dissenting:
I am not persuaded by the majority’s interpretation of the bond here, but instead read the conditions it states in the disjunctive, that is, before Berg could get back his collateral, either he had to satisfy the judgment against him within 90 days or the court had to lift the stay of execution.
In E. P. Wilbur Tr. Co. v. Eberts, 337 Pa. 161, 168, 10 A.2d 397, 400 (1940), the Supreme Court stated:
The covenants in a bond should be construed to mean what the parties intended so far as that intention can be ascertained by the words used .... If, however, the language is not free from doubt, then the circumstances surrounding the making of the bond and particularly the purpose for which it was given, should be taken into account. (Citation omitted.)
See Manufacturers and Merchants Building and Loan Ass’n v. Willey, 321 Pa. 340, 183 A. 789 (1936); Krewson v. Erny, 158 Pa. Super. 380, 45 A.2d 240 (1946); Barratt v. Greenfield, 137 Pa.Super. 310, 9 A.2d 188 (1939).
Here, the majority has equated the term “and otherwise,” which connects the two stated conditions, with “and,” giving as its reason that “ ‘otherwise’ is merely an adverb introducing a different condition which must be met in addition to (‘and’) the previous condition before the collateral may be released.” At 222. I cannot agree that the language is as unambiguous as the majority suggests. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged (1961) has three definitions of “otherwise” when used as an adverb: “1: in a different way or manner; 2: in different circumstances: under other conditions; 3: in other respects.” When the second definition is applied here, the bond would seem to provide that if Berg was to get back his collateral, the judgment had to be satisfied, but in different circumstances, a lifting of the stay of execution might be sufficient. I find this interpretation of the bond as persuasive as that of the majority, but in any case, at least it demonstrates that the bond is ambiguous.
*328As noted, E. P. Wilbur Tr. Co. v. Eberts, supra at 168, 10 A.2d at 400, when a bond is ambiguous the court must ascertain the parties’ intentions by looking to the surrounding circumstances and the purpose for which the bond was given. Here, a consideration of the surrounding circumstances and purpose of the bond shows that it is improbable that the majority’s interpretation is correct. Berg and the other defendants posted the bond so that the lower court would stay execution of the judgment against them while they litigated the validity of the judgment in this court and the Supreme Court. The bond was solely to protect Alexander and Alexander’s judgment until execution. Once the lower court lifted the stay of execution, which occurred before Berg petitioned for the release of his collateral, the bond no longer served any useful purpose. The collateral should therefore have been released. The majority’s interpretation of the bond would require, however, that Berg had previously satisfied the judgment within 90 days of the entry of the bond. It is difficult to understand the reason for this additional requirement, since the bond was only intended to protect the judgment, not to serve as a vehicle for satisfying it. Once the stay of execution was lifted, Alexander and Alexander was free to execute on the judgment.
Assume the following three cases:
1) Berg had satisfied the judgment in full within 90 days. Under the majority’s interpretation, Berg would not be entitled to get back his collateral until the court granted leave to pursue execution on a judgment that had already been satisfied.
2) Berg had not satisfied the judgment in full within 90 days but successfully attacked the judgment on appeal to this court. Under the majority’s interpretation, Berg would have had to have paid the judgment within 90 days of the bond even though the judgment was later declared void.
3) Berg had not satisfied the judgment in full within 90 days and had not been successful in attacking the *329judgment on appeal to this court or the Supreme Court. The lower court then lifted the stay of execution. Even if Berg satisfied the judgment at this point, under the majority’s interpretation the collateral could not be released because the judgment was not satisfied within 90 days of the entry of the bond.
The second case is certainly troublesome: to require Berg to pay the judgment while he was contesting it would effectively eliminate the need for any bond: why would Alexander and Alexander need to protect its judgment with a bond when it had already been paid the amount of the judgment? The third case is perhaps even more troublesome, because it is close to the facts of this case. If we assume that Berg has not at present satisfied the judgment- and this is by no means clear, since Berg argues that his payment of the $502 did satisfy his entire obligation-and that he then decides that he wants to do so, he still could not get back his collateral because the judgment was not satisfied within 90 days of the entry of the bond. I submit that such a result is absurd, and that the only way to render this bond reasonable is to interpret it as permitting the release of collateral now that the stay of execution has been lifted.
I should vacate the lower court’s order dismissing Berg’s petition and order that his collateral be released.