(dissenting). The language of the court’s final charge could reasonably have led the jury to believe that that charge was intended to preempt and negate all previous jury instructions and make the outcome of the case completely dependent upon their resolution of one issue only: Who crossed the white line?
The complaint alleged that the defendant operator was negligent (1) in being inattentive; (2) in failing to apply his brakes; (3) in failing to maintain control; (4) in failing to sound his horn; (5) in violating the speed statute; (6) in violating the statute concerning the passing and overtaking of another vehicle; and (7) in violating the federal *45interstate commerce commission safety regulation concerning maximum driving and on-duty times for the continuous operation of a truck.
After four hours of deliberation, the jury submitted a question to the court requesting clarification of a state statute. The court responded in part as follows: “. . . I ought to add at this point the issue is a simple one in this case really. It is a question of who crossed that white line and hit the other. It is as simple as all that. If you make up your mind that the truck went into the right lane and struck her, then that is it. If you make up your mind that she went in the left lane and struck the truck, then that is it. Now, it is not a difficult problem. I am sorry to be saying it this way, but that is the real nub of the case. They are both driving along, both are driving legally on a highway, as I recall the evidence . . . .” Fifteen minutes after that supplemental instruction, the jury returned their verdict.
The plaintiffs claim that the court erred in that final charge (1) by failing to instruct the jury that its comments did not supersede the original instructions; (2) in improperly narrowing the issues to “Who crossed that white line?” thereby invading the province of the jury and negating the plaintiffs’ other claims of negligence; and (3) in intimating to the jury that the legality of the operation of the truck was not a disputed fact for their determination. Szela v. Johnson Motor Lines, Inc., 145 Conn. 714, 722, 146 A.2d 910.
“The right of the trial court to comment upon the evidence, and to give his view of its weight, is well established in this state, but such comment must be reasonable and fair.” Laffin v. Apalucci, 128 Conn. 654, 657, 25 A.2d 60; Schiesel v. S. Z. Poli *46Realty Co., 108 Conn. 115, 124, 142 A. 812. The court should discuss the facts in evidence in a manner which would enable the jury to understand the real issues in the case. Here, the real issues were (1) whether anyone was negligent, and, if so, (2) whether that negligence was the proximate cause of the collision and the resulting injuries. To make those issues depend solely on who crossed the white line went too far. Laffin v. Apalucci, supra, 657, 658.
It is not negligence per se merely to cross a white line, as the court instructed; the jury could have found, as claimed, that the vehicle of the named plaintiff crossed the white line because it was pushed there when struck in the rear by the defendant operator’s truck. Even if the jury had found that the named plaintiff’s vehicle did cross the white line, the jury could nevertheless have found that her act of crossing the white line was not the proximate cause of the collision. Those real issues were removed from the jury’s consideration by the court’s final comments. All inferences and conclusions of negligence and proximate cause were to be drawn by the jury and not by the court. Nesbit v. Crosby, 74 Conn. 554, 563, 51 A. 550.
In essence, the court’s charge not only had the effect of directing the jury to infer negligence from the act of crossing the white line, but also suggested that the crossing of the white line must have been the sole proximate cause of the collision. Considering the effect that a final instruction has upon a jury, such an instruction, erroneous as here, constituted reversible error. Laffin v. Apalucci, supra, 658.
I would, therefore, find error and remand the case for a new trial.