dissenting:
I agree with the Court of Special Appeals, sitting en banc with but one judge dissenting, that the trial judge erred in granting the motion for judgment n.o.v. Viewed in the light most favorable to Mabe, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that BP represented to Mabe that Faison *650was its agent, and that the representation thereby caused Mabe justifiably to rely upon Faison’s skill. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 267 (1957). Consequently, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, which entered a judgment upon the jury verdict.
While I agree with the majority that Faison was not BP’s actual agent, I believe that he was BP’s apparent agent, since, under the circumstances, apparent authority was created:
“... [A]pparent authority to do an act is created as to a third person by written or spoken words or any other conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the third person to believe that the principal consents to have the act done on his behalf by the person purporting to act for him.” Id. at § 27.
What Mabe observed were the indications by signs and advertising that the station was a BP station; nothing attracted him “except for the BP station, ... BP signs, BP gas, BP pumps.” The attendant “had a BP uniform” which was “[g]reen with the yellow BP,” “had a BP hat and just a regular BP service man. BP service man.” Although these manifestations may have been directed to the community at large, they were “words” or “conduct” within the contemplation of § 27. See Restatement, supra, § 8, Comment b.
Moreover, in my view, a jury could find that BP’s manifestations, reasonably interpreted, caused Mabe to believe that BP consented to have Faison service his car. According to the majority’s position, it is common knowledge that a substantial portion of gas stations are independently owned and that the signs mean merely that a customer may purchase BP products. The short answer is that many stations are company owned, and BP, as a principal, is responsible for the information which came to Mabe’s attention. Id. at § 27, Comment a. In this instance, although Mabe saw all these indicia of BP control, he saw no sign — and there was none — which stated that Faison was *651the sole owner of the business. In my view, Mabe reasonably assimilated the information available to him and concluded that Faison was a BP agent.1 See Wood v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 508 F. 2d 167, 175-77 (5th Cir. 1975); Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F. 2d 308, 310 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 829 (1971); Standard Oil Co. v. Gentry, 241 Ala. 62, 1 So. 2d 29, 31-32 (1941); Beck v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 245 Cal. App.2d 976, 54 Cal. Rptr. 328, 330 (1966); Johnston v. American Oil Company, 51 Mich. App. 646, 215 N.W.2d 719, 721 (1974); Chevron Oil Company v. Sutton, 85 N. M. 679, 515 P. 2d 1283, 1286-87 (1973); cf. Taxi Operators v. Kern, 178 Md. 252, 254-59, 13 A. 2d 374 (1940) (Diamond Cab held liable for injuries sustained in hit and run accident where cabs were individually owned but all bore same markings). See also Sheraton Corp. of Am. v. Kingsford Packing Co., Inc., 319 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. App. 1974).
I believe also that the evidence was sufficient to permit a jury to conclude that Faison’s apparent authority caused Mabe justifiably to rely on Faison’s skill. Although, in my view, the majority erroneously excludes the testimony of Mabe’s father and brother on the issue of Mabe’s reliance, I conclude that in any event, Mabe’s testimony alone presented a jury question.2 Mabe testified that in addition to the BP station, there were two other stations within sight *652when he noticed that his engine was overheating. He chose to enter the BP station because “I always buy BP gasoline, always deal with BP.” (Emphasis added.) That he had patronized a BP station near his home for about a year prior to the accident provided support for this testimony. Mabe’s statement, although perhaps not explicit, clearly permitted the jury to infer that he trusted the skill of those whom he thought were BP’s agents, as well as the quality of BP's products.
The majority, on the other hand, emphasizes that Mabe presented no evidence to show that BP’s media advertising encouraged reliance on the skill of BP’s agents, and therefore concludes that it was unreasonable for Mabe to rely on Faison’s skill. Rather, in the majority’s view, reliance only on Faison’s products was justified.
The logic of the majority’s opinion completely escapes me. BP’s media advertising is irrelevant to the determination of reliance because Mabe has presented a compelling case of justification for his reliance, superior to any which he might have presented had he relied solely on advertising. Mabe relied not on impersonal media commercials, but rather on his substantial and continuous personal experience with BP over a period of more than a year. In short, Mabe’s patronage of a BP station, although not Faison’s BP, more effectively established Mabe’s trust in BP’s skill and products than any advertising could have hoped to accomplish. The same decisive fact, prior patronage inducing reliance on a person’s skill, was present in Standard Oil Co. v. Gentry, 1 So. 2d 29, where the oil company was held liable. Cf. Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F. 2d at 310 (Texaco held liable where plaintiff relied on advertising).
Since Mabe justifiably relied on Faison’s skill as a result of Faison’s apparent authority, I believe that BP should be liable to Mabe as if Faison were BP’s agent. See Restatement, supra, § 267; Wood v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 508 F. 2d at 175-77; Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F. 2d at 310; Standard Oil Co. v. Gentry, 1 So. 2d at 31; Beck v. Arthur Murray, *653Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. at 330; Johnston v. American Oil Company, 215 N.W.2d at 721; Chevron Oil Company v. Sutton, 515 P. 2d at 1286-87. See also Sheraton Corp. of Am. v. Kings ford Packing Co., Inc., 319 N.E.2d at 858-59.
I therefore dissent.
. Indeed, although Mabe did not know it at that time, BP may have been actively acquiescing in the concealment of Faison’s ownership of the business. BP recognized its responsibility to avoid deceiving the public, because in the lease BP explicitly required Faison to “furnish, install and display continuously on the exterior of the station at a point visible and accessible to the public, a legible sign showing that [Faison] is occupying said station under a lease and is the sole owner of the business.” Since the lease reserved to BP the right to inspect the station, and to terminate the lease and repossess the property without notice upon the breach of any of the covenants therein, BP’s failure to enforce the quoted provision during the three years prior to the accident may well have created an agency by estoppel. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 8B (1) (1957).
. The majority excludes the testimony of Mabe’s father and brother in the belief that their testimony is irrelevant to the issue of whether Mabe himself relied on Faison’s apparent authority. Quite to the contrary, that testimony is probative circumstantial evidence supporting both Mabe’s understanding of BP’s manifestations and the reasonableness of his reliance upon them, especially since all three Mabes were subject to the same influences and were similarly situated. In any event, BP did not object to the excluded testimony now ignored by the majority.