Dissenting Opinion by
Judge Kramer:I respectfully dissent.
At a time when the so-called “modern approach to penology” dictates leniency towards prisoners, as a therapeutic measure necessary for rehabilitation, when new humanistic treatment of prisoners has become the accepted governmental standard, Williams’ actions, as disclosed by the record of this case, should not be deemed to be “gross negligence.”
The record discloses that there were no written rules, regulations, standards, or procedures published or given to Williams, or any other such counselors, related to what was to be done or followed under such circumstances as confronted Williams. The method of handling such escape situations was left to the judg*445ment and discretion of the counselors. It is interesting to note that the Commission recognized this fact when it stated in its adjudication: “. . . it was his [Williams] judgment that they [the boys] would return to bed and forget the situation. ...” A forestry camp, such as is involved in this case, is not a penitentiary, and its inmates are not supposed to be treated like hardened criminals. As I read the record, the Appointing Authority did not provide cells in which the boys could have been jailed. Under the facts of this case, the most Williams should be faulted with is bad judgment.
If I am permitted to take judicial notice of recent official governmental trends in this Commonwealth in the field of penology, then I take note of recently much-publicized penological trends when boys in forestry camps, such as are involved in this case, are taken by State officials across state lines to a night club, when narcotic and murder convicts are sent to college at state expense and without supervision (from which status they escape), when prisoners are permitted to leave prison to attend weight-lifting contests and then to a tavern (from which one escapes), etc., it is beyond my comprehension, taking such trends into account, how Williams can be found guilty of “gross negligence” and dismissed from his position, which he has held for eight years. Williams may not have used sound judgment, warranting disciplinary action or suspension measures, but in no way can I view this record as supporting the charge of “gross negligence.” The Appointing Authority’s dismissal and the Civil Service Commission’s affirmation of such dismissal is an abuse of discretion.
One of the findings (No. 8) quoted in the majority opinion of the Commission is that the boys here in question had a history of “absconding.” Accepting that as true, if there was any negligence in this case, it falls on *446those state officials who sent these boys to a minimum security youth forestry camp in the first instance. Furthermore, the record discloses that the percentage of absconding at the camp where Williams was employed was decreasing. The Commission and the majority conclude that Williams’ failure to require these boys to undress and to don pajamas should be characterized as “gross negligence.” If these boys were prone to “abscond” after the incident described in the record, it is unreasonable to believe that they would not have redressed in their street clothes and absconded in any event.
From my point of view, I must strenuously dissent, because I sincerely believe the result of this case to be a travesty of justice.
Judge Crumlish, Jr. joins in this Dissenting Opinion.