dissenting. From the outset, two deficiencies perplex proper appellate review of this proceeding for a declaratory judgment. The case was submitted for decision on an agreed statement of facts. The findings report only the stipulated facts and no more. These include conclusions of law predicated upon hypothetical suppositions of fact. The 1951 ordinance is incorporated in the findings as an exhibit. The text of the ordinance and its preamble are also subject to conflicting inferences of fact. Indeed, the declaratory relief announced in the majority opinion is based on inferences of law and fact which appear to me to be of doubtful validity.
The submission of a controversy on an agreed statement presupposes that all the essential facts necessary to the determination of the controversy have been stipulated. And while an agreed statement is construed against the appellant, we are bound to afford every part of the record a reasonable construction. And if a result contrary to that reached below is required, judgment should be entered accordingly. Olan Mills, Inc. v. City of Barre, 123 Vt. 478, 481, 194 A.2d 385.
*270In any event, neither this Court nor the court below can supply an essential fact which is omitted. St. Albans Hospital v. City of St. Albans, 107 Vt. 59, 62, 176 Atl. 302. And the action may be dismissed on the ground the facts agreed upon are insufficient to support the judgment sought by the plaintiff. 1165 Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Alger, 288 N.Y. 67, 41 N.E. 2d 461, 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agreed Case §27; Annot. 97 A.L.R. 302.
Perhaps the trial court was so persuaded here for that was the action taken. The lower court has made no independent findings. Its judgment order states no declaration of rights. And we are left in the dark as to why the lower court dismissed the petition.
Despite these shortages, the majority has undertaken to settle this important controversy by making the declaration of rights which the trial court refused. Yet the order dismissing the action is affirmed. I would reverse and remand for adequate findings on essential facts so that a true declaratory judgment can be entered. This is accepted procedure in the face of the deficiencies which confront this proceeding. See Am. Jur. 2d, Agreed Case §26; Annot. 97 A.L.R., supra, 302.
Paragraph 6 of the complaint alleges that “an ordinance purporting to govern outdoor advertising was passed at a meeting of the voters in the Town of Shaftsbury on the 6th day of March, 1951 — .” The joint answers of the defendants deny the representation and allege affirmatively that the voters of the town authorized the selectmen “to prepare regulations with reference to outdoor advertising pursuant to Chapter 173 of the Vermont Statutes of 1947, that the selectmen prepared such regulations pursuant to said Chapter 173 — ” which was approved by the voters in 1951.
The agreed facts do not settle these issues. It is not even stated that a zoning ordinance was enacted — merely “an ordinance regulating outdoor advertising.”
The declaratory adjudication made by the majority upholds the vote of the Town in 1951 with one hand. With the other, it strikes down the vote to repeal the action in 1953 on the strength of the assumption that the original vote enacted a true and valid zoning ordinance.
I believe there is more involved in this declaration than the contamination of our scenic landscape. The soundness and integrity of fundamental principles of municipal zoning are at stake.
*271That the control and regulation of outdoor advertising is a proper exercise of the police power of the State is not open to question. Kelbro, Inc. v. Myrick, 113 Vt. 64, 70, 30 A.2d 527. But municipal corporations are the creation of the Legislature. Towns within the State possess only those powers which are expressly granted, or clearly implied by delegation from the sovereign, through the Legislature. State v. Page, 112 Vt. 326, 331, 24 A.2d 346; Whiting Co. v. City of Burlington, 106 Vt. 446, 461, 175 Atl. 35; New Haven v. Weston, 87 Vt. 7, 13, 86 Atl. 996.
Of course, it can be fairly implied that the Legislature intended to empower the towns to regulate outdoor advertising if and when they adopt legally valid zoning ordinances. Such authority, by implication, is derived from the definition of “structures” contained in the Zoning Act which specifies the term “shall include all outdoor advertising structures, devices and displays.” 24 V.S.A. §3001 (V.S. ’47 §3847).
But to achieve zoning regulations which have legal force and effect, it was essential for the Town of Shaftsbury to comply with the procedural prerequisites which the Legislature made mandatory conditions to the delegation of the power to accomplish zoning. These include a vote by the town to undertake the zoning project. Upon such a vote, the selectmen were directed to appoint a zoning commission to prepare a preliminary plan, recommending “the boundaries of the various original districts and appropriate regulations to be enforced therein.” This must be followed by public hearings prior to a final report to the selectmen. And the selectmen were enjoined from taking any action to enact zoning ordinances until they had received the final report of the zoning commission. V.S. ’47 §3859.
