dissenting:
The majority here holds that a reimburser is not required to reimburse the Fund for money paid to a former employee as a result of agency error. It bases this holding on an interpretation of the language "attributable to service in the employ of such nonprofit organization” contained in Maryland Code (1957,1979 Repl. Vol.), Art. 95A, § 8 (d) (2). The majority concludes that the "payment here was attributable solely to agency error and not to service in the employ of the nonprofit organization.”
In my view, the language, the legislative history, and the purpose of § 8 (d) (2) indicate that the Legislature intended the phrase "benefits paid” to include money paid to a former employee as a result of agency error and, therefore, intended reimbursers to reimburse the Fund for such payments. The fact that the Legislature intended reimbursers to reimburse the Fund for such payments indicates that it also intended that such payments be considered to be "attributable to service in the employ of such nonprofit organizations.” I, therefore, would hold that a reimburser is required to reimburse the Fund for money paid to a former employee as a result of agency error. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Here the reimburser contends that § 8 (d) (2) requires reimbursement for benefits paid but does not require reimbursement for payments that are not benefits. It points out that that section provides, in pertinent part, that any nonprofit employer who elects to reimburse the Fund must reimburse the Fund in:
"an amount equal to the amount of regular benefits and one half of the extended benefits paid. ...” 1 (Emphasis added.)
*702It further points out that § 20 (b) defines "benefits,” in pertinent part, as:
"money payments payable to an individual, as provided in this article. . ..” (Emphasis added.)
It maintains that because money erroneously paid after a final agency determination of disqualification is not money "payable ... as provided in this article,” such payments are not "benefits” within the meaning of § 20 (b) and § 8 (d) (2). The reimburser concludes, therefore, that it is not required to reimburse the Fund for such payments. I do not agree.
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the actual intent of the Legislature. Department of State Planning v. Mayor of Hagerstown, 288 Md. 9, 14, 415 A.2d 296, 299 (1980). The primary source from which to determine this intent is the language of the statute itself. In determining whether the meaning of a statutory provision is ambiguous, even when its language appears to be clear, it is necessary to examine that provision in context and in relation to all the other provisions of the statute. Comptroller of the Treasury v. John C. Louis Co., 285 Md. 527, 538, 404 A.2d 1045, 1052-53 (1979). A provision is ambiguous if its meaning is in conflict with other provisions of the same statute. Celanese Corp. of America v. Davis, 186 Md. 463, 471, 47 A.2d 379, 383 (1945); Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471, 485 (1854); 2A A. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 46.04 (4th ed. C.D. Sands 1973). When statutory language is ambiguous, a court may consider the statute’s legislative history and administrative interpretations and must consider its purpose. Department of State Planning, 288 Md. at 15, 415 A.2d at 299.
An examination of the phrase "benefits paid” contained in § 8 (d) (2) in context and in relation to § 20 (b) and § 17 (d) of the statute reveals that the phrase "benefits paid” may have two different meanings. If the word "benefits” were defined in accordance with § 20 (b) as "money payments payable to an individual, as provided in this article,” then *703the phrase "benefits paid” would refer only to money paid after an agency determination of eligibility. Under such circumstances, a reimburser would not be required to reimburse the Fund for payments made after an agency determination of disqualification or other ineligibility.
The word "benefits” as used in § 17 (d), however, would appear to have a different meaning. That section provides in pertinent part:
"When any person has received any sum for benefíts for which he is found by the Executive Director to have been ineligible, the amount thereof may be recovered from benefits payable to him or which may be payable to him in the future. ...” (Emphasis added.)
In view of the parties’ concession that under this section, money paid to a claimant after an agency determination of ineligibility may be recovered, there can be no question that the word "benefits” as used in § 17 (d) refers to any money paid to an individual regardless of his eligibility at the time of the payment. If the word "benefits” contained in § 8 (d) (2) were defined in accordance with § 17 (d), then the phrase "benefits paid” contained in § 8 (d) (2) would refer to any money paid, including money paid after an agency determination of disqualification or other ineligibility. Under these circumstances, a reimburser would be required to reimburse the Fund for payments made after an agency determination of disqualification or other ineligibility.
