concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s result in No. 173 Misc. Docket 1979, which dismissed the appellants’ complaint in prohibition.
However, I dissent from the majority’s result and opinion in No. 236 Misc. Docket 1980, which provides that the appellants cannot be enjoined from acting in their official capacity. The appellants are elected officials of Chester Township whose right to hold office was questioned in a quo warranto proceeding filed on February 8, 1980. This action alleged that improper notice of the meeting of Township Supervisors at which they were elected, as well as a lack of a quorum, invalidated their election. On February 12, 1980, the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County granted an Injunction which restrained the appellants from acting in their “official” capacity pending the resolution of the quo warranto proceeding. On February 26, 1980, the Common Pleas Court ordered that the Injunction remain in effect. The appellants filed a notice of appeal to this Court and also requested an order staying the Injunction pending appeal. A Stay was granted by Mr. Justice Nix and Mr. Justice Kauffman on April 7, 1980.
I would dismiss this appeal and dissolve the aforementioned Stay.
The issue in this case is whether the Common Pleas Court can grant equitable relief which restrains the appellants (who are public officials) from acting in their “official” capacity, while a quo warranto action is pending which will or may remove them from office.
While not condoning the alleged illegal activities of the appellants, the majority applies the “exclusive remedy *490rule” 1 which prohibits injunctive relief when the remedy of quo warranto is available. The traditional rationale for this rule was to foster the “Gibraltar of stability in government tenure.” In re Board of School Directors of Carroll Township, 407 Pa. 156, 180 A.2d 16 (1962). It can be argued that efficient governmental functioning would be impaired by enjoining the action of the officials, even though these officials are under attack in a quo warranto action. This rationale fails when applied to this case. The Common Pleas Court found that prior to the alleged usurpation by the appellants the business of the Township was conducted by compromise, (Supplemental Reproduced Record at 67a) and there was no serious impairment. Further, whatever danger may be present that Township business would be impaired if the injunction were affirmed would be outweighed by public outrage at seeing officials who allegedly seized power illegally conducting the Township business, and in derogation of the rights of the residents of the Feltonville section of Chester Township.2
Furthermore, I would grant injunctive relief because the majority’s result is not in accord with recent decisions of this Court. These decisions have developed what can be termed the “exceptional circumstances doctrine,”3 which permits injunctive relief in exceptional circumstances, even where the remedy of quo warranto is available.
The deviation from the exclusive remedy rule was first stated in Mayer v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 1, 190 A.2d 444 (1963), wherein this Court held that the exclusive remedy rule did *491not apply in cases where exceptional circumstances existed.4 The statement of the doctrine in Mayer was dictum, as the court assumed arguendo, that an equitable remedy was available concurrently with quo warranto but denied the relief on other grounds. However, this new doctrine was followed by this court in later decisions. Specter v. Martin, 426 Pa. 102, 232 A.2d 729 (1967) (Equitable relief was granted where the district attorney, the appropriate party to bring quo warranto, could not be expected to bring the action against himself); Chaflin v. Specter, 426 Pa. 464, 233 A.2d 562 (1967) (If equitable relief was not granted immediately a later quo warranto action might necessitate removal of a mayor, with the attendant political chaos); League of Women Voters v. Board of Commissioners, 451 Pa. 26, 301 A.2d 797 (1973) (The court enjoined a public official from acting in his official capacity even though the remedy of quo warranto was available because the attorney general and the district attorney refused to commence a quo warranto action-the exceptional circumstances); Cf: DeFranco v. Belardino, 448 Pa. 234, 292 A.2d 299 (1972) (The court did not find that the exceptional circumstances doctrine was applicable and denied equitable relief. While the circumstances were similar to the instant case, the shenanigans of the Township Supervisors in DeFranco did not rise to the level of blatant illegality as they do in the instant case).5
*492The exceptional circumstances which make injunctive relief necessary in this case are the alleged blatant illegality of the actions of the appellants, the finding of the Common Pleas Court that the actions of the appellants threaten to continue (Supplemental Reproduced Record at 64a), and that these actions are directed at precluding the Feltonville residents from representation on the Chester Township Board of Supervisors. (Supplemental Reproduced Record at 65a). The spectre of arrogant disregard of legality by public officials which may lead to conflict between communities confronts us here and surely constitutes exceptional circumstances which are grounds for injunctive relief.
The trauma which accompanied the Watergate tragedy has indicated the need for effective and efficient means for dealing with illegal official conduct. It is highly, unlikely that the citizens of this nation would place a greater premium on continued governmental function than on immediately restraining the wrongdoing officials. The social conditions which attended the historical exclusive remedy rule are changed now, and case law which supports this rule has lost its value as precedent. The “Gibraltar of stability in governmental tenure”, the exclusive remedy rule, can no longer be the sole criteria for good government.
Consequently, I would affirm the order of the Common Pleas Court.
O’BRIEN, J., joins in this concurring and dissenting opinion.. The majority cites Borough of Pleasant Hills v. Jefferson Township, 359 Pa. 509, 59 A.2d 697 (1948) and In re Board of School Directors of Carroll Township, 407 Pa. 156, 180 A.2d 16 (1962) in support of this rule.
. The conflict on the Board of Supervisors of Chester Township apparently stems from an underlying conflict between the communities of Toby Farms and Feltonville. The trial court found that the actions of the appellants are. directed at precluding the Feltonville residents from representation on the Chester Township Board of Supervisors. (Supplemental Reproduced Record at 65a).
. Comment, Quo Warranto in Pennsylvania: Old Standards and New Developments, 80 Dick.L.R. 218, 232 (1976).
. The court in Mayer stated,
“... in recent years exceptions have been wisely recognized by the Courts to the narrow circumscribed limited remedy of Quo Warranto for several reasons: (1) quo warranto does not always furnish an adequate and full remedy; (2) the wisdom of applying a remedy which will avoid a multiplicity of suits; (3) the paramount right of the public to have a surer and more adequate remedy to restrain wrongful acts by a public official, ...” Id., 411 Pa. at 7, 190 A.2d at 447.
. Mr. Justice Pomeroy in his dissent in DeFranco v. Belardino, 448 Pa. 234, 292 A.2d 299 (1972) decries the fact that denying injunctive relief had allowed the defendant to perpetrate a “slick and transparent scheme” in circumstances similar to this case. Id., 448 Pa. at 238, 292 A.2d at 301. In the same case, Mr. Justice Manderino in his dissent rejected the exclusive remedy rule saying that “No more time should be wasted in the judicial system by citizens, lawyers and judges trying to determine how many quos can successfully dance on *492the needle point of the warrantos.” Id., 448 Pa. at 23, 292 A.2d at 301.