dissenting joined by RAKER, J.
This case is a reciprocal discipline case. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ayres-Fountain, 379 Md. 44, 56-59, 838 A.2d 1238, 1245-47 (2003); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Richardson, 350 Md. 354, 365-66, 712 A.2d 525, 530-31 (1998); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sabghir, 350 Md. 67, 78-79, 710 A.2d 926, 931-32 (1998); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gittens, 346 Md. 316, 324, 697 A.2d 83, 87 (1997); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Willcher, 340 Md. 217, 221-22, 665 A.2d 1059, 1061 (1995); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Saul, 337 Md. 258, 267-68, 653 A.2d 430, 434 (1995); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hopp, 330 Md. 177, 185-86, 623 A.2d 193, 197 (1993); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sparrow, 314 Md. 421, 425-26, 550 A.2d 1150, 1152 (1988); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Parsons, 310 Md. 132, 142-43, 527 A.2d 325, 330 (1987); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Haupt, 306 Md. 612, 614-15, 510 A.2d 590, 591-92 (1986); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bettis, 305 Md. 452, 455, 505 A.2d 492, 493 (1986); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Moore, 301 Md. 169, 171, 482 A.2d 497, 498 (1984); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rosen, 301 Md. 37, 39, 481 A.2d 799, 800 (1984). Such cases arise when “[a]n attorney who in another jurisdiction (1) is disbarred, suspended, or otherwise disciplined, (2) resigns from the bar while disciplinary or remedial action is threatened or pending in that jurisdiction, or (3) is placed on inactive status based on incapacity,” Maryland Rule 16-773(a), and bar counsel has filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in *557the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Rule 16-751(a)(2). Maryland Rule 16-773(b). Reciprocal discipline cases have two, significantly interrelated aspects: an evidentiary aspect and a sanction-imposition aspect.
In reciprocal cases, “[a] final adjudication in a disciplinary proceeding by a judicial tribunal ... that an attorney has been guilty of misconduct is conclusive proof of the misconduct in the hearing of charges pursuant to this Rule.” See Maryland Rule 16-773(g)1. With the evidentiary foundation in place, the issue of the appropriateness of the sanction imposed must be addressed. As to that, this Court’s jurisprudence and Maryland Rule 16-773 are instructive. Subsection (c), which requires the Court to issue a show cause order upon the filing of the petition, is a mechanism within the Rule that permits either of the parties to the proceedings to show “why corresponding discipline or inactive status should not be imposed.” Maryland Rule 16-773(c). Moreover, the Rule prescribes the exceptional circumstances, which, if shown, will allow the party making the showing to avoid the reciprocal discipline. Maryland Rule 16-773(e) provides:
“(e) Exceptional Circumstances. Reciprocal discipline shall not be ordered if Bar Counsel or the attorney demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that:
“(1) the procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process;
*558“(2) there was such infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to a clear conviction that the Court, consistent with its duty, cannot accept as final the determination of misconduct;
“(3) the imposition of corresponding discipline would result in grave injustice;
“(4) the conduct established does not constitute misconduct in this State or it warrants substantially different discipline in this State; or
“(5) the reason for inactive status no longer exists.”
This Court’s treatment of the second aspect of our reciprocal discipline process, the imposition of sanction, has been, to now, both consistent and well settled. It is:
“We are prone, see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sabghir, 350 Md. 67, 83, 710 A.2d 926, 934 (1998); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Richardson, 350 Md. 354, 365-66, 712 A.2d 525, 530-31 (1998), but not required, see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gittens, 346 Md. 316, 324, 697 A.2d 83, 87 (1997), to impose the same sanction as that imposed by the state in which the misconduct occurred. Indeed, the Court is duty-bound to assess for itself the propriety of the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction and that recommended by the Commission, Gittens, 346 Md. at 326, 697 A.2d at 88, to look not only to the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction, but to the particular facts and circumstances of each case, the outcome being dependent upon the latter, but with a view toward consistent dispositions for similar misconduct. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Willcher, 340 Md. 217, 222, 665 A.2d 1059, 1061 (1995) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Parsons, 310 Md. 132, 142, 527 A.2d 325, 330 (1987)); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Saul, 337 Md. 258, 267-68, 653 A.2d 430, 434-35 (1995). We ordinarily will defer to the sanctioning State when the two States’ purpose in disciplining counsel is the same.”
