordinance. The petition requested the property be placed within the city’s I-1 (Service Industrial) zone....
“The City of Rockville Planning Division staff recommended approval.... ”
We long ago held contrary to the majority's position on this issue. In Beshore v. Town of Bel Air, 237 Md. 398, 409, 206 A.2d 678 (1965) one of the issues present was explained:
“The appellant next contends that the resolution No. 20, providing for both annexation and zoning ... is invalid for four specific reasons.... The appellants argue that ‘zoning changes and classifications for which there is a specific statute [Code (1957), Art. 66B] are not intended to be included in an annexation resolution under the guise of “conditions and circumstances” provisions of the annexation statute.’
“Resolution No. 20 in the case before us adequately describes the four tracts and provides for their annexation, and then fixes their zoning classifications....
*613“A municipality having an authorized planning and zoning authority has exclusive jurisdiction to zone annexed property.... To require such a municipality to annex and then later zone, in separate proceedings, would appear to be illogical and wasteful when the requirements of both Art. 23A and Art. 66B can be satisfied in one proceeding, as happened in the instant case.... ”
See also Northeast Plaza, supra at 30, 526 A.2d 963: “We have also approved the combination of zoning and annexation in one resolution.”
Thus, I respectfully submit, the majority is again mistaken. The zoning here involved was not a comprehensive rezoning, it was upon a specific application; it was piecemeal and cannot be anything else, and that zoning amended the zoning district map. It is immaterial whether it was original or otherwise. It was piecemeal zoning, and the majority can point to no other piece or parcel of property zoned or rezoned at the same time. The majority can point to no other property owner who had filed a petition for zoning. The majority cannot possibly claim that it was a comprehensive rezoning. The majority’s argument that the Rockville statute does not apply because annexation zoning is original zoning is an attempt at obscuration. The issue in respect to the Rockville ordinance is not whether the zoning is original or a rezoning, but whether it is upon specific application i.e., ‘local zoning map amendment’ or as part of ‘comprehensive zoning.’ The majority’s position that the Rockville ordinance does not apply is grievously wrong. The Rockville ordinance states in clear, concise language “The counsel may impose .. . conditions ... upon the grant of any application for a local amendment to the zoning map.... ” The inclusion of zoning requests during individual annexations are applications for amendments to local zoning maps because, if granted, they amend the zoning maps by the inclusion of the annexation area.
Under the majority’s theory newly annexed land would be unzoned because annexation could not amend the zoning map *614to include it. The Legislature specifically provided that conditional zoning authority was conferred “upon the [original] zoning or rezoning of any land.... ” Anytime the area of newly zoned land, via annexation or otherwise, is added to an existing zoning map-that map is amended. With all due respect, there is nothing in the Rockville ordinance, or before this Court indicating that Rockville did not intend conditional zoning to apply to any land then, or thereafter, included in the zoning map.
Today, in regards to conditional zoning, the majority of this Court, influenced by a misinterpretation by the intermediate appellate court, creates new law, unsupported by the common law, any of this Court’s cases, the statutes or the Constitutions.
Part B. Annexation issue18
(Whatever “or” is)
One of the relevant statutes in respect to the annexation issues in this case is Maryland Code (1957, 2001 Repl.Vol.), Article 23A, Section 9(c)(1) and (2). It provides as follows:
“(c) Limitations on charter amendments; effect of annexation.—(1) A municipal corporation which is subject to the provisions of Article XI-E of the Maryland Constitution may not amend its charter or exercise its powers of annexation, incorporation or repeal of charter as to affect or impair in any respect the powers relating to sanitation, including sewer, water and similar facilities, and zoning, of the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission or of the Maryland National Capital Park and Planning Commission. Except that where any area is annexed to a municipality authorized to have and having then a planning and zoning *615authority, the municipality shall have exclusive jurisdiction over planning and zoning and subdivision control within the area annexed; provided nothing in this exception shall be construed or interpreted to grant planning and zoning authority or subdivision control to a municipality not authorized to exercise that authority at the time of such annexation; and further provided, that no municipality annexing land may for a period of five years following annexation, place that land in a zoning classification which permits a land use substantially different from the use for the land specified in the current and duly adopted master plan or plans or if there is no adopted or approved master plan [in the annexing municipality], the adopted or approved general plan or plans of the county or agency having planning and zoning jurisdiction over the land prior to its annexation without the express approval of the board of county commissioners or county council of the county in which the municipality is located.
“(2) If the county expressly approves, the municipality, without regard to the provisions of Article 66B, § 4.05(a) of the Code, may place the annexed land in a zoning classification that permits a land use substantially different from the use for the land specified in the current and duly adopted master plan or general plan of the county or agency having planning and zoning jurisdiction over the land prior to its annexation.” [Some emphasis added.] [Alteration added.]
Regardless of the agreement of the parties at the times of the oral arguments, I read the provision much differently than they did and much differently than the majority opinion. A careful reading of the statute and the proper consideration of its plain meaning, and I believe a fair consideration of the legislative circumstances in which it was first placed in a form similar to the present, supports a different interpretation if the annexing municipality already has the appropriate planning and zoning authority and procedures, as Rockville has in the case sub judice.
The majority states on page 553 of its opinion that:
*616“The Owners’ literal interpretation is that if the annexing jurisdiction’s plan includes a land use recommendation for an area originally outside of its jurisdiction in anticipation of its possible future annexation, then it may look first to its own municipal plan, and is only required to look to the county plan if there is no municipal plan.... ”
The majority thus concedes that the owners’ position constitutes a literal interpretation of the statute. I agree. It is literal and it represents the plain meaning of-this statute-and there is, contrary to the assertions of the majority, absolutely no relevant legislative history that conflicts with that literal and plain meaning.
Additionally, the majority states on page 536 of its opinion:
“Frankly put, the requirement of uniformity serves to protect the landowner from favoritism towards certain landowners within a zone by the grant of less onerous restrictions than are applied to others within the same zone elsewhere in the district, and also serves to prevent the use of zoning as a form of leverage by the local government seeking land concession, transfers, or other consideration in return for more favorable zoning treatment.”
I may be dense (the majority, and others, may well agree) but for the life of me, I fail to perceive how imposing more onerous restrictions, such as a prohibition as to uses upon property being annexed, not less onerous restrictions, constitutes favoritism towards the landowner who is being prohibitéd by the condition from doing that which he would otherwise have the right to do. The situation in the case at bar is one hundred eighty degrees from the situation the majority describes as “Frankly put....”
