Alameda County Waste Reduction and Recycling Act of 1990 (Measure D) imposes a $6 “surcharge” per ton of solid waste deposited in landfills located in Alameda County. The majority conclude that the surcharge is a valid regulatory fee. I believe the trial court properly found this surcharge to be a special tax imposed in violation of article XIII A, section 4 of the California Constitution.
A municipality has broad powers to enact regulations for a purpose reasonably related to promoting the public health, safety, comfort, and welfare, by means reasonably appropriate to the regulatory purposes which are not in conflict with general laws. (Barry v. City of Oceanside (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 257, 261 [165 Cal. Rptr. 697], citing Higgins v. City of Santa Monica (1964) 62 Cal.2d 24, 30 [41 Cal.Rptr. 9, 396 P.2d 41]; and Sunset Amusement Co. v. Board of Police Commissioners (1972) 7 Cal.3d 64, 72 [101 Cal.Rptr. 768, 496 P.2d 840].) Sanitation, including waste disposal, is subject to local regulation, and it is within Alameda County’s police power to address conservation of its landfill space. In the exercise of its police power, a municipality has the right to fix and collect reasonable regulatory charges in order to cover all direct and incidental costs attendant to its regulation. (County of Plumas v. Wheeler (1906) 149 Cal. 758, 764 [87 P. 909].) Such charges are exempt from the supermajority requirement of article XIII A, section 4. (Pennell v. City of San Jose (1986) 42 Cal.3d 365, 375 [228 Cal.Rptr. 726, 721 P.2d 1111].)
Such a surcharge, however, is a special tax when it is insufficiently related to accomplishing its purported regulatory purpose. The term “special tax” does not include “any fee which does not exceed the reasonable cost of providing the service or regulatory activity for which the fee is charged and which is not levied for general revenue purposes.” (Gov. Code, § 50076.) A valid regulatory fee requires that the fee not “exceed the sum reasonably *287necessary to cover the costs of the regulatory purpose sought.” (United Business Com. v. City of San Diego (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 156, 165 [154 Cal.Rptr. 263].)
Article XIII A, section 4, was not intended to be a “fiscal straight]acket” requiring a two-thirds vote for charges imposed where direct benefits are being conferred upon those being charged for the performance of proprietary functions. (Mills v. County of Trinity (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 656, 660 [166 Cal.Rptr. 674].) However, if the public is asked to bear the cost of a benefit to a discrete group, it must agree by a two-thirds vote. (Evans v. City of San Jose (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 728, 738 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 601]; Mills, supra, at p. 663.) Similarly, a fee may be imposed upon those who place or increase a burden upon the local entity, and vicariously the general public, so as to offset the costs reasonably attributable to their actions. (Shapell Industries, Inc. v. Governing Board (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 218, 234-235 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 818]; see also Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 317, 325 [170 Cal.Rptr. 685]; Bixel Associates v. City of Los Angeles (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1208, 1211 [265 Cal.Rptr. 347]; Terminal Plaza Corp. v. City and County of San Francisco (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 892, 906 [223 Cal.Rptr. 379].) However, if an imposed charge exceeds the reasonable relationship between the burdens imposed by the payor, then the charge operates as a special tax.1 If an insufficient connection exists between the “regulatory fees” and the problem being addressed, the “fees” are special taxes. For example, a school facilities fee valid as to residential developers (Trent Meredith, supra, passim) is invalid as to commercial developers where no sufficient connection is shown to exist between their commercial construction and the need for additional school facilities. (Shapell, supra, at p. 240; Bixel, supra, at p. 1218.)
To determine whether the imposition of a tonnage-based surcharge upon those disposing of solid waste in landfills located in Alameda County deters or reduces the excessive generation of waste so as to conserve landfill space, we must analyze the use of the fee involved (Mills v. County of Trinity, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d at p. 661; United Business Com. v. City of San Diego, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 165). “ ‘If revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental the imposition is a tax; while if regulation is the primary purpose the mere fact that incidentally a revenue is also obtained *288does not make the imposition a tax.’ ” (City & County of San Francisco v. Boss (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 445, 450-451 [189 P.2d 32], cited with approval in United Business Com., supra, at p. 165.)
The overall regulatory purpose of Measure D is to deter and reduce the excessive generation of waste in order to conserve landfill space. The measure seeks to accomplish this purpose through conservation and waste reduction programs within the county funded by imposition of a surcharge on all who use landfills in the county. In its funding capacity, the surcharge is exacted on those disposing into Alameda County landfills solid waste from areas inside and outside of the county. The proceeds are used to fund programs to reduce excessive waste within the unincorporated areas of Alameda County and its eligible cities.
This surcharge is used to fund programs not reasonably related to conserving landfill space, because the programs it funds only address waste generated in Alameda County. The proportions of waste disposed of from areas in the county which are or are not eligible for program funding, and from areas outside the county, may change; however, the overall amount of waste disposed in the landfills will not necessarily be decreased. Since the proceeds from the surcharge are directed solely toward these programs, rather than used to directly address problems resulting from the waste disposed of by the intended payors, the use and the purpose of the surcharge is to exact revenue, not conserve landfill space. This makes the exaction serve as unrelated revenue not exempted from article XIIIA by Government Code section 50076.
