DISSENTING OPINION BY
JUDGE FRIEDMAN.I respectfully dissent. Jerry Jones (Jones) is a parolee who spent thirteen months in custody without posting bail awaiting disposition of new criminal charges and received a sentence of only twelve months. The majority holds that Jones is not entitled to credit on his original sentence for the extra one month of prison time that cannot be applied to his new sentence. I realize that, pursuant to Berry v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 756 A.2d 185 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000), a parolee whose confinement awaiting disposition of new criminal charges exceeds the ultimate sentence of imprisonment on those charges is not entitled to credit against the original sentence for the additional time served. However, for the reasons that follow, I believe that Berry was wrongly decided and should be overruled.
I. Statutory Authority for Credit
The statutory provisions governing prison time credit make clear that a parolee is entitled to credit against either an original sentence or a new sentence for time spent in custody awaiting disposition of new criminal charges. No statutory provision even remotely suggests that a parolee is not entitled to credit for such prison time.
A. Sentencing Code
Under section 9737 of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9737, when a parolee is convicted of new criminal charges, the court orders an “appropriate agency” to report to the court whether the parolee is entitled to credit for time spent in custody as a result of those criminal charges. After reviewing the information submitted, the court is required to give the parolee credit for “all” time spent in custody “as a result of the criminal charge for which [the] prison sentence is imposed-” Section 9760(1) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760(1).
Here, Jones spent thirteen months in custody awaiting disposition of the charge that he violated section 13(a)(16) of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic (Drug Act),1 relating to unlawful possession of a controlled substance. However, Jones received a sentence of only twelve months in prison, the maximum period of confinement allowed by law. See section 13(b) of the Drug Act, 35 P.S. § 780-113(b). Because Jones served one month more than the sentence of imprisonment ultimately imposed, it is not possible to give Jones credit against his new sentence for “all” the time he spent in custody. The question then is whether, under these circumstances, the Board should give Jones credit against his original sentence for the extra month that he spent in custody awaiting disposition of the new criminal charges.
*170B. Parole Act
The only statutory provision restricting the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole’s (Board) authority to give prison time credit against an original sentence is section 21.1 of the act commonly known as the Parole Act.2 Section 21.1 states that, when the Board discontinues a parolee’s parole status and recommits the parolee as a convicted parole violator (CPV), the parolee is given “no credit for the time at liberty on parole.”
Although the Board may not give a CPV credit against an original sentence for time “at liberty” on parole, the Parole Act does not prevent the Board from giving credit against an original sentence for time spent in custody awaiting disposition of new criminal charges. In fact, section 21.1 of the Parole Act suggests that the Board should give credit against an original sentence for all time spent not “at liberty” on parole.3 Thus, in my view, section 21.1 of the Parole Act means that, unless it is possible to give a parolee credit against a new sentence under the Sentencing Code, the parolee should receive credit against the original sentence for time in custody awaiting disposition of new criminal charges.4
II. Case Law
A. The Gaito Rule
The general rule governing the allocation of credit for time served awaiting disposition of new criminal charges is set forth in Gaito v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 488 Pa. 397, 412 A.2d 568 (1980). If a parolee is held in custody solely because of a detainer lodged by the Board and has otherwise met the requirements for bail on new criminal charges, the time spent in custody is credited against the original sentence. If, however, a parolee remains incarcerated on new criminal charges because he faded to satisfy bail requirements on those charges, the time spent in custody is credited to the new sentence. An exception to the general rule, set forth in a footnote in Gaito, states: if a parolee is not convicted of the new charge, or if no new sentence is imposed for a conviction on the new charge, the pre-trial custody time is applied to the parolee’s original sentence. Id.
I believe that the general rule in Gaito was intended only to address the “typical” case, where the parolee is convicted of new criminal charges and the parolee’s time in custody does not exceed the sentence of imprisonment. In such a case, Gaito ensures that the parolee receives full credit for time in custody, either on the new sentence or the original sentence, but not both.