Moreover, the Legislature’s intention, I believe, is, generally, to protect the rights of municipalities in respect to annexation and zoning. Accordingly, in respect to any ambiguity in language which the majority concedes has a literal meaning, ambiguity that I do not believe exists in the first instance, such dreamed ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the municipality, here Rockville. In respect to annexation stat*617utes generally, we held in Prince George’s County v. Mayor and City Council of Laurel, 262 Md. 171, 277 A.2d 262 (1971), in respect to similar provisions relating to annexation and zoning conflicts between municipalities and Prince George’s County and the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission, that the Legislature intended to protect the rights of municipalities as they extended their boundaries into additional territory, specifically holding that when Laurel extended its boundaries into the area of the Commission, the newly annexed property was no longer within the boundaries or jurisdiction of the Commission and thus the city zoning would control:
“At the time of the annexation and rezoning, the property in question was part of, and was situated within, the borders of the Regional District. Laurel’s actions were the source of some dismay to the ... Commission ... both of which refused to give any recognition to the attempted rezoning. ...
“... Again in 1957, as we have previously noted, the Legislature addressed itself even more precisely to the particular question presented, and granted pre-eminence in planning and zoning to certain municipalities (e.g. Laurel) over areas which they might annex.
“. .. the Legislature generally intended ... [to grant] protection to the zoning rights of certain municipalities over areas which they might annex.” Id. at 174, 182-83, 277 A.2d at 264, 268. [Alteration added.]
In the case at bar, Rockville, as are all municipalities under the “exclusive” language of the statutes, is granted preeminence in zoning matters.
We additionally noted in Laurel the existence of a statute, then section 2 of Article 23A, similar to the present statute, which the Commission claimed limited the power of Laurel to exercise exclusive zoning power in the annexed area:
*618“ ‘The legislative body of every incorporated municipality ... shall have general power ... but nothing in this article shall be construed to authorize ... any incorporated municipality to pass any ordinance which is inconsistent or in conflict with any ordinance ... ordained or adopted by the ... Commission....’”
Id. at 181, 277 A.2d at 267 (quoting Md.Code (1957, 1966 Repl.Vol.) Art. 23A § 2) (emphasis omitted). We answered by holding:
“the Legislature generally intended that where ordinances of municipalities and the Commission come into conflict the authority of the Commission shall prevail, with the particular exception stated in the second half of Sections 9(c) and 19(p) granting protection to the zoning rights of certain municipalities over areas which they might annex." Id. at 183, 277 A.2d at 268. [Emphasis added.]
Later we noted what is also absolutely relevant in the case at bar:
“It is further essential to keep in mind ... that the Town of Laurel is not within the Regional District....
“Indeed, if one were to reason that Laurel were exempt from the workings of the law only to the extent of its boundaries of April 24, 1961, and that when it annexed the acreage ... it became a municipal corporation ‘within the area of the Regional District’ by extending those boundaries into the Regional District, one comes to the somewhat absurd conclusion that Laurel would thereby lose all of its zoning and planning authority because of the annexation. ... What the Legislature intended ... was basically what it had earlier said in sections 9(c) and 19(p) of Article 22A-that the Commission is to prevail in matters of planning and zoning, except for instances of municipalities having a planning and zoning authority." Id. at 185-87, 277 A.2d at 269-70. [Some emphasis added.]
*619By comparison, the majority’s position in the case sub judice would lead to the same “somewhat absurd conclusion that [ ] [Rockville] would thereby lose all of its zoning and planning authority [over the annexed area] because of the annexation.” Id. at 186, 277 A.2d at 270 (alterations' added) (emphasis omitted). In the conclusion portion of this dissent, I point out just some of the other land use absurdities that result from the position the majority takes on this issue.
We also noted in Laurel:
“This serves to buttress the interpretation which we have given to Article 23A. As was noted by Judge Loveless in his opinion:
‘Consequently, considering Chapter 596 [of the Acts of 1957] with Chapter 197 of the Acts of 1957, we see an apparent clear legislative intent to permit municipalities in Montgomery County to retain and possess planning and zoning authority; and certainly from Article 23A, Section 9(c) and 19(p), these municipalities would have this power in Prince George’s County areas which were not in the Regional District.’”19 Id. at 183 n. 3, 277 A.2d at 268 n. 3.
Upon careful examination of the language of the primary statute at issue in the case sub judice, as it was enacted, the provisions at issue primarily provide that when a municipality having planning and zoning authority and approved master plans, annexes land, it shall have exclusive jurisdiction over planning and zoning within the area annexed, provided that for a period of five years land so annexed may not be placed in a zoning district substantially different from the original zoning district in which the annexing municipality first places the annexed property. In other words, it might limit the right of *620the property owner whose property is annexed to seek a reclassification, or perhaps even a variance, for a period of five years. Once a municipality annexes property, that property, for zoning purposes, is outside the boundaries and jurisdiction of the County.
The majority utilizes the legislative history of a prior statute in interpreting the subsequent statute that modifies the prior statute. It attempts to support its position by quoting from our case of Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission v. Mayor and City Council of Rockville, 272 Md. 550, 561, 325 A.2d 748, 754-55 (1974). It proffers that the case supports the position the majority takes in the present case. It does; but only if one ignores the 1975 statute that presents the issue the Court is resolving today. The 1975 amendment was intended to change the thrust of the earlier statute that was at issue in Maryland-National The majority is particularly disingenuous to rely on the intention of the Legislature when it originally passed a statute, to determine what it means when it later substantively modifies that very statute in order to achieve a different purpose.
The majority also cites to Northeast Plaza Associates v. President and Commissioners of the Town of North East, 310 Md. 20, 28-31, 526 A.2d 963, 967-69 (1987), for the same proposition. In Northeast the only thing this Court held was that zoning upon annexation was not original zoning and that such zoning had to satisfy the change/mistake rule. In 1988 the Legislature then immediately amended the statute to overrule our holding. The issue of county approval was only mentioned as dicta in the case. Neither Northeast nor Maryland-National, fairly read and construed, in my view, support the majority’s position, and neither does City of Gaithersburg v. Montgomery County, 271 Md. 505, 318 A.2d 509 (1974). It was decided before the enactment of the amendment that raises the questions in this case. This Court’s interpretation of the legislative intent in respect to the prior statute, offers little, if any, light on the legislative intent in respect to the 1975 amendment. If the majority is correct, the Legislature was just repeating itself when it modified the statute to an *621either “or” type of statute. Such an interpretation of a substantive amendment is simply insupportable.