Ayres-Fountain, 379 Md. at 57, 838 A.2d at 1246 (quoting Gittens, 346 Md. at 327, 697 A.2d at 88); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ruffin, 369 Md. 238, 253-254, 798 A.2d 1139, 1148 (2002). See also Roberson, 373 Md. at 355-56, 818 A.2d at 1076.
*559Our cases also make clear that, for sanctioning purposes, important considerations for this Court have been the location of the attorney’s practice, where the misconduct actually occurred, two factors recognized as quite pertinent by other courts, see In re Schlem, 308 A.D.2d 220, 222, 763 N.Y.S.2d 558, 559 (N.Y.A.D.2003) (“As to the appropriate sanction, it is generally accepted that the state where respondent lived and practiced law at the time of the offense has the greatest interest in the sanction imposed ... and deference is particularly appropriate where the misconduct occurred in that state”); Copren v. State Bar, 64 Nev. 364, 383, 183 P.2d 833, 842 (1947) (“in the spirit and under the law of comity, we should recognize the California judgment of suspension in the instant case, as to the acts of misconduct of petitioner which occurred in California”), and the seriousness with which the other jurisdiction treats the misconduct.
In accepting the sanction imposed by the Supreme Court of Delaware in Ayres-Fountain, though noting that it likely was not identical to one that this Court may have imposed had the matter been initiated in Maryland, we said:
“the respondent essentially is a Delaware lawyer; that is where she lives and where she principally practices. More important, the misrepresentations upon which the petitioner principally relies are misrepresentations made to the Supreme Court of Delaware, in certifications contained in annual filings that Court requires to be made in support of its oversight of the administration of justice in that State. That Court was fully informed of the facts and circumstances of the respondent’s conduct. In addition to the stipulation, which is quite detailed and explicit, not only as to the violations but with respect to the respondent’s admissions, the court reviewed the Report and Recommendation of Sanction of the Board of Professional Responsibility. That Report, which accepted the facts recited in the stipulation, was prepared only after the Board conducted a hearing to determine the appropriate sanction to recommend. The Board, in addition to discussing the considerations that were *560taken into account in fashioning the sanction recommendation, painstakingly analyzed the cases bearing on the proper sanction and that formed the basis for the recommendation it made.
“Having been presented with the Report and the recommendation for a three year suspension, the Supreme Court of Delaware adopted the Report and accepted the recommendation, but only after it had “considered the matter carefully.” That it had a firm grasp of the facts and the gravity of the situation is shown by the court’s recitation of the admissions the respondent made, noting particularly that “she falsely represented to the Delaware Supreme Court, in her Certificates of Compliance filed between 1996 and 2000, that she had timely paid all federal, state, and local payroll, gross receipts and income taxes [and] concealed her failure to pay various federal, state and local taxes from the ODC and its auditor.” In addition, the court referred to the aggravating factors to which the parties stipulated, indicating that the sanction was appropriate “in light of the[ir] presence.” ”
379 Md. at 58-59, 838 A.2d at 1246-47. See Gittens, 346 Md. at 324, 697 A.2d at 88 (noting that the misconduct for which the respondent was being sanctioned occurred solely in the District of Columbia). Thus when the attorney primarily practices in another jurisdiction and there commits his misconduct, deference to the reciprocal discipline sanction is usual, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Scroggs, 387 Md. 238, 874 A.2d 985 (2005); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Steinberg, 385 Md. 696, 870 A.2d 603 (2005); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ayres-Fountain, 379 Md. 44, 838 A.2d 1238 (2003); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Roberson, 373 Md. 328, 818 A.2d 1059 (2003); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ruffin, 369 Md. 238, 798 A.2d 1139 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gittens, 346 Md. 316, 697 A.2d 83 (1997), and the divergence from it, rare. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dechowitz, 358 Md. 184, 747 A.2d 657 (2000).2
*561That is as it should be. In In re Zdravkovich, 831 A.2d 964, 968-969 (D.C.2003), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia interpreted Rule XI, § 11(c), its equivalent to Maryland Rule 16-773(e), characterizing and rationalizing its reciprocal discipline standard as follows:
“We have adopted a rigid standard for reciprocal bar discipline cases. As already indicated, we presumptively impose identical reciprocal discipline, unless the attorney demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the case falls within one of five specified exceptions articulated in Rule XI, §§ 11(c). In re Gardner, 650 A.2d 693, 695 (D.C.1994); In re Zilberberg, 612 A.2d 832, 834-35 (D.C.1992). While the plain language of Rule XI, §§ 11(c) places the burden on the disciplined attorney to establish by clear and convincing evidence that a lesser sanction is warranted, the Office of Bar Counsel also has standing to object to the imposition of identical discipline, see, e.g., In re Reid, 540 A.2d 754, 758 (D.C.1988), and may recommend a different sanction when it believes an exception applies. See, e.g., In re Berger, 737 A.2d 1033, 1040 (D.C.1999). Such instances, however, should be rare. Underlying our strict standard in reciprocal bar discipline cases is not only the notion that another jurisdiction has already afforded the attorney a full disciplinary proceeding, but also the idea that there is merit in according deference, for its own sake, to the actions of other jurisdictions with respect to the attorneys over whom we share supervisory authority.”
