I respectfully dissent. I would grant the petition because the facts of this case show the juvenile court’s appointment of independent counsel under Welfare and Institutions Code section 317, subdivision (e) was for the express and specific purpose of pursuing all potential third party personal injury claims on behalf of the dependent minors. Thus, because independent counsel were properly authorized and capable of pursuing the minors’ tort claims, the time to present such claims was not tolled beyond the date counsel were appointed.
1. The Time for Filing a Tort Claim Is Tolled Only When There Is Inadequate Representation.
The County of Los Angeles (County) contends the minors failed to present their late claim within one year of the accrual of their cause of action, i.e., within one year from the appointment of independent counsel on January 7, 1998. The minors, on the other hand, contend that even though they had court-appointed independent counsel to pursue their tort claims, it was necessary for the juvenile court to appoint a guardian ad litem to prosecute such claims.
The central issue in this case is whether the minors’ tort claims against the County were tolled by virtue of the juvenile court’s failure to appoint a guardian ad litem despite the fact that it appointed independent counsel to pursue such claims on their behalf. Cases that have dealt with the tolling provisions of the California Tort Claims Act—Government Code section 911.4, subdivision (b)1—hold the one-year time period within which to present a late claim will be tolled when the claimant does not have a *1318representative capable of representing his or her interests. These cases indicate that the purpose of the tolling provisions is to ensure the claimant is properly represented by one authorized to act on his or her behalf.
For example, in Hernandez v. County of Los Angeles (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1020 [232 Cal.Rptr. 519, 728 P.2d 1154] (hereinafter Hernandez), a claim was not timely filed on behalf of a minor suffering profound mental retardation and severe physical handicaps allegedly caused by negligent medical care at a county hospital immediately before, during and after his birth. The minor argued that because he was mentally incapacitated during the entire time period of his injury, the time for presenting a late claim was tolled until his mother was appointed as his guardian ad litem. The court disagreed, concluding: “By explicitly providing that the ‘time during which the person who sustained the alleged injury . . . is a minor shall be counted’ ... for purposes of the late-claim filing period, the Legislature has clearly indicated that it did not intend to authorize the filing of a claim on behalf of a child many years after the accrual of his cause of action. [Citation.] With respect to such an injured child, the Legislature evidently concluded that it was reasonable to expect that a late-claim application would be filed on his behalf by a parent or another adult responsible for the child’s care within one year of the accrual of his cause of action.” {Id. at p. 1025, italics omitted and added; see also Kagy v. Napa State Hospital (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1, 5 [33 Cal.Rptr.2d 741] [“Section 911.4 . . . recognizes that an injured person may choose not to apply for leave to file a late claim, but contemplates that the choice should be made by someone having the capacity to make an intelligent choice.”].)
Thus, Hernandez found that formal appointment of a guardian ad litem is not necessary to present a governmental tort claim. If a minor has a parent or another adult responsible for the child’s care, that minor may not invoke the tolling provisions because that person can present a claim on the minor’s behalf. Summarizing the Hernandez conclusion, we stated, “[t]he fact that a minor is not permitted to prosecute a claim through the courts without a guardian ad litem does not alter [the result in Hernandez], and the time for filing a late claim is not tolled until the minor’s parent is formally appointed guardian ad litem by a court.” (Reyes v. County of Los Angeles (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 584, 593 [243 Cal.Rptr. 35].) Consequently, while appointment of a guardian ad litem is a prerequisite to a minor’s filing a civil action (Code Civ. Proc., § 372, subd. (a)), a guardian ad litem is not necessary in order to present a governmental tort claim.
In Kagy v. Napa State Hospital, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th 1, the court held the one-year period was tolled because the public guardian appointed for *1319the incapacitated claimant lacked the authority to file a suit on behalf of the claimant and therefore could not adequately represent the claimant’s interests. (Id. at pp. 6-7.) Likewise, in Favorite v. County of Los Angeles (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 835 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 656], the court held the claims statute was tolled where the conservator appointed for the incapacitated claimant was incapable of acting on the claimant’s behalf because the claimant could not communicate with the conservator regarding the nature and extent of her injuries. (Id. at pp. 840-841.) Consequently, tolling will be allowed if the claimant does not have a representative who is authorized to represent the claimant’s interests or the representative is incapable of doing so.
