dissenting.
Defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance “in, on or within 500 feet of a public park.” The majority has judicially expanded the five-hundred-foot public park zone to include the area where defendant’s stash of drugs was found in order to justify defendant’s conviction. Because I cannot accept the strained interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1(a) that allows the majority to uphold defendant’s park zone conviction, I must dissent.
I agree with the majority that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction for his distribution of marijuana, for the amount of marijuana that he possessed on his person when he was within five hundred feet of a public park, and for the amount of marijuana and cocaine he constructively possessed, stored in his stash. For his actions within a public park zone and for the amounts of marijuana and cocaine found on his person and that he constructively possessed, defendant was convicted of fourth-degree possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(l) and b(12) (count one); third-degree distribution or possession of marijuana with intent to distribute while within 500 feet of a public park, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(l) (count three); third-degree possession of cocaine, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(l) (count four); and third-degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-51(1) and b(3) (count five). The majority and I part company in this appeal because the Court is willing to uphold an additional conviction for second-degree distribution or possession of cocaine with intent to distribute while within five hundred feet of a public park zone, contrary to N.J.S.A 20:35-7.1 (count seven), when the cocaine involved in that second-degree conviction *376was not “in, on or within 500 feet of [a public park].” N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 (emphasis added).
The statute calls for possession of the contraband to be within the five-hundred-foot zone protecting a public park. Ibid. The stash of cocaine on which rests defendant’s second-degree park zone conviction was located outside of the five-hundred-foot zone. Nevertheless, the majority upholds that conviction based on a novel application of constructive possession that relocates the constructively possessed cocaine to where defendant is situated. The majority cannot cite to a single case in this State where a thing, constructively possessed, is deemed to be possessed at a location other than where the thing itself is located. At oral argument, the State conceded that it could not cite to a single case to support that proposition either.
The novel spin that the majority gives to the principle of constructive possession is not supported by State v. Spivey, 179 N.J. 229, 844 A.2d 512 (2004). In Spivey, the defendant’s apartment was located less than five hundred feet from a public park. Id. at 233, 844 A.2d 512. In searching the defendant’s apartment pursuant to a warrant that authorized a search of both the defendant’s person and home, the police found a sizable amount of drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a loaded firearm. Ibid. The firearm, and some marijuana with drug paraphernalia, were found in different locations within the kitchen. Ibid. The issue before the Court was whether there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant under N.J.S.A 2C:39-4.1a., for possessing a firearm “while in the course of’ possessing with intent to distribute drugs within five hundred feet of a public park. Id. at 232, 844 A.2d 512. Although the defendant was arrested while standing on the sidewalk outside his apartment, the Court’s analysis did not focus on where the defendant was located; rather, our analysis and holding focused on the relationship between the location of the drugs and the firearm, in the context of determining the “while in the course of’ element of 2C:39^.1a. We upheld Spivey’s conviction based on the premise that he constructively possessed the items where they *377were found in his home. It certainly was not the case that under the Court’s analysis either the drugs or the firearm had to be moved from their actual location to another place where the defendant happened to be found when arrested.
Spivey simply provides no support for the approach to constructive possession taken today by the Court. From my perspective, saving one count of this defendant’s multiple convictions is of small significance. What looms large is the uncertainty that now will be east over where a constructively possessed item is possessed. Is the location of an item constructively possessed now a movable target, sometimes where the person is located and other times where the item actually is? The location of a constructively possessed item should not be made susceptible to manipulation to maximize criminal penalties. I believe the better approach is to follow the plain language of the statute itself. Even if I were to assume that there is some room to argue ambiguity, I would conclude that the rule of lenity favors defendant because neither the language nor legislative history of this statute supports the majority’s conclusion.
The statute at issue here, N.J.S.A 2C:35-7.1(a), provides that
[a]ny person who violates subsection a. of N. J.S.2C:35-5 by distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog while in, on or within 500 feet of the real property comprising a public housing facility, a public park, or a public building is guilty of a crime of the second degree, except that it is a crime of the third degree if the violation involved less than one ounce of marijuana.
Subsection a. of N.J.S.A 2C:35-5 provides:
Except as authorized by P.L.1970, c. 226 (C.24:21-l et seq.), it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or purposely:
(1) To manufacture, distribute or dispense, or to possess or have under his control with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog; or
(2) To create, distribute, or possess or have under his control with intent to distribute, a counterfeit controlled dangerous substance.
Under the rules of statutory construction, if the language is clear and unambiguous on its face and admits of only one reasonable meaning and manner of application, then those unambiguous *378words are enforced consistent with their literal meaning. State v. Reiner, 180 N.J. 307, 311, 850 A.2d 1252 (2004). If, however, a statute’s text lends itself to more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consult extrinsic sources in the quest to ascertain and implement legislative intent. Ibid. When extrinsic sources do not resolve the ambiguity, courts are expected to employ applicable canons of construction that in the context of a penal statute call into play the rule of lenity. Id. at 318, 850 A.2d 1252. The rule of lenity requires that penal statutes be strictly construed and that ambiguous language be read in favor of a criminal defendant. State v. Livingston, 172 N.J. 209, 217-18, 797 A.2d 153 (2002).