The exception in Gaito provides for credit on the parolee’s original sentence despite the parolee’s failure to satisfy bail *171requirements (1) when the parolee is not convicted or (2) when the parolee is convicted but receives no new sentence. Like the general rule, the exception ensures that a parolee receives full credit for time in custody. The exception shows that the court in Gaito did not intend that the general rule should be applied when it would deprive a parolee of credit for time in custody.
Here, Jones spent thirteen months in prison without satisfying bail requirements. Under the general rule in Gaito, the thirteen months is credited to Jones’ new twelve-month sentence. However, it is impossible to credit the entire thirteen months to the twelve-month sentence. In order to ensure that Jones receives full credit for his time in custody, which I believe to be the aim of Gaito and the Parole Act, I would direct the Board to give Jones credit on his original sentence for the extra one month that he spent in custody.5
B. Pre-Gaito Case Law
A review of certain cases pre-dating Gaito that provide background for the Gaito rule make apparent that, as the rule evolved in this court, it was never suggested that the Board should give a parolee anything less than full credit for time in custody.
1. Superior Court’s Bigley Opinion
In Commonwealth v. Bigley, 281 Pa.Super. 492, 381 A.2d 802, 804 n. 5 (1974) (emphasis added), our superior court stated:
Whether the time [a parolee] spent between arrest and sentencing is treated as time spent awaiting trial on the new charges or as time spent awaiting final commitment as a parole violator, [the parolee] is entitled to credit for this time towards either the old sentence or the new sentence, but not towards both.
Thus, if a parolee spent thirteen months in jail between arrest and sentencing and received a sentence of only twelve months, as in this case, the parolee would receive twelve months credit on the new sentence and one month credit on the original sentence.
The court in Bigley also held that the Board has authority to determine whether credit is to be given to the original sentence or the new sentence. See Bigley (relying on section 17 of the Parole Act, 61 P.S. § 331.17, which gives the Board “exclusive power” to recommit parolees). After Bigley, the Board took the position that it had absolute discretion to credit a parolee’s confinement between arrest and sentencing to either the old sentence or the new sentence. See Mitchell v. Board of Probation and Parole, 31 Pa.Cmwlth. 243, 375 A.2d 902 (1977), aff'd, 491 Pa. 291, 420 A.2d 1324 (1980).
2. Padgett and Mitchell
In Padgett v. Board of Probation and Parole, 30 Pa.Cmwlth. 221, 373 A.2d 467 (1977), this court began to restrict the Board’s discretion in allocating credit for time in custody. In Padgett, a parolee was arrested on July 9, 1975, and was charged with new criminal offenses. The Board issued a warrant that same day, but the Board lifted the warrant on October 27, 1975. The parolee did not post bail until December 23, 1975. The Board credited *172the parolee’s new sentence for the time spent in custody from July 9, 1975, until October 27,1975. This court reversed. In doing so, we stated that, because of the Board warrant, the parolee was in the Board’s custody from July 9, 1975, until October 27, 1975. Thus, that prison time could be credited only to the original sentence.6 Padgett.
In Mitchell, decided a few months after Padgett, the Board argued pursuant to Bigley that, when the Board lodges a de-tainer against a parolee who has been arrested on new charges, the Board has discretion to give credit following conviction to either the old sentence or the new sentence. This court made the following statement:
[O]nce the Board ... lodges its detainer or causes a parolee to be arrested on its warrant, a parolee is in the custody of the Board and is no longer incarcerated “for the offense or offenses for which such sentence is imposed”.... The Board, not being compelled to lodge a detainer against a prisoner who will remain incarcerated in any event, must abide by the consequences of its election to do so.
We recognize that this holding puts us in direct conflict with the position adopted by the Superior Court in [Bigley] that Section 17 of the [Parole] Act, 61 P.S. § 331.17, placing exclusive discretionary power in the Board to recommit parole violators, extends this far. This section ... does not grant to the Board authority to deny a prisoner credit for time incarcerated while in the Board’s custody subject to its detainer or warrant.
