CONCURRING OPINION
Justice NEWMAN.This is a situation where applying the plain language of one section of a statute leads to an absurd result, which is dissonant with the purpose of the statutory scheme in its entirety. I join in the result that the Majority reaches because of the unambiguous words of Section 1705(b)(3) of Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705(b)(3). By holding that the children of an owner of a registered but uninsured vehicle are not bound to limited tort remedies despite the fact that their parent is deemed to have chosen the limited tort option, this Court confers greater benefits on children of parents who have not maintained financial responsibility than on those with financially responsible parents. Nevertheless, as the Majority states, “the clarity of the language does not require us to look to the purposes of the statute.” Majority Opinion at 207-09, 883 A.2d at 457. I write separately to express my opinion that I find it difficult to believe that the legislature could have intended this outcome when it provided for the election of tort options and financial responsibility at Section 1705 of the MVFRL.1
I believe that our holding today produces a result that directly opposes the goal of the MVFRL. We have held that *212“the legislative history of the MVFRL indicates that the primary concerns of the General Assembly in repealing the No-fault Act and enacting the MVFRL were the spiraling cost of automobile insurance and the resultant increase in the number of uninsured motorists driving on public highways. See Senate Journal, Oct. 4, 1983, 1142-53; House Journal, Dec.. 13,1983,2139-59.” Windrim v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 537 Pa. 129, 641 A.2d 1154, 1157-58 (1994) (internal citations omitted).2
Had Theresa Holland complied with the mandate of the financial responsibility law, and purchased insurance with the limited tort option, her children would have been limited by her choice and unable to pursue noneconomic damages. Because Holland drove without insurance, and paid no premium whatsoever, her children are now entitled to pursue noneconomic damages, in the same way they would have had their mother bought the full tort option. Stated most simply, the direct result of the Majority’s decision is to encourage and reward failure to comply with the law, an outcome that the legislature surely did not intend when it implemented the MVFRL. While I am sympathetic to the plight of some families who may be unable to afford automobile insurance, even with the lower premium charged for the limited tort option, the fact is that the MVFRL requires it. To comply with the law, an individual need not buy full tort and can maintain financial responsibility by choosing the limited tort option. However, the problem in this case is that Theresa Holland did neither; rather, she drove without insurance. The inability to afford automobile insurance does not allow for an exception to the requirement of maintaining financial responsibility.
Section 1705(b)(3) states that “[a]n individual who is not an owner of a currently registered ... vehicle and who is not a named insured ... shall not be precluded from maintaining an action for noneconomic loss .... ” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705(b)(3) (emphasis added). The Majority applied *213the literal wording of this Section, which is the only way this Court can read it because the words are clear. This requires us to determine that the Holland children are entitled to the full tort option because they do not own a car and are not named insureds, since their mother drove an uninsured car. Because it is true that the Holland children did not own the registered uninsured car, they are not precluded from maintaining an action for noneconomic loss.
I note that although the words in Section 1705(b)(3) are clear, the fact is that the Superior Court and the Commonwealth Court reached two directly opposite holdings in Ickes v. Burkes, 713 A.2d 653 (Pa.Super.1998), and Hames v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 696 A.2d 880 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997). In Ickes, the Superior Court held that full tort remedies were available to the wife of the owner of a registered but uninsured vehicle where the wife did not have an ownership interest in the vehicle. In Hames, the Commonwealth Court concluded that children of an owner of a registered but uninsured vehicle were bound by their mother’s deemed selection of the limited tort option. I believe that these two conflicting determinations reflect the dilemma that this matter presents—applying the literal words of one section of the statute yields a result that the legislature likely did not intend to govern the outcome in the instant case. The fractured Superior Court Opinion in this matter, too, indicates the difficulty of reconciling the words of Section 1705(b)(3) with the intent of the MVFRL. Holland v. Marcy, 817 A.2d 1082 (Pa.Super.2002).
Although the clear wording of Section 1705(b)(3) calls for the result that the Majority articulates, I believe that the legislature did not intend this outcome, because the legislature “does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1). It is my opinion that the legislature likely designed this Section to apply only to individuals who have no connection to either cars or insurance and who, however, have had the misfortune of being involved in an accident that was the fault of another.
