dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from parts I and II of the court’s majority opinion for the following reasons:
I
THE DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO HAVE A PRELIMINARY HEARING OUT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY ON THE FLASHBACK AND REPRESSED-RECOLLECTION EVIDENCE BY FAILING TO REQUEST SUCH A HEARING BEFORE THE TRIAL JUSTICE.
Rule 104(a) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence provides that “[p]reliminary ques*888tions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined” by the trial court. However, only hearings on the “admissibility of confessions” must be “conducted out of the hearing of the jury.” See R.I.R.Evid. 104(c); see also State v. Killay, 430 A.2d 418, 421 (R.I.1981) (noting that when the “voluntariness of an extrajudicial statement or confession is challenged, the trial justice must conduct an evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury in order to determine admissibility under constitutional standards”). Hearings on other preliminary issues “shall also be conducted out of the presence of the jury when the interests of justice require or, when an accused is a witness, if the witness so requests.” R.I.R.Evid. 104(e).
Rule 104, therefore, does not mandate that the trial justice conduct evidentiary hearings on the admissibility of flashbacks or repressed-recolleetion evidence out of the hearing or the presence of the jury — until and unless the court first determines that the interests of justice so require. But that possibility did not materialize in this case because defendant never specifically asked the trial justice to conduct such a hearing or to make such a determination. He did file a motion in limine to suppress or to exclude this evidence. But nowhere in his memoran-da or in his oral communications to the court did he request a pretrial evidentiary hearing or suggest that the trial justice make the kind of determinations discussed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). And when he was asked at the in limine motion hearing if he had “any problem with the victim testifying as to her flashbacks,” defense counsel told the trial justice that he wished to “rest” on his legal memo-randa. In these circumstances, there can be no reversible error on the basis of the trial justice’s failure to convene such an evidentia-ry hearing sua sponte.4
Moreover, the trial justice here had the opportunity to review the proposed flashback and repressed-recollection evidence in an adversarial proceeding outside the presence of the jury that ultimately convicted defendant. The defendant’s conviction occurred at a second trial after his first trial before a jury aborted because of the declaration of a mistrial. At that first trial, both the complaining witness and the treating physician testified concerning the flashbacks and repressed-recollection evidence. Defense counsel had the chance to cross-examine these witnesses to challenge the reliability of this evidence. Thus, by the time of the second trial the trial justice already had the benefit of assessing the reliability of this testimony outside the presence of the second jury — thereby obviating any practical need to convene still another evidentiary hearing to have these same witnesses testify yet again on these same subjects.
Defense counsel also failed to object at either trial when the court proceeded to hear foundation testimony in the jury’s presence on the admissibility of the victim’s and the state’s expert evidence pertaining to flashbacks and repressed recollections. The trial justice’s decision to deny defendant’s motion in limine to exclude this evidence “need not be taken as a final determination of the admissibility of the evidence referred to in the motion.” State v. Fernandes, 526 A.2d 495, 500 (R.I.1987) (“the trial justice may, in appropriate circumstances, reconsider such a[n in limine] determination”). Thus, by remaining mute when the witnesses were called to testify at trial and by failing to request an evidentiary hearing outside the jury’s presence, defendant has waived the right to raise this issue on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Donato, 592 A.2d 140, 141 (R.I.1991).
*889Although I agree with the majority that in some situations the better practice may be to hold hearings outside the presence of the jury when the admissibility of novel “scientific” theories is at issue, I cannot fault the trial justice for failing to conduct a Rule 104(c) hearing in this case in the absence of a request by defendant that he do so and in the teeth of defense counsel’s avowed intention to “rest” on legal memoranda that failed to make any such request — especially in a case like this one in which the trial justice already had the opportunity during the first trial to hear this evidence outside the presence of the second trial’s jury and to assess its reliability. Cf Fed.R.Evid. 104 advisory committee’s note (acknowledging that “[a] great deal must be left to the discretion of the judge who will act as the interests of justice require” (emphases added)). In these circumstances, convening a nonjury evidentiary hearing would have been a colossal waste of everyone’s time and money. Accordingly, I would sustain the trial justice’s actions here.