*562To like effect, see Mississippi Bar v. Drungole, 913 So.2d 963, 2005 WL 977004 (Miss.2005); Copren v. State Bar, 64 Nev. 364, 385-389, 183 P.2d 833, 843-844 (1947).
In Mississippi, reciprocal discipline is governed by Mississippi Bar Discipline Rule 13, which provides:
“When an attorney should be subjected to disciplinary sanctions in another jurisdiction, such sanction shall be grounds for disciplinary action in this state, and certification of such sanction by the appropriate authority of such jurisdiction to the Executive Director of the Bar or to the Court, shall be conclusive evidence of the guilt of the offense or unprofessional conduct on which said sanction was ordered, and it ■will not be necessary to prove the grounds for such offense in the disciplinary proceeding in this state. The sole issue to be determined in the disciplinary proceeding in this state shall be the extent of the final discipline to be imposed on the attorney, which may be less or more severe than the discipline imposed by the other jurisdiction.”
Applying that Rule, the Supreme Court of Mississippi defers both to the factual determinations made and to the sanction imposed by another jurisdiction. In Drungole, it explained:
“In assessing sanctions for reciprocal attorney discipline cases, we give deference to the sanction imposed by the foreign jurisdiction. After all, this Court takes the findings of the foreign jurisdiction as conclusive evidence of professional misconduct.... In accepting the findings of the foreign jurisdiction, our focus on the due process protections afforded the attorney must never waiver. See generally Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51, 37 S.Ct. 377, 61 L.Ed. 585 (1917). An attorney who is the subject of a disciplinary complaint is entitled to fundamental due process protections throughout the course of the proceedings. In re Rokahr, 681 N.W.2d 100, 108 (S.D.2004). Thus, it seems only appropriate that we afford deference to the sanctions imposed by the foreign jurisdiction. If the attorney was afforded full or partial substantive and/or procedural due process in the foreign jurisdiction, then the foreign jurisdiction would have had the best opportunity to consider the testimony of the *563witnesses, examine the lawyer’s mental state, determine the existence of aggravating and/or mitigating factors, and assess the credibility of the witnesses.”
913 So.2d at 968, 2005 WL 977004 at *4 (Miss.2005). Acknowledging that Rule 13, by its terms, does not bar the court from imposing any sanction it deems appropriate, the court was clear that “Rule 13 is not an invitation to disregard logic, reason or common sense.” Id. at 970, 2005 WL 977004 at *6. Just as it is necessary to take “the cold record of the foreign jurisdiction as conclusive” in reciprocal attorney discipline cases, deference must also be afforded to the foreign jurisdiction’s findings. “[Ojnly under extraordinary circumstances should there be significant variance from a sanction imposed by the foreign jurisdiction.” Id.
