In Re Stanback

KING, Associate Judge:

This matter is before the court on the Report and Recommendation of the Board on Professional Responsibility (“Board”) that respondent, Clarence F. Stanback, Jr., be disbarred from the practice of law in the District of Columbia, based on the Board’s findings that respondent committed the following violations of the disciplinary rules: failure to preserve the identity of estate funds in an identifiable account; intentional misappropriation; failure to maintain complete records of estate funds coming into his possession; and neglect of a legal matter.1 The Board also found that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct by: commingling/misappropriating funds and failing to keep complete records; failing to promptly deliver funds and to tender full accounting; failing to protect an estate’s interest after termination of representation by promptly surrendering papers or property; failing to represent the client zealously and diligently; and interfering with the administration of justice.2 Respondent challenges the Board’s *1111findings and recommendation on the grounds that: (1) the hearing committee and Board erred in finding that he failed to establish mitigation pursuant to In re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321 (D.C.1987); and (2) two hearing committee members were improperly predisposed to decide against him. We hold that the claim of bias is not supported by the record. We also hold that there is a basis for the Board’s findings that respondent failed to prove that he was suffering from an alcohol-induced impairment at the time he misappropriated his clients’ funds. Therefore, we adopt the recommendation of the Board and order that respondent be disbarred.

I.

On December 9, 1992, Bar Counsel charged respondent with the violations set forth above for actions stemming from his representation of Kathleen and Andrew Doig in connection with their duties as personal representatives of the estate of Alice Kelly, who died on September 17, 1986. Most of the facts supporting the charges were stipulated and agreed to by Bar Counsel and respondent. In sum, respondent admitted that he violated the various disciplinary rules, however, he challenged, before the Board, the hearing committee’s findings relating to the timing of the misappropriation of his clients’ funds3 and the hearing committee’s rejection of the Kersey defense. Applying the applicable standard of review, the Board sustained the hearing committee’s factual findings with respect to both points. See In re Micheel, 610 A.2d 231, 234 (D.C.1992) (“The Board is obliged to accept the hearing committee’s factual findings if those findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record, viewed as a whole.”).

Respondent contends that the misappropriation occurred no earlier than March of 1991, a time when it is essentially undisputed that his alcoholism substantially affected his professional conduct. Alternatively he argues, if the misappropriation occurred in late 1990, as the hearing committee found, there was also evidence to establish that at that time his ability to conduct his professional activities was impaired due to alcoholism. Because the circumstances relating to the misappropriation of funds and respondent’s problems with alcohol are the only factual questions in dispute, we will set out the evidence presented on those points in some detail.

A. Committee’s Findings As to Misappropriation

The facts developed before the hearing committee showed that, acting on respondent’s advice, Kathleen Doig, in late August of 1990, closed an estate bank account in West Virginia in the amount of $10,979.75. A check for that sum, made payable to respondent, was sent to, and deposited by respondent in a trust account. On August 30, 1990, respondent, acting without either the knowledge or consent of his clients, withdrew $8,000 from the trust account, and deposited that sum in his office operating account. Using both his own and estate funds, he then paid a $15,000 office rent bill with a check drawn on that account. The evidence also established that, upon learning that the Internal Revenue Service had placed a levy on the trust account in late September or October, 1990, respondent withdrew additional funds from the trust account, without authorization from the Doigs, and placed those funds together with some personal funds in a strongbox.

By the end of November 1990, the balance in the trust account had fallen to $5,355.02, and it remained below $10,979.75, the amount belonging to the estate, from December 3, 1990 through the end of January 1991, when the balance again rose above that amount. However, at the end of February 1991, the balance in the trust account again fell below $10,979.75 and thereafter remained below that level. Respondent testified that during that period, he kept estate funds in a strongbox and did not misappropriate them for his own use until March of 1991.