II
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S UNCHARGED SEXUAL MISCONDUCT WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED TO SHOW DEFENDANT’S LEWD DISPOSITION.
I believe the trial justice properly admitted evidence of defendant’s uncharged sexual misconduct under the lewd- or lustful-disposition exception to the general rule prohibiting the introduction of uncharged bad acts as evidence of a defendant’s character or propensity to commit the charged crime. We have repeatedly relied upon this exception to permit prosecutors to introduce evidence of a defendant’s other acts of sexual misconduct to prove lascivious intent, and the current trend in this and other jurisdictions has been toward broadening the range of acts involving defendant’s prior sexual misconduct that will be deemed admissible in cases of this kind. See State v. Brigham, 638 A.2d 1043, 1045-46 (R.I.1994); State v. Tobin, 602 A.2d 528, 531-32 (R.I.1992); State v. Messa, 542 A.2d 1071, 1072-74 (R.I.1988); State v. Cardoza, 465 A.2d 200, 202-03 (R.I.1983); State v. Pignolet, 465 A.2d 176, 180-83 (R.I.1983); State v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614, 624-28, 382 A.2d 526, 532-34 (1978); see generally Lisa M. Segal, Note, The Admissibility of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offense Cases: New Federal Rules of Evidence Codify the Lustful Disposition Exception, 29 Suffolk U.L.Rev. 515 (1995) (reviewing recent changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence that codify the lewd-disposition exception in sex-offense cases and the trend among state courts to expand the use of a defendant’s prior sexual misconduct as evidence of his proclivity to commit the charged sexual offense(s)).
Indeed, we have previously refused to retreat from our own recognition of the so-called lewd-disposition exception to the general rule barring evidence of other “bad acts” — notwithstanding the failure of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence to codify this common-law doctrine as one of the express exemptions set forth in Rule 404(b). See Tobin, 602 A.2d at 531-32.
We should continue to allow evidence of this kind to be introduced in child-molestation prosecutions because, in such matters, it is not unusual for there to be a dearth not only of eyewitnesses but also of independent physical evidence to establish the crime’s commission. Indeed, the eyewitnesses are usually only the complaining witness and the alleged perpetrator. Thus, the alleged victim’s credibility is usually of singular importance on the question of the defendant’s ultimate guilt or innocence. In this type of sexual-misconduct case, admission of corroborative evidence in the form of defendant’s other sex offenses of a similar type as those allegedly committed by defendant in the pending case serves to reduce the probability that the prosecuting witness is lying or hallucinating while increasing the probability that defendant committed the crime for which he has been charged.
Admission into evidence of defendant’s other acts of sexual misconduct involving victims of the same class, type, or status as the complaining witness is also justified in child-molestation cases because
“these cases generally pit the child’s credibility against an adult’s credibility and of*890ten times an adult family member’s credibility. Since sexual abuse committed against children is such an aberrant behavior, most people find it easier to dismiss the child’s testimony as being coached or made up or conclude that any touching of a child’s private parts by an adult must have been by accident. In addition, children often have greater difficulty than adults in establishing precise dates of incidents of sexual abuse, not only because small children don’t possess the same grasp of time as adults, but [also] because they obviously may not report acts of sexual abuse promptly, either because they are abused by a primary care-taker and authority figure and are therefore unaware such conduct is wrong, or because of threats of physical harm by one in almost total control of their life.” State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W.Va. 641, 650-51, 398 S.E.2d 123, 132-33 (1990).
I also do not agree with the majority’s suggestion that for such evidence of other sexual misconduct to be admissible, it must fit neatly within one of the expressly stated exceptions to Rule 404(b). Rule 404(b) provides in pertinent part:
“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or to prove that defendant feared imminent bodily harm and that the fear was reasonable.” (Emphasis added.)
The enumerated exceptions set forth in that rule are merely illustrative and are not the exclusive purposes for which such evidence may be admissible. Moreover, this court has emphasized that although the lewd-disposition exception is at odds with the general prohibition against the use of prior-bad-acts evidence, “there is * * * a strong line of authority * * * recognizing a special exception for evidence of a defendant’s disposition to commit sexual offenses.” Tobin, 602 A.2d at 531.
