dissenting:
Although I agree with the majority that the objective standard set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 8104 renders unnecessary a determination of whether appellee acted willfully in refusing to mark the judgment satisfied as to appellant, I respectfully dissent. In its opinion, the majority examined the few cases interpreting § 8104 and concluded that an exchange of releases between the parties to a judgment does not amount to “satisfaction.” Consequently, it affirmed the trial court’s denial of liquidated damages. Since I do not believe that either § 8104 or the caselaw interpret*240ing it compels such a result, I would reverse and remand the case so that the trial court may consider the other issues presented by the parties.
42 Pa.C.S. § 8104 states:
(a) General rule. — A judgment creditor who has received satisfaction of any judgment in any tribunal of this Commonwealth shall, at the written request of the judgment debtor, or of anyone interested therein, and tender of the fee for entry of satisfaction, enter satisfaction in the office of the clerk of the court where such judgment is outstanding, which satisfaction shall forever discharge the judgment;
(b) Liquidated Damages. — A judgment creditor who shall fail or refuse for more than 30 days after written notice in the manner prescribed by general rules to comply with a request pursuant to subsection (a) shall pay to the judgment debtor as liquidated damages 1% of the original amount of the judgment for each day of delinquency beyond such 30 days, but not less than $250 nor more than 50% of the original amount of the judgment. Such liquidated damages shall be recoverable pursuant to general rules, by supplementary proceedings in the matter in which the judgment was entered.
In Busy Beaver Building Centers, Inc. v. Tueche, 295 Pa.Super. 504, 442 A.2d 252 (1981), we examined the meaning of the term “satisfaction” in the context of 42 Pa.C.S. § 8104. In that case, Harry Tueche, who purchased goods on credit, executed a judgment note in favor of Busy Beaver. However, he failed to comply with the payment schedule contained therein. Consequently, Busy Beaver recorded the note in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County and transferred the resulting judgment to Westmoreland County. Thereafter, Tueche and his wife executed a mortgage, which was secured by three lots, in a lesser amount in favor of Busy Beaver. After Busy Beaver released two parcels and had the third sold at a sheriffs sale, it marked the Washington County judgment “satisfied in full.” Later, the Tueches requested Busy Beaver to *241mark the Westmoreland County judgment satisfied. Busy Beaver refused and the Tueches filed suit. Although the trial court ordered the judgment marked satisfied, it denied the recovery of liquidated damages. On appeal, we concluded that the term “satisfied” meant that the underlying debt obligation had been paid in full. Since the Tueches had not completely paid the debt, we affirmed.
We considered this issue again in First National Consumer Discount Co. v. Fetherman, 838 Pa.Super. 323, 487 A.2d 987 (1985). In Fetherman, First National, which obtained a foreclosure judgment against the Feathermans in the sum of $27,600.00, had one of the two parcels of mortgaged land sold at a sheriffs sale. That sale generated approximately $27,000.00 in net proceeds. Although the sale failed to generate sufficient funds to extinguish the debt, First National never sought a deficiency judgment or began execution proceedings with respect to the other parcel of land. Approximately two years after the sale, the Feathermans’ counsel requested First National to mark the judgment satisfied. It refused and the Feathermans instituted suit in an effort to have the judgment marked satisfied and recover liquidated damages. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the requested relief. On appeal, we followed the principles set forth in Busy Beaver strictly and reversed the award of liquidated damages. Reviewing our order, the supreme court reversed, holding that since respondent did not seek a deficiency judgment, the debt was deemed to have been paid in full. First National Consumer Discount Co. v. Fetherman, 515 Pa. 85, 527 A.2d 100 (1987).
The final case in which we considered the issue of what may constitute “satisfaction” in the context of 42 Pa.C.S. § 8104 is Woodstown Construction, Inc. v. Clarke, 862 Pa.Super. 119, 523 A.2d 804 (1987). There, Woodstown recorded a $17,900.00 judgment note executed by Clarke. Shortly thereafter, it agreed to accept $1,000.00 as full payment on the note, release Clarke from all claims, and mark the judgment satisfied. Since Woodstown did not *242mark the judgment satisfied, Clarke filed suit seeking an award of liquidated damages. Following a hearing, the trial court awarded him $8,950.00 in liquidated damages. On appeal, we distinguished Busy Beaver and concluded that Clarke was entitled to an award of liquidated damages. However, we vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case for the assessment of damages predicated on Clarke’s payment of $1,000.00 rather than on fifty percent of the judgment. The supreme court, in a per curiam order, subsequently reversed and reinstated the trial court’s award. Clarke v. Woodstown Construction, Inc., 516 Pa. 519, 533 A.2d 708 (1987).
As my discussion of the caselaw construing § 8104 reveals, the meaning of the term “satisfaction” has evolved greatly since we decided Busy Beaver. The two subsequent case's considering this issue, Featherman and Woods-town, limited the expansive language of Busy Beaver. In those cases, we held that a judgment may be satisfied by operation of law and by an agreement to accept as full payment a sum that is less than the amount actually owed. Although Pennsylvania appellate courts have never decided whether an exchange of releases may constitute “satisfaction” of a judgment under § 8104, I believe that such a holding is the next logical step in the evolutionarily process described above and, consequently, one that we should adopt. Therefore, I would hold that a mutual exchange of releases may amount to “satisfaction” under § 8104.
Although appellant was released from his obligation with respect to the judgment, the majority held that the failure of the two remaining debtors to satisfy the underlying obligation defeated his right to recover liquidated damages. Since the majority’s analysis focuses on conduct of parties for whom appellant is neither responsible nor able to control, I cannot agree.
The obvious purpose of § 8104 is to provide protection for judgment debtors who have satisfied their judgments from the adverse impact that a judgment that has not been marked satisified could have upon their financial affairs. *243The majority’s conclusion would defeat this purpose. Therefore, I would reverse and remand the case to the trial court for consideration of the other issues raised by the parties below.