*1112Although respondent maintained that the misappropriation did not occur until February or March of 1991, the hearing committee, pointing to respondent’s significant indebtedness beginning in the summer of 1990; his admitted commingling of funds in October of 1990; his use of the commingled funds for non-estate purposes immediately thereafter; and the absence of any record-keeping with respect to estate funds, rejected that claim and found that misappropriation occurred soon after the estate funds were transferred to respondent’s operating account in late 1990. In short, the committee ruled that there was clear and convincing evidence of intentional misappropriation of the clients’ funds in the fall of 1990, which, in the absence of legally recognized mitigation, mandated disbarment pursuant to In re Addams, 579 A.2d 190,193 (D.C.1990) (en banc).

B. Committee’s Findings On the Kersey Defense

Although respondent concedes that he intentionally misappropriated client funds (while disputing when the misappropriation actually occurred) and that mandatory disbarment would ordinarily flow from such conduct, he contends that pursuant to Ker-sey, he should not be disbarred because his misconduct was caused by clinical depression and excessive alcohol consumption. There was no serious dispute that respondent suffered from an alcoholism-induced impairment that substantially affected his professional conduct from approximately March 1991 onward. Had the misappropriation occurred then, a Kersey defense might be sustainable if the other conditions are met. The hearing committee, however, as noted above, found that misappropriation occurred five or six months earlier, in October 1990. Respondent maintained that he was similarly impaired at that time, and in their respective efforts to prove or disprove that claim, considerable evidence was presented by respondent and Bar Counsel. Respondent called four expert witnesses, Bar Counsel called one; respondent also called several lay witnesses. Those witnesses presented the following picture of respondent’s mental condition.

Respondent called Dr. Stanton E. Same-now, a clinical psychologist, who first met with respondent on May 5, 1992. Dr. Same-now testified that respondent had been alcohol-dependent, and had used cocaine and alcohol, from 1988 through 1991, with the heaviest drinking and cocaine use occurring in March or April of 1991 and after. Dr. Samenow testified that he had no information concerning the quantity of alcohol respondent was drinking from 1988 through 1990, and he could not say how alcohol might have affected respondent’s judgment before 1991.

Dr. Ronald D. Wynne, a clinical psychologist, also called by respondent, described respondent’s addiction as being a “mixed chemical dependence,” but could not say whether his misconduct was caused either by alcohol or cocaine usage, concluding that “it is probably some combination of the two.” Even though Dr. Wynne testified that respondent could be considered by “any prudent professional” an alcoholic at some point between 1988 and 1991, he conceded that the psychological tests performed did not give any indication “in terms of years” of the date respondent’s judgment became impaired by alcoholism. Dr. Wynne did not diagnose respondent as suffering from depression. When asked what was the extent of respondent’s drinking problem in October of 1990, Dr. Wynne testified:

I think that ... maybe that was the first cracking of the armor. I think at that point, he was in, if you will, the kind of existential crisis that many people who have drunk heavily for years get in.

Dr. Wynne opined that some condition must have been present at that time to affect respondent’s judgment. He concluded that, but for the alcohol and cocaine use, respondent would not have misappropriated the estate funds.

Dr. David T. George, a psychiatrist who treated respondent at the Suburban Hospital in November 1991, testified that he diagnosed respondent as suffering from situational depression 4 and alcohol abuse, a condition less serious than alcoholism or alcohol depen-*1113denee. Dr. George did not detect any withdrawal symptoms, nor did respondent exhibit physiological evidence of alcohol dependence. Finally, Dr. George was unable to fix the date of the onset of respondent’s alcohol abuse.

Respondent also called Susan Makepeace, Director of the D.C. Bar’s Lawyer Counseling Program who testified that she first saw respondent in April of 1992, concluding that he had a serious alcohol problem at that time. She referred him to the Kolmac Clinic which conducts an intensive, eighteen-month, out-patient program. Respondent, however, completed only three months of that program, claiming that he did not need the treatment.