Because the meaning of the word "benefits” in § 20 (b) is in conflict with its meaning in § 17 (d), the meaning of the phrase "benefits paid” contained in § 8 (d) (2) is ambiguous. As a result of this ambiguity, it is unclear whether a reimburser must reimburse the Fund for erroneous payments made after an agency determination that a claimant was disqualified or otherwise ineligible.
A comprehensive review of 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 3301 — 3311 (Employment Security Amendments of 1970) and Md. Code, Art. 95A discloses a statutory scheme that distinguishes between the obligations of employers who pay contributions *704to the Fund (contributors) and those of reimbursers. Contributors are required to make payments to the Fund regardless of whether any of their former employees have been paid benefits from the Fund. Contributors must pay the Fund a statutorily determined amount that may be modified by the contributors’ experience rating which is essentially based upon the total amount of chargeable benefits paid from the Fund to each contributor’s former employee. Art. 95A, § 8 (b); § 8 (c) (2); § 8 (c) (4); § 8 (c) (4) (i).2 In addition, contributors must pay a surcharge if the fund balance falls below a specified level. § 8 (c) (4) (ii).3 Moreover, FUTA requires contributors to pay a Federal unemployment tax, 26 U.S.C.A. § 3301,4 that provides the funds for the *705Maryland Unemployment Insurance Administration Fund, from which, in turn, the administrative expenses of ESA are paid. Art. 95A, § 14.5
The Legislature, recognizing that administrative errors occur, provided that under specified circumstances, payments from the Fund made to former employees are not to be charged against a contributor’s experience rating. § 8 (c) (10) (A); § 8 (c) (10) (B); § 8 (c) (2) (ii); § 8 (c) (8) and § 17 (e); § 8 (c) (8) and § 17 (d).6 In addition, if the Executive Director determines that a contribution was erroneously collected, a contributor is entitled to an adjustment in the form of a credit or a refund. § 15 (b).7 Although the individual contributor is thus afforded some degree of relief, he, like all other contributors, must ultimately share in and pay for *706the cost of these agency errors, all of which result in payments from the Fund. § 20 (i).8
Reimbursers are not required to make any payment to the Fund unless a former employee has been paid money from the Fund. The reimburser must pay the Fund only the amount that was paid from the Fund to a former employee. § 8 (d) (2). Reimbursers are not required to pay a surcharge if the Fund balance falls below a specified level. Moreover, they are not required to pay the FUTA tax and, therefore, do not share in the costs of the Fund’s administration. 26 U.S.C.A. § 3301 and § 3306 (c) (8). Finally, Art. 95A does not provide for any kind of relief for reimbursers when agency error results in payments from the Fund to the reimbursers’ former employees.
At the time § 8 (d) (2) was enacted, the Legislature was cognizant of the differences between the obligations of contributors and reimbursers. It also recognized that agency errors occur. It was fully aware that although it had afforded some degree of relief to contributors by providing that their individual experience ratings not be charged for agency errors which resulted in payments of money from the Fund to their individual employees, it nonetheless had required that employers must ultimately share in and pay the cost of agency errors which resulted in payments of money from the Fund. In the absence of an express provision affording reimbursers any form of relief, there is nothing to indicate that when an agency error results in the payment of money from the Fund to reimbursers’ former employees, the reimbursers should be excused from the employers’ ultimate obligation to pay the cost of such errors.
In my view, the entire statutory scheme embodied in the Employment Security Amendments of 1970 and Md. Code, Art. 95A evidences a legislative intent that reimbursers who *707do not contribute to the; Fund, and who do not share in the expenses of maintaining or administering it, should not be afforded relief from the cost of agency errors made with respect to the reimbursers' former employees at the expense of the contributors who ultimately pay those costs. While it may appear somewhat inequitable to require reimbursers to pay for agency errors for which they are not responsible, it must be remembered that they elect to become reimbursers and may at their option terminate that election to become contributors to the Fund. In my view, it is even more inequitable to require contributors to pay for agency errors for which they are no more responsible than are reimbursers when it is remembered that contributors alone bear the total administrative costs of the Fund.
