concurring.
I agree that the trial court’s jurisdiction to issue the divorce decree was not divested during the pendency of the *27appeal from its earlier order relating to interim counsel fees and costs. I write separately to emphasize that the reasoning underlying the holding in the instant case demonstrates what I have always believed to be the instrinsic flaw in the majority’s analysis in Fried v. Fried, 509 Pa. 89, 501 A.2d 211 (1985).
In Fried, the majority stated that, “Under the present procedure an appeal of an interim order stays the entire action and results in unnecessary delay in the dissolution of divorce actions.” 509 Pa. at 97, 501 A.2d at 215. Joined by Justice Larsen, I dissented from the majority’s opinion, stating:
Nor is it true that an appeal from a trial court’s order relating to economic claims must delay the resolution of the remaining claims. While an appeal ordinarily divests a trial court of authority to proceed further, Rule 1701(c) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure specifically provides that where only a particular claim is involved, an appeal shall prevent the trial court proceeding further with only such claim unless otherwise ordered. Clearly, Rule 1701(c) would encompass an appeal from an order awarding alimony pendente lite or counsel fees and would prevent any unnecessary delay.
509 Pa. at 100-101, 501 A.2d at 217.
In the majority opinion in Fried, no reference was made to Pa.R.A.P. 1701(c); nor was Rule 1701(c) analyzed by the majority in determining the effect of an appeal from an order relating to alimony pendente lite, counsel fees or expenses on the underlying divorce action. Yet the Court now chastises the Superior Court for “virtually ignoring” Rule 1701(c) in finding that the trial court had been divested of jurisdiction in the present case. I, for one, do not find fault with the Superior Court’s analysis because it was predicated upon this Court’s same failing in Fried.
LARSEN, J., joins in this concurring opinion.