Among respondent’s lay witnesses were personal friends, professional associates, and a former client. Each testified to some changes in respondent’s social behavior and some professional lapses between 1989 and 1991. The former client testified that respondent failed to return a May 1990 telephone call and that respondent did not make contact until 1993 when he called to apologize for his conduct. His personal friends participated in an intervention in November of 1991 when they could no longer ignore the changes in his social behavior.

Bar Counsel called Dr. Raymond F. Patterson, a psychiatrist, who testified that he met with respondent three times in April of 1993, and that he reviewed the records of Drs. Samenow and Wynne and those of Suburban Hospital and the Kolmac Clinic. His diagnosis of respondent included indications of alcohol dependence, cocaine abuse, and dysthymic disorder, defined as “depressive symptoms,” which was characterized as “essentially a lesser or minor depression.” Dr. Patterson testified that the closest point in time he could fix for the onset of actual deterioration in respondent’s ability to function due to alcohol was between March and December of 1991. Dr. Patterson also testified that he was unable to say “with professional certainty,” whether respondent’s judgment was impaired prior to March of 1991, or if it was impaired, the extent of any impairment. He opined that at the time respondent misappropriated his clients’ funds (October 1990), he would have been able to form an intent to take money he knew did not belong to him, and would have known that such conduct was wrong.

On the basis of this testimony, and for the reasons discussed below, the hearing committee concluded that respondent had not established that he suffered from alcoholism or depression at the time he misappropriated his clients’ funds, an indispensable element of a Kersey defense. The hearing committee observed that, even though the medical evidence conclusively established respondent suffered, at some point, from a combination of alcohol abuse or dependence, cocaine abuse, depression, and possibly a personality disorder, these conditions were found to be medically disabling no earlier than March of 1991, and no later than November of that same year when respondent was hospitalized. See In re Miller, 553 A.2d 201, 205-06 (D.C.1989). Therefore, because the misappropriation was found to have occurred in the fall of 1990 and respondent did not begin to suffer from alcoholism or depression until five or six months later, the hearing committee concluded that respondent could not invoke the Kersey defense. The hearing committee also found, assuming respondent was impaired by alcohol in late 1990, that he failed to show that the alcohol impairment substantially caused the misconduct or that he had since been rehabilitated. It recommended disbarment. Concurring in that recommendation, the Board agreed with the hearing committee’s finding that there was no proof of alcoholism. The Board also found there had been no showing that the misconduct was substantially caused by alcoholism and that respondent failed to establish that he was rehabilitated.

C. Bias Claims

Three of the four hearing days were devoted to respondent’s mitigation defense, and during respondent’s mitigation testimony, the lay member of the hearing committee questioned respondent, who is black, concerning his previous assertion that he had been subjected to racial prejudice while associated with an all-white law firm, which, according to respondent, contributed to his drinking *1114problem. In addition, the same hearing committee member, in a concurring opinion, expressed his personal view that this court has been too lenient in permitting attorneys’ alcoholism to serve as mitigation for otherwise disbarrable violations. Respondent contends that the lay member’s questions during the hearing and the sentiments he expressed in the concurring opinion demonstrated personal bias.

Respondent also alleges bias on the part of the committee chair because the chair questioned the relevance of the testimony of one of respondent’s witnesses. After hearing that witness’s testimony, which was both lengthy and marginally relevant, the chair cautioned respondent that the testimony of respondent’s remaining witnesses would only be relevant to the mitigation defense if they testified concerning actions that tended to establish that respondent’s drinking had an effect upon his behavior. Although not all of the listed witnesses actually testified, the chair did nothing to prevent respondent from calling any of those witnesses; nor did the chair limit the testimony of the witnesses who did testify.

II.

The issues before this court are: (1) whether the Board’s finding that respondent failed to establish that the misappropriation was due to an alcoholism-induced impairment of his ability to conduct his professional responsibilities is sustainable; and (2) whether the Board erred in rejecting respondent’s contention that members of the committee were biased against respondent so as to deprive him of a fair hearing.