The respondent, although also admitted to practice in Maryland, Virginia, Florida and Colorado, practiced law primarily in the District of Columbia, where the firm in which he was a partner maintained an office. He was charged with violating, and was found by the judge to whom this case was assigned to have violated, Rule 8.4(b) and (c) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, i.e. to have “committed a criminal act that reflects adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness of a lawyer” and to have “engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit and/or misrepresentation.” The basis for these findings was the respondent’s misappropriation, over a period of time, of more than $600,000 from the law firm in which he was a partner. After extensive proceedings, during which the respondent cooperated with Bar Counsel and underwent extensive counseling and analysis, the reports of which were provided to, and extensively reviewed and considered by the District of Columbia Board on Professional Responsibility (the Board), the Board recommended to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three years, with one year suspended, in favor of two years probation or until the respondent’s therapist advises Bar Counsel that therapy is no longer required. The Court of Appeals accepted that recommendation, after a hearing and consideration of the record *564made before the Board. Subsequently, the respondent received reciprocal discipline from the Supreme Courts of Florida and Colorado, the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Although it has no problem with deferring to the finding of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals with respect to the misconduct to which the sanction at issue applies, and is, perhaps, even happy to do so, the majority is loath to give that court’s sanction determination any consideration whatsoever. Like the Mississippi Supreme Court, I believe that the two are, and should be, inextricably related. What that court said on the subject is worth repeating:
“[I]t seems only appropriate that we afford deference to the sanctions imposed by the foreign jurisdiction. If the attorney was afforded full or partial substantive and/or procedural due process in the foreign jurisdiction, then the foreign jurisdiction would have had the best opportunity to consider the testimony of the witnesses, examine the lawyer’s mental state, determine the existence of aggravating and/or mitigating factors, and assess the credibility of the witnesses.”
Drungole, 913 So.2d at 968, 2005 WL 977004 at *4. It also is worth repeating that six other courts, presented with the same record, have deferred to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals as to the sanction.
The majority does not dispute that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals approaches attorney discipline from the same perspective as this Court, with an eye to the protection of the public and not to punish the erring attorney. 389 Md. 531, 547, 886 A.2d 606, 615 (2005). The majority concedes that deference is the norm, “we are prone” to do so, id.; nevertheless, on this record, its rationale for refusing deference in this case can only be that the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia did not exact the pound of flesh that we would have done had the matter initiated in this Court, i.e., it did not *565punish the respondent to the extent we think required. That is not the test.
Our Rule 16-773 contemplates, indeed, requires, that reciprocal discipline be avoided only when there are “exceptional” circumstances shown by either Bar Counsel or the respondent. The majority appears to agree, suggesting that there are such exceptional circumstances: imposing reciprocal discipline “would result in grave injustice,” subsection (e)(3), and the respondent’s misconduct “warrants different discipline in this State.” Maryland Rule 16-773(e)(4). Rather than explain these conclusions — it is simply inconceivable to me how deference to a home state’s imposition of a sanction in a reciprocal discipline case can result in a grave injustice and the majority does not even attempt to clarify the point3 — the majority *566simply reviews our reciprocal discipline cases, emphasizing our oft-repeated admonition that we are not absolutely bound to impose identical discipline and noting that, in many of the cases in which we imposed reciprocal discipline, we were satisfied that the same sanction would have been imposed in this State, in any event. The majority also was able to find an exception, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dechowitz, 358 Md. 184, 747 A.2d 657 (2000), in which the Court declined to impose reciprocal discipline; two, if you count Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Parsons, 310 Md. 132, 527 A.2d 325 (1987), in which we reduced, rather than increased, the length of the sanction ordered by the other jurisdiction. That the result in the other jurisdiction is not the same as that which would have been reached here does not suffice to make the situation exceptional or demonstrate that substantially different discipline is warranted in this State. If that is all that is required to demonstrate exceptional circumstances, then there is no reason for reciprocal discipline; it really is meaningless.