Aside from my difference with the majority about where a constructively possessed item is possessed, the critical disagreement in this matter turns on application of the term “possessing” contained in N.J.S.A 2C:35-7.1. Despite the plain language that calls for the possession of the contraband to be “in, on or within” the public park zone, a majority of this Court uses its novel approach to constructive possession to get the drugs within the park zone. Consistent with that view, a defendant can be prosecuted under the statute if he is physically within the proscribed zone but constructively possesses drugs that are located outside the proscribed zone. Several textual arguments have been advanced for, and against, that approach.
If one were to agree that reasonable interpretations of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 have been advanced by both parties, rendering it unclear whether the Legislature intended to make a defendant standing within a drug-free zone culpable for constructively possessing drugs located outside of the proscribed zone, resort may be had to extrinsic aids to resolve the ambiguity. See State v. Reiner, supra, 180 N.J. at 314, 850 A.2d 1252. Here, however, extrinsic sources do not cure the specific ambiguity with which we are faced.
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 closely resembles and was modeled after N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (creating drug-free school zones). In general respects, both enactments share a similar purpose: to create *379drug-free zones around certain areas by imposing enhanced penalties upon those who engage in drug activities within those areas. See State v. Parker, 335 N.J.Super. 415, 424, 762 A.2d 690 (App.Div.2000) (recognizing legislative intent in enacting both 2C:35-7 and 2C:35-7.1 was to reduce presence of drugs within protected zones). In enacting the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1986, the Legislature explained its intent in the statute’s opening section. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-l.l(a)-(e). Besides expressing its abhorrence of drug activity on or near school property and its desire to enhance the punishment of those who engage in drug distribution within the protected zones, the Legislature emphasized its desire to deter persons from the prohibited conduct through the use of “stern” enhanced penalties, citing “the need to ensure a uniform, consistent and predictable system for the sentencing of convicted offenders.” N.J.S.A 2C:35-l.l(a). That said, nowhere does N.J.S.A 2C:35-7.1 state that its enhanced penalties apply to the constructive possession of drugs not actually located in a protected zone.1 The vagueness of such an elastic notion of the physical parameters of the enhanced-penalty zone is problematic. The majority acknowledges the concerns inherent in a broad application of its holding and superimposes a “totality of the circumstances” factual analysis in this type of possession case. It remains to be seen in future cases just how far drug-free zones can be stretched under the majority’s framework to include contraband physically located outside of the perimeters expressly delineated by statute.
In my view, merely because the legislative history contains strong support for the creation of drug-free zones does not mean that drugs physically located outside of those zones may be swept within the statute’s reach. The statute describes clearly and *380precisely (“500 feet”) the area -within which enhanced penalties will pertain. We presume an intent by the Legislature to avoid, vagueness in penal statutes and, consequently, in respect of their application, because of the negative consequences of such imprecision. Vague laws may offend constitutional due process by failing to give adequate notice. See State v. Valentin, 105 N.J. 14, 18, 519 A.2d 322 (1987).
Although it is undoubtedly true that the legislative history surrounding the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1986 evinces a strong legislative desire to wage an aggressive campaign against drug-related activity, that general intent is not enough. Ibid. (stating that “[pjenal laws cannot be extended by implication or intendment.”). Nowhere in those materials is the answer to the precise question that this Court must now resolve: whether the Legislature intended to include within the purview of 2C:35-7.1 the prosecution of a person for a possessory offence under that statute when that person stands physically within the public park zone but constructively possesses drugs located outside of the statutorily defined drug-free zone. Because an examination of extrinsic sources does not resolve the question of whether the legislative prohibition applies in these circumstances, I am compelled to resort to the rule of lenity that requires that penal statutes be construed strictly and ambiguities be interpreted in favor of criminal defendants.
The rule of lenity “has at its heart the requirement of due process. No one shall be punished for a crime unless both that crime and its punishment are clearly set forth in positive law.” In re Suspension of DeMarco, 83 N.J. 25, 36, 414 A.2d 1339 (1980). And, the canon serves the compelling function of preventing arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See State v. Valentin, supra, 105 N.J. at 18, 519 A.2d 322 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227-28 (1972)). The rule of lenity and its requirement of strict construction in a defendant’s favor is particularly apt when the statute at issue is a penalty enhancer. See Deville v. State, *381388 Md. 217, 858 A.2d 484, 487-88 (2004) (construing Maryland’s habitual drug offender statute strictly and explaining that “[w]hen there is doubt as to the Legislature’s intent regarding the application of an enhanced penalty, the rule of lenity requires that any ambiguity within criminal statutes be interpreted in favor of the defendant.”).
For all the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. I would reverse defendant’s conviction under N.J.S.A 2C:35-7.1 (count seven). I would hold that the cocaine that defendant constructively possessed was located where the cocaine stash was kept and that, therefore, defendant cannot be convicted of possession of that cocaine under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1. The statute does not apply when the drugs are not “in, on or within” the precise perimeter of the drug-free zones delineated in the act.
Justice ALBIN joins in this dissent.
For affirmance—Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices LONG, ZAZZALI, WALLACE, and RIVERA-SOTO—5.
For reversal—Justices LaVECCHIA and ALBIN—2.
Indeed, one could argue that such an interpretation of the statute renders superfluous the language "by distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog” contained in 2C:35-7.1, because that activity is already proscribed under 2C:35-5.