Since 1975, the last clause of Article 23A § 9(c), and later (c)(1), has, as I read its clear and unambiguous language, only applied, and only applies, in instances where the annexing municipality has no planning and zoning authority and/or master plans and thus the prior zoning classifications in the county are relevant in such circumstances by reason of the last long clause in subsection (1) following the “or” I have bolded above.
In 1974, Judge Eldridge for the Court in Gaithersburg, supra, interpreted certain language of the statute as it then existed. At that time there was no subsection (c)(2), nor any provision relating to current master plans of annexing municipalities or county approval; all of the then provisions were contained in one subsection. The last several clauses, those relevant to our inquiry, then stated:
“(c) Limitations on charter amendments; effect of annexation. ... and further provided, that no municipality annexing land may for a period of five years following annexation, place that land in a zoning classification which permits a land use substantially different from the use for the land specified in the current and duly adopted master plan or plans of the county or agency having planning and zoning jurisdiction over the land prior to its annexation.”
Md.Code (1957, 1973 Repl.Vol.), Art. 23A § 9(c). What the majority holds today is identical to that 1974 holding, which was prior to the 1975 amendment at issue in the present case. In the majority’s collective mind, nothing has changed. In my view, that is incorrect. A mere reading clearly shows that the statute changed substantively in 1975.
The primary issue before the Court in Gaithersburg was whether the statute only applied in Prince George’s and Montgomery County, because if so, it might be subject to constitutional challenge in that such provisions are required to be uniform within a class of municipal corporations and the general assembly had only created one class; thus, a provision *622that applied only to municipalities in two counties might be unconstitutional. The Court’s opinion included language in respect to the then statute that provided that “no municipality annexing land may, for a period of five years ... place such land in a zoning classification which permits a land use substantially different from a use” that existed under the County’s master plan just prior to annexation. Gaithersburg, 271 Md. at 512-13, 318 A.2d at 513. That is exactly what the language of the statute in effect at that time stated. Similar language was reiterated by this Court in October of the same year in Maryland-National, supra. At issue in that case was the constitutionality of that prior specific provision. Again, referring to the statute as it existed in October of 1974, we stated:
“The question is whether the words ‘prior to its annexation’ modify only the phrase ‘county or agency’ or whether they also refer to ‘duly adopted Master Plan.’ ... In short, the city’s new zoning must be compared with the Master Plans in effect prior to the annexation.”
Maryland-National, 272 Md. at 557, 325 A.2d at 752-53. It is thus clear that under the circumstances of the provisions as they existed in 1974, the new zoning classifications imposed by the municipalities during annexation was, from 1970 to 1975, compared with the prior county zoning and master plans.
However, in the 1975 Legislative session the Legislature modified the language of section (c) to read basically as (c)(1) currently does. The 1975 statute replaced the old statute and reenacted it with added language that changed the focus to the municipality’s zoning from prior county zoning if the municipality had independent planning and zoning authority and master plans. The majority argues that interpreting plans to mean the plans of the municipality would render “the sub-section effectively a nullity.” Actually, to construe the modification to the section as the majority interprets it, renders the statute modifying the section to be a nullity. The majority’s position reverts the statute to its meaning before the 1975 amendment. From 1970 to 1975, the exclusive *623jurisdiction of a municipality was limited by the prior zoning in the County.
However, the pertinent language added in 1975 created a two-step process. The added language changed the statute to entail a consideration of whether the municipality had zoning to be the first consideration. It recognized the exclusivity of existing municipal zoning. Prior to 1975, and even early in that year’s legislative process, the provision that zoning not be changed for five years expressly referred to the provision:
“that no municipality annexing land may for a period of five years ... place that land in a zoning classification which permits a land use substantially different for the use specified in the current and duly adopted master plan or plans[*] of the county or agency having planning and zoning jurisdiction over the land prior to its annexation.” Md.Code (1957, 1973 Repl.Vol.), Art. 23A § 9(c).
However, the provision was intentionally amended in the Senate Judiciary Committee to its final form by the insertion right at the point of the bracketed asterisk above, this language:
“or if there is no adopted or approved master plan, the adopted or approved general plan or plans of the county or agency having planning and zoning jurisdiction over....”
Without the language of the Judiciary Committee amendment, the relevant plans were county plans. If it was the intention of the Senate to retain the requirement of conformance with county plans and county approval in all circumstances, that above amending language during the adoption process of the bill would have been totally unnecessary. It would be meaningless. Considering that the entire lengthy sentence preceding the asterisked language referred to the exclusive jurisdiction of a municipality if it had zoning authority and master plans, the “or” amendment can only be to provide for county consideration and approval if a municipality has no zoning authority or master plan or plans. Every known precept of applicable statutory construction supports *624.the position that I take in reference to the meaning of the word “or.”
The majority then construes another statute that is not applicable in this case. It states at 558: “There can be no doubt, from the language of the statute as it existed in 1971 and 1972, that the terms ‘plan’ or ‘plans’ found in Chapters 116 and 38, respectively, refer to the plan or plans of the preannexation county jurisdiction, and not those of the annexing municipality.” If one is construing the law as it existed in 1972 that may very well be correct. In 1971 the Legislature had passed a statute that appeared to so provide. However, in 1975 it passed a new statute, amending that prior statute. The new statute provided just to the contrary. It is that 1975 statute, not the 1971 statute that is at issue in the case sub judice. The prior statute affords no support for the intentions of the Legislature in 1975; instead, the fact that the same statute was modified supports the position I believe to be appropriate.
I find it unusual that the majority in explaining its position states, in part, on page 559 that:
“Second, apparently in response to our decisions in ... [the cases above referred to], where we held municipal rezoning actions invalid on the ground of inconsistency with county master plan recommendations, Chapter 613 provided a means where the five year limitation on the annexing jurisdiction’s ability to change the zoning of the annexed property could be waived if express county approval were obtained. As a result of the adoption ... [it] read:
‘... or....’”
