OPINION BY
President Judge LEADBETTER.The Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (PennDOT), appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County (trial court), which sustained the statutory appeal of Ezra J. Burgess from a fifteen-day add-on suspension of his motor vehicle operating privilege imposed under Section 1544(a) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1544(a).1 On appeal, the issue is whether Burgess’ operating privilege was suspended when PennDOT assigned three points to his record for his convictions of the underlying violations of the Vehicle Code, thereby requiring PennDOT to impose a fifteen-day add-on suspension. After review, we conclude that PennDOT met its burden of proof to establish that the add-on suspension was properly imposed, and we reverse.
On April 19, 2007, Burgess received a citation for speeding and driving an unregistered vehicle. Burgess did not respond *1015to the citation. On June 14, 2007, Penn-DOT mailed Burgess a notice stating that his operating privilege would be suspended indefinitely effective July 5, 2007, unless he responded to the citation before that date. On August 16, 2007, Burgess paid the fine for his citation; thus, he was considered convicted of the charges in the citation on that date.
On August 24, 2007, PennDOT notified Burgess that his operating privilege was suspended for fifteen days, effective on August 24, 2007, because he was convicted of an offense while his operating privilege was suspended. Burgess appealed to the trial court, which held a de novo hearing.
Prior to the trial court’s decision, on November 2, 2007, Burgess paid a fee to restore his suspended operating privilege pursuant to Section 1960 of the Vehicle Code, as amended, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1960, which provides: “[PennDOT] shall charge a fee of $25 ... to restore a person’s operating privilege or the registration of a vehicle following a suspension or revocation.” In 2008, the trial court rescinded Burgess’ fifteen-day suspension, concluding that under Department of Transportation v. Cable, 135 Pa.Cmwlth. 475, 580 A.2d 1194 (1990), Burgess’ initial suspension ended on August 16, 2007, when he paid the fine for his conviction and that PennDOT, therefore, could not add-on a fifteen-day suspension because his license was not suspended when he was convicted.
PennDOT appealed to this court, arguing that the trial court erred in determining Burgess’ suspension for failure to respond to the citation ended when he paid the fine for the citation. PennDOT contends that when Burgess was convicted on August 16, 2007, it properly imposed the additional fifteen-day suspension because his conviction required imposition of three points on his driving record. Under Section 1544(a), when an individual’s operating privilege is suspended and he commits an infraction accumulating a point on a driving record, PennDOT is required to impose a five-day suspension for each point. PennDOT asserts that for Burgess to have his operating privilege reinstated, he had to comply with Section 1960, which he did well after PennDOT imposed the add-on suspension.
Burgess argues that under Section 1533(d) of the Vehicle Code, as amended, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1533(d),2 and Cable, his suspension for failing to respond to the speeding citation ended when he paid the fine on August 16, 2007. Burgess contends that PennDOT may not further suspend his operating privilege under Section 1544 because he did not accumulate any points on his driving record until he was convicted of speeding on August 16, 2007.
In Cable, Stephen Cable was issued a citation for failing to stop his vehicle at a red light. He did not to respond to the citation and PennDOT suspended his motor vehicle operating privilege. Cable then paid the fine for the citation and was convicted of the minor offense.3 PennDOT *1016assigned three points to Cable’s driving record and notified him that his operating privilege would be suspended for fifteen additional days under Section 1544(a) because he was convicted of an offense while his operating privilege was suspended.
This court in Cable relied on the prior versions of Section 15334 and Section 15435 of the Vehicle Code, and determined that a suspension period was for a definite time. Therefore, the court determined that Cable’s suspension expired when he paid the fine for his citation. Ultimately, the court concluded that Cable was not under suspension when points were assigned to his record; thus, PennDOT could not impose a fifteen-day additional suspension under Section 1544(a). Cable, 580 A.2d at 1195-96.
PennDOT, however, argues that the Cable decision does not govern the instant case. The General Assembly amended Section 1533 and Section 15436 to their current versions after the Cable decision. The current version of Section 1533(d) expanded the language of the prior version of Section 1533 to require an individual to restore one’s license under Section 1960.
Burgess, however, argues that the current version of Section 1533(d) performs two functions: (1) it provides that a suspension expires when the applicable fine and/or penalty for a citation is paid; and (2) PennDOT may reimpose the suspension, for example, if the restoration fee pursuant to Section 1960 is not paid.
In Rossi v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 580 Pa. 238, 860 A.2d 64 (2004), our Supreme Court reviewed the 1994 amendment to Section 1543, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543, a similar add-on suspension provision. Section 1543(c)(1) provides that:
(c) Suspension or revocation of operating privilege. — Upon receiving a certified record of the conviction of any person under this section, the department shall suspend or revoke that person’s operating privilege as follows:
*1017(1) If the department’s records show that the person was under suspension, recall, or cancellation on the date of violation, and had not been restored, the department shall suspend the person’s operating privilege for an additional one-year period.