A. Misappropriation

As stated previously, the Board must accept the hearing committee’s factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence in the record, Micheel, supra, 610 A.2d at 234, and this court, in turn, must accept the Board’s findings of fact, applying the same standard. See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(g) (1994); In re Cooper, 591 A.2d 1292, 1294 (D.C.1991). Respondent contends the misappropriation of estate funds occurred in March 1991, however, the hearing committee found that the misappropriation occurred in the fall of 1990, possibly as early as October of that year.5 While there is evidence in the record that respondent also misappropriated funds in March 1991, there is substantial evidence, not satisfactorily rebutted, that the misappropriation occurred at the earlier time. See In re Godfrey, 583 A.2d 692, 693 (D.C.1990); In re Thompson, 579 A.2d 218, 221 (D.C.1990) (evidence as to time of misappropriation was wholly within respondent’s ability to produce and his testimony on this matter is speculative, entitling it to little weight). Therefore, on the basis of the evidence presented, the Board concluded that misappropriation occurred in October of 1990. That finding is firmly supported by the record and we have no basis for concluding that the Board erred in making it.

B. The Kersey Defense

We next turn to consideration of respondent’s contention that he established entitlement to the benefits of the Kersey defense. In analyzing that claim, the Board applied a three-pronged test, requiring respondent to satisfy each prong of the test. Under that test, respondent must: (1) prove by clear and convincing evidence that he suffered from an alcoholism-induced impairment6 at the time he misappropriated his *1115clients’ funds; and if so, (2) prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the alcoholism substantially caused him to engage in that misconduct; and (3) prove by clear and convincing evidence that he now is substantially rehabilitated. See Temple, supra note 6, 596 A.2d at 586, 591; Miller, supra, 553 A.2d at 203-04; Kersey, supra, 520 A.2d at 326-27. Although we have never formally adopted this test, the Board regularly uses it, and we have, without remark, accepted its use, as does respondent in this case.7 See In re Appler, 669 A.2d 731, 739 (D.C.1995). So far as we can determine, the application of this test has never been challenged and we conclude, for the reasons discussed below, that it correctly sets out what needs to be established. Therefore, we hold that in order to invoke a Kersey defense, an attorney must meet this three-pronged test.

The Board concluded that respondent faded to satisfy any of the prongs. Because we are satisfied that the Board’s finding that respondent faded to satisfy the first prong is sustainable, we hold that respondent’s assertion of the Kersey defense fads. We, therefore, do not consider the other two prongs.

1. Standard of Proof

Before we turn to our analysis of the Board’s application of the first prong, we wid address a burden of proof issue that divides the majority from our dissenting codeague. As noted, the hearing committee and the Board appded the three-pronged test outlined above, each concluding that respondent faded to meet his burden on each prong. As to the first prong, the Board found that respondent faded to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that he was suffering from an alcohodsm-induced impairment in the fad of 1990, when the Board found the misconduct occurred. Although respondent argues in this court that he met his burden on this prong, he does not ehadenge the Board’s use of the clear and convincing evidence standard. In our previous cases, there has been no occasion to address the question of the burden of proof that appdes to this prong, because there was never any dispute that the attorney was impaired by alcohol, or drugs, during the period when the misconduct occurred. See, e.g., Miller, supra, 553 A.2d at 204; Kersey, supra, 520 A.2d at 325; Temple, supra, 596 A.2d at 589. Therefore, in our previous cases, we focused on the burden of proof necessary to establish the nexus between the impairment and the misconduct, i.e., the second prong of the test. With respect to that causal connection, we applied a preponderance of the evidence standard. Miller, supra, 553 A.2d at 203-04 n. 4. In this case, however, the extent of respondent’s alcoholism in the fall of 1990 was very much in dispute.