Because it cannot explain the language preceding the “or” in such a fashion that it supports the majority’s decision, the majority eliminates it. It Manny Holtzed it. In describing how the statute now reads, the majority intentionally leaves out the language preceding the “or.” By doing so it summarily deletes the qualifying language that requires the “or” in the first place. If that language, the language preceding the “or,” is included it would clearly indicate that the annexing authori*625ty’s zoning, if it has any, is the relevant zoning and, only in the case of the absence of zoning in the annexing authority, does the county’s previous zoning become relevant. Had I focused on the end that the majority wishes to achieve, I would have ignored the same language. However, I am completely unaware of any canon of statutory construction that allows a court to arbitrarily write out language of a statute if that language supports a position contrary to the position a Court wants to reach. It is wrong to do so.
I have examined the records in the Department of Legislative Reference, the Maryland State Archives and the Maryland State Law Library. The records merely indicate that Senate Bill 864 was introduced by Senator Malkus during the 1975 legislative session, and, as introduced, was in the original form that I indicated above. It was then amended as indicated. There was an additional attempt by Senator Malkus to limit its application to Dorchester County, but that failed to make its way into the bill.
The legislative history I have found is, therefore, limited to the changes in language that occurred during the bill’s passage.
This Court has said that “ ‘[t]he cardinal rule [of statutory interpretation] is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.’ ” Liverpool v. Baltimore Diamond Exchange, Inc., 369 Md. 304, 316, 799 A.2d 1264, 1271 (2002) (quoting Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128, 756 A.2d 987, 991 (2000)); see also State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 717, 720 A.2d 311, 315 (1998) (quoting Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995)). Legislative intent must be sought in the first instance in the actual language of the statute. Liverpool, 369 Md. at 316, 799 A.2d at 1271; Chase, 360 Md. at 128, 756 A.2d at 991; Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437, 444-45, 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997); Stanford v. Maryland Police Training & Correctional Comm’n, 346 Md. 374, 380, 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997) (quoting Tidewater v. Mayor and City Council of Havre de Grace, 337 Md. 338, 344, 653 A.2d 468, 472 (1995)); Coburn v. *626Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 256, 674 A.2d 951, 957 (1996); Romm v. Flax, 340 Md. 690, 693, 668 A.2d 1, 2 (1995); Oaks, 339 Md. at 35, 660 A.2d at 429; Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 92, 400 A.2d 1091, 1096 (1979); Board of Supervisors v. Weiss, 217 Md. 133, 136, 141 A.2d 734, 736 (1958). Furthermore, where the statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a definite and simple meaning, courts do not normally look beyond the words of the statute itself to determine legislative intent. Liverpool, 369 Md. at 316-17, 799 A.2d at 1271-72; Chase, 360 Md. at 128, 756 A.2d at 991; Marriott Employees, 346 Md. at 445, 697 A.2d at 458; Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987).
In Liverpool, 369 Md. at 316-17, 799 A.2d at 1271, we stated:
“ ‘Where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, a court may neither add nor delete language so as to “reflect an intent not evidenced in that language,” nor may it construe the statute with “ ‘forced or subtle interpretations’ that limit or extend its application.” Moreover, whenever possible, a statute should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory.’ ”
(quoting Chase, 360 Md. at 128, 756 A.2d at 991 (quoting Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Md. v. Dir. of Fin. for Mayor of Balt., 343 Md. 567, 578-79, 683 A.2d 512, 517 (1996) (internal citations omitted))).
The majority notes how we set out the six principal tenets of statutory interpretation in Mazor v. Department of Correction, 279 Md. 355, 360-61, 369 A.2d 82, 86-87 (1977):
“1.] The cardinal rule of construction of a statute is to ascertain and carry out the real intention of the Legislature.
["2. The primary source from which we glean this intention is the language of the statute itself.
[/3. In construing a statute, we accord the words their ordinary and natural signification.
*6274.] If reasonably possible, a statute is to be read so that no word, phrase, clause, or sentence is rendered surplusage or meaningless.
5.] Similarly, wherever possible an interpretation should be given to statutory language which will not lead, to absurd consequences.
[/6. Moreover, if the statute is part of a general statutory scheme or system, the sections must be read together to ascertain the true intention of the Legislature.” [/Emphasis added.] [. Citations omitted.]
In statutory construction, absurd results are to be avoided. This Court recently stated in Annapolis Market Place, L.L.C. v. Parker, 369 Md. 689, 715, 802 A.2d 1029, 1044 (2002), “that a ‘statute [must] be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is illogical or incompatible with common sense.’ ” (quoting State v. Brantner, 360 Md. 314, 321, 758 A.2d 84, 88-89 (2000) (citing D & Y, Inc. v. Winston, 320 Md. 534, 538, 578 A.2d 1177, 1179 (1990))) (alteration added). See also Blandon v. State, 304 Md. 316, 319, 498 A.2d 1195, 1196 (1985) (“[R]ules of statutory construction require us to avoid construing a statute in a way which would lead to absurd results.”); Erwin and Shafer, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 304 Md. 302, 311, 498 A.2d 1188, 1192 (1985) (“A court must shun a construction of a statute which will lead to absurd consequences.”); Comptroller of the Treasury v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 303 Md. 280, 284, 493 A.2d 341, 343 (1985) (“A statute should not be construed by forced or subtle interpretations.”).
In the absence of any legislative history to the contrary, it is clear that the phrase added during the bill’s progress through the Legislature, was intended to create alternatives. Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 817 (10th ed.1998), proffers as its first definition of the word “or”: “1-used as a function word to indicate an alternative < coffee "tea> <sink "swim>.” The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 1011 (Unabridged ed.1983), provides in its first definition: “1. (used to connect words, phrases, or clauses representing alternatives).” That portion of the complex sen*628tence at issue here that preceded the use of the word “or” referenced municipalities, and only municipalities; that portion of the sentence following the word “or” referenced counties, and only counties. To state otherwise is to create an unsupportable statement. It is the equivalent of stating that everything depends upon what “or” is.
In my view, “or” is “or.”
And I believe the unambiguous language of the statute lends itself to no other interpretation. Additionally, there is no available legislative history that indicates a different interpretation; one that would permit “or” to mean whatever a majority of this Court, from time to time, determines it to mean.
The municipality’s zoning and master plans, of necessity, had to be the zoning and plans described in the statute that preceded the “or.” Up until that point in sub-section (c) in the statute (the relevant provision of the statute), the only governmental entities that had been mentioned were municipalities. In other words, the language following the “or” presented an alternative to what preceded the “or.” Logically, the clause preceding the “or” referred to a municipality’s zoning authority or master plans.
