dissenting.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶ 27 On January 6,2003, the superior court issued a warrant for Ochser’s arrest for violation of a child support order. Roughly 60 days later, on March 13, 2003, the court quashed that warrant. Unfortunately, although the court’s minute entry order contained the legend: “FAXED: MCSO,” the March 13 order did not make its way into the records of the Maricopa County Sheriffs Office. Before Deputies Funk and Cruz set out to arrest Ochser in Flagstaff the morning of May 5, 2004, they confirmed that Sheriffs Office records showed the outstanding warrant for his arrest. Of course, it would not matter how many times the deputies checked the Sheriffs records; because the order the court had issued more than a year before quashing the arrest warrant was missing from the Sheriffs records, the warrant would continue to show up as valid on those records.
¶ 28 Ochser had thought ahead about how to protect himself against precisely this sort of bureaucratic mishap. Out of an abundance of caution, he had obtained two certified copies of the order quashing the warrant. He carried one in his car; the other he kept in his desk at the Lowell Observatory in Flagstaff. But Ochser was not in his office or his ear when the deputies arrived. They waited for him in the parking lot of the observatory and approached him when he pulled up in an observatory van.6 Over his protests, they handcuffed him, then shackled him and put him in the back of a patrol car.
¶ 29 On summary judgment, we must take as true that after he was handcuffed, Ochser told the deputies that the arrest warrant was no longer valid. In deposition testimony submitted on the cross-motions for summary judgment, Ochser then related:
Q: What did they — what did either one or both of them say when you said it wasn’t valid?
A: They said — he said, “We have what we need to bring you in.” And I told him that he needed to check____ And I told him that he should go into my office, and in my inbox there is a certified copy of the minute entry where the — or the order actually of where the judge quashes the warrant.
And he said to me, “I don’t need to go to your office to find anything. I’ve got everything I need.”7
¶ 30 After Ochser protested, Funk left him and Cruz in the parking lot and entered the building. He did not, however, go to Och-ser’s desk to pick up the certified copy of the order Ochser had told him was there. Instead, Funk used an observatory phone to make at least one telephone call. Funk testified that because Ochser was “quite insistent” that the warrant had been quashed, he called the Sheriffs OIC, which verified “[i]t was a valid warrant.” Funk also testified he telephoned a judge’s office and spoke to a temporary worker who “had no clue on how to cheek anything or do anything.” (Cruz’s account was different; he testified that when Funk returned to the ear, he told Cruz he had reached a court clerk who confirmed that the warrant was valid.)8
¶ 31 In response to. the deputies’ motion for summary judgment, Ochser offered evidence that under these circumstances, if the *492subject of an arrest warrant informs officers that a copy of an order quashing the warrant is close by, the reasonable course for the officers is to retrieve the order. For example, the deputies’ expert witness on law enforcement practices testified that he would agree “that if the jury believes that Mr. Ochser told [Funk and Cruz] ‘I’ve got a copy of the order quashing that warrant sitting in my desk; go get it,’ that he should have done that.” Funk and Cruz’s supervisor at the time likewise agreed that he would want his deputies to take the time to inspect papers proffered by the target of an arrest if they could do so safely.
DISCUSSION
¶ 32 In reviewing the deputies immunity defense, we first determine whether the deputies violated Ochser’s constitutional right to be free of arrest without probable cause. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). The majority seems to conclude the arrest constituted a breach of Ochser’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. Supra ¶ 17. I agree. See Wilson v. City of Boston, 421 F.3d 45, 55 (1st Cir.2005) (arrest made on mistaken belief that a warrant had been issued violated Fourth Amendment); Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 270 (3d Cir.2000) (“[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that a mistakenly issued or executed warrant cannot provide probable cause for an arrest.”) (citing Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971)); State v. Evans, 177 Ariz. 201, 866 P.2d 869 (1994) (arrest made on warrant that had been quashed was a “warrantless” and “plainly illegal” arrest) rev’d on other grounds, Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995).
¶33 Under Saucier, the next question is whether the right that was violated was clearly established at the time. 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. This inquiry ... must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposi-tion____Id. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151; see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, -, 129 S.Ct. 808, 822, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (collapsing the two analytical steps; outcome “turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness of the [deputies’] action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken’ ”) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)).
¶34 In the ordinary case, a law enforcement officer reasonably may assume that probable cause supports issuance of an arrest warrant. Berg, 219 F.3d at 272. As the Supreme Court has explained in another context:
Given the requirements that arrest be made only on probable cause and that one detained be accorded a speedy trial, we do not think a sheriff executing an arrest warrant is required by the Constitution to investigate independently every claim of innocence, whether the claim is based on mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of requisite intent.
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145-6, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979).9 Nevertheless, “an apparently valid warrant does not render an officer immune from suit if his reliance on it is unreasonable in light of the relevant circumstances.” Berg, 219 F.3d at 273. The “relevant circumstances” that may render reliance on a warrant unreasonable “include, but are not limited to, other information that the officer possesses or to which he has reasonable access, and whether failing to make an immediate arrest creates a public threat or danger of flight.” Id.