The minors essentially argue that independent counsel appointed by the juvenile court was not capable of acting on their behalf without a formally appointed guardian ad litem. Thus, the minors contend that their claims accrued on January 23, 1998, when their dependency status terminated. But as the case law indicates, a minor does not need a guardian ad litem in order to file a governmental tort claim, as opposed to a civil action, as long as that minor has a parent or another adult responsible for his or her care who can file a tort claim on his or her behalf. As a result, the significant issue here is whether the juvenile court’s appointment of independent counsel under Welfare and Institutions Code section 317, subdivision (e) is consistent with the purposes of Goverment Code section 911.4, subdivision (b), and the case law construing it.
2. Independent Counsel Were Authorized and Knowledgeable Representatives.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 317 gives the juvenile court authority to appoint counsel to represent “the parent, guardian, or [minor] at the detention hearing and at all subsequent proceedings before the juvenile court.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 317, subd. (d).) Subdivisions (c) and (e) provide, however, a much more expansive role of appointed counsel for the minor that extends beyond the dependency proceedings.
If the juvenile court finds that the minor will “benefit from the appointment of counsel,” the court must appoint counsel to represent the minor’s interests. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 317, subd. (c).) Such counsel cannot represent another party or the county agency whose interests conflict with the minor’s interests. (Ibid.) Subdivision (c) also provides that “[a] primary responsibility of any counsel appointed to represent a [minor] pursuant to this section shall be to advocate for the protection, safety, and physical and emotional well-being of the [minor].” Subdivision (e) further provides: “The counsel for the [minor) shall be charged in general with the representation of *1320the [minor’s] interests. ... In any case in which the [minor] is four years of age or older, counsel shall interview the [minor] to determine the [minor’s] wishes and to assess the [minor’s] well being, and shall advise the court of the [minor’s] wishes. Counsel for the [minor] shall not advocate for the return of the [minor] if, to the best of his or her knowledge, that return conflicts with the protection and safety of the [minor]. In addition counsel shall investigate the interests of the [minor] beyond the scope of the juvenile proceeding and report to the court other interests of the [minor] that may need to be protected by the institution of other administrative or judicial proceedings. . . . The court shall take whatever appropriate action is necessary to fully protect the interests of the [minor].” (Italics added.)
In Akkiko M. v. Superior Court (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 525 [209 Cal.Rptr. 568] (hereinafter Akkiko M), the court considered a minor’s challenge of an order dismissing her counsel appointed under former Welfare and Institutions Code section 318. In reviewing the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 318, which are now essentially part of Welfare and Institutions Code section 317, the court noted as follows: “It is apparent that many of the responsibilities normally associated with a guardian ad litem have been placed upon counsel. In light of the duties placed upon counsel by [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 318, we reject the Department’s argument that, as guardian ad litem, the Department controls litigation and retention of counsel for an abused or neglected minor. The Legislature intended that independent counsel, not the Department in its role as guardian ad litem, would control litigation and represent the interests of the abused or neglected child.” (Akkiko M., supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 530, italics added; see also In re Alexis W. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 28, 36 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 488] [“ ‘The role of counsel for the child [in dependency proceedings] is not merely to act as a mouthpiece for the minor . . . .’ ”].)2
Therefore, independent counsel appointed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 317, subdivision (e), has broad duties to represent the dependent minor’s best interests, including interests outside the scope of the juvenile proceeding. In addition, the juvenile court has broad authority and responsibility to “take whatever appropriate action is necessary to fully protect the interests of the [minor].” (Ibid.) The broad duties of appointed counsel are, I believe, consistent with and substantially equivalent to the role of a guardian ad litem, at least with respect to filing a governmental tort *1321claim. As a result, the appointment of independent counsel serves the purposes of Government Code section 911.4 and the case law because the minor has a representative that is sufficiently authorized and knowledgeable about his or her interests to pursue tort claims on his or her behalf.
In the present case, the juvenile court expressly granted independent counsel the authority and responsibility to investigate and pursue tort claims against third parties. The juvenile court file in this case shows the juvenile court’s order of January 7, 1998, appointing independent counsel for the minors was directly prompted by reports filed with the juvenile court. Those reports indicated that the minors had alleged abuse by their foster mother, Sandra Rodriguez. For example, a July 25, 1997, Judicial Review Report disclosed that in May 1996, “all three minors had disclosed possible abuse by a foster mother alleged to have occurred while they were [sic] foster care.” The report further disclosed that all three minors were interviewed by a social worker from the department of children and family services (DCFS) who agreed that such abuses did occur. As a result of this report, on July 25, 1997, the juvenile court ordered DCFS to investigate the foster home and provide an incident report. Even though the minors already had counsel representing them within the context of the juvenile court proceedings, the juvenile court subsequently appointed independent counsel to protect the minors’ interests with respect to their tort claims.