That logic, in my view, is further supported by some of the language of the definitions section of Maryland Code (1957, 2001 Repl.Vol.) Article 66B, Section 1.00(g)(1) and (2), which provides a generic definition of the term “plans” in respect to scope of the term in zoning matters applicable under that article. It provides:
“(g) Plan.—( 1) ‘Plan’ means the policies, statements, goals, and interrelated plans for private and public land use, transportation, and community facilities documented in text and maps which constitute the guide for the area’s future development.
(2) ‘Plan’, includes general plan, master plan, compréhensive plan, community plan, and the like as adopted in accordance with §§ 3.01 through 3.09 of this article.”
*629Section 3.05, referring to the powers of planning commissions in respect to a plan, refers to one plan, with multiple required elements such as a “land use plan element,” “transportation plan element,” “community facilities plan element” and so forth. The statute appears to define and require one plan, whether it is titled a general plan, master plan, comprehensive plan or the like, that must contain numerous elements. It may be the practice in some jurisdictions to satisfy the elements of the overall plan, however it is titled in a particular jurisdiction, by the method of adopting various transportation “plans,” land use “plans” and the like. Even so, there is only one plan that may incorporate the other plans as necessary elements of that one plan. Therefore, when Article 23A § 9(c) speaks in one place of “current and duly adopted master plan or plans” and in a following clause “or if there is no adopted or approved master plan, the adopted or approved general plan or plans of the county,” it is really referring to the same type of plan-the single overarching plan, however tilted, of a particular jurisdiction (the municipality’s plan, if it has one; the county’s, if there is no municipal plan) that may be comprised of various “plan elements.” If the plans discussed in the current version of Article 23A § 9(c) preceding the “or” were meant to be the county plans, then the subsequent mention of plans following the “or” is redundant and the provisions preceding the “or” are meaningless. That construction, the one the majority adopts, is, in my view, incorrect. The better view, the only logical meaning of the language that modified the statute, is that if the municipality has no overall plan or plans at the time of annexation, then, but only then, is the county plan or plans relevant. The majority today holds that the law remains as it was before 1975, and in the process bastardizes the meaning of the word “or.”
The last change that resulted in the statute in its current form occurred in 1988 Maryland Laws, Chapter 450 (House Bill 667), and it repealed and reenacted the statute. Whereas, the next previous form of the statute had provided in an undivided section that ivhen a municipality did not have zoning authority or master plans, the new zoning must not be *630substantially dissimilar to the previous county zoning “without the express approval” of the county, the new 1988 statute created a new subsection (c)(2).
The 1988 statute was a direct reaction to our opinion in Northeast, supra. It is somewhat difficult to determine where the misinterpretation of the prior 1975 amending statute began. In any event, a confusing situation resulted from Northeast and the Legislature’s attempt to, in essence, reverse our holding. As I indicate elsewhere, there was dicta in Northeast that mentioned the language that had been originally contained in the statutes prior to 1975. In the Northeast case, the municipality had obtained county approval and our opinion was framed in that context-a presumption that county approval was necessary and was obtained. In that context, our discussion of the 1975 statute as dicta, contained this statement (indicated by our bolding):
“By ch. 613 of the Acts of 1975, the General Assembly again amended § 9(c) to allow ‘substantially different’ rezoning of annexed land without regard to the five-year limitation, if the municipality obtained the express approval of the appropriate county. As amended, therefore, nothing in § 9(c) purports to preclude a municipality from rezoning annexed land when, as here, it obtains the county’s express consent.... But nothing in § 9(c) eliminates the requirement that the municipality comply with the pertinent provisions of Art. 66B, and with its own charter, when it engages in the process of zoning newly annexed land. ”
Northeast, 310 Md. at 29, 526 A.2d at 968 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The italicized language, not the bolded language, was our holding. It was, however, the initial bolded statement, the dicta, that has contributed to the continuation of that statute being misconstrued. We failed to recognize in 1988, just as the majority fails to realize in the present case, that the 1975 change, in essence, made municipal zoning paramount if a city had zoning, and that the county zoning consideration under the 1975 statute was merely an alternate that applied only when a municipality did not have zoning and master plans. We were not asked to construe that part of the *6311975 amendment in Northeast. We assumed that county approval was required because it had actually been obtained in that case.20 Our focus was not on county approval. We focused, instead, on whether zoning upon annexation had to comply with the change/mistake rule or whether it constituted original zoning. In that context the whole issue of whether county approval was required was completely irrelevant.
Local governments, prior to Northeast, had always assumed that the first zoning classification upon annexation was original zoning and that the “change/mistake” rule did not apply. In the Court’s opinion in Northeast, we held the “change/mistake” rule to apply, which led to the Legislature’s attempt to modify our Northeast holding, but only as relevant to the applicability of the “change/mistake” rule and the character of the initial zoning upon annexation.
The new 1988 paragraph (c)(2), in my view, only provides an exemption from the provisions of the “change/mistake” rule found in Article 66B § 4.05 and only in those instances where county approval is necessary, and obtained. Otherwise, it does not apply because the municipal zoning upon annexation is original zoning in the first instance, albeit,' as I have noted, it is a request for a local map amendment made simultaneously, as permitted, with a request for annexation. If the county zoning was, in such instances, the applicable zoning, any change upon annexation would not be original zoning, and the “change/mistake”rule would apply. The purpose of the 1988 statute was to make crystal clear that the “change/mistake” rule did not apply to the zoning of annexed property because, as the municipality’s zoning applied, it was original zoning and not a change in zoning. Its only purpose was to negate this Court’s holding in Northeast that the “change/mistake” rule applied in annexation situations because it was a change from prior county zoning.
*632It appears clear to me that the intention of the Legislature in 1975 was to restrict, for a period of five years, rezoning of annexed land by a municipality with planning and zoning authority and master plans, from its initial original zoning upon annexation. In the event that the annexing municipality did not have zoning authority or did not have master plans and planning, then, and only in that event, the provisions relating to the prior zoning in the county would be applicable. In either event, the annexed land’s zoning would remain stable for a period of five years. Subsequent amendments have not, in my opinion, reordered that focus. My perception, I respectfully suggest, is further supported by a consideration of the relevant statutes concerning charter counties’ relationships with zoning and planning generally.