¶ 35 As in this case, the trial court in Berg entered summary judgment against a person who brought a civil rights claim after he was arrested pursuant to an invalid warrant. Id. at 267-68. The warrant in that case mistakenly was issued for violation of parole. When an officer showed up to make the *493arrest, the plaintiff protested and “offered to produce release documents proving that he was no longer on parole.” Id. at 267. The arresting officer, however, refused to look at the release documents and instead told the plaintiff to bring them with him to jail. Id. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the order dismissing the plaintiffs claim and remanded for consideration of facts that it held raised “valid questions concerning the reasonableness” of the arresting officer’s conduct, including that the warrant was three years old, the documentation the suspect offered to show that he had completed his parole and the “nonviolent nature of the crime.” Id. at 273-74.
¶ 36 The majority attempts to distinguish Berg on the ground that the warrant in that case was not supported by probable cause. Supra ¶ 24. But the order that quashed the civil arrest warrant in this ease eliminated the legal basis on which the warrant had been issued. Indeed, the universal premise of this variety of false-arrest civil rights claim is that the arrest was not supported by probable cause. See Wilson, 421 F.3d at 56 (no probable cause existed for arrest made in mistaken belief that warrant had been issued); Berg, 219 F.3d at 270 (“mistakenly issued or executed warrant cannot provide probable cause for an arrest”) (emphasis added). That is because if there is probable cause for the arrest, absent excessive force or other circumstances not present here, there is no constitutional violation on which to base a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.10
¶ 37 Moreover, the fact that the deputies in this case may have called to check on the warrant after Ochser complained does not distinguish this case from Berg. As in this ease, after the suspect in Berg disputed the warrant, the arresting officer telephoned headquarters to confirm the warrant was valid. 219 F.3d at 268. Thus, Berg establishes that when a person named in an arrest warrant offers documentation close at hand to support his contention that the warrant is invalid, the arresting officers may not disregard that documentation simply because a call to headquarters has “proven” that the warrant remains outstanding.
¶ 38 The First Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Berg rule in Peña-Borrero v. Estremeda, 365 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir.2004). Having once been arrested on a valid warrant, the plaintiff in Peña-Borrero posted bail and was released. Id. Six weeks later, police officers came to his home and arrested him pursuant to the identical warrant. Id. at 9-10. The plaintiff told the officers he had a copy of the executed warrant and a bond receipt in the trunk of his car. Id. at 10. The officers retrieved the documents from the plaintiffs car, but arrested him anyway and brought him to police headquarters, where he was detained for several hours. Id.
¶ 39 The First Circuit concluded the plaintiffs allegation that officers made the arrest “in the face of unambiguous evidence that their warrant was unenforceable” “would support a jury conclusion that defendants acted unreasonably in arresting [him] and taking him into custody.” Id. at 13-14. “In our view,” the court held, “such a seizure could be objectively unreasonable and a violation of appellant’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights.” Id. at 14. Standing alone, the officers’ failure to check the warrant’s validity before executing it would not have supported the plaintiffs claim; it was their insistence on proceeding with the arrest after they were confronted with the documents plaintiff offered that reflected “a much more deliberate disregard” for the plaintiffs constitutional rights. Id. at 13.
¶ 40 The majority attempts to distinguish Peña-Borrero on the ground that in that case the officers arrested the plaintiff even though they had “unambiguous evidence” that the warrant was not valid. Supra ¶ 21. But that is Ochser’s precise allegation: He contends he told the deputies he had unam*494biguous proof that the warrant they sought to execute had been quashed. See, e.g., De-toledo v. County of Suffolk, 379 F.Supp.2d 138, 145 (D.Mass.2005) (motion to dismiss civil rights claim denied; even if officer had no duty to retrieve other documents from nearby storage locker, officer proceeded with arrest despite having the quash order at hand).
¶41 Contrary to the deputies’ argument, Ochser’s contention is not that Funk and Cruz were obligated to launch an independent investigation into the validity of the warrant. Rather, Oehser contends the deputies should not have brushed aside his offer to provide them with a certified court document proving that the warrant they were trying to execute had been quashed. By the same token, the issue is not, as the majority puts it, whether the deputies acted unreasonably by failing to independently investigate the warrant. Supra ¶ 17. Instead, it is whether they acted unreasonably by refusing Ochser’s entreaty to examine the order he offered to provide them that had quashed that warrant more than a year before. Under these circumstances, as the court held in Peñar-Borrero, the plaintiffs “claim of improper arrest arguably required no independent investigation; he did not simply assert a mistake, but also provided substantiation.” 365 F.3d at 13.
¶ 42 For the same reason, Mitchell v. Alui-si, 872 F.2d 577 (4th Cir.1989), on which the majority relies, is not on point. Defendants in that case arrested the plaintiff over her oral protests that the warrant had been recalled. Id. at 578. She did not offer or offer to provide a copy of the order recalling the warrant. Id. In contrast, Oehser did more than complain that the arrest warrant was invalid: He informed the deputies that a certified copy of the minute entry quashing the warrant was on his desk.