In this case, I believe that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in admitting such evidence to show that defendant had a lewd disposition toward young girls. In fact, this court, in sexual-assault and child-molestation cases, has previously upheld the admissibility of the defendant’s other sexual misdeeds with the complainant victim to show an accused’s lascivious intent toward that person. Jalette, 119 R.I. at 627, 382 A.2d at 533 (adopting the holding in People v. Kelley, 66 Cal.2d 232, 424 P.2d 947, 57 Cal.Rptr. 363 (1967)). We expanded that doctrine in State v. Pignolet, 465 A.2d 176 (R.I.1983), to permit a child victim, other than the complainant, to testify about a defendant’s uncharged sexual misconduct toward other members of the victim’s family.
In Pignolet evidence of the defendant’s sexual misconduct toward a different stepdaughter was admissible to show that his actions toward the complainant stepdaughter were part of an ongoing pattern of aberrant sexual behavior toward young children in his charge. The rule created in Pignolet, however, was limited in that the only prior sexual misconduct that was admissible was that which was closely related to the crime(s) charged in time, place, age, family relationship of the victims, and the form of the sexual acts perpetrated. Id. at 181-82.
The majority contends that these limitations are necessary to avoid the overwhelming prejudice against a defendant that this type of evidence evokes in jurors. Under the majority’s reasoning, however, if the third-party victim in Pignolet were a neighboring child rather than the complainant’s sister, evidence of the defendant’s sexual assault of that child would have been excluded on the basis that no family relationship existed between the neighbor victim and the complainant. Yet both instances clearly bear on the defendant’s proclivity to commit sexual offenses against minor children within his ambit, and neither instance appears more emotionally prejudicial to the defendant than the other. Therefore, if this court is willing to admit evidence of a defendant’s lewd disposition to commit sexual acts of the type charged, I fail to understand why such testimonial evidence must pertain to a victim who *891is related to the prosecuting witness as opposed to one who is the defendant’s godchild or who is otherwise under his thrall or within his or his family’s circle of acquaintances.
In this case the state, in rebuttal, introduced two incidents of other sexual misconduct by defendant with two young girls. The first incident allegedly occurred in the summer of 1977 in defendant’s pool cabin and involved defendant’s then-seven-year-old godchild. While the seven-year-old was showering after a swim, defendant allegedly entered the shower naked and only allowed the child to leave when she threatened to scream. The second incident involved a twelve-year-old friend of defendant’s godchild and occurred in the fall of 1981. The twelve-year-old went to a slumber party at defendant’s godchild’s home. She testified that while watching television late at night, defendant, who was kneeling in front of her, repeatedly rubbed her breast. Shocked and scared, the twelve-year-old ran out into the street and encountered a police officer. Subsequently defendant was arrested.
Both of these incidents of other sexual misconduct involved young girls and allegedly occurred during or near the period during which the charged sexual offenses were committed. Indeed, just a few months before defendant allegedly molested his godchild’s friend, he coerced the then-seven-year-old complainant in this ease to perform fellatio on him. The following summer, after a swim in defendant’s pool, the complainant, then approximately eight years of age, engaged in sexual intercourse with defendant in the pool cabin of his Lincoln home.
Although I agree that such evidence should be admitted cautiously and not indiscriminately, I believe the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in allowing such evidence to be introduced in this case. Typically, the recondite nature of these types of sex-offense crimes and the resulting lack of disinterested witnesses in many of these cases are factors that favor allowing such evidence to be introduced, albeit only with a limiting instruction of the kind that the trial justice gave here. When one considers the reluctance of many child victims to report this type of crime, much less to testify at trial, and the consequent difficulty of convicting child molesters and rapists, effective prosecution of such sex offenders would be unduly deterred if such evidence were not admissible. On the other hand, the exclusion of such evidence would result in conditions adverse to public safety, to the welfare of families and their children, and to the public interest. The need to admit such other sex-offense evidence is especially compelling in child-molestation eases because they often center on the testimony of a young child whose credibility can be easily impeached by the defense and contrasted favorably to the comparatively articulate adult defendant who can convincingly deny the truth of such reprehensible accusations.
