concurring and dissenting. I agree with the Court upholding conditions 24 and 25 and striking condition 26, although I would not remand to allow the trial court to redraft it. I disagree with the extent of the Court’s “fine-tuning” of conditions 18 and 23, because I believe it unnecessarily restricts the trial court’s discretion in fashioning conditions of probation and departs from our usual standard of review.
The no-checking-account condition (condition 23) is viewed as “so indirectly related to the conduct to be prevented that it can only have a minor impact,” and consequently not “reasonably related” to probationer’s crimes and is “ ‘unduly restrictive’ of *306[her] autonomy.” This is, of course, a matter of judgment, in which different judges could reasonably disagree. That is why the law gives the trial judge, who was there on the scene, deference in making the judgment. See State v. Bubar, 146 Vt. 398, 405, 505 A.2d 1197, 1202 (1985) (trial court given “great discretion in setting conditions of probation”). The trial court’s decision must not be reversed on appeal unless there is no rational support for it or, in words more familiar, an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is not established because we disagree with the judgment. If reasonable judges could differ over a discretionary choice, it cannot be an abuse of discretion. A decision is an abuse of discretion when it is so far out of line that no reasonable jurist could agree with it. As Judge, now Justice, John Paul Stevens once wrote about discretion in making sentencing decisions:
There are . . . matters — such as the sentencing decision — in which the choice of alternatives is left to the trial judge, not because the decision is of little importance, but rather because the factors which may properly influence his decision are so numerous, variable and subtle that the fashioning of rigid rules would be more likely to impair his ability to deal fairly with a particular problem than to lead to a just result.
United States v. McCoy, 517 F.2d 41, 44 (7th Cir. 1975).
A probationary sentence is one point on a continuum of possible punishments, the most restrictive being incarceration. A probationer’s liberty is by definition restrictively conditioned because the probationer, having been convicted of criminal behavior, is subject to controls designed to rehabilitate her. 28 V.S.A. §§ 252(a) (condition must be “reasonably necessary to ensure that the offender will lead a law-abiding life or to assist [her] to do so”), 252(b)(13) (conditions permitted if “reasonably related to .. . rehabilitation”). A condition of probation is valid if it reasonably relates to the crime committed. State v. Whitchurch, 155 Vt. 134, 137, 577 A.2d 690, 692 (1990). Defendant bears the burden of proving that a court abused its discretion in imposing a probation condition.
In deciding that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering condition 23, the Court points out ways defendant might circumvent the lack of a checking account in order to cash her *307ill-gotten third-party checks and laments the “serious impediment” the lack of a checking account will have on her daily living. Lest we forget, the inconvenience of incarceration is far more onerous than probation. Although the Court’s reasoning might persuade a sentencing court to avoid imposing that particular probation condition in the first instance, it is not so persuasive that I would overrule the trial court.
The record establishes the relationship between defendant’s abuse of checking accounts and her criminal behavior. Because banks are reluctant to cash third-party checks for people without accounts, a checking account facilitates cashing the checks of others. Consequently, condition 23 makes it more difficult for defendant to negotiate checks she might get from potential victims. This condition is not unnecessarily restrictive; one out of four American families does not maintain a checking account. Federal Reserve Bulletin 5 (Jan. 1992).
The Court’s attempt to distinguish cases upholding conditions similar to condition 23 on the ground that in those cases the defendant was convicted of passing bad checks is weak. Here defendant preyed on a large number of frail and mentally retarded people receiving and cashing their disability checks. That defendant was not convicted of passing a worthless check drawn on her own account, a misdemeanor, does not alleviate the threat posed by a defendant who kidnapped, abused, and assaulted people who provided her with the opportunity to part them from their money — a form of check robbery. As the trial court stated:
I have a very deep and a very abiding concern for the safety of others as [to your] using checks, or receiving monies that belong to other people . . . [and] about who you take in to live with you, because . . . you’re not taking in fallen birds or wounded people out of generosity. . . . You’re taking in people ... so that you can get at their money. . . . That’s what I have to protect other people from, and that’s what I have to protect you from.
The Court goes on to show how much more creative it is than the trial court by pointing out various alternative conditions. That, however, is not our job. We have a limited scope of review and, except to see that the outer permissible limits set by the Legislature are not exceeded, we are not to substitute our *308choices for those of the trial court. Here, the Court has set inner limits of its own choosing that are not required by any statutory or constitutional authority.