The study and hearings by the zoning commission constitute the planning phase of municipal zoning. And until this procedural requirement had been completed, the selectmen, as the legislative body of the Town, were powerless to consider or propose zoning ordinances to the voters of the town for final approval. V.S. ’47 §3849 (24 V.S.A. §3003, later amended by 1963, No. 166 §§2, 3 and 4). Thompson v. Smith, 119 Vt. 488, 500, 129 A.2d 638.
The agreed findings and the 1951 ordinance which they incorporate, fail to establish that the voters of the town ever authorized its selectmen.to inaugurate a zoning project. The only preliminary vote taken was “to regulate and restrict outdoor advertising.”
*272The text of the ordinance reports the selectmen proceeded to adopt the restrictions against advertising structures upon the vote of the 1950 town meeting alone, without the appointment of, or consideration at public hearings- by a zoning commission. There is no mention of the planning procedure required by the statute.
In construing the limits of delegated power — “Silence is negation, and doubt is fatal to the claim. This doctrine is vital to the public welfare.” Peru Turnpike Co. v. Peru, 91 Vt. 295, 299, 100 Atl. 679; Whiting Co. v. City of Burlington, supra, 106 Vt. at 461.
The ordinance itself makes no direct reference to zones or zoning. The Town of Shaftsbury is constituted-as “one district” without mention of “zoning.” It undertakes to restrict only outdoor advertising, without regard to location, throughout the full area of the township. Our statute, as it did in 1951, requires:
Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan and designed to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic and other dangers; to promote health and the general welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks and other public requirements. Such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular use, and with a view to conserving the value of property and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout such municipality. 24 V.S.A. §3009; V.S. ’47 §3855.
Thus the power to zone is not absolute. It is conditioned upon adherence to a comprehensive plan. The purpose of the requirement is to avoid arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious exercise of the zoning power. This is the inevitable product of a piecemeal approach to the problem. Kozesnik v. Montgomery Township, 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1, 7; State v. Huntington, 145 Conn. 394, 143 A.2d 444, 446; 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §25, 79 et seq. (1965 Rev. Vol.). It bears a different connotation from a “master plan.” Absent a plan outside the ordinance itself, the question is whether the inclusive scope of the statutory objectives inhere in the regulations enacted. Kozesnik v. Montgomery Township, supra, 1-3-1 A.2d at 7.
*273The manifest purpose of the statutory requirement for the appointment and preliminary planning of the zoning commission is to insure that a thorough and understanding regulatory design will be explored and considered prior to enactment. The objective of the public hearings by the commission is to afford full opportunity for expression of approval or objection by the variant interests to be affected by the proposal. By this process the zoning needs of the town can be ascertained.
To my mind, these considerations dispute the conclusion that the 1951 ordinance was legally enacted as a zoning regulation. Since it appears from the record presented that the ordinance was not constituted according to the mandatory directives of the Zoning Enabling Act, it cannot be declared to be of legal force and effect. Otherwise, the ordinance amounts to an' unwarranted assumption of zoning power which the town is not entitled to exercise.
Regulations undertaken by municipalities under authority conferred by zoning enabling statutes must follow the grant by the Legislature of the power to zone. The Town of Shaftsbury could receive and translate the power delegated by the State only by strictly pursuing the procedure and following the design of the statute. Thompson v. Smith, supra, 119 Vt. at 498-501; See 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, supra, §2558 and 58 Am. Jur., Zoning §7.
The present record on appeal is empty of any affirmative showing that a zoning commission was appointed to prepare a comprehensive plan or that the attempt to regulate outdoor advertising was in accordance with a comprehensive plan. Indeed the preamble and the restricted scope of the ordinance itself oppose any inference of statutory compliance with these essential requirements.
Granting that indiscriminate advertising along scenic highways is aesthetiaclly offensive and that it is desirable to control this activity at the local government level, the Legislature has ordained that this function can be performed only within the framework of properly established zoning procedures. Courts are not at liberty to ignore and nullify these restrictions upon the delegated power, although the shortcut indicated in the Shaftsbury ordinance might hasten the accomplishment of a worthy objective.