Mitchell, 375 A.2d at 905. Thus, Padgett and Mitchell limited the Board’s discretion in allocating prison time credit whenever the Board issued a warrant.7 This court did not believe that the parolee’s failure to post bail delayed the efficacy of a Board warrant; the Board’s detainer had an immediate effect.8
3. Davis
In Davis v. Cuyler, 38 Pa.Cmwlth. 488, 394 A.2d 647 (1978), this court reconsidered Mitchell. The parolee in Davis was arrested on May 20, 1976, and the Board issued a warrant on May 28, 1976. The parolee was convicted and was sentenced on September 7, 1977. In imposing the sentence, the trial court gave the parolee credit on his new sentence for the time he served from May 20, 1976, to September 7, 1977. The Board, however, ignored the trial court’s allocation of credit based on Mitchell and gave the parolee credit on his original sentence for that period of time.
Ignoring Padgett and focusing on Mitchell, this court pointed out that, in Mitchell, the parolee posted bail after the Board lodged its detainer, and, thus, the parolee would have been released but for the Board’s detainer. In other words, once the parolee satisfied the bail requirements, the Board’s detainer was the sole reason for the parolee’s continued confinement. *173Having made this observation, this court modified its holding in Mitchell to mean that where the Board’s detainer is the sole reason for the parolee’s confinement, the Board must apply the time in confinement to the original sentence.9 Davis.
In Gaito, our supreme court indirectly adopted the Davis rationale.10 In doing so, our supreme court recognized that this court had established two lines of cases, one based on Mitchell, before it was modified, and one based on Davis. The underlying issue in Gaito, then, was whether this court was correct in Padgett and Mitchell that the Board, by lodging a warrant against a parolee who had not posted bail on new criminal charges, gained immediate control over the parolee. Of course, the court decided that a Board detainer did not have immediate effect where the parolee failed to post bail. In reaching this result, the court never entertained the notion that, in applying the rule that was adopted, a parolee might not receive full credit for time in custody.
III. Credit Statutes and “Dead Time”
One of the purposes of a credit statute is the elimination of “dead time,” which is time that a person spends in custody that will not be credited to any valid sentence. Chavis v. Smith, 834 F.Supp. 153, 159 (D.Md.1993). By enacting a credit statute, the legislature seeks to ensure that a defendant receives as much credit as possible for time spent in custody as is consistent with constitutional and practical considerations. Id. A credit statute can create a liberty interest that is protected by the United States Constitution. Id
Here, section 9760 of the Sentencing Code and section 21.1 of the Parole Act are credit statutes. To the extent that the holding in Gaito is an expression of the legislative intent expressed in those credit statutes, I submit that the application of Gaito requires that a parolee receive as much credit as possible for time in custody awaiting disposition of new criminal charges, thereby minimizing “dead time.”
IV. Penal Checking Account
The majority indicates that this court has rejected “penal checking accounts” for parolees. (Majority op. at 166-67.) The “penal checking account” concept was first introduced in the case of United States ex rel. Smith v. Rundle, 285 F.Supp. 965 (E.D.Pa.1968). In Rundle, an inmate sought credit against his present sentence for time he served under an invalid sentence. The court denied the inmate credit because, if there were “penal checking accounts,” a person could serve several years in prison under an invalid sentence and could seek to apply that prison time to a crime that he has not yet committed. Id. I agree that this type of “penal checking account” is improper. However, there is no such “penal checking account” in this case.
Whenever a parolee seeks credit against his original sentence for time in custody awaiting the disposition of new criminal charges, there is always an existing sentence to credit. This is not a situation where the parolee seeks to have the prison time credited to some future crime. A sentence already has been imposed, and it has not yet been served fully. Given that context, if a parolee is in prison awaiting the disposition of new charges and that *174prison time cannot be applied to the new sentence ultimately imposed, the parolee should receive credit on the original sentence.