The majority appears to rely on Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 773 A.2d 463 (2001) to justify its refusal to defer to the District of Columbia sanction decision. That reliance is misplaced. Vanderlinde did not change this Court’s view of lawyer misappropriation. Long before that case was decided, we were clear, and stated often in our cases, time and again, that misappropriation of client funds alone will result in disbarment in the absence of compelling extenuating circumstances. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Bernstein, 363 Md. 208, 229, 768 A.2d *567607, 618 (2001); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Milliken, 348 Md. 486, 519, 704 A.2d 1225, 1241 (1998); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Williams, 335 Md. 458, 474, 644 A.2d 490, 497 (1994); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Casalino, 335 Md. 446, 452, 644 A.2d 43, 46 (1994); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bakas, 323 Md. 395, 403, 593 A.2d 1087, 1091 (1991); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Short, 303 Md. 317, 321, 493 A.2d 362, 364 (1985); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garson, 287 Md. 502, 503, 413 A.2d 564, 564 (1980). Vanderlinde addressed, rather, what would suffice as mitigation to reduce the sanction in a misappropriation case. The majority’s position is apparently that unless a misappropriation case, regardless of where originated, meets the Vanderlinde test for mitigating circumstances, reciprocation of a sanction less than disbarment is precluded, either because under Rule 1G — 773(e)(3) a “grave injustice” would result in that an attorney in a reciprocal case would receive a lesser sanction than would an attorney, under the exact same facts, in a case originating in Maryland, or because, as a result of that decision, only disbarment may be imposed as a sanction.
This Court has continually admonished, repeated in virtually every reciprocal discipline case, that we seek “consistent dispositions for similar conduct.” If, as the majority’s reliance on Vanderlinde, seems to suggest, seeking consistent dispositions has greater relevance to the sanction decisions within this State4 than does the rule of reciprocity, then one must wonder what the reason for Rule 16-773(e) is, and what the importance is of the requirement that there be a demonstration of consistency as to sanction. The answer is, of course, that the Rule contemplates a sanction decision from the receiving jurisdiction and, as important, contemplates that there will be deference paid to it, just as there is expected that deference *568will be paid — and there is — to the findings of that jurisdiction as to the charged misconduct. If the sanction determination is a de novo exercise or the sanction of the receiving state may be disregarded, with impunity, then there simply is little, if any, value to a reciprocal sanctions scheme and, I submit, to a reciprocal discipline regime. If reciprocal discipline is to have any meaning in misappropriation cases, Vanderlinde can not be construed as the majority does. If it is so construed, I question, as I have said, the value of the reciprocal discipline rule. I wonder as well why, if the receiving State’s judgment is not to be trusted on the sanction, we should accept the misconduct determination.
As indicated, the majority reviewed several of our reciprocal discipline cases in support of its analysis, some in which we imposed the same sanction as the other jurisdiction and some in which we did not. To be sure, there are cases in which we stated that the sanction from the other jurisdiction was what would have been imposed in this State had the disciplinary action initiated here and others where we made a point of stating that we were imposing reciprocal discipline, deferring to the sanction decision of the other jurisdiction. I fail to see why all of those cases are not cases in which we deferred to the other jurisdiction; consistency with the result that would obtain in any event is a reason to defer. The cases the majority cites to show that we have deviated from the reciprocal sanction do not require that we deviate in this case. In fact, they prove the point that I espouse: that this Court rarely deviates and then for exceptional reasons only.
Only one of the cases, Dechowitz, may actually support the majority. 358 Md. 184, 747 A.2d 657 (2000). In that case, we did impose a more severe sanction in a reciprocal case, disbarment, rather than a period of suspension. Id. at 193, 747 A.2d at 661. Thus, it is an exception to Rule 16-773, perhaps falling under subsection (e)(4). It is significant, however, that the attorney in that case was still on probation when this Court considered the disciplinary petition. Id. at 191, 747 A.2d at 661. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. White, 354 Md. 346, 731 A.2d 447 (1998), is not a pure reciprocal discipline case: while *569some of the misconduct committed by White occurred while she was practicing in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, id. at 350-351, 731 A.2d at 450, which later sanctioned her by suspending her from practice in that court, id., significant and equally serious violations occurred in Maryland and were charged here, as an initial matter. Id. at 354-361, 731 A.2d at 452-456. Thus, that the sanction imposed was greater than that imposed by the federal District Court can not be attributed solely to a refusal to defer to that eoui’t’s sanction determination due to a belief that a substantially different sanction was warranted.
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Parsons, 310 Md. 132, 527 A.2d 325 (1987), is an unusual case. There, following a precedent set five months earlier in a non-reciprocal attorney discipline case with facts identical to those of Parsons, we suspended Parsons for ninety days, rather than six months,' which suspension was not to run concurrently with the suspension imposed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Id. at 143, 527 A.2d at 330. It is significant that the District’s suspension had already ended; therefore, it is likely that we would have deferred, by running our suspension concurrently, had that opportunity been available.