To invoke this defense, an attorney must, in the first instance, before the question of causation even arises, show that he or she was impaired by alcohol during the period of the misconduct. Kersey, supra, 520 A.2d at 326. Such a showing is one almost entirely within the attorney’s capacity to establish, just as, at the other end of the process, it is the attorney who has the wherewithal to show that he or she has been rehabilitated. We think it self-evident that it is the attorney who has the greatest access to the evidence, and who can best identify medical and lay witnesses necessary to show both impairment and rehabilitation. Because of these considerations, and because a successful invocation of this defense often permits an attorney to avoid serious sanctions, including disbarment, for conduct causing great harm to his or her clients, we do not consider a clear and convincing evidence requirement for both the disability prong and the rehabilitation prong to be either unduly burdensome or unreasonable. See Temple, supra, 596 A.2d at 591; Appler, supra note 7, 669 A.2d at 741 (holding that respondent failed to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that he has been rehabilitated). Although we think that we have implicitly imposed that standard in our previous cases, to eliminate any doubt, we now hold that an attorney must meet the clear and convincing evidence standard on *1116both the impairment and rehabilitation prongs of this defense. It is that standard, not challenged by respondent, that the Board applied here.

Our dissenting colleague maintains, however, that by imposing a clear and convincing evidence standard on the first prong we have, in effect, imposed that same standard with respect to the second prong that, as we held in Miller, only requires a showing by of a preponderance of the evidence. We do not agree. Each step of this test is separate and distinct, and can be fairly kept so. We clearly recognized that separation in Kersey, where we observed: “As the Board aptly noted, ‘[i]t is not enough to say that the offender is an alcoholic and ipso facto causation is proven. After all, not all alcoholic lawyers steal their clients money.’ ” Kersey, supra, 520 A.2d at 325; accord In re Shorter, 570 A.2d 760, 770 (D.C.1990) (“If respondent has established that he could not resist, we would be inclined to consider his gambling pathology as a defense, provided he could also provide a farther causal link between the illness and his sanctionable non-gambling behavior.”) (emphasis added). Indeed, in this case, both the Board and the hearing committee had no difficulty maintaining separation between the first and second prongs. Both carefully distinguished each step of the process from the other, drew separate conclusions with respect to each, and found, on the causation prong, that respondent failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the requisite connection had been established.8 Although we do not address the Board’s finding on causation because our ruling on the first prong is dispositive, we think the Board unmistakably demonstrated that the question of causation is a readily identifiable element of the test that is separate and distinct from the other prongs, carrying its own burden of proof. Therefore, we cannot agree with the dissent’s contention to the contrary.

2. Analysis of the First Prong

The evidence indisputably supports respondent’s claim that he was suffering from alcoholism by November of 1991, and very likely as early as March of 1991. As noted above, however, the misappropriation was found to have occurred late the previous year and respondent had the burden of showing that he was impaired at that time. This respondent failed to do.

The experts from both sides essentially agreed that respondent’s ability to conduct his professional activities was impaired by alcoholism by March 1991, but with the possible exception of Dr. Wynne, none opined that such an impairment was present at an earlier time. The hearing committee and the Board did not credit some of the expert testimony because it depended on respondent’s self-reporting of facts, reasoning that the facts supplied were of questionable reliability because they may have been influenced by respondent’s self-interest.9 Finally, although the lay witnesses called by respondent did testify regarding some professional lapses in his performance in 1990, the hearing committee gave little weight to that testimony, as it was permitted to do, DistRict of Columbia BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rules Rule 11.2, Actions by Hearing Committee (1990) (“Board Rules”), because, during that period, respondent’s “lapses,” apart from the misappropriation, were minimal. The Board agreed. We have no basis, on this record, for overturning these findings or the Board’s ultimate conclusion that respondent failed to meet the first prong of the Kersey test; i.e., he failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence, that his ability to carry out his professional duties was kn-*1117paired by alcoholism at the time he misappropriated his clients’ funds. It follows therefore that the Kersey defense must fail.

C. Bias

Finally, respondent maintains that the Board erred in rejecting his contention that two members of the hearing committee were biased against him. To prove bias, respondent must present facts: “(1) that are material and are stated with particularity; (2) which, if true, would convince a reasonable person that bias exists; and (3) which show that the bias is personal, as opposed to judicial, in nature.” See In re Alexander, 466 A.2d 447, 449 (D.C.1983); In re Evans, 411 A.2d 984, 994 (D.C.1980). As the Board found, respondent failed to meet these requirements.

