Commonwealth v. Crawford

ROBERTS, Justice

(concurring).

The Latinism “corpus delicti” has, I fear, confused the majority and led it to improperly analyze that issue in this case. “Corpus delicti” encompasses two analytically distinct elements which are frequently confused. First, a defendant may not be convicted on the basis of his extra-judicial confessions or admissions unless they are corroborated by independent evidence which establishes *266that a crime has in fact been committed by someone. Commonwealth v. Ware, 459 Pa. 334, 367, 329 A.2d 258, 274-75 (1974). Second, in every criminal case and regardless of any confession or admission, the Commonwealth, as part of its ultimate burden of proof, must prove “beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime has in fact been committed.” Id. at 367-368 n. 43, 329 A.2d at 275 n. 43.

In the former instance, the corroboration requirement is satisfied “if the independent evidence ‘points to an unlawful killing, although it may indicate as well accident or suicide’ . . . .” Id. at 366, 329 A.2d at 274, quoting Commonwealth v. Coontz, 288 Pa. 74, 79, 135 A. 538, 539 (1927). In the latter instance, however, the Commonwealth must prove the “corpus delicti” with evidence of the same quality and quantity as is required for proof that the defendant is the perpetrator of the crime. Accordingly, we will review the evidence for sufficiency of proof of “corpus delicti” under the standard we generally employ to review the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Murray, 460 Pa. 605, 609, 334 A.2d 255, 257 (1975).

In this case, appellants’ “corpus delicti” argument is of the second variety, i. e., a branch of their general argument that the evidence is insufficient to support their convictions. Commonwealth v. May, 451 Pa. 31, 301 A. 2d 368 (1973), and Commonwealth v. Boykin, 450 Pa. 25, 298 A.2d 258 (1972) (opinion of three Justices), cited by the majority, deal with “corpus delicti” as it relates to corroboration of an extra-judicial statement and thus are clearly inapposite here.

In my view, the evidence introduced in this case, as analyzed by the trial court in its able opinion denying post-trial motions, was of sufficient quantity and quality for the jury to have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that appellants are guilty of voluntary manslaughter, in-*267eluding the necessary intermediate conclusion that the death of Thomas Young, Jr., was the result of a criminal act.

Because appellants’ other contentions either are without merit or were not properly preserved for appellate review, I concur in the result.