V. Equity
In Davidson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 667 A.2d 1206 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995), this court stated that the exception to the general rule in Gaito is based in equity. Equity requires the administration of justice according to principles of fairness, justness and right dealing.11 It is not fair or just to deny credit to a parolee for prison time when the parolee has a sentence that could be credited. To deprive the parolee of liberty under such circumstances fails to give due accord to the sanctity of liberty and trivializes the protection of liberty afforded by law.
VI. Equal Protection
A. Parolee and Non-parolee
Some might argue that Jones should not receive the one month credit against his original sentence because a non-parolee, who has no original sentence to credit, would not receive such credit. However, it is not fair that anyone, parolee or non-parolee, spend thirteen months in prison when the ultimate sentence is only twelve months. It makes no sense not to rectify the wrong for parolees simply because we are unable to rectify the wrong for non-parolees.
B. Indigent and Non-indigent
The right to credit for time in custody awaiting trial on a bailable offense is a constitutional right protected by the equal protection clause. Nelson v. United States, 402 U.S. 1006, 91 S.Ct. 2193, 29 L.Ed.2d 428 (1971); Gaines v. United States, 402 U.S. 1006, 91 S.Ct. 2195, 29 L.Ed.2d 428 (1971); Durkin v. Davis, 538 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir.1976). Courts may not refuse to grant a person credit for time served where bail was set and the defendant was unable to raise it due to lack of wealth. Kincade v. Levi, 442 F.Supp. 51 (M.D.Pa.1977). Such refusal constitutes unequal treatment between one unable to make bail and one who can make bail. Durkin.
Here, Jones filed a petition to proceed in forma pauperis with this court. Thus, it is likely that Jones failed to satisfy bail requirements due to indigency. The majority’s view is that, under the Parole Act, Jones would have been entitled to full credit, on his original sentence, for time in custody if he had posted bail. Because Jones did not post bail, Jones is not entitled to full credit. When we interpret a statute, we presume that the legislature does not intend to violate the United States or Pennsylvania Constitutions. Section 1922(3) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(3).
For the reasons stated above, I would overrule Berry and reverse the Board’s failure to give Jones one month credit on his original sentence.
Judges SMITH-RIBNER and COHN join in this dissent.. Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).
. Act of August 6, 1941, P.L. 861, added by section 5 of the Act of August 24, 1951, P.L. 1401, as amended, 61 P.S. § 331.21a.
. Only the Board has jurisdiction to give a CPV credit against an original sentence for time in custody. A trial judge, in sentencing a CPV on new criminal charges, is permitted to give credit against a new sentence for time in custody. However, in no event may a CPV receive credit on both the old and new sentence for the same time in custody.
. Cf. Williams v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 816 A.2d 366 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003) (stating that, where a parolee's prison time cannot be credited to a new sentence, the prison time should be credited to the original sentence; otherwise, there would be an unjustifiable total loss of credit for prison time).
. In Berry, the parolee asked this court to extend the exception in Gaito so that a parolee who received a sentence shorter than his period of incarceration would receive credit against his original sentence for the additional time. Without any discussion of the propriety of such an exception, this court simply stated, "We refuse to do so." Berry, 756 A.2d at 138.
. Obviously, this court’s analysis in Padgett is contrary to Gaito. Because the parolee in Padgett did not post bail until December 23, 1975, Gaito would require that the time served from July 9, 1975, until October 27, 1975, could be credited only to the new sentence.
. Presumably, when the Board did not issue a warrant, the Board still had discretion under Bigley to give prison time credit to either the old sentence or the new sentence, but not to both.
.I note that, in this case, the Board issued a warrant to detain Jones at the beginning of Jones’ thirteen months in custody. Under Padgett and Mitchell, the Board would be required to credit Jones’ original sentence with the entire thirteen months.
. I note that, in Padgett, the parolee had not posted bail after the Board lodged its detainer and, therefore, would not have been released.
. This court relied on Davis in Rodriques v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 44 Pa.Cmwlth. 68, 403 A.2d 184 (1979), and, in Gaito, our supreme court adopted the rationale set forth in Rodriques.
. See Black’s Law Dictionary 540 (6th ed.1990).