75 Pa.C.S. § 1548(c)(1) (emphasis added). The 1994 amendment added the “and had not been restored” language. 580 Pa. at 241, 860 A.2d at 65-66. Our Supreme Court held that as a result of the addition of this language, a driver’s operating privileges are not automatically restored by operation of law once the time-certain suspension period expires. 580 Pa. at 244, 860 A.2d at 67. Rather, a driver is required to satisfy the requirements of administrative restoration provisions such as Section i960, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1960, before being entitled to drive without restriction. Id. Thus, our Supreme Court determined that under Section 1548(c)(1) of the Vehicle Code, an individual’s motor vehicle operating privilege may be suspended for one year if that individual operated a motor vehicle following the expiration of suspension period without first completing the administrative steps necessary to restore one’s license pursuant to Section 1960 of the Vehicle Code. Id.
Similarly, the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed an operating privilege suspension issue shortly after Rossi was decided in Commonwealth v. Williams, 872 A.2d 186 (Pa.Super.2005). Williams’ one-year suspension had ceased and he had allegedly completed all the necessary paperwork to have his operating privilege restored. While Williams was waiting for PennDOT to notify him that his privilege had been reinstated, he was cited for driving through a stop sign without stopping, and had his operating privilege suspended for operating a vehicle while under suspension. The Superior Court concluded that Williams could be convicted of driving under suspension although his suspension period had expired, because he had not received notice from PennDOT that it was legal for him to operate a vehicle again.
Although Burgess presents a plausible interpretation of Section 1533(d), under Rossi and Williams, Burgess’ operating privilege was suspended until he paid his restoration fee as required by Section 1960. If we adopted Burgess’ interpretation of Section 1533(d), then the instant case would undercut the rationale from Rossi and Williams that an operating privilege remains suspended until all administrative steps, including paying the restoration fee pursuant to Section 1960, are completed by an individual and Penn-DOT.
In conclusion, the trial court committed an error of law in interpreting the relevant statutory provisions. See Wagner v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 931 A.2d 104 (Pa.Cmwlth.2007) (the interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to plenary review). Therefore, PennDOT’s imposition of the add-on suspension was proper. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and reinstate the fifteen-day add-on suspension imposed pursuant to Section 1544(a), 75 Pa.C.S. § 1544(a).
ORDER
AND NOW, this 25th day of March, 2010, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County in the above-captioned matter is hereby REVERSED, and the fifteen-day add-on suspension imposed by the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing is REINSTATED.
. Section 1544(a) provides:
(a) Additional point accumulation. — When any person’s record shows an accumulation of additional points during a period of suspension or revocation, the department shall extend the existing period of suspension or revocation at the rate of five days for each additional point and the person shall be so notified in writing.
. 1533(d) of the Vehicle Code provides:
(d) Period of [operating privilege] suspension. — The suspension shall continue until such person shall respond to the citation, summons or writ, as the case may be, and pay all fines and penalties imposed or enter into an agreement to make installment payments for the fines and penalties imposed provided that the suspension may be reimposed by [PennDOT] if the defendant fails to make regular installment payments and, if applicable, pay the fee prescribed in [S]ection 1960 (relating to reinstatement of operating privilege or vehicle registration).
. See Section 6501(b) of the Vehicle Code, as amended, 75 Pa.C.S. § 6501(b), which provides that: "A payment by any person charged with a violation of this title of the fine prescribed for the violation is a plea of guilty.”
. The prior version of Section 1533 provided that:
The department shall suspend the operating privilege of any person who has failed to respond to a citation to appear before a court of competent jurisdiction of this Commonwealth or of any state for violation of this title, other than parking, upon being duly notified in accordance with general rules. There shall be 15 days to respond to such notification before suspension is imposed. The suspension shall be for an indefinite period until such person shall respond and pay any fines and penalties imposed. Such suspension shall be in addition to the requirement of withholding renewal or reinstatement of a violator's driver’s license as prescribed in [Sjection 1503(c) (relating to persons ineligible for licensing).
. The prior version of Section 1543 provided that:
(c) Suspension or revocation of operating privilege.-Upon receiving a certified record of the conviction of any person under this section, the department shall suspend or revoke that person’s operating privilege as follows:
(1) If the department’s records show that the person was under suspension, recall or cancellation on the date of violation, the department shall suspend the person's operating privilege for an additional one-year period.
.Section 1543(c)(1) of the Vehicle Code, as amended, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(c)(1), provides: "If [PennDOT’s] records show that the person was under suspension, recall or cancellation on the date of violation, and had not been restored, the department shall suspend the person’s operating privilege for an additional one-year period.” See also Section 1543(a) of the Vehicle Code, as amended, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(a) (operating a vehicle after an operating privilege suspension, but before restoration of one’s operating privilege, is a summary offense).