However, because of the extremely prejudicial nature of such other sexual-misconduct evidence, it is important to maintain certain safeguards to protect a defendant from false accusations and injustice. First, such other sexual-misconduct evidence should be relevant to a material issue in the trial. Second, the evidence should be similar in kind to that of the charged offense. Third, the prosecution’s proposed use of such evidence should be revealed in time for the defendant to have the opportunity to present a case in response and thereby reduce the possibility of unfair surprise. And finally, the trial justice should have the discretion to exclude otherwise relevant sexual-misconduct evidence if its probative value fails substantially to outweigh its prejudicial effect in the circumstances of the case.
Here, these conditions have all been satisfied. First, defendant’s prior sexual misconduct was relevant to his motive to commit the crimes charged. “ ‘Motive’ is said to be the moving course, the impulse, the desire that induces criminal action on [the] part of the accused.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1014 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, evidence of defendant’s pri- or sexual misconduct bore on his lewd desire to be sexually intimate with young girls that befriended him. The evidence was also of critical importance to the complainant’s credibility and was relevant to the issue of the perpetrator’s identity. The incidents of defendant’s prior sexual misconduct also corroborate the complainant’s testimony. The defendant attempted to impeach her testimo*892ny on cross-examination by suggesting that she was emotionally disturbed, that she had a history of violent sexual contacts with other men, and that while on medication for manic depression, the complainant had imagined defendant violating her. Thus, evidence of defendant’s prior sexual misconduct served to rebut these defense suggestions and to reduce the probability that the complainant was imagining defendant’s sexual abuse of her or was confusing defendant’s behavior toward her with some other unpleasant sexual experience.
Second, the evidence of other sexual misconduct was sufficiently similar to the charged offenses to warrant its admissibility. The uncharged incidents of sexual misconduct occurred during the same relative period as the charged offenses, with girls of similar age, who, to some extent, befriended defendant and whose testimony, if creditable, clearly indicates defendant’s proclivity to commit sexual offenses with young, trusting girls.
Third, more than a year prior to trial and pursuant to discovery, defendant had received from the prosecution all the pertinent statements pertaining to his alleged sexual assault of his godchild’s friend. He - became aware of the immediate relevancy of this evidence during his cross-examination of the state’s first witness and, in fact, sought and secured the court’s permission for additional time to contact defense witnesses with knowledge of the incident. Further, there was a week’s continuance prior to the introduction of evidence relating to the incident involving defendant’s godchild, and defendant was contacted within three days of the state’s discovery of this witness. In such circumstances, defendant’s claim of unfair surprise is untenable.
Finally, the record reveals that on several occasions the trial justice carefully considered the evidence of defendant’s prior sexual misconduct and concluded that its relevancy was not substantially outweighed by the potential for undue prejudice and that the jurors were entitled to consider all the evidence in determining defendant’s guilt or innocence. The trial justice therefore properly performed his function and admitted highly probative evidence under a well-recognized exception to Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.
In my judgment the unique nature and distinctive character of sexual-assault and child-molestation prosecutions justify the continued vitality of the lewd-disposition exception. After all, if we are willing to admit evidence of the defendant’s prior sexual assaults on the victim and on other members of the victim’s family, it does not appear to me to be a great leap beyond these already existing exceptions to permit the introduction into evidence of the defendant’s sexual assault of one or more of his godchildren or, for that matter, of any other young girl in his or his family’s circle of acquaintances. All this evidence is highly relevant to showing the defendant’s lewd disposition toward a certain class of persons of which the complaining child witness is a member.
For these reasons, I would sustain the decision of the trial justice in this matter and affirm the conviction on appeal.
. I cannot agree with the majority's suggestion that the mere filing of a motion to suppress or to exclude evidence of this type "is sufficient to trigger the right to a preliminary hearing to determine admissibility.” Unlike motions to exclude evidence of confessions, where Rule 104(c) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence specifically mandates a hearing outside the jury’s presence, there is no requirement that a trial justice convene such a hearing whenever motions are filed on other kinds of preliminary evidentiary matters. See, e.g., State v. Sabetta, 680 A.2d 927, 933-34 (R.I.1996) (affirming trial justice's exclusion of proposed expert testimony on eyewitness identification without requiring the trial justice to conduct a Rule 104 evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury before doing so).