1. Alleged Bias of the Lay Member of the Hearing Committee

As noted above, three of the four hearing days were devoted to the respondent’s mitigation defense, and, with respect to the rehabilitation element of that defense, respondent’s experience at the all-white law firm where he had been employed was relevant because it was probative on the question of whether respondent could withstand future racial tensions without relapsing into alcoholism. The committee had before it a report submitted by Dr. Patterson, who had been called as an expert witness by Bar Counsel, which reported that respondent had stated to him that he had been subjected to racial prejudice at the law firm. Respondent contradicted that assertion in his own testimony before the hearing committee, however, when he denied that any racial prejudice had been directed at him during that employment. That denial triggered a series of follow-up questions on that point from the committee’s lay member.10 See Boaed Rule 11.1 (Rule expressly permits the questioning of a witness by committee members “for the purpose of clarifying matters raised at the hearing.”). It is those questions that respondent claims show bias on the part of that hearing committee member.

While at first blush, the questions, when read in the cold transcript, might give one pause concerning the motivation of the questioner, there is no contemporaneous indication that either respondent or his counsel considered that the inquiries by the hearing committee member evidenced a biased viewpoint. For example, none of respondent’s *1118answers- suggested any such concern on his part; indeed, as discussed below, the opposite would appear to be the case. Moreover, respondent’s experienced counsel, who was present throughout the inquiry, did not object or give any other indication that she found the questions to be in any way improper. In fact no claim of bias was made until respondent filed his exceptions to the hearing committee’s report some six months after the testimony was given and one month after the hearing committee issued its unanimous report recommending respondent’s disbarment.

Moreover, the Board found, and there is nothing in the record to support a contrary conclusion, that the questions by the hearing committee member did not establish that the member was biased against respondent. Indeed, as the Board observed, a reading of the entire exchange between respondent and the hearing committee member, suggests that the latter seemed somewhat sympathetic to respondent’s circumstances rather than hostile. One example provided by the Board was the lay member’s comment:

I am not here pushing anything in particular other than this. I want you to tell me that you have reached the point that you can deal with that. Because if you cannot deal with that, it is going to happen again[,]

which was followed by a lengthy response that reveals no hint of any hostility or irritation by respondent. This was followed by further exchanges which gave no sign that the questions had sprung from a biased source or that respondent perceived that they did. In sum, as the Board found, respondent did not show that the lay member of the hearing committee was personally biased against him.

Respondent also contends that the same hearing committee member, in his written concurring opinion, displayed a predisposition toward imposing the harshest possible sanction against him.11 The board rejected this claim as unfounded; we also find that claim meritless.

We think, at most, that the opinion reflects the hearing committee member’s firm disagreement with the way the attorney disciplinary system currently deals with the question of attorney impairment, induced by substance abuse, that results in harm being inflicted upon clients. Expression of such an opinion, however, does not itself constitute bias because a hearing committee member may hold an opinion and express his or her views on law or policy without providing ground for reversal if the member still “is capable of refining his views ... and maintaining a completely open mind....” See S.E.C. v. First City Fin. Corp., 281 U.S.App.D.C. 410, 417, 890 F.2d 1215, 1222 (1989) (citations omitted). In our jurisprudence, it is not uncommon for judicial officers to criticize the law in concurring and dissenting opinions or in other ways.12 That practice is *1119a time-honored means of keeping the law responsive to changing conditions. For example, in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 349, 112 S.Ct. 2009, 2017-18, 119 L.Ed.2d 121 (1992), Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep’t of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 373, 112 S.Ct. 2019, 2030-31, 119 L.Ed.2d 139 (1992), and Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629, 98 S.Ct. 2531, 2538, 57 L.Ed.2d 475 (1978), over a span of fourteen years, Chief Justice Rehnquist, consistently and “largely for the ... [same] reasons,” dissented from the position taken by the majority of the Court. He criticized the majority’s application of the Commerce Clause to out-of-state hazardous waste disposal and gave the reasons he thought the application should be different. This expression of his point of view, however, did not establish that he was “biased” against any party.