¶ 43 The majority concludes that after Oehser told Funk and Cruz he had a certified copy of the order quashing his arrest on his desk, reasonable law enforcement officers could disagree “as to whether they were required to investigate further.” Supra ¶ 20. My view is that to the contrary, reasonable law enforcement officers could not disagree that the deputies should have retrieved and inspected the order Oehser offered that quashed the warrant they were there to execute. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (issue should not be posed “as a broad general proposition” but instead “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case”). The deputies do not contend that inspecting the documentation Oehser offered would have required extraordinary effort. Nor do the deputies contend that retrieving the order Oehser offered them would have jeopardized their mission or public safety.11
¶ 44 On this record, under the authorities cited above and construing the facts and all inferences as we must in favor of Oehser, I cannot conclude that any reasonable law enforcement officer would decide that Funk and Cruz acted reasonably by rejecting Och-ser’s request that they inspect the certified copy of the court order he told them was on his desk.12
¶ 45 Furthermore, in my view there is no question that it was “clearly established” at the time of the arrest in this case that an arresting officer may not disregard documentary evidence offered by a person named on an arrest warrant that proves the warrant is invalid. Berg was decided by a United States Circuit Court of Appeals in 2000; another Circuit Court handed down Peña-Borrero in 2004, prior to Ochser’s arrest. Cf Soto v. Bzdel, 214 F.Supp.2d 69, 76-77 (D.Mass.2002) (holding that although officers who arrested person after he provided them with documentary evidence that warrant had been recalled would not be charged with *495knowing in 1999 they were violating a clearly established right, “[t]his ought not hold true in the future.”). On appeal, the deputies have cited no case that rejects or even questions the principle these federal eases established.13
¶46 Accordingly, I would conclude that under the facts Oehser presented, and “in the light of pre-existing law,” the unlawfulness of the deputies’ conduct in this ease was clear. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) (“contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right”); McDonald v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292, 293 (7th Cir.1992) (issue does not “require a prior case that is ‘precisely on all fours on the facts and law involved here’ ”) (citing Landstrom v. Illinois Dep’t of Children & Family Sews., 892 F.2d 670, 676 (7th Cir.1990)).
CONCLUSION
¶ 47 Based on the authorities cited above, because Oehser submitted evidence on which it may be concluded that the deputies knew or should have known that their conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right, I would reverse the judgment and remand for trial.
. According to Ochser, the deputies had their guns drawn when they approached him; Funk denied that he or Cruz had removed their guns from their holsters.
. Funk admitted Ochser told him the warrant had been quashed. He denied, however, that Ochser told him a copy of the order quashing the warrant was in his office. Funk’s partner, Cruz, also was asked whether Ochser said he had a copy of the order quashing the arrest warrant on his desk. At first, Cruz responded, "I don’t recall that, no.” A minute or so later, however, Cruz volunteered, "I do not recall that, but it could be possible.”
. Ochser questions whether Funk in fact telephoned OIC. He argues that Ahlquist, the head of OIC, testified that if a deputy called to report that the subject of an arrest warrant was protesting that the warrant had been quashed, she would have searched the court's docket for an order quashing the warrant. In fact, at her deposition, Ahlquist was able to pull up a copy of the order quashing Ochser’s arrest warrant in about two minutes. Since OIC did not search the court records in Ochser’s case, Ochser argues Funk either did not call OIC or, if he did, he did not let OIC know that Ochser had said the warrant had been quashed.
. As Ochser points out, Baker did not concern the validity of an arrest but whether, after incarcerating a suspect, the sheriff had a duty to investigate the suspect’s repeated assertions that the wrong person had been arrested. See Brown v. Byer, 870 F.2d 975, 978 (5th Cir.1989).
. The deputies similarly argue that Berg is distinguishable because the warrant in that case was mistakenly issued (rather than, in this case, mistakenly executed). But this argument overlooks Berg's observation that probable cause does not exist for a warrant that is “mistakenly issued or executed.” 219 F.3d at 270.
. The undisputed evidence is that a third Sheriff's Office representative (a posse member) was present, and Oehser, whom deputies knew only as a child-support violator, was securely handcuffed and shackled in the back seat of a patrol car.
. In response to the deputies' motion for summary judgment, Oehser offered testimony by the deputies' expert witness and the deputies' supervisor that it would have been reasonable for the deputies to inspect the document he proffered. Supra ¶ 31.
. In Lauer v. Dahlberg, 717 F.Supp. 612 (N.D.Ill.1989) aff'd, 907 F.2d 152 (7th Cir.1990), the court concluded an arresting officer was entitled to disregard an uncertified copy of a warrant recall order. In that case, however, the officer inspected the document proffered by the suspect. and reasonably doubted its authenticity, given that it was not a certified copy. 717 F.Supp. at 614. By contrast, here, of course. Funk and Cruz did not bother to inspect the certified copy of the order to which Oehser directed them.