Maryland Code (1957, 2001 Repl.Vol.) Article 25A, Section 5, Express Powers, Paragraph (X) Planning and Zoning, enumerates certain zoning powers for counties in which it is applicable. Sub-paragraph (v)1 and 3 provide:
“(v) The powers granted to the county pursuant to this paragraph shall not be construed:
“1. To grant to the county powers in any substantive area not otherwise granted to the county by other public general or public local law;
“3. To authorize the county or its officers to engage in any activity which is beyond their power under other public general law, public local law, or otherwise.... ”
These limiting provisions are not found in any of the other twenty-nine express powers enumerated in the Express Powers Act. Only zoning powers are so limited.
Maryland Code (1957, 1997 Repl.Vol.) Article 28, Title 7, Maryland-Washington Regional District (sometimes referred to as the Regional District Act), Section 7-105, Powers restricted in municipalities in Montgomery County, provides in sub-section (b):
*633“Except as provided by agreement under this section, neither the Commission nor the Montgomery County Planning Board nor the district council may exercise any planning or zoning power or jurisdiction within any municipal corporation that existed as of June 1, 1957, as provided under subsection (a) of this section. A municipality that incorporates after June 1, 1957 may not exercise planning, zoning, or subdivision power unless expressly provided for in this article.”
Rockville was an incorporated municipality prior to 1957. According to the Rockville office contacted by this member of the Court, Rockville was first incorporated in either 1802 or 1808. . Unless Rockville has agreed otherwise, the zoning powers of Montgomery County, ie., the District Council, in respect to areas within the boundaries of Rockville, including post-annexation boundaries, are limited to the provisions of sub-section (i), which states that
“The Commission or the Montgomery County planning board ... may submit recommendations to any municipal corporation with respect to any planning or zoning action ... and the recommendation ... shall be incorporated as a part of the record of the action by the municipal corporation.”
This Court was not made aware of any agreement that exists that divests the City of Rockville of its zoning powers. Accordingly, in respect to zoning matters within its boundaries and jurisdiction, it is bound by the requirements, and only the requirements, of Article 66B.
We stated in Laurel, 262 Md. at 179, 277 A.2d at 266, also a case involving annexation and zoning under predecessor statutes to those at issue here:
“A reading of sections 9(c) and 19(p) as they were originally enacted, coupled with the amendment added to each section in 1957, indicates that the Legislature intended to protect the zoning rights of municipalities having a planning and zoning authority and to extend their jurisdiction into areas which the municipality annexed or had authority to annex.”
*634As to the five-year provision, I, likewise, see no other purpose for the 1975 amendment, other than to grant primacy to an authorized municipality’s current zoning upon annexation, and only reserving a consideration of prior county zoning to those situations in which municipalities - have no zoning authority or master plans. The interest of the State is that newly annexed lands conform with the zoning in the particular district. If a municipality has no zoning, the State’s interest is that the land retain the zoning it previously had. In other words, for a period of five years the State desires that the property be zoned. Its interests are served regardless of which entity’s zoning is impressed upon the newly annexed land.
I would hold that when a municipality has planning and zoning authority, and has duly adopted and appropriate master plans, the prior county zoning and county approval of annexation zoning is not relevant. Moreover, the initial municipal zoning upon annexation generally, is original, piecemeal zoning. The municipality, however, is limited in respect to changing the original zoning it first imposes on newly annexed land for a period of five years.
I emphasize again that it is my view that under the statute, when municipalities have zoning authority and have adopted and approved master plans, the County, has no power to impose conditions. A municipality’s desires in such instances should not be held hostage to county approval. Under the governance scheme in Maryland, a municipal corporation is not subordinate to county government, nor is a municipal corporation required to be subservient to the wishes of a county. Municipalities get their power directly from the State government.
In any event, the County Council for Montgomery County, sitting as the District Council for the relevant portion of the Maryland Washington Regional District in Montgomery County, approved of the annexation by Resolution No. 14-57, dated February 23, 1999, but conditioned its approval on the city prohibiting “retail use of the site, except for a gasoline service *635station.” Thereafter, Rockville entered into an Annexation Agreement with the property owner that provided, as relevant here, in a whereas clause that “the Owners and the City agree that the annexation of the subject property should be made subject to the conditions set forth in Resolution No. 14-57 of the Montgomery County Council as hereinafter set forth.” The annexation agreement then contained several conditions, including the provision imposed by the County, that no retail uses other than a “gasoline service station,” could be conducted on the premises.21 The annexation agreement was executed between the property owners and Rockville on July 20, 1999. The actual annexation resolution was enacted on July 26,1999 and, pursuant to statute, was to be effective forty-five days thereafter.
A zoning ordinance, imposing 1-1 zoning on the annexed property, was finally approved on August 2, 1999, by the passage of Ordinance No. 10-99. As relevant to the case at bar, zoning ordinance No. 10-99 provided in certain whereas clauses:
“WHEREAS, by Resolution No. 14-57, the County Council for Montgomery County ... approved City of Rockville Annexation Petition No. ANX97-0124, and its rezoning from the County’s I-2 zone to the City’s I-1 zone, under certain conditions; and
“WHEREAS, the Mayor and Council of Rockville, having fully considered the matter, has determined to place the annexed property in the City’s I-1 zone, under certain conditions to be set forth in an annexation agreement.... ”
The actual enactment clause of the zoning ordinance made no further reference to the conditions imposed by the annexation and zoning arrangement with the County.
In this case it was ultimately determined by Montgomery County that the I-1 District, the city’s heaviest industrial *636district, was not substantially the same as- the County I-2 District. If there were no “approval” exception to the annexation statute, and if that “approval” provision applied (which, in my view it should not) even when municipalities have planning and zoning authority and master plans, it would mean that the City of Rockville could never annex into the County where the property was county-zoned I-2. Any County could then, by structuring its zoning ordinances to conflict with the city ordinances, be able to completely stymie the annexation process. As we indicated in Laurel, 262 Md. at 179, 277 A.2d at 266, and supra, the State’s scheme appears to encourage municipal annexations.
“A reading of Sections 9(c) and 19(p) as they were originally enacted, coupled with the amendment added to each section in 1957, indicates that the Legislature intended to protect the zoning rights of municipalities having a planning and zoning authority and to extend their jurisdiction into areas which the municipality annexed or had authority to annex.”
I am unaware of any change in the Legislature’s intent in the matter of annexation and the majority points to none.
