(dissenting). The method of recording the votes of the members of the defendant board did not comply with the mandate of § 1-21 of the General Statutes.
Section 1-21 requires that “[t]he votes of each member of any such body upon any issue before such body shall be reduced to writing and made available for public inspection within forty-eight hours . . . .” There is no ambiguity in the language. The trial court’s conclusion that the defendant McKinney’s furnishing of the minutes of its meeting complied with that statute because the identity and vote of each person voting could have been ascertained (since the minutes list the names of all members present, and identify by name all those voting negatively and all those abstaining from voting) should not stand.
Section 1-21 requires two separate written records of meetings: (1) a listing of the votes and (2) copies of minutes of the meeting. The plaintiffs did, not seek copies of the minutes. What they did seek was “that the plaintiffs be supplied by the defendants with the record of the votes of each member of said Board of Education upon each of the issues before it at the meeting of June 28,1973.” Since that request was not complied with, the board failed to carry out a clearly defined statutory duty imposed upon it.
*600There are ten members on the defendant board. If we assume that all ten members were in attendance but that, before a vote on an issue was taken, two members left the meeting for one reason or another, and thereafter a vote was taken and recorded according to the method followed by the board and, of the remaining eight members, two voted negatively and one abstained, it would then be impossible to know who the members were that voted affirmatively.
Assume again that all ten members were in attendance but, before a vote was taken, four members left the meeting and the remaining six voted affirmatively. It would again be impossible to know who the six members were who voted affirmatively since the procedure followed by the board as found by the trial court would record the vote as follows: “ [A] vote upon a motion with nothing further indicates a -unanimous vote of the Board.”
The foregoing examples are not intended to suggest that, in the present case, the defendants intentionally or inadvertently failed to make known how a particular member voted on a particular issue, but, rather, they are intended to illustrate that submission of the minutes in place of a clear record of the votes could lead to possible irregularities and an infringement on the public’s right to know.
Because of the tremendous increases in governmental agencies and the great impact that their actions have on the individual, it is important that individuals have knowledge of the doings of these bodies. The provisions of § 1-21 accomplish a salutary objective in this regard by requiring specific and full disclosure of their doings. Moreover, each individual is better able to select more respon*601sive members if be possesses knowledge of tbeir views. While it is true that such knowledge can be gained by attendance at open sessions, knowledge of the voting records of an agency member at an executive session would not be possible in the absence of the statutory requirements of § 1-21.
To meet the mandate of § 1-21, a roll call vote is required so that the secretary can accurately record the names of those voting in the affirmative, the names of those voting in the negative, and the names of those abstaining. It is not enough for the chairman merely to ask for ayes and nayes upon a motion. The intent of the statute is specific: full disclosure. This court should not condone anything less than what the statute specifically requires.
I would, therefore, find error, reverse the judgment and order a remand with direction that judgment of mandamus be rendered for the plaintiffs.