Roddenberry v. Roddenberry

FUKUTO, Acting P. J., Concurring and Dissenting.

I concur in the majority opinion to the extent it affirms that portion of the judgment which denied Eileen Roddenberry profits from postdivorce animations, movies, and merchandising, and awarded her $900,000 in punitive damages for fraud. However, I respectfully dissent from the opinion insofar as it reverses her award of profit participation income from “Star Trek 2” and “Star Trek 3.”

Gene and Eileen Roddenberry came into the divorce with their community property interests in Norway, which, in turn, held an ownership interest in a *668“science fiction property entitled ‘Star Trek.’ ” The Star Trek television series, after generating a multimillion-dollar deficit during its three years on the air, had been canceled. Despite the failure of the series, Eileen Roddenberry consented to a divorce settlement agreement whereby she would retain her community property interest in “any profit participation interest in ‘Star—Trek,’ ” while otherwise relinquishing all interest in Norway. Consistent therewith, Gene Roddenberry agreed to transfer her “[a] one-half interest in all future profit participation income from ‘Star Trek’ to which [Eileen Roddenberry] and/or [Gene Roddenberry] are entitled.”

At trial, Eileen Roddenberry contended it had been the intention of the parties, when they negotiated their 1969 settlement agreement, that she would retain her community property interest in one-half of any and all profits generated by future exploitations of Star Trek, regardless of their form. The defendants, on the other hand, maintained the parties had intended to transfer all of Norway to Gene Roddenberry, except for Eileen Roddenberry’s retention of a profit participation interest in the original, then-defunct Star Trek television series.

Since the Roddenberrys’ settlement agreement had failed to define precisely what was meant by the phrase “ ‘Star-Trek,’ ”1 the language of the divorce decree incorporating that agreement was reasonably susceptible of either of the interpretations asserted by the parties, as well as others. Thus, the trial court properly admitted extrinsic evidence to aid it in determining the parties’ intent at the time the settlement agreement was negotiated. After considering the extrinsic evidence, which was subject to multiple, conflicting inferences and required resolution of credibility issues, the trial court concluded Eileen Roddenberry was entitled to receive profit participation income from the original Star Trek series and any “successors, sequels and spin-offs,” but not from Star Trek-related animations, movies, or merchandising. The court provided a reasoned basis for construing the decree as it did and that is all that is required to warrant an affirmance on appeal under the substantial evidence test.

I am unpersuaded that the trial court, in focusing on whether Star Trek 2 was a “continuation” of the original Star Trek, lost sight of the underlying issue in the case, i.e., “the extent and scope of the rights of [Eileen Roddenberry] in Norway’s profit participation income from Star Trek as determined and delineated by the divorce decree.” The defendants argued below that the decree could not reasonably be construed to include Star Trek *6692 because it had “nothing to do with the original” series. The court rejected that notion, explaining in detail why Star Trek 2 should be considered a continuation of the original series and Star Trek 3 a sequel to Star Trek 2. The court’s analysis was relevant in demonstrating that these series fit into the category of Star Trek exploitations for which the parties had intended Eileen Roddenberry to receive profit participation income.

A petition for a rehearing was denied May 3, 1996, and the petition of appellant Eileen A. Roddenberry for review by the Supreme Court was denied July 31, 1996.

"‘Star-Trek’ ” was merely identified as one of numerous “literary properties, concepts reduced to writing, contracts, commitments and written submissions . . . .”