The legislative history of the Employment Security Amendments of 1970 evidences the same legislative intent. Senate Report No. 91-752, 91st Congress, 2d Session, reprinted in [1970] United States Code Congressional and Administrative News, 3606, 3618, was issued before Congress enacted the Employment Security Amendments of 1970 to the Federal Unemployment Tax Act which subjected nonprofit employers to its provisions. That report stated, in pertinent part, that by permitting nonprofit employers to elect the status of reimbursers rather than contributors, "the nonprofit organizations would be allowed to adopt a form of self-insurance.”
In my view, Senate Report No. 91-752 evidences that Congress intended reimbursers to bear the risk and, therefore, the loss occasioned by agency errors that result in erroneous payments to their former employees. I recognize that certain elements of self-insurance may not be applicable to a reimburser. However, the essence of self-insurance is the assumption by the self-insurer of the otherwise insurable risks associated with the activity in question. The risk of loss resulting from agency error is such a risk. The Fund insures a contributor against the risk of loss resulting from agency error with respect to its former employees. If a reimburser is intended to be a self-insurer, it must be regarded as assuming the risk of loss resulting from *708agency error with respect to its former employees. Any reimburser unwilling to assume this risk may elect to become a contributor.
In order to assist the States in implementing the Employment Security Amendments of 1970, the Manpower Administration of the Department of Labor issued a document entitled "Draft Legislation to Implement the Employment Security Amendments of 1970 . . . H.R. 14705, Together with Explanatory Commentary.” The commentary following § 8 (f) (5), which is substantially similar to Art. 95A, § 8 (d) (2), provided in pertinent part:
"Non-charging of benefits to employers reflects concepts that are not reasonably applicable or adaptable to reimbursing employers. When benefits paid to a former employee of a contributing employer are not charged to the employer’s account, he escapes only the consideration of such benefit payments in the computation of his contribution rate. He does not avoid a potential liability to share with all other contributing employers, to the extent that the fund may require, in meeting such benefit costs. Minimum contribution rates, solvency accounts, socialized costs, etc., are devices that recognize this potential liability.
"Reimbursing employers, who are required to pay into the State fund an amount equal to the benefit costs attributable to service in their employment, are in an inherently different position. They are self-insurers, fully liable for such benefit costs of their employees and not liable at all for the cost of any other benefits. If a reimbursing employer, for example, were relieved of the cost of post-disqualification benefits paid to a worker who had quit his employment, no other reimbursing employer could be required to pay into .the fund to help meet that cost, as is in effect the case with a contributing employer whose account is non-charged for such a benefit payment.” [United *709States Dept, of Labor, Draft Legislation to Implement the Employment Security Amendments of 1970 . . . H.R. 14705 at p. 104.] (Emphasis added.)
This language shows that at the time the States were preparing to implement the Employment Security Amendments of 1970, the Department of Labor’s administrative interpretation of those amendments was that reimbursers were self-insurers required to bear the loss occasioned by agency errors.
1 assume that in 1971 when the Maryland Legislature enacted § 8 (d) (2), it was aware of the legislative history of the Employment Security Amendments of 1970 and the Department of Labor’s administrative interpretation.9 Messitte v. Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co., 287 Md. 289, 294, 411 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1980); Police Comm’r of Baltimore City v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 419, 379 A.2d 1007, 1011 (1977); Allers v. Tittsworth, 269 Md. 677, 684, 309 A.2d 476, 480 (1973). Both support the view that the Legislature intended reimbursers to reimburse the Fund for payments made as a result of agency error.
This conclusion is consistent with the purpose of § 8 (d) (2). In North Charles General Hospital, Inc. v. Employment Security Administration, 286 Md. 115, 121, 405 A.2d 751, 755 (1979), this Court recognized that the Legislature’s general purpose in enacting § 8 (d) (2) was to minimize the economic burden of reimbursers’ participation in the Fund. At the same time, the Court determined that the Legislature intended reimbursers to be entitled to minimize their *710economic burden only under the very limited circumstances expressly provided by statute.
The majority recognizes that "this case must be determined upon the basis of construction of the Maryland statute.” Yet the only rationale it offers for its interpretation of § 8 (d) (2) is that "the Congress and the General Assembly obviously intended to favor nonprofit organizations such as the employer here.” Thus, in reaching its result the majority totally ignores the statutory scheme embodied in the language of the Act, the legislative history of the Employment Security Amendments of 1970, the Department of Labor’s administrative interpretation, and the purpose of § 8 (d) (2) as articulated by this Court in North Charles.