As to condition 18, the Court agrees that a condition restricting defendant’s place of residence is appropriate. Such a condition is designed to protect the community by restricting defendant’s living options to minimize her opportunity to mistreat vulnerable people in the future. See State v. Mace, 154 Vt. 430, 436, 578 A.2d 104, 108 (1990) (liberty may be restricted “so long as the conditions have a reasonable nexus with rehabilitation of the defendant and protection of the public”). Here, the evidence supported a need to control defendant’s residence as part of restructuring her life to prevent future criminality.
The Court’s objection to condition 18 is that it lacks the specificity required to give defendant fair notice and provides no guidelines for a probation officer to determine what places are suitable for her as a residence. Defendant could not violate condition 18, however, unless she resided in a place other than as directed by her probation officer. State v. Peck, 149 Vt. 617, 619-20, 547 A.2d 1329, 1331 (1988) (fair notice may be provided by probation officer’s instructions and directions).
The Court’s concern with the lack of guidelines for the residence condition is unfounded. A probation condition should be understood in a reasonable way without requiring painstaking qualifiers to safeguard against an errant probation officer. Any probation condition can be unreasonably supervised, and a probationer may petition the court for relief if that should happen. The potential for abuse should not be presumed at the outset, and a probationer must demonstrate that a condition is prejudicial in fact, not merely in her imagination.
The Court says that the rationale supporting the court’s ability to intervene would also necessarily allow the probation officer to set all conditions. It does not follow, however, that the sentencing court must so fine-tune the details of the conditions that nothing is left to a probation officer’s discretion. After all, unlike most judges, probation officers are specifically trained, experienced professionals whose daily activity is largely devoted to supervising criminal offenders. Further, the unpredictability of future circumstances and the multifarious factual considerations that resist discrete characterization of criminal *309behavior and sentencing needs militate in favor of some degree of flexibility in fashioning probation conditions.
My final concern with the exactitude the Court requires is the added appellate burden it will assuredly produce. When a defendant is dissatisfied with the degree of fine-tuning of a condition, today’s decision does not require defendant to inform the sentencing court beyond an unspecific objection to the condition in its entirety. Defendant here simply objected to the conditions and had no suggestions whatsoever as to how to fine-tune them.
The last condition — consent to searches, warrantless or not— is not a condition that makes any sense, and I agree it should be struck. I would not, however, remand to the trial court to redraft it to comply with Griffin v. Wisconsin. The authority to search a probationer’s person, premises, or possessions is governed by the Fourth Amendment and Article 11, which apply to everyone in Vermont. Such doctrines as “special needs,” e.g., State v. Berard, 154 Vt. 306, 312, 576 A.2d 118, 121 (1990) (“special needs” justify warrantless searches in prison), or exigent circumstances — not a person’s status as a probationer — may support a warrantless search under proper circumstances. Such a search is valid under constitutional analysis, not because a probationer signed away the constitutional right. Although one may voluntarily relinquish constitutional rights, a probationer in no sense consents within the true meaning of that term.
Nor do I find the approach approved here either workable or authorized by Griffin. In Berard, we upheld a random search of prison cells, which officers conducted under clear, objective administrative guidelines and which was not arbitrarily directed against an individual prisoner. Id. at 314, 576 A.2d at 122. This approach is consistent with Griffin, allowing a search pursuant to a policy, which was itself found reasonable under constitutional standards. The Berard approach offers individuals some protection from harassment because the policy and standards must be articulated in advance and applied equally to all. See id. at 314, 576 A.2d at 122-23 (guidelines “serve as basis to determine if prison policy in practice generally matches its theory, or whether corrections officials consistently and purposefully exercise prison cell searches for purposes beyond” asserted need for prison security).
*310In contrast, what the Court proposes today is not that the Legislature or an administrative agency set standards for all probationary searches, but that a judge set specific standards for a single probationer in findings and conditions that are an awkward cross between making probation policy and issuing search warrants. This function differs from that of a judge issuing a search warrant, neutrally reviewing specific facts and determining whether there is sufficient reason to permit a specific search under universal standards. Rather, the Court’s opinion calls on judges to draft hypothetical search warrants, identifying in advance what searches of an individual will be reasonable and how and when they may be conducted. The Court’s formulation is not only impractical, asking judges to anticipate future circumstances, but also unjust, making reasonableness a sliding scale rather than a uniform standard for all probationers. I do not envy trial judges performing this task.
I respectfully dissent.