Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Pomeroy :I concur in the decision of the Court, but since I reach the result by a somewhat different approach to the problem, I summarize herewith my reasons:
(1) I agree that the bank signature card establishing the joint account with right of survivorship between John Zabek and his son, Walter, in the form here employed constituted under our cases a complete written contract. The funds which went into the account being those of John, the contract was one of gift to Walter.
(2) While the validity of a gift may be challenged by proper evidence of lack of the requisite donative intent, lack of capacity on the part of the donor, or lack of completeness of the gift, no such attempts were made in this case.
(3) The testimony of John’s other sons, Stanley and Frank, as to statements in the nature of admissions made by Walter, ivas objected to at the hearing by appellants. I agree with Judge Hay, dissenting in the court below, that the testimony was violative both of the parol evidence rule and of the so-called Dead Man’s Act (Act of May 23, 1887, P. L. 158, 28 P.S. §322) and should have been excluded. It was violative of the Aet because, in seeking to reclaim the proceeds of the joint account Stanley and Frank were, of course, *129attacking the gift of which John, the decedent, was donor and Walter, now deceased, was donee. Both donor and donee had an interest in maintaining the integrity of the gift; their right and capacity to enter into the transaction are presumed; both donor and donee, through their personal representatives, are parties to the record herein. In seeking to strike down the gift, “the interest of appellants of necessity must be adverse to that of decedent[s].” King v. Lemmer, 315 Pa. 254, 173 Atl. 176 (1934). Pronzato v. Guerrina, 400 Pa. 521, 531, 163 A. 2d 297 (1960); Katz v. Lockman, 356 Pa. 196, 51 A. 2d 619 (1947).
(4) The testimony of William Z. McDivitt, the president of the bank where the account was opened, on the other hand, stands in a different light. While not essential to prove a gift, his testimony was strongly corroborative of John Zabek’s donative intent, and was unobjected to by any party. McDivitt’s testimony did not violate the Dead Man’s Act, since he was a disinterested witness as to both decedents, nor the parol evidence rule, since it was not offered to alter, revoke or amend the contract in question.
Mr. Justice Jones joins in this concurring opinion.