In my view, the language, the legislative history, and the purpose of § 8 (d) (2) indicate that the Legislature intended reimbursers to reimburse the Fund for payments made as a result of agency error. I am persuaded that the Legislature intended the phrase "benefits paid” contained in § 8 (d) (2) to refer to any money paid, including money paid to a former employee after an agency determination of disqualification or other ineligibility. Moreover, because the language, the legislative history, and the purpose of § 8 (d) (2) indicate that the Legislature intended reimbursers to reimburse the Fund for payments made as a result of agency error, I can only conclude that the Legislature further intended that such payments must be considered to be "attributable to service in the employ of such nonprofit organization[s].” I, therefore, would hold that a reimburser is required to reimburse the Fund for payments erroneously made after a final agency determination that a claimant was disqualified or otherwise ineligible to receive payments.10 *711Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
Judges Eldridge and Cole authorize me to state that they join me in the views expressed herein.
. Ch. 727, Acts of 1980, effective 1 July 1980, repealed and reenacted Art. 95A, § 8 (d) (2) with changes in language that are not here relevant.
. Art. 95A, § 8 (b) provides:
"Each employer shall pay contributions equal to two and seven-tenths per centum of wages paid with respect to employment except as hereinafter provided.”
§ 8 (c) (2) provides in pertinent part:
"The Executive Director shall maintain an experience-rating record for each employer.
[A]ll regular benefits and ... any extended benefits paid to [a claimant] shall be charged against the experience-rating record of his principal base period employer....”
§ 8 (c) (4) provides in pertinent part:
"The Executive Director shall determine for each fiscal year the contribution rate of each employer ... on the basis of his experience-rating record....”
§ 8 (c) (4) (i) provides in pertinent part:
"The Executive Director shall compute for each employer a benefit ratio that is the quotient obtained by dividing the total regular and extended benefits chargeable to his experience-rating record ... by the total of his annual payrolls....”
. § 8 (c) (4) (ii) provides in pertinent part:
"[Wjhen the fund balance on the computation date is less than 4.5 percent... the rates at which employers shall be required to pay contributions shall be in accordance with the table of basic rates, adjusted as shown in the table of basic rate adjustments....”
. 26 U.S.C.A. § 3301 provides in pertinent part:
"There is hereby imposed on every employer ... an excise tax, with respect to having individuals in his employ, equal to ... 3.4 percent... of the total wages ... paid by him during the calendar year with respect to employment (as defined in section 3306(c)).”
*705§ 3306 (c) provides in pertinent part:
"fT]he term 'employment’ means any service performed ... except ... (8) service performed in the employ of a religious, charitable, educational, or other organization described in section 501 (c) (3) which is exempt from income tax under section 501(a).”
Thus, nonprofit employers, whether they elect to contribute to or reimburse the Fund, are not required to pay the FUTA tax.
. Art. 95A, § 14 (a) provides in pertinent part:
"There is hereby created in the State treasury a special fund to be known as the Unemployment Insurance Administration Fund.... All moneys in this fund which are received from the federal government ... shall be expended solely for... the proper and efficient administration of this article.”
. A contributor’s experience rating is not charged if a former employee was not entitled to the money paid him because he left his employment voluntarily (§ 8 (c) (10) (A)), was found guilty of committing a crime against the employer (§ 8 (c) (10) (B)), was found to be disqualified as a result of reversal of a previous agency determination (§ 8 (c) (2) (ii)), was found by the Executive Director to have made false statements knowingly in order to obtain benefits (§ 8 (c) (8) and § 17 (e)), or was found by the Executive Director not to have been entitled to receive the money because he had received retroactive wages, had been employed at the time, or had been disqualified or otherwise ineligible for such benefits (§ 8 (c) (8) and § 17 (d)).
. § 15 (b) provides in pertinent part:
"Where any employing unit has made a payment to the Executive Director of contributions ... the employing unit ... may make application to the Executive Director for an adjustment thereof... or for a refund.... If the Executive Director shall determine that such amount... was erroneously collected, the Executive Director shall allow ... an adjustment..,.”
