I dissent.
Respondents and amici curiae do not view Penal Code section 859b in isolation.1 Neither do I. Inherent in the application of section 859b is the understanding that the accused, unable to post bail, are being deprived of liberty before probable cause has been established to hold them to answer. Thus, strict application of section 859b is necessary where there has been an excessive invasion of a prisoner’s pre-preliminary examination freedom, even where there might be risk of flight. (Landrum v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 1, 12 [177 Cal.Rptr. 325, 634 P.2d 352].) As the majority opinion *994acknowledges, “Section 859b reflects a clear legislative intention to prevent prolonged incarceration prior to a preliminary hearing.” (Ibid.; People v. Kowalski (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 174, 178 [242 Cal.Rptr. 32].)
The majority opinion states that the People should not be penalized by the risk of having defendants abscond where the continuance is not at the People’s behest, but that of a codefendant. What the People and the majority opinion ignore is that the preliminary examination was not continued at these defendants’ request. The majority opinion states that to read section 859b without reference to other statutes and laws would lead to absurdity. Not so. The flaw in this argument is that joinder statutes, as the People acknowledge, have been around a long time and predate Proposition 115. At no time has the California Supreme Court indicated that joinder of codefendants interferes with or supersedes an in-custody defendant’s right to dismissal or release without bail for violation of section 859b’s statutory period. The People’s interpretation of section 859b, as limited by section 1050.1, would return it to the pre-1970 version when there was no statutory time limit and preliminary examinations merely had to be held without unreasonable delay. (Landrum v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.3d 1, 12.) “Within a reasonable time” is an amorphous concept that could permit “seemingly limitless prepreliminary examination detention without a judicial determination of probable cause” and could raise serious constitutional issues. (Id., at p. 11, fn. 14.)
Moreover, the statutory time limitation was strengthened rather than relaxed in 1977 when the Legislature rewrote the statute to provide that both the district attorney and the defendant had a right to a speedy preliminary examination and that the 10-court-day rule could be violated “ ‘in no instance’ ” where it was applicable. (Landrum v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.3d 1, 12; Stats. 1977, ch. 1152, §1, pp. 3698-3699.) Although the Legislature subsequently carved out the exceptions discussed in the majority opinion, it has done so conservatively and has been vigilant in protecting the right of a defendant not to be incarcerated for prolonged periods without a judicial determination of probable cause.
By accepting the People’s reasoning, the majority opinion judicially engrafts an additional exception to section 859b. That is not our prerogative, no matter how wise it may appear. Our function in construing a statute is “to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted . . . .” (People v. McMahan (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 740, 749 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 708].) Had the Legislature intended that one codefendant could waive the statutory time limit of section 859b for other codefendants by providing good cause *995for a continuance, it would have included such language in the statute. (In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 774 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574]; see People v. Mackey (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 177, 183 [221 Cal.Rptr. 405].) “ ‘ “If the words of the statute are clear, the court should not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on [its] face ... or from its legislative history.’” ” (Mackey, supra, at p. 184, discussing the 60-day limitation of section 859b in which a preliminary hearing shall be held.) Furthermore, good cause to continue the preliminary hearing of one defendant may not constitute good cause as to all defendants.
Where the statute specifies exceptions to the general rule, we may not imply or presume other exceptions. (People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1082 [255 Cal.Rptr. 352, 767 P.2d 619], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 299, fn. 10 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 841 P.2d 938].) The People have other remedies by resorting to the grand jury with no postindictment preliminary hearing (Cal. Const., art. I, § 14.1), or moving for severance under section 954. Seeking an indictment involves a single proceeding and avoids the possibility of multiple preliminary hearings. In fact, that is what the People ultimately did here.
I would therefore reject the majority opinion’s attempt to “harmonize” section 1050.1 and section 859b, and leave to the Legislature — or electorate — any further exception to section 859b’s mandate. Section 859b means what it says: if a defendant’s preliminary hearing is delayed with good cause, the defendant shall be released in the absence of an exception set forth in section 859b. Section 1050.1 gives the prosecution the right to maintain joinder but not to force pre-preliminary examination detention of an in-custody defendant by overriding or limiting the statutory time limits of section 859b.
I would affirm the orders.
Petitions for a rehearing were denied February 16, 1995. Stone, J., was of the opinion that the petitions should be granted. Petitioner’s application for review by the Supreme Court was denied May 18, 1995. Mosk, J., Kennard, J., and Werdegar, J., were of the opinion that the application should be granted.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.