The correct interpretation of the stated provisions of Article 23A § .9, that I discussed and noted at the inception of this portion of the dissent, especially where it refers to qualified municipalities having exclusive zoning jurisdiction over annexed cases, is buttressed by the inclusion elsewhere of similar provisions in Maryland Code (1957, 2001 Repl.Vol), Article 23A, Section 19, which deals primarily with the procedures for annexation. Section 19(s) restates that “where any area is annexed to a municipality authorized to have and having then a planning and zoning authority, the said municipality shall have exclusive jurisdiction over planning and zoning....” The proposition that counties somehow retain some level of relevance to municipal zoning is inconsistent with the use of the word “exclusive.” Moreover, the thrust of the statutes, even under their former language, appears to attempt to encourage and further the enlargement of municipal boundaries by annexation. To read the last clause of the relevant portion of section 9(c)(1) to mean that upon annexation the *637annexed property’s zoning must be substantially similar under all circumstances to the previous zoning in the County ignores, as I have repeatedly noted, the use of the disjunctive “or,” and makes some of the prior language, and other language elsewhere, relating to municipalities having “exclusive” jurisdiction if they have their own planning and zoning processes, completely meaningless.
Rockville has, in my view, expressly authorized conditional zoning by ordinance consistent with the power granted to it by the State. The condition imposed is not in conflict with the State statute or Rockville’s ordinance. Accordingly, to the extent the condition constitutes “conditional zoning,” it would be authorized “conditional zoning” and, therefore, would be valid.
II. Conclusion
My last comments concern the result that occurs by reason of the holdings that the majority renders today. Because of it’s holding, the majority actually is placing this property (and any property involved in annexation) in limbo. It is, according to the majority, still zoned County I-2. That holding, that upon zoning at the time of annexation municipal property remains in county zoning districts, will apply to all future annexations anywhere in Maryland. In many other municipal annexations, not just the present one, annexed property may remain designated in county zoning districts for up to five years even where the municipality has had its own zoning for decades. Nonetheless, such property remains annexed to, and is accordingly, within the city, in this case Rockville.
Does the zoning inspector (or equivalent enforcement official) of Montgomery County enforce the county zoning requirements in the area annexed to the city? If so, how does he have any power to enforce anything relating to zoning in respect to parcels in Rockville, which the State says has “exclusive” zoning powers within its boundaries? Conversely, how does the zoning inspector of Rockville enforce a statute or zoning district classification that does not exist within the municipality? When the county zoning administrator takes an *638alleged violating property owner before one of its administrative bodies or into court the defendant will allege that he is within the city and thus.cannot violate a county zoning ordinance’s district classification because the municipality’s zoning power is, under State statutes, exclusive. If such a property owner is taken before the city’s administrative bodies or to court by the city zoning inspector, the property owner will allege that the city zoning inspector has no authority to prosecute violations of county statutes and county district classifications and that he is violating no municipal ordinance. As importantly, how does a property owner in the annexed area seek variance or special exception relief from the constraints of the county I-2 classification? Does he or she apply to the authorities in the county in respect to property not within county jurisdiction because it is “exclusively” within the jurisdiction of the city? Does he or she apply to the authorities in the city for relief from the constraints of a zoning district not in the city’s zoning classifications? If it can ever be figured out who to apply to for relief, which entity’s procedural requirements control? If the county’s ordinance says re-applications for relief after a denial of a request must wait two years and the city’s ordinance says one year, how long does the applicant have to wait? If it is claimed that the provisions of the county I-2 district, in relation to a particular parcel in annexed territory, constitute a unconstitutional taking, which governmental entity is sued? The county or the city? Which one is ‘taking’ it. There may well be many other irreconcilable situations? Not only are the interpretations of the majority, in my view, incorrect, the result, by any reasonable standard, is, I suggest, clearly absurd. To go where the majority’s opinion on this issue takes this court is, in my view, to ignore any reasonable interpretation of the words “or” and “exclusive.”
For all the reasons expressed herein, I would reverse the holding of the Court of Special Appeals.
Chief Judge BELL joins in this dissent.
. As Judge Harrell correctly states, "Conditional zoning” even if it relates to conditions such as uses, is a very different concept than the term "conditional use.”
. Manny Holtz is solely responsible for the confusion over conditions that limit uses during reclassifications. For over seventeen years we have avoided accepting its interpretation that prohibits conditions that limit uses. See Attman, infra. Today, with little independent analysis, the majority states that the Court of Special Appeals was correct and automatically elevates it to a holding of this Court. Because the writer of Manny Holtz failed to conduct any analysis and declined to even acknowledge the relevant statutes, a mere statement in that opinion, unsupported by anything, is now likewise declared by this Court to be the law.
. A gas station is a gas station. Without the reclassification/annexation condition, as a special exception, a gas station can be operated on the subject annexed property within the new district as a permitted use. With the condition, the identical gas station can be operated on the subject annexed property within the new district if it can qualify for a *585special exception. In my view a permitted use of this nature cannot destroy the "uniformity” of uses within a district.
It is, I respectfully suggest, logically impossible for a use permitted within a district to destroy ihe statutory uniformity of a district. Allowing a use not permitted within a district might adversely affect the uniformity of a district, but conditional zoning is not concerned with allowing uses not otherwise permitted, but with limiting uses that are permitted. Accordingly, a permitted use simply cannot destroy the uniformity which the statute requires.
. I use the word "generally” merely as cautionary language in the event that there is some Maryland non-use conditional zoning case, prior to *586the enabling act, of which I am unaware. I have found none. The majority mentions none.
. Wakefield v. Kraft, 202 Md. 136, 141, 96 A.2d 27, 28-29 (1953). The suggestion of conditional zoning mistakenly emanating from Wakefield probably results from the fact that there was a private purchase contract between the property owner and a prospective buyer that was “conditioned” on the property being rezoned. That language has apparently been improperly picked up in some of the subsequent cases.
. The Baylis Court cites several Maryland cases. One, Huff v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, 214 Md. 48, 57, 133 A.2d 83, 88 (1957), relates to "spot zoning” issues; two, Marino v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 215 Md. 206, 215, 137 A.2d 198, 201 (1957); three, Oursler v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, 204 Md. 397, 406, 104 A.2d 568, 572 (1954), to "variance” or "special exception” issues; four, Baltimore County v. Missouri Realty Inc., 219 Md. 155, 148 A.2d 424 (1959), to the change/mistake rule applicable to reclassifications generally. None of them were pure conditional zoning cases. Thus, at least arguably, Baylis is the first, and certainly (he seminal, pre 1970’s case in Maryland on conditional zoning.
. In the case at bar all retail uses except gas stations were prohibited.
