Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Cohen:At oral argument and in its brief much of appellant’s argument before us dwelt upon the extent of the auditor general’s power, by regulation, to govern the internal affairs of the association. I consider this argument misdirected. The auditor general’s only concern is to determine if the funds received by appellant from the Commonwealth are being spent in accordance with the purpose for which they were paid. In doing so, the auditor general’s duty and power to examine the books and records of the association are clear, as is his duty to refuse to approve requisitions for further payment if he determines that funds are being used for an improper purpose. This does not involve interference with the internal affairs of appellant for, as the Auditor General has stated, nothing prevents the association from establishing a special death bene*92fit limited in its coverage as long as Commonwealth funds are not used for this purpose.
Therefore, acknowledging, as the majority does, the auditor general’s duty and power to audit appellant’s records and to withhold approval of future requisitions of Commonwealth funds if he discovered an improper use of such funds, we are faced with what is the true issue in this case: Is the use of Commonwealth funds in the manner described a violation of the purposes for which they were appropriated?1
The Act of 1895, supra, does not specify the purposes for which these funds are to be used. It states that the amount involved shall be paid “. . . to the relief fund association of . . . the fire department, or of such fire company, or fire companies, paid or volunteer ... as is or are engaged in the service of [the municipality] and duly recognized as such by the council . . . of such city . . . .” In Commonwealth v. Souder, 376 Pa. 78, 101 A. 2d 693 (1954), we affirmed a decision of the Superior Court, 172 Pa. Superior Ct. 463, 94 A. 2d 136 (1953), holding that individual members of an association designated by a municipality to receive the funds could not divide the funds privately. The necessary, though unstated, implication of that holding was that the funds had to be used for the general relief and protection of all the members of the receiving association. We so indicated in our prior opinion in this case, 415 Pa. 305, 308, 203 A. 2d 476, 478, and in our opinion in Hanover Township Police Pension & Benefit Fund Association Case, 396 Pa. 313, 152 A. 2d 705 *93(1959), dealing with the analogous police pension benefit associations which receive the premiums tax paid to the Commonwealth by foreign casualty insurance companies.
I perceive no reason to retreat from this position. While appellant argues with some force that its special death benefit serves a useful purpose in the recruitment of volunteers and in practice costs very little, it cannot escape the fact that Commonwealth funds intended for the relief of all members of the association are being used to provide a benefit for fewer than all. This is improper and cannot be justified even for good reasons. Therefore, I would now squarely hold that the payments made by the Commonwealth under the Act of 1895 may be used only for the general relief of all active and formerly active members of the relief fund associations.
With respect to the $100 per year payment by appellant to the Firemen’s Legislative Federation of Pennsylvania, I am tempted to say simply that this is de minimis in view of its negligible effect upon appellant’s funds. However, I do not believe that such a conclusion is warranted in a situation where we deal with a statutory directive of this nature. There is no way to comply with the legislative purpose of providing relief for firemen except to do so completely, and use of any of the Commonwealth funds for lobbying activity is not such a compliance. It just does not jell to say that the legislature has permitted funds that it allocated for a designated purpose to be used to influence and to direct the prospective determinations Of the appropriating authority.
I dissent.
Mr. Justice O’Brien joins in this dissenting opinion.There is no room for the argument that no violation could have occurred here because only the interest on the funds was set aside for the special death benefit. The same restrictions apply to the interest as to the principal. Commonwealth ex rel. v. Flowers, 320 Pa. 73, 181 Atl. 485 (1935); Reliance Bldg. & Loan Ass’n Case, 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 315, 14 A. 2d 581 (1940).