The Majority correctly points out that the issue before the Court is one of statutory construction, and, as such, is a *214question of law subject to our plenary review. Hoffman v. Troncelliti, 576 Pa. 504, 889 A.2d 1013, 1015-16 (2003). Section 1705(a) deals with car owners and the choices they make, or fail to make, regarding the election of tort options.
I do not believe that the legislation was promulgated to bestow greater benefits on children of the uninsured than on those whose parents purchased insurance. The Majority intimates that providing full tort benefits to children of uninsured parents will not contribute to escalating insurance costs, labeling that a “theoretical hypothesis,” which is “necessarily suspect,” due to a lack of record evidence regarding the addition of costs to the system. Majority Opinion at 207 n. 15, 883 A.2d at 456 n. 15. I maintain that there can be little doubt that allowing recovery of full tort remedies in the absence of the payment of any premium adds costs to the system. In Windrim, we stated that “in passing the [MVFRL], the Legislature was primarily concerned with the rising consumer cost of automobile insurance, created in part by the substantial number of uninsured motorists who contributed nothing to the pool of insurance funds from which claims were paid.” Windrim, 641 A.2d at 1156 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). Therefore, I take exception to this assertion and posit that we can take judicial notice of the fact that when people recover full tort remedies for which they have paid no concomitant premium, the system incurs a cost for which it is not compensated. I see no need to provide record evidence of what is, in fact, a truism.
Sections 1705(a) and (b) provide numerous instances showing that the tort option chosen by the insured binds the members of the insured’s household. In these other sections involving “election” of tort options, the legislature has indicated that the status of children, with respect to limited or full tort, follows that of their parent.3 The children of insured parents who chose limited tort are circumscribed by the parental choice. Section 1705(a)A. The children of parents who select full tort are entitled to that coverage. Section *2151705(a)B. When parents do not return the paperwork manifesting their choice, but continue to pay premiums, they and those they are “empowered by this section to bind by [their] choice” are presumed to have chosen the full tort coverage. Section 1705(a)(3).
However, Section 1705(a)(5), which states that an owner of a registered ear who does not maintain financial responsibility is “deemed to have chosen the limited tort alternative,” does not repeat the language in preceding sections reflecting that the choice of the deemed insured binds the members of the household of the insured. In the absence of that specific language, the Majority correctly concludes that it would be necessary for the legislature to insert additional words into Section 1705(a) to demonstrate its intention that children be bound by the choices of their parents.
The legislature also prescribes the outcome for individuals who own registered cars and who have not purchased insurance, i.e., who do not maintain financial responsibility. These people are “deemed to have chosen the limited tort alternative.” Section 1705(a)(5). They are “deemed to have chosen” limited tort because they did not exercise the option themselves. Section 1705(a)(5) is included in the same section as Section 1705(a)(l)A., which states that Pennsylvania law “give[s] you the right to choose a form of insurance that limits your right and the right of members of your household to seek financial compensation.... ” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705(a)(l)A. If the mother of the Holland children had actively chosen limited tort, instead of driving without insurance, her children would have been the recipients of that choice, pursuant to Section 1705(a)(l)A. However, their mother did not choose, and the legislature left a hole with the “deemed to have chosen” language by not providing that, as in Section 1705(a)(l)A., the children, too, are “deemed to have chosen” the option of their mother.
Judge Bowes in the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in the fractured Superior Court decision in the instant matter noted that the “deemed to have chosen” language “evinces an intent by the legislature to create the legal fiction of an *216insurance policy where the uninsured owner of a vehicle stands in the shoes of a named insured.” Holland, 817 A.2d at 1095 (Bowes, J., concurring and dissenting). While I find that interpretation eminently sensible, the fact is that the legislature is the entity that must correct the omission that leads to the result we determine today.
For this reason, I join the Majority Opinion in affirming the determination of the Superior Court.
Justice NIGRO joins this concurring opinion.. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705.
. Although Windrim involved an exclusionary clause in a contract of insurance, its reference to legislative history is germane to this case.
. In referring to children in these examples, I address children who reside in the household of their parents, as in the matter sub judice.