The victim in this case suffered grievous harm. Moreover, Chris, the 14-year-old perpetrator, unquestionably had serious behavior problems. However, I cannot agree that it was reasonably foreseeable that a student, who had been disciplined primarily for defiant and disruptive behavior, would rape another student while on school grounds. The majority’s contrary position expands the concept of duty to the point of essentially imposing strict liability on school districts for the criminal conduct of any student with a discipline record that includes hitting and kicking other students. This is a clear departure from established California law. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
As noted by the majority, a school district has a general legal duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising the conduct of the students on school grounds and may be held liable for injuries proximately caused by the failure to exercise such care. (Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City Sch. Dist. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508, 513 [150 Cal.Rptr. 1, 585 P.2d 851].) The standard imposed on school personnel in carrying out this duty is the degree of care “ ‘which a , person of ordinary pmdence, charged with [comparable] duties, would exercise under the same circumstances.’ ” (Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 741, 747 [87 Cal.Rptr. 376, 470 P.2d 360].) For example, a school district may be held liable for injuries arising out of students engaging in unsupervised “roughhousing” or “horseplay” on campus during school hours, i.e., the type of behavior one would expect from unsupervised children. (Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 751.) Nevertheless, there are limits on this duty to supervise. A school district is not an insurer of its students’ safety. (Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City Sch. Dist., supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 513.)
With respect to the district’s alleged negligent supervision in the context of this particular incident, the district cannot be held liable for the minor’s injuries in the absence of a legal duty to protect its students from sexual assaults perpetrated by other students while on campus. Such a duty exists only if the risk of the particular type of harm was reasonably foreseeable when it occurred. (Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 739 [69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912].) “As a classic opinion states: ‘The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.’ (Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co. (1928) 248 N.Y. 339, 344 [162 N.E. 99] ....)” (Ibid.) Moreover, the bare possibility that the injury complained of could result from the defendant’s acts is insufficient. Through hindsight, everything is foreseeable. (Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1103, 1133 [286 Cal.Rptr. 85].)
The majority asserts that the district knew or reasonably should have known that the minor was subject to the risk of an assault, including a sexual *527assault, from Chris. However, the majority does not adequately explain why this is so. The majority simply focuses on the victim’s status. According to the lead opinion, the “unique vulnerabilities of special education students” (lead opn., ante, at p. 520) and the “unique responsibilities” associated with their instruction and their “special needs” (id. at p. 521) made this particular type of harm, i.e., a sexual assault, foreseeable. The deficiency in this analysis is that no consideration is given to whether it was reasonably foreseeable that another student would commit such a crime. Under California law, a duty to protect the minor from a sexual assault does not exist unless it was reasonably foreseeable that this kind of harm could occur. (Leger v. Stockton Unified School Dist. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1459 [249 Cal.Rptr. 688].)
Although the law generally does not impose a duty on a defendant to control the conduct of another or to warn of such conduct, the special relationship that exists between a school district and its students may impose such a duty. (Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dist. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 707, 712, 715 [230 Cal.Rptr. 823].) However, this duty is not unlimited.
To determine the scope of a school district’s duty to control the conduct of one of its students, the California Supreme Court has looked to the common law duty that parents owe third parties to supervise and control the conduct of their children. In Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 811, 968 P.2d 522], the court noted that the relationship between school personnel and students is analogous in many ways to the relationship between parents and their children. (Id. at p. 934.) “At common law, ‘[s]chool officials are said to stand in loco parentis, in the place of parents, to their students, with similar powers and responsibilities.’ ” (Id. at p. 935.)
California law finds a special relationship between parent and child. (Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist., supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 934.) Accordingly, the parent has a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the minor child so as to prevent the child from intentionally harming others. (Ibid.) However, this duty of supervision is limited. The parent’s “ ‘[knowledge of dangerous habits and ability to control the child are prerequisites to imposition of liability.’ ” (Id. at p. 935.) “ ‘[O]nly the manifestation of specific dangerous tendencies ... triggers a parental duty to exercise reasonable care to control the minor child in order to prevent ... harm to third persons.’ ” (Ibid.)
