(concurring). I am in complete agreement with Part I of the majority opinion which holds that the provision in the statute increasing judicial salaries which purports to exclude a legislator, during the term for which *308he was elected, from the salary increase should he be appointed to judicial office during such term, is a class of special legislation interdicted by N. J. Const., Art. IV, §7, par. 9(5). Once this provision falls, the Wiley nomination runs afoul of N. J. Const., Art. IV, §5, par. 1 which, inter alia, prohibits any legislator during the term for which he was elected, from being nominated to a judgeship the emoluments of which have been increased during such term.
Since the Wiley nomination is invalid on this ground, I find it unnecessary to consider, were the statutory provision held not to be unconstitutional special legislation, whether the nomination would still be in violation of Art. IV, § 5, par. 1.
It may well be that in today’s economic climate, with its persistent inflationary trends resulting in the constant erosion of the purchasing power of the salary dollar, Art. IV, § 5, par. 1 should be reconsidered at least insofar as it concerns salary increases which merely reflect economic conditions. There is considerable merit to the position that a cost of living increase enacted during a legislator’s term ought not bar him from nomination or appointment during such term to an office aJSected by such increase. However, this would require a substantial modification of the constitutional provision, a matter beyond the province of this Court.