By ordering appointed counsel to “provide reports to both the court and the minors’ dependency court attorney on the progress of the case on a regular basis,” the juvenile court expected that counsel would take all the appropriate steps necessary to protect the minors’ tort claims against third parties. In the words of the statute, by appointing independent counsel to pursue the minors’ tort claims, the trial court took the “appropriate action . . . necessary to fully protect the interests of the [minor].” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 317, subd. (e).)
To hold that the appointed counsel in this case were not authorized or adequate to pursue tort claims against the County would not only ignore the broad duties of independent counsel under Welfare and Institutions Code section 317 and the express provisions of the juvenile court’s order appointing such counsel, but would also ignore the policy behind Government Code section 911.4. The purpose behind section 911.4 is to protect a governmental entity from having to respond to a claim many years after the accrual of the action. (Hernandez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1030.) The statute, as interpreted by case law, accommodates a claimant by tolling the one-year provision when that claimant’s interests are not adequately represented. Accepting the minors’ argument that they needed a guardian ad litem in order to present their governmental tort claims against the County allows *1322independent counsel, expressly appointed for such purpose, to idly sit on the minors’ rights for many years simply because a guardian ad litem was not appointed. The purpose of Government Code section 911.4 in preventing stale claims against a public entity is not served by such a result.
I realize that rejecting the minors’ tolling argument would effectively penalize them because a timely claim was not filed on their behalf. However, while the cases indicate that the Legislature intended to accord special solicitude to the claims of an injured minor so that a court may not attribute to the minor the neglect or ignorance of his or her parents or attorney, such special solicitude is applicable only “so long as the application is filed with the entity within one year of the accrual of the cause of action.” (Hernandez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1028; see also Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 479-480 [58 Cal.Rptr. 249, 426 P.2d 753].) If a minor has an authorized representative with knowledge concerning the claim who fails to present the claim within the one-year limitation period of section 911.4, a public entity, as well as a court, is powerless to grant relief. (See, e.g., Hom v. Chico Unified Sch. Dist. (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 335, 339 [61 Cal.Rptr. 920] [concluding that failure of minor’s parent to present tort claims to school board within one year of injury rendered board and court powerless to grant relief under the act]; Carr v. State of California (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 139, 144-145 [129 Cal.Rptr. 730] [concluding that failure of parent to present tort claims on behalf of mentally incapacitated minor within one year of injury barred claims against state].)
3. Conclusion.
In Hernandez, the court held the one-year claims period under section 911.4 is not tolled if a mentally incapacitated minor has parents capable of acting on his or her behalf. In other words, according to our Supreme Court, “a parent or another adult responsible for the child’s care” is expected to file a claim on behalf of a minor within the jurisdictional time constraints of section 911.4. (Hernandez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1025.) Here, the juvenile court appointed independent counsel to act on the minors’ behalf in filing tort claims against third parties. The minors’ cause of action accrued at that time. I see no reason why, for purposes of presenting a governmental tort claim, the independent counsel appointed by the juvenile court in this case occupy a different position from that of the minor’s parent in Hernandez. In both cases, a late claim is barred where the minors have adults who are capable of pursuing claims on their behalf and are authorized to do so.
Unlike Kagy v. Napa State Hospital, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at pages 6-7, or Favorite v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pages 840-841, *1323where the courts held that the one-year period was tolled because the conservator or public guardian appointed for the incapacitated claimant lacked the authority or sufficient knowledge of the claim to file a suit on behalf of the claimant, the independent counsel appointed in the present case not only had the statutory obligation to represent the minors’ interests beyond the scope of the juvenile proceeding, but they also had the express authority of the juvenile court to present tort claims on the minors’ behalf and keep the juvenile court apprised of the case. To hold that a guardian ad litem or full legal custody of the parents was required before the claims began to accrue is to ignore the importance of independent counsel under Welfare and Institutions Code section 317 and the express order of the juvenile court in this case.
Petitioner’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied November 28, 2001. Chin, J., did not participate therein.
further statutory references are to the Government Code.
The majority distinguish Akkiko M. by concluding that even though independent counsel controls litigation and represents the litigation interests of dependent minors, such counsel does not actually take the place of a guardian ad litem. But neither section 911.4 nor the case law requires a guardian ad litem before a minor can present a tort claim. As already discussed, the case law merely requires an adult responsible for the minor who is authorized and capable of protecting the minor’s interests.