I dissent.
Judge RAKER joins in the views expressed herein.
. (g) Conclusive Effect of Adjudication. Except as provided in subsections (e)(1) and (e)(2) of this Rule, a final adjudication in a disciplinary or remedial proceeding by another court, agency, or tribunal that an attorney has been guilty of professional misconduct or is incapacitated is conclusive evidence of that misconduct or incapacity in any proceeding under this Chapter. The introduction of such evidence does not preclude the Commission or Bar Counsel from introducing additional evidence or preclude the attorney from introducing evidence or otherwise showing cause why no discipline or lesser discipline should be imposed.
The (e)(1) and (e)(2) exceptions relate to “notice and opportunity to be heard.” See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Roberson, 373 Md. 328, 344-345, 818 A.2d 1059, 1069 (2003). Maryland Rule 16-773(e)(l) requires compliance with due process, and Maryland Rule 16-773(e)(2) ensures against “infirmity of proof.”
. In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dechowitz, 358 Md. 184, 747 A.2d 657 (2000), the Court disbarred the attorney, rather than impose *561reciprocally the sanction imposed by the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Federal Court and adopted by the Supreme Court of California. Id. at 193, 747 A.2d at 661. Noting that the attorney's sanction grew out of his guilty plea to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a crime similar to one for the conviction for which this Court determined that disbarment was the appropriate sanction, see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McGonigle, 295 Md. 264, 266, 454 A.2d 365, 367 (1983), the Court decided that it was not bound to follow the California decision, concluded that the attorney had not met his burden of presenting extenuating circumstances, and adopted bar counsel's disbarment recommendation. Id. at 193, 747 A.2d at 661.
. In the Conclusion to the opinion, the majority opines:
"It would be [aJ grave injustice in allowing a member of this Bar to commit such an offense and be given a lesser sanction because another jurisdiction did so, while other members of the Maryland Bar would be sanctioned more severely. The current state of the law in this state warrants a substantially different discipline than that imposed by the District of Columbia for offenses of the nature extant in the instant case.” 389 Md. at 555, 886 A.2d at 620.
This is hardly a demonstration of extraordinary circumstances. It is, however, perhaps a reflection and a statement by the majority of what attorney discipline, to it, has become: rather than a vehicle for the protection of the public, as our cases loudly proclaim that is its purpose, it is, more importantly, a vehicle to punish the erring attorney, to send the message forth, whether or not a lesser sanction would afford the public adequate protection. It also says a great deal about the majority's approach to comity between the various jurisdictions charged with attorney discipline.
Reciprocal discipline cases come to us with a fully developed record, after the charges against the attorney have been investigated, the attorney has been charged and, following appropriate proceedings, has been determined to have committed the misconduct charged, and the disciplinary authority, often the State’s high court, after considering the facts and circumstances, including mitigating and aggravating factors, has imposed what it considers an appropriate sanction. And, because the goal of attorney discipline in the jurisdiction from which received ordinarily will be the same as in the reciprocal State, they are received, in short, having already undergone a thorough and thoughtful analysis, not simply as to the underlying conduct, but also as to the sanction necessary for the public’s protection. Further analysis of the sanction by the reciprocal court is therefore not necessary to ensure the desired *566result, unless, of course, there are exceptional circumstances or it is supposed that this Court is, or may lay claim to being, the only court able to protect the legal consuming public from the misconduct of corrupt or misbehaving lawyers. I submit that we do not have a silver bullet, never mind the only silver bullet. As we are required to do when presented with any judgment from another State, I would have thought we would, on the basis of comity, defer to that judgment, even when it embodies a result that would not have obtained in this State. Apparently, to the majority, the need for comity in the area of attorney discipline is neither great, nor wanted. Perhaps, we would be just as well off without reciprocal discipline; of what value is it if we do not value it or use it only when it suits us to do so?
. On this point, the majority acknowledges the importance of the factor requiring the assessment of the facts and circumstances, “with a view toward consistent dispositions for similar conduct,” but hastens to add: “a proper review of our own cases is just as important in order to ensure that all members of the Maryland Bar are subject to the same standards.” 389 Md. at 549, 886 A.2d at 616.