Applying this analysis here, it is my position that the district cannot be held liable for injuries arising out of this criminal conduct under a theory of negligent supervision unless it had knowledge of Chris’s “specific dangerous tendencies,” i.e., his tendencies to commit sexual assaults. Admittedly, Chris *528was a discipline problem. However, defiance and disruption are not indications of such “dangerous tendencies.” Further, Chris’s prior acts of physical violence, i.e., punching respondent in seventh grade and kicking another student in the groin in eighth grade, would not lead one to reasonably anticipate that he would commit a sexual assault.
In contrast, the majority finds no distinction between a physical assault and a sexual assault for purposes of foreseeability in this case. The majority offers no justification for this position. Apparently, in the majority’s view, each type of assault results in the same kind of harm. However, the facts of this case belie this conclusion. Before this sexual assault occurred, the minor had been physically assaulted, i.e., punched by Chris, without any apparent long-term adverse consequences. In contrast, the minor was devastated by this sexual assault. Moreover, if physical assaults and sexual assaults are considered equivalent in this context, school districts will be compelled to view every defiant and disruptive child as a potential rapist. This is an unreasonable burden.
Additionally, contrary to the majority, I consider the analogous situation presented in Romero v. Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1068 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 801], to be persuasive. There, the adult defendants were sued for negligent supervision when, after inviting two minors into their home, one was sexually assaulted by the other. The court found that the adults assumed a special relationship with the minors. (89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1081.) Nevertheless, the court held that under a nonfeasance theory of negligent supervision, the adults had no duty to protect the injured minor in the absence of actual knowledge of the offending minor’s propensities. (89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1083.)
In reaching this conclusion, the Romero court adopted the rule set forth in Chaney v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 152 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 73]. In Chaney, the court was faced with determining the extent of a wife’s duty to her minor invitees to prevent sexual assaults perpetrated by her husband. The court noted that the wife’s duty of reasonable care to the injured child depends on whether the husband’s behavior was reasonably foreseeable. (Id. at p. 157.) However, “[w]ithout knowledge of her husband’s deviant propensities, a wife will not be able to foresee that he poses a danger and thus will not have a duty to take measures to prevent the assault.” (Ibid.) The court further held that, although a wife’s knowledge may be proven by circumstantial evidence, it must reflect the wife’s actual knowledge and not merely constructive knowledge or notice. (Ibid.) In other words, such deviant behavior is so shocking and outrageous that, as a matter of law, one cannot be charged with reasonably foreseeing the risk of harm unless one has actual knowledge of the perpetrator’s propensities.
*529This “actual knowledge” requirement is equally applicable here. Without actual knowledge of Chris’s deviant tendencies, the district could not reasonably foresee the danger he posed. The district had no knowledge of Chris’s propensity to commit sexual assaults. Before this outrageous incident, there had never been any sexual misconduct at any school in the district for at least 31 years. These circumstances mandate the finding that it was not reasonably foreseeable that this junior high school boy would rape a special education student on school grounds.
The lead opinion dismisses the Chaney/Romero line of authority on the ground that “school grounds provide a different setting than an adult’s home.” (Lead opn., ante, at p. 524.) The lead opinion further states, without elaboration, that “there are differing public policy concerns related to the responsibilities of school districts that provide mandatory education as compared to adults who invite children into their home on a voluntary basis.” (Ibid.) However, both school districts and adults who invite children into their homes are acting in loco parentis. Thus, in taking this position, the majority is effectively elevating a school district’s duty to exercise reasonable care to control a minor child above that of a parent.
In sum, under these circumstances, the district should not be held liable for the sexual assault perpetrated by one of its students. The district had no knowledge of that student’s propensity to commit such an act. Consequently, the district did not owe a legal duty to the minor to protect him from this unforeseeable event. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment on this ground.
A petition for a rehearing was denied August 1, 2003, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied October I, 2003. Baxter, L, Chin, J., and Brown, L, were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.