concurring.
I concur in the result of the principal opinion. I write separately, however, because I think its holding will continue to create confusion concerning when a civil contempt judgment is enforced and, therefore, . final for purposes of determining when the contemnor must file a notice of appeal. In my opinion, the only consistently practical time to consider a civil contempt order enforced and, therefore, final and appealable is when the judgment is actually enforced. In this case and others, when imprisonment is the remedy, the better and traditional rule is that the judgment is actually enforced when the con-temnor is incarcerated. In re Marriage of Crow and Gilmore, 103 S.W.3d 778 (Mo. banc 2003).1
By holding that the time for appeal also begins to run when “the trial court ‘takes evidence’ — conducts a hearing to see if the contempt has been purged — finds that the contempt has not been purged and then reissues a warrant of commitment,” the principal opinion perpetuates the confusion as to when the contemnor has a final judgment, subject to appeal.
For purposes of appeal, a civil contempt order is not final until “enforced.”
When “enforcement” occurs depends .on the remedy. Two remedies to coerce compliance are compensatory per diem fines and imprisonment.
When the remedy is a fine, the contempt order is “enforced” when the moving party executes on the fine....
When the remedy is imprisonment, the traditional rule is that the contempt order is “enforced” when there is “actual incarceration pursuant to a warrant [or order] of commitment.”
Id. at 781 (citations omitted).
A court conducting “a hearing to see if contempt has been purged” and even the ré-issuance of a warrant of commitment following such a hearing does not necessarily mean “that incarceration is imminent” or that the judgment is actually being “enforced” as the principal opinion suggests. Op. at 25. Enforcement by the threat of incarceration is no more imminent than a judgment that imposes a fine that, is not executed. For example, courts routinely extend the stay to give the con-temnor additional time to purge the contempt or schedule another hearing to see if the contemnor complies with the civil contempt order. These actions do not necessarily enforce the civil contempt order. This Court’s prior cases, which are cited in In re Marriage of Crow and Gilmore, provided “[w]hen the remedy is imprisonment, the traditional rule is that the contempt is ‘enforced’ when there is ‘actual incarceration pursuant to a warrant [or order] of commitment.’ ” 103 S.W.3d at 781.2
*28I think the better rule would be for this Court to adhere to the “traditional rule” and hold that a contempt order is enforced and, therefore, final and appealable only when the contemnor is incarcerated. This would eliminate any confusion and draw a bright line as to when the time for appeal begins to run. Similarly, this would be consistent with the rule providing that when the remedy for civil contempt is a fine that the contempt order is considered “enforced” and, therefore, final only when the moving party executes on the fine. Additionally, this also would be consistent with the rule regarding the review of a criminal contempt judgment, which is pursued by writ of habeas corpus once the contemnor is incarcerated. Smith v. Pace, 313 S.W.3d 124, 129 (Mo. banc 2010).
Applying the traditional rule to the current case, Pamela Carothers was taken into custody on March 31, 2010. Her second notice of appeal, filed on April 6, 2010, was timely because it was within 10 days of the civil contempt order being enforced by her incarceration — thus becoming final. Accordingly, I concur in the result of the principal opinion and the analysis regarding the right to counsel in contempt proceedings.
. "[A]n incarcerated contemnor is entitled to release on bond pending appeal.” Id. at 782.
. Ten separate cases are cited to support this traditional rule of law, while only two cases are cited to support the proposition "[t]his Court has intimated that an order of commit*28ment is sufficient to ‘enforce’ a contempt order.” 103 S.W.3d at 781. A departure from the traditional rule did not alter the outcome in In re Marriage of Crow and Gilmore and has done nothing to cease any confusion by the litigants and courts in these civil contempt cases.