Similarly, in this case the lay member of the hearing committee did no more than what scores of other judicial officers have done, and his concurring opinion is fully in keeping with that time-honored practice. On this record we can discern no basis for concluding that the Board erred in ruling that the committee member had set aside his “personal views — which, given human nature, are always present — and found the relevant facts solely on the evidence presented.” First City Fin. Corp., supra, 281 U.S.App.D.C. at 417, 890 F.2d at 1222.

2. The Chair

Respondent also alleges that the chair was biased because he suggested that one of respondent’s witnesses had not added much to respondent’s case. This contention borders on the frivolous.

It is evident from this record that the chair merely attempted to ascertain the number of witnesses respondent intended to call, and by way of a proffer of their testimony, to determine whether their testimony would be cumulative or even relevant, and whether stipulations might be a more efficient way to present the evidence. The chair made this inquiry after three witnesses, from a list of over a dozen prospective mitigation witnesses, had testified. Such an inquiry, rather than indicating bias or prejudice, was nothing more than the reasonable exercise of the presiding officer’s prerogative to properly conduct the proceedings. See Boahd Rule 11.2 (“Hearing Committee shall determine the weight and significance [of the] ... evidence,” and may exclude irrelevant and cumulative evidence.); see also Williams v. United States, 228 A.2d 846, 848 (D.C.1967) (“[chair] has responsibility of moving a [hearing] along in an orderly and efficient manner; in short he has the responsibility of managing the conduct of a [hearing]”); Molnar v. Gulfcoast Transit Co., 371 F.2d 639, 640 (5th Cir.1967) (the need to preserve limited judicial resources puts burden on judge to give procedural direction to a case to assure the most effective use of resources consistent with interests of justice). There is no support whatsoever in this record that the chair’s actions in any way denied respondent a fair and full opportunity to present his case to the committee.

Therefore, it is ORDERED that respondent, Clarence F. Stanback, Jr., shall be disbarred from the practice of law in the District of Columbia, effective thirty days from the date of this opinion.

. DR 9-103(A); DR 9-103(A)(2); DR 9-103(B)(3); DR 6 — 101(A)(3) (1991).

. Rule 1.15(a); Rule 1.15(b); Rule 1.16(d); Rule 1.3(a); Rule 8.4(d) (1991).

. The dates of respondent’s misappropriation are material in view of his invocation of the Kersey mitigation defense.

. The witness testified that this depression was a "reaction to problems in his life.”

. Bar Counsel was obligated to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that a misappropriation occurred at some point after the clients' funds were received. See In re Williams, 464 A.2d 115, 119 n. 8 (D.C.1983). Respondent, however, was obligated to show, also by clear and convincing evidence, that he suffered from an alcoholism-induced impairment when the misappropriation occurred, and, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the impairment caused him to commit the acts constituting the misconduct. See Miller, supra, 553 A.2d at 203-04; Kersey, supra, 520 A.2d at 327. Thus, if respondent sought to avail himself of a Kersey defense relating to his conduct in March 1991, it was his burden to establish that the misappropriation occurred at that time rather than on the earlier date.

. In Temple we held that the Kersey defense was also available to an attorney who was addicted to lawfully acquired drugs. In re Temple, 596 A.2d 585, 586 (D.C.1991).

. In his motion before the hearing committee, in which he sought to invoke the Kersey defense, respondent acknowledged the test applied when he stated: “[u]nlike the burden of proof on the issues of disability and rehabilitation, [respondent's] burden on causation is only by a preponderance of evidence."

. The Board also found that respondent failed to meet the third Kersey requirement. While we do not need to address that prong of the test, we emphasize that rehabilitation is crucial. A fundamental underpinning of any Kersey treatment is the clear indication that the misconduct will not recur.