The surcharge might reduce landfill by increasing the cost of disposing of solid waste in landfills; i.e., it provides an economic disincentive to excessive generation and disposal of solid wastes above and beyond operating costs. However, if the nexus of cost benefit is met merely by making a disfavored act more expensive, then article XIIIA offers illusory protection and Government Code section 50076 is a meaningless tautology. Moreover, as the trial court noted, the cost of the service regarding Government Code section 50076 correlates here not to the need for the funds generated per tonnage disposed based upon burdens actually imposed by the users, but rather correlates to programs to reduce excessive waste in Alameda County. Thus, the mere use of the landfill, rather than the excessive use, is what is being deterred. Consequently, I would hold that the trial court correctly found that the surcharge imposed by Measure D, however laudable a goal involved, is not entitled to exempt status as a regulatory fee.
Measure D’s surcharge is a special tax. Although this suggests that its imposition violates article XIIIA because it was not approved by two-thirds *289of the electorate, only those special taxes falling within the intended reach of article XIII A require supermajority voter approval. (Rider v. County of San Diego (1991) 1 Cal.4th 1, 10 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 490, 820 P.2d 1000].)
The supermajority limitations not only were placed upon the imposition of property-related taxes, but also upon the levy of “special taxes” so as to restrain the ability of local governments to recoup their losses from decreased property taxes by imposing or increasing levies on nonproperty taxes. (Rider v. County of San Diego, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 7; Heckendorn v. City of San Marino (1986) 42 Cal.3d 481, 488-489 [229 Cal.Rptr. 324, 723 P.2d 64].) “[T]he four sections of article XIII A are ‘functionally related in furtherance of, a common underlying purpose, namely, effective real property tax relief’ ” (City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47, 56 [184 Cal.Rptr. 713, 648 P.2d 935]) and also are designed to promote a broader objective, the curtailment of government spending. (Terminal Plaza Corp. v. City and County of San Francisco (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 892, 906 [223 Cal.Rptr. 379]; see also County of Fresno v. Malmstrom (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 974, 983-985 [156 Cal.Rptr. 777]; Mills v. County of Trinity, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d at p. 663.) Article XIII B, which acts in tandem with article XIII A, limits the growth of appropriations and requires excess proceeds from licenses or user fees over the reasonable cost of providing regulatory services be returned to the users. (Cal. Const., art. XIII B, §2, subd. (b); County of Fresno v. State of California (1991) 53 Cal.3d 482, 486 [280 Cal.Rptr. 92, 808 P.2d 235]; County of Placer v. Corin (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 443, 448, 451 [170 Cal.Rptr. 232]; Mills, supra, at p. 663.)
The proceeds generated by Measure D’s surcharge go into the Alameda County Recycling Fund (Measure D, Alameda County Charter, § 64.050A) to be disbursed by the recycling board (Measure D, id., § 64.060). Expenditures are based upon percentages of the total moneys collected. (Measure D, id., § 64.060A and § 64.060B.) Not only does this financing scheme insure that no surplus could ever result, it makes the cost of the programs dependent on the amount of funds generated by the surcharge. Article XIII A requires that the surcharge be set at an amount reflecting the reasonable cost of providing the regulatory service. Furthermore, the surcharge may be increased in several ways, which do not require a supermajority vote. (Measure D, Alameda County Charter, § 64.050D fl 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.) These features indicate that the surcharge runs counter to articles XIII A’s and XIII B’s broad objectives to limit government taxation and spending. Subjecting Measure D to the supermajority voter approval is consonant with the objectives of article XIIIA and, since it did not receive two-thirds voter approval, it is invalid if the surcharge is imposed by an entity restricted by section 4 of article XIII A.
*290Section 4 of article XIII A expressly restricts only counties, cities and special districts. Measure D was enacted by initiative and thus by the citizens of Alameda County. Ordinarily, initiatives require only majority approval for passage; however, the county exercises considerable control over the imposition of the surcharge and the use of the funds generated by it. The county is the sole body empowered to ensure the collection of said surcharge, either by modifying use permits of said landfills or “by any other means necessary.” (Measure D, Alameda County Charter, § 64.050A.) Only the county has the power to raise the surcharge and may adjust it in accordance with the consumer price index. (Measure D, id., § 64.050D ][ 3.) Finally, only the county has the power to waive the surcharge. (Measure D, id., § 64.050B.)
The power of the county to raise and waive the surcharge indicates that it is the county, not the recycling board, that has imposed this tax. Indeed, the recycling board’s control over the surcharge is “purely administrative and managerial in nature. . . . It is at all times strictly tethered to its designated purpose: to spend certain amounts of money on projects dictated by the board of supervisors.” (Monterey Peninsula Taxpayers Assn. v. County of Monterey (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1520, 1529 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 188].) Since Alameda County controls the imposition of this special tax, and it is explicitly subject to article XIII A, section 4, I would hold the surcharge invalid because it did not receive supermajority voter approval.
A petition for a rehearing was denied April 19, 1993, and the petition of respondent City of Dublin for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 3, 1993.
Consequently, most regulatory fees imposed according to payors’ burdens are limited to the actual operating costs of providing the service to the payors’ themselves. For example, tonnage-based landfill gate fees are proper insofar as used to meet operating expenses of simply running landfills owned and operated by the County. (Anaheim City School Dist. v. County of Orange (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 697, 688-689, 701 [210 Cal.Rptr. 722].) This is significantly different here, where the exactions are used to fund special programs serving individuals who are unrelated to the payors of the fee.