concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court that the Superior Court erred in its analysis regarding the valuation of Mr. Gordon’s pension. However, I disagree with its determination that the Superior Court erred by excluding the “continuation pay” and “retirement bonus” from marital property. In making the determination that these assets should be included as marital property, the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court relies upon this Court’s reasoning in Berrington v. Berrington, 534 Pa. 393, 633 A.2d 589 (1993), which provides that a non-employee spouse should be able to share in any increases in pension benefits which occurred post-separation but were not attributable to the efforts or contributions of the participating spouse. Id. at 403, 633 A.2d at 594. This rationale, however, was designed for circumstances dictating a deferred distribution and attempts to compensate the non-employee spouse for waiting to receive his or her portion of the pension benefits. Id. at 414, 633 A.2d at 600; Holland v. Holland, 403 Pa.Super. 116, 588 A.2d 58 (1991), alloc, denied, 528 Pa. 611, 596 A.2d *405158 (1991). As we are dealing with an immediate offset situation in this case, this reasoning is not applicable.1
I believe that the “continuation pay” and “retirement bonus” fall squarely under LaBuda v. LaBuda, 349 Pa.Super. 524, 503 A.2d 971 (1986), alloc, denied, 514 Pa. 648, 524 A.2d 494 (1987), the crucial factor being the determination of when the party accrued the “right” to the benefit in question. Id. at 533, 503 A.2d at 976. As the Superior Court points out, this early retirement incentive program was not a benefit offered on a continuous basis; rather, it was offered by the company during times of down-sizing or reorganization. During the marriage or at the time of separation, Mr. Gordon had no “right” to this benefit. In fact, in her brief to this Court, Mrs. Gordon acknowledged that there was only a “possibility” that Mr. Gordon could benefit from an early retirement program. (Appellee’s Brief at 21). Mr. Gordon’s “right” accrued when he was offered the package in 1987 during reorganization of his department. Furthermore, it appears that these incentives were not provided in lieu of any of the original pension benefits which accrued during the marriage; rather they were given in addition to those benefits. Therefore, these benefits should be excluded from the marital estate. Accordingly, I write separately as I would affirm the Superior Court’s determination of this issue.
Moreover, I disagree with the determination of the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court that the employer’s contribution of $73,000 toward the purchase of the ORBIT account should be included as a marital asset. Rather, I agree with the Superior Court that the entire ORBIT account should be excluded from marital property because this incentive was offered to appellant four years after the date of separation.
*406 ORDER
And now this 15th day of October, 1996, appellant’s request for reargument is denied. The order of August 2, 1996 is amended as follows. The order of Superior Court is reversed as to Issue 1. The order of Superior Court is affirmed by an evenly divided court as to Issue 2.
. The Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court may argue that the fifteen year lapse between the separation and equitable distribution would bring this case under the reasoning in Berrington, but I do not believe that the parties' inability to settle this matter in a reasonable amount of time should dictate the determination of what should be included as marital property.