I concur in parts 1, 2A, and 3 of the Discussion of the majority opinion. I also concur in the majority’s conclusion in part 2B that Tony Reis failed to obtain permanent status based on his claim the district failed to give him notice of his temporary status under Education Code1 section 44916 because Reis failed to demonstrate two consecutive years of probationary service. (§ 44929.21, subd. (b).) As to the remainder of part 2B, however, I respectfully dissent. I conclude Reis is precisely the type of teacher the Legislature intended to exempt from section 44910.
Since 1997, Tony Reis has maintained a “Full Time Preliminary Designated Subjects Vocational Educational Teaching Credential” in the subject of agricultural mechanics. At the Biggs Unified School District, agricultural mechanics is part of the regular educational program.
In 1997, Reis started as a probationary teacher teaching agricultural mechanics in a .57 full-time equivalent (FTE) position and obtained permanent status in that position in 1999. He taught that subject until he was given a notice of termination in March 2003.
In his second year of employment with the district, the district assigned Reis to a regional occupational program (ROP) class for an additional .43 FTE position. He continued in that position until he was given notice of his termination in March 2003.
The first paragraph of section 44910 provides that “Service by a person as an instructor in classes conducted at regional occupational centers or programs, . . . shall not be included in computing the service required as a prerequisite to attainment of, or eligibility to, classification as a permanent employee of a school district.” However, the second paragraph contains an exception that states this rule does not apply to a “regularly credentialed teacher who has been employed to teach in the regular educational programs of the school district and subsequently assigned as an instructor in the regional occupational centers or programs.” (§ 44910.) The pivotal question here is whether Reis fits within this exception. I believe he does.
In examining this statute, our job is to “ ‘ascertain legislative intent so as to effectuate a law’s purpose. [Citations.] “In the construction of a statute . . . the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is . . . contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; . . .” [Citation.] Legislative intent will be determined so far as possible from the language of statutes, read as a whole, and if the words are reasonably free from ambiguity and uncertainty, the courts will look no *825further to ascertain its meaning. [Citation.]’ ” (California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Golden Valley Unified School Dist. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 369, 375-376 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 642].)
The key word of the statute—“subsequently”—is unambiguous. The basic definition of “subsequent” is “following in time, order or place.” (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Diet. (10th ed. 2000) p. 1170, col. 1.) This definition renders one event subsequent to another if it follows in any one of the three potential classifications: time, order or place. It does not suggest that the event must follow in all three classifications, nor does the use of the disjunctive render this word ambiguous. Thus, section 44910 simply requires that the teacher be employed in the regular educational program and then following that event in time or order or place be appointed to a position in the ROP program.
Here, Reis was a regularly credentialed teacher who was employed to teach in the regular educational programs of the district during the 1997-1998 school year in a .57 FTE position. Subsequent to that employment, he was assigned to teach as an ROP teacher in a .43 FTE position. Thus, subsequent both in time and in order to Reis’s initial teaching assignment in the regular educational programs of the district, he was assigned as an instructor to an ROP position. He fits within the literal terms of the exception.
I believe the majority and I would both agree that a full-time mathematics, English, Latin, or Greek teacher who was subsequently assigned to a full-time ROP position would fall into this exception. However, nothing in the language of section 44910 or the definitions of “subsequently assigned” limits its application to assignments that wholly displace a teacher’s prior assignment. The statute does not state that the subsequent assignment must follow in time and in place and in order. In my view, the majority’s analysis of this statute that adds this restriction is not supported by the plain language of the statute.
Further, I find nothing in the legislative history that supports the majority’s analysis that section 44910 does not apply to Reis. As the majority acknowledges, the intent behind section 44910 was to “allow school districts more flexibility in operating their ROP’s. (Assem. Com. on Ed., Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 292 (1973-1974 Reg. Sess.) May 2, 1973 (Assembly Report).) Under preexisting law, an ROP teacher, like other teachers, could attain permanent status after three years of service as a probationary teacher. (Ibid.) But because ROP’s involve ‘education and training in career technical courses’ (§ 52301, subd. (a)), an ROP teacher may have only ‘specialized training.’ (Assem. Rep., supra.) Furthermore, it was perceived that ‘to meet and adjust to the rapidly changing needs of our technical society, it ha[d] become *826necessary to initiate new training programs and phase out programs for which there [wa]s no longer a need in terms of employment opportunities.’ (Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., Statement Regarding Assem. Bill No. 292 (1973-1974 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 26, 1973.) If a particular program was dropped, but the teacher in that program had acquired permanent status, the teacher could be ‘virtually untransferable to another teaching assignment within the district.’ (Assem. Rep., supra.)” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 820-821.)
Thus, as the majority correctly concludes, the purpose behind section 44910 was “to prevent these specialized, virtually untransferable ROP teachers from becoming permanent employees.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 821.) Reis, however, is not one of those teachers. By definition, a teacher who first works in the regular educational program of a school district before being assigned to the ROP program is not a specialized virtual untransferable teacher. Before he was an ROP teacher, Reis taught in the regular educational programs of the Biggs Unified School District. While Reis’s subject of agricultural mechanics may not have the universal application of reading, writing or arithmetic, Reis is no different than a Greek teacher or a performing arts teacher, whose subject has limited application. In short, Reis is not the type of teacher the Legislature sought to exclude from the ranks of permanent employees by virtue of this statute.
Rather, Reis is exactly the type of teacher the Legislature explicitly sought to shield from the effects of the new law: a regularly credentialed teacher who had previously been employed in regular educational programs and then assigned to the ROP program. While the statute may most often protect full-time teachers who are subsequently assigned to an ROP program, nothing in the legislative history for this section supports the proposition that the Legislature only sought to protect those teachers. If that was the Legislature’s intent, they are free to write a statute which says that. Until they do, I am bound by the unadorned language of the statute.
Given that there are only four possible categories for teachers: permanent, probationary, temporary, and substitute (Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916-917 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 811, 62 P.3d 54]), and that the district has offered no other basis for classifying Reis as a temporary or substitute teacher when it hired him to be an ROP teacher, Reis’s initial ROP service must have been as a probationary teacher. Once he served two consecutive probationary years as an ROP teacher in the .43 assignment and was employed the first day of the 2000-2001 school year in that same position, his rights as a permanent teacher were vested automatically independent of any action by either party. (Kamin v. Governing Board (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 1014, 1017-1018 [139 *827CaLRptr. 853].) Thus, I would conclude Reis achieved permanent status in his .43 FTE position effective the first day of the 2000-2001 school year. (§ 44929.21, subd. (b).)
All further statutory references are to the Education Code unless otherwise indicated.