. § 20 (i) provides:
" 'Fund’ means the Unemployment Insurance Fund established by this article, into which all contributions and payments in lieu of contributions required and from which all benefíts provided under this article are paid." (Emphasis added.)
. The majority relies on a 1979 decision of the Secretary of Labor in a conformity proceeding involving the States of Delaware, New Jersey and New York that I find to be unpersuasive. United States Dept, of Labor v. Delaware et al., Conformity Proceedings-ETA-1 (31 Oct. 1979). The Secretary's statement there that the term "self-insurer,” appearing in Senate Report No. 91-752, did not evidence a congressional intent "to require 'pure self-insurance’ (i.e., strict liability) of reimbursing employers . . .” was dicta. The Secretary’s holding was that the question whether a reimburser may be relieved of the obligation of reimbursing for payments made as a result of agency error was a matter of state law. Moreover, the Secretary’s decision is irrelevant to the interpretation of § 8 (d) (2) because that section was enacted by the Maryland Legislature in
. A similar result has been reached under analogous circumstances by the Court of Appeals of Oregon and the Oregon State Legislature. In 1974, the Court of Appeals of Oregon, in deciding Mann Home v. Morgan, 19 Or. App. 853, 529 P.2d 964 (1974), applied the Oregon Employment Security Act as it existed prior to 1973 Amendments and held that reimbursers are required to reimburse the Fund for payments properly made as a result of an agency determination of eligibility after the expiration of a period of disqualification although contributors would not be charged for the payment of such benefits. Or.Rev.Stat. § 657.471(3) (1979). In 1973, the Oregon State Legislature amended the statute to require reimbursers to reimburse the Fund for such payments. Or.Rev.Stat. § 657.504 (1979).
*711I am not persuaded by the opinions of the courts in California, Florida, and Idaho, cited by the majority, that have reached opposite results under the same or analogous circumstances. Neither were the legislatures of those states. Indeed, the holdings in each of these cases was undone by enactments of the appropriate state legislatures.
In 1976, the California Court of Appeals, in deciding Carleson v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 64 Cal. App. 3d 145, 134 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1976), held that reimbursers are not required to reimburse the Fund for payments erroneously made to ineligible claimants. Cal.Unempl.Ins.Code § 803 (c) (West 1972). In 1978, the California State Legislature amended the California Unemployment Insurance Code to require reimbursers to reimburse the Fund for payments made as a result of such agency error. Cal.Unempl.Ins.Code § 803 (c) (West Supp. 1980).
In 1975, the District Court of Appeal of Florida, in deciding Baptist Hospital, Inc. v. White, 313 So. 2d 106 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1975), held that reimbursers are not required to reimburse the Fund for payments made as a result of an erroneous determination of eligibility that is subsequently reversed. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 443.08 (3) (e) 1c (West 1966). In 1977, that Court, in deciding City of Stuart v. McMullian, 340 So. 2d 1209 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1977), held that a political subdivision that is a reimburser is not required to reimburse the Fund for payments made as a result of an erroneous determination of eligibility that is subsequently reversed. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 443.07 (5) (b) (West 1966). In 1978, the Florida State Legislature amended the Florida Unemployment Compensation Act to require reimbursers to reimburse the Fund for payments made as a result of an erroneous determination of eligibility that is subsequently reversed. Fla.Stat.Ann. 8 '443.07 (5) (b) & (c) & 8 443.08 (3) (i), (k) & (1) (West Supp. 1980).
In 1977, the Supreme Court of Idaho, in deciding Department of Employment v. St. Alphonsus Hosp., 98 Idaho 283, 561 P.2d 1316 (1977), applied the Idaho Employment Security Law as it existed prior to 1976 Amendments and held that reimbursers are not required to reimburse the Fund for payments made as a result of an agency determination of eligibility that is subsequently reversed. Idaho Code § 72-1349 (f) (1973). In 1976, the Idaho State Legislature amended the statute to require reimbursers to reimburse the Fund for payments erroneously made not only as a result of an agency determination of eligibility that is subsequently reversed, but also after a final agency determination that a claimant was disqualified or otherwise ineligible. Idaho Code 8 72-1349A (a) (1) (Supp. 1980).