. The hearing committee took this position because of a number of conflicts in respondent’s own testimony. One striking example was respondent's initial testimony that he had placed estate funds in a locked box where they remained, and that he never misappropriated them for his own use. After Bar Counsel established that respondent had later borrowed funds in order to repay the estate, respondent admitted he had in fact used the estate funds for his own use.

. The substance of the questions asked by the lay member and the answers provided by respondent were as follows:

Q. What is the racial make up of your firm?
A. They are all white....
Q. One of the difficulties of being a very smart young black man like yourself is white folks and how they behave. One of the things that I am worried about is that perhaps you have not yet come to the conclusion of how it is possible to deal with white folks. It seems to me that what happened to you when the firm treated you as they did, it drove you over the line because you felt that you were being treated as if you were nothing because of your color, and that that sense of it was one of the more important motives for what happened to you, in addition to your mother’s death, and in addition to your family's falling apart, and in addition to other elements that we can think of. I am not here pushing in particular other than this. I want you to tell me that you have reached the point that you can deal with that. Because if you cannot deal with that, it is going to happen again....
A. ... But I didn’t look at it as a race thing.
Q. Except you yourself described that this is what drove you over the line.
A. Oh it was. It was.
Q. There were many alternatives that you still had available to you at that time. Why was this thing so powerful in its destructive effect upon you? I am asking the question straightforwardly because I have had a great deal of experience. As I say, you are a very smart young black man, and many of them end up where you have ended up. Most of them ended up there because they thought they were doing the thing that white folks expected them to do, and they did it very successfully, and then at some point someone pulled the rug out from under them and they went down the tubes.... I have seen it happen many, many times. It is a very familiar kind of situation from my experience. And I want to make sure that you actually are able to handle that, because it is a terribly destructive thing, as you well know.
A. Your question is: Do I believe that because I am black that it did not work out with that firm? And how would I deal with that again?
Q. [yes] ...
A. [That had] nothing to do with color. And I guess color had not been an issue again until you raised it. To me the issue was, I allowed myself to be programmed by failure ... if they were black I would have felt the same way.

. The concurring opinion of lay member of the hearing committee was as follows:

I strongly agree with the Committee’s recommendation to disbar Respondent, but I go considerably further. I think it obvious that in this case, as in any case in which Respondent claims mitigation for a disbarrable offense because of the disability of addiction, whether alcohol or some other psychoactive drug, at a minimum, the Respondent should be immediately suspended from the practice of law until he or she can show, ... the addiction does not constitute a danger to his or her clients.... At the same time in my five years experience sitting on hearing committees, the claim has too often been an obvious attempt to a scam, whose only purpose is to escape suspension or disbarment. By tying suspension to the claim of disability because of addiction, we can destroy most of its appeal for unscrupulous lawyers ...
Unfortunately, in the leading cases handed down by the Court of Appeals, notably Temple, Miller, and Kersey, the weakened standards of causation and proof adopted in them (and the retreat from deterrence as a relevant consideration) has the consistent result of placing the disability of the lawyer before the interest of both the profession and the public.
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It is an important responsibility of the Bar to assist addicted lawyers in their rehabilitation. However, the present attitude of the Court of Appeals to that responsibility is that of locking the bam door after the horse has fled....

(Emphasis added).

. See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, Bench Warrants Upon The Prosecutor's Demand: A View From The Bench, 71 Colum.L.Rev. 403, 415 n. 42 (1971) ("A draft of this article was distributed before publication to the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. At the request of the Committee's Chairman ... [the author] tendered a suggested revision of rule 9(a) *1119that would substantially embody the views here espoused."); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Plea For Legislative Review 60 S.Cal.L.Rev. 995, 995 (1987) (citing Congress' failure to review and revise statutes that "slip from the judges' grasp” as one cause for federal court overload).

At the time of these publications, Judge Frankel was a United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, and Justice Ginsburg was United States Circuit Judge, D.C. Circuit; she is now an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court.