CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
Chief Justice CAPPY.I join the opinion of the majority in all respects except for its conclusion that the Township Commissioners were not required to review Appellant Elias Kassoufs submission of November 22, 2000, prior to the Commissioners rendering a final decision on his application for subdivision approval. The record is replete with evidence that the Commissioners engaged in a virtual war of attrition against this developer and this development, and thus, acted in less than good faith in considering Appellant’s land use application. In light of the Commissioner’s recalcitrant conduct and in fairness to both parties, I would remand this matter for the Commissioners to fully consider the letter Appellant submitted on November 22, 2000, in response to the Township engineer’s review of Appellant’s November 14, 2000, plan; to give Appellant a “last *241chance” opportunity to respond to any objections or modify his plan; and for final consideration of the plan by the Commissioners.
First, as acknowledged by the majority, it is far from clear whether the Commissioners considered Appellant’s November 22, 2000, letter submitted in response to the Township Engineer’s review of Appellant’s plan. Majority Opinion at pp. 235-37, 883 A.2d at 474. The Commissioners’ decision letter makes vague references to a letter dated November 27, 2000, however, no such letter exists. Even if, as the majority supposes, the Commissioners meant Appellant’s letter of November 22, 2000, but simply erred in their reference thereto, there is no indication that the Commissioners fully considered the letter prior to voting—indeed the record strongly suggests just the opposite, that the Commissioners did not review Appellant’s revised plan.1
Second, while I agree with the majority that, in general, “reciprocal actions taken in good faith are required of the parties” and that “a reciprocal good faith standard cannot simply eliminate the inherent discretionary powers of a municipality in this area,” Majority Opinion at pp. 237-39, 883 A.2d at 475, the majority’s analysis of the parties’ conduct focuses solely on the shortcomings of Appellant. I believe that the majority fails to consider the entire experience of the parties regarding the process of obtaining the Township’s approval for the subdivision, which clearly establishes an equal lack of good faith on the part of the Township.
Specifically absent from the majority’s analysis regarding the good faith of the parties is any discussion of the litigation at the initial stages of the subdivision approval process. In early 1998, Appellant sought approval by the Township of the development of Appellant’s property as a residential subdivision. Approval was sought under the applicable ordinance as well as the then-applicable steep-slope ordinance. The Town*242ship denied steep-slope approval. Appellant appealed this determination to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which in October 1998, reversed the Township’s decision and granted steep-slope approval. Yet even after the court’s order granting steep-slope approval, in mid-1999, the Township boldly required Appellant to obtain a new steep-slope approval before he would be permitted to file his subdivision plan. This was because the Township had repealed the old steep-slope ordinance and had replaced it with a new steep-slope ordinance. Again, Appellant was forced to seek recourse in the courts and on November 15,1999, the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County ruled that the Township could not reject Appellant’s prior steep-slope approval by repealing the prior ordinance and enacting a new steep-slope ordinance.
Thus, the longer view of this seven-year odyssey not only reveals an obdurate Township, employing dubious methods to prevent development of this property but also brings the events that followed into their proper focus.
Thereafter, in June 2000, Appellant filed an application for final subdivision approval. The Township Commissioners initially rejected Appellant’s application, determining that it was incomplete. After re-submitting the application in July 2000, the Commissioners approved referral of the plan for consideration by the Township Planning Commission. The application also was reviewed by the Township engineer, who found 66 defects in the application. Thereafter, Appellant and the Planning Commission engaged in a lengthy period of discussion to arrive at a plan that was acceptable to the Township. Certain defects remained outstanding. Concessions, however, were made by Appellant including a reduction in the number of lots from 19 to 15. Ultimately, the Planning Commission recommended denying the plan on October 18, 2000.
The matter was then referred to the Township Commissioners. Specifically, the plan was scheduled for the agenda for decision by the Commissioners only six days later—October 24, 2000. In light of the date on which the Township Commissioners were to consider the plan, Appellant revised the plan *243and on October 23, 2000, Appellant submitted the plan for the Commissioner’s October 24th meeting.
At the October 24, 2000 meeting, the Commissioners were hesitant to consider the plan as it had only been recently received. Appellant expressed his belief that the Commissioners were not required to act that evening, and the Township solicitor recommended granting Appellant an extension. The Commissioners set November 14, 2000 as the date for Appellant to submit a final plan, indicating that a decision would be made at their November 28, 2000, meeting. Appellant agreed to this three-week period to file his plan, with, according to Appellant, the proviso that the Township engineer would promptly comment on Appellant’s October 23, 2000 submission.2
The Township engineer, however, did not offer his comments on the plan prior to its due date—November 14. Without the engineer’s comments on the prior plan, and the looming deadline, Appellant submitted a revised plan on November 14th. It was not until November 17, 2000, three days after Appellant’s plan was due, that the Township’s engineer responded to Appellant’s prior plan. On November 22, 2000, five days after receipt of the Township engineer’s comments, Appellant resubmitted his plan.
A review of the transcript reveals that the November meeting appeared to be a foregone conclusion. When the plan was placed before the Commissioners as an agenda item, the first comment on the plan was a motion to reject the plan. There was no request for a report by the Township engineer or from the Township solicitor, and there was no request for comments by Appellant. The Commissioners immediately considered a motion for rejection. After limited discussion, the Chairman called for a vote after expressing his reservation regarding *244voting without reviewing the most recent submission. The Commissioners unanimously rejected Appellant’s plan.
In conclusion, while I join the majority’s opinion in virtually all respects, I respectfully dissent from its analysis regarding the respective good faith of the parties. While Appellant may have not at all times acted in good faith, the Township, as evidenced by its seven-year battle against development of this property, also acted in less than good faith. Accordingly, in fairness to both parties, I would remand the matter to the Commissioners to consider the letter Appellant submitted on November 22, 2000, in response to the Township engineer’s review of Appellant’s November 14, 2000 plan, to give Appellant a final opportunity to respond to any objections made thereto or a final chance to modify his plan, and for the Commissioners to render a final determination approving or disapproving of the plan.
Madame Justice NEWMAN joins this concurring and dissenting opinion.. For example, the President of the Board of Commissioners, Craig P. Steven, expressed discomfort with voting on the plan without reviewing the revised plans, R.R. 404, and the record suggests that the other Commissioners did not even see the revised plan. R.R. 400-01, 404.
. Although an express agreement by the Township’s engineer to provide a response prior to the due date for the submission of the final plan does not appear to be contained in the record, it is axiomatic that receipt of the Township engineer’s response to the October 23, 2000 submission after the date on which the "final” submission was due would be valueless to Appellant.