. A Planning Commission recommended non-use conditions (limitations) in Rohde v. County Board of Appeals for Baltimore County and Ortel Realty, Inc., 234 Md. 259, 263, 199 A.2d 216, 218 (1964), but the issue of conditional zoning was not raised before this Court, "Despite some possible ambiguity in the order, it is not directly attacked as being conditioned with regard to the reclassification from one zone to another.” In another case apparently decided after the 1968-69 Commission had completed its work and made its recommendations, and shortly after the statute was amended by the Legislature, this Court, in a case apparently decided below before the 1970 amendment was finally passed, upheld the denial of a rezoning that had included recommendations by a local commission for certain non-use conditions. However, the denial below, which we affirmed, had been based on reasons, other than the recommendation for conditional zoning. Messenger v. Board of County Commissioners for Prince George’s County, 259 Md. 693, 271 A.2d 166 (1970). In any event, no notice of the new 1970 amendments was taken by the Court. This Court decided the case in November of 1970; the advance sheets may not have been published at that time. Even then, however, we recognized that "In Prince George’s County, conditional zoning is permitted by statute. See Sec. 59-839 of the Prince George's County Zoning Ordinance.” Messenger, 259 Md. at 707, 271 A.2d at 173. The Court noted that whereas the applicants had failed to establish the basic prerequisites for the rezoning in the first instance, it would have been "a waste of time and effort” to consider the matter of the conditions recommended.
. The proceedings before the administrative agency in National Capital occurred prior to the enactment of the State enabling statute authorizing conditional zoning. Our opinion does not note the date of the lower court decision. But, it is clear that the statute authorizing conditional zoning was not presented to this Court in that case.
. In National Capital, the Montgomery County Attorney had rendered an opinion that conditional zoning "is not permitted in Montgomery County.” The Court took note of that opinion but, as I state above, took no notice of the 1970 amendment to Article 66B, which, for the first time, expressly permitted conditional zoning by local governments that expressly and properly adopt such provisions. Apparently, even by the time of our decision, Montgomery County had not exercised the authority granted by the 1970 Article 66B amendment, and that amendment, if known by Montgomery County, was not brought to the Court’s attention in that, with the county’s failure to adopt such provisions, the Article 66B amendment, even if applicable because it was enacted while the case was in progress below, was not relevant to the case. More important, as I note, the Court’s comments relative to conditional *597zoning were based on the Court’s prior cases, the holdings of which, had been to a large degree superseded by (he 1970 amendment to Article 66B. Thus our language in that case, relative to the prohibition of conditional zoning in Maryland was dicta and, by 1972, inaccurate.
. The concept of "spot zoning” always relates to uses of property; never to such things as set backs, design of buildings, height of buildings; i.e., "yard issues.”
. In this quotation, I omitted the legislative editing marks.
. Because the language is so clear, I suppose that is why the majority could not get to the position it takes by a “plain meaning” analysis. Because a plain meaning analysis takes it where it does not want to go and because it would lead to a different interpretation than the land use bar in the suburban areas had given the language, the majority, essentially ignores the statute’s plain meaning in this case of first impression for this Court.
. Generally, county zoning provisions do not apply within municipal corporations. While municipalities, other than Baltimore City, may be within the geographical boundaries of counties or regional entities, they are not, contrary to the opinions of some, subservient to county or regional governments unless the State has, by statute, otherwise dictated. Each local municipal entity gets its power directly from the State, not from the county or region in which it is located.
. As stated, supra, this section is now codified in Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol., 2001 Supp.), Article 66B, Section 4.01(c).
. The availability of 'conditional zoning' that permits limitations as to uses is, in reality, a tool that can ease the burdens on property owners that seek reclassifications in order to engage in specific projects. Persons who are opposed to any development on a specific piece of property because they want the private property of others to remain open space, often use as a weapon a refrain to legislative bodies, that essentially states: "If you permit the reclassification, there is nothing to prohibit the developer from using the property for any of the uses permitted in the district. Some of these uses could be very detrimental to our properties.” Private property owners counter this argument by displaying a willingness to be limited to specific uses and projects.
. The majority states that the dissent "erroneous[ly] conflates original zoning with the “piecemeal” rezoning process.” This dissent to be sure, is a conflation of two tests into a new concept. That is because this is a case of first impression. If one assumes, as even the majority accepts, that there are only two types of Euclidean zoning-piecemeal and comprehensive-the individual application of one property owner for a zoning of one piece of property must be one or the other. It obviously cannot be comprehensive-it is an individual application for a zoning classification for a single, specific parcel. Unless the majority creates a completely new type of zoning, the process here was piecemeal, and the application would be an individual application for which the Rockville statute would have to apply. As to the majority’s accusation that the dissent creates a strawman, the appropriate response is 'to ask.’ What is it-this zoning upon an individual combined petition for annexation and zoning? It has to be subject to some characterization; two are available-piecemeal or comprehensive. Piecemeal is the characterization traditionally associated with individual applications. The majority’s opinion rejects that characterization. There is only one left-comprehensive; but the majority knows that trying to characterize the process as comprehensive has as much chance of success as getting a pig to fly. Instead, the majority continues to avoid the real issue by insisting on the difference between "original” zoning and "change/mistake” zoning, arguing in essence that if it is not "change/misfake” zoning it is "original.” I agree. If (hat was ihe issue rather than a proposition obscuring the issue, the majority would be correct. In essence, the majority has created its own "strawman,” one that supports the position it wants to reach.
. I rely in this portion of my dissent on my perception that the plain meaning of the statute controls. If I believed that the statute was ambiguous, my opinion as to its meaning would constitute pure conjecture and would be no better than the conjecture of the majority. In that event, I would probably concur with the result the majority reaches on this issue.
. On page 553 the majority also states that a second possible interpretation of the statute is that "the General Assembly merely was acknowledging the hierarchy of local governmental planning and the differing terminology used to identify those various land use plans by the various jurisdictions.” There is no hierarchy as between county and municipal plans. They are on equal footing. Both get their zoning power directly from the Stale-neither gets its power from the other. There is no pecking order.
. “On February 4, 1986, the Cecil County Commissioners passed a resolution approving the proposed zoning changes." Northeast, 310 Md. at 23, 526 A.2d at 965.
. As Judge Harrell correctly points out, even with the prohibition against other retail uses, there are, according to the use provisions of the Rockville zoning statutes, numerous other uses permitted either as of right, or by special exception in the I-1 zone.