concurring.
In Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 448, 625 A.2d 1110 (1993), we recognized the existence of a duty of care between a real estate agent conducting an open house to attract potential homebuyers and a member of the public who attended that open house. Recognition of that duty of care was intended to ensure the safety of the visitors to the open house tour, limited to alerting open-house attendees “only to defects that are reasonably discoverable through an ordinary inspection of the home undertaken for purposes of its potential sale.” Ibid. In the instant matter, the Appellate Division determined that the Hopkins duty of care did not extend to the short-term lease of a summer rental facilitated through the services of a real estate agent. Reyes v. Egner, 404 N.J.Super. 433, 466-67, 962 A.2d 542 (App.Div.2009). We issued a limited grant of certification to review that determination, 199 N.J. 130, 970 A.2d 1047 (2009), and now an evenly divided Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division that granted summary judgment to the agent. I, and the justices joining this concurrence, would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division, substantially for the reasons expressed in the thoughtful opinion by Judge Sabatino, and briefly add the following to amplify why we decline to embrace, on these facts, the extension of the Hopkins duty of care that our dissenting colleagues would apply.
*420I.
Initially, we note, as did the Appellate Division, that plaintiffs1 must obtain an extension of the duty of care that was announced in Hopkins in order to succeed in their action against the real estate agent in this matter. As Hopkins arose in the specific context of an open house conducted in connection with the sale of real property, to recognize a similar duty where a short-term tenant already has taken occupancy of a rental property plainly requires an extension of Hopkins. Our disinclination to adopt such an extension in this case arises not from a conviction that Hopkins must be limited strictly to the factual context of an open house to sell real property, as we need make no such limiting determination in order to resolve this case. Rather, our affirmance of the grant of summary judgment to the real estate agent hinges on the specific facts presented in this matter, the most central of which is that the Reyes family resided in the summer home for nine days before the unfortunate injury to their family member occurred.
Our decision to extend a duty of care in Hopkins was based on the application of a fairness inquiry that weighed and balanced four factors: (1) the nature of the parties’ relationship; (2) the nature and foreseeability of the risk; (3) the existence of an opportunity to inspect and to warn; and (4) the public policy underlying the imposition of the duty. Hopkins, supra, 132 N.J. at 439-45, 625 A.2d 1110 (citing Goldberg v. Hous. Auth. of the *421City of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291 (1962)); see Rogers v. Bree, 329 N.J.Super. 197, 201, 747 A.2d 299 (App.Div.2000) (synthesizing four factors analyzed in Hopkins). It is unnecessary to engage in a full analysis of each of those considerations, for there is a plain and decisive difference between the facts in Hopkins and those in the present case relating to the third factor: the opportunity to inspect. The visual inspection by a realtor discussed in Hopkins, which is done for the purpose of ensuring the safety of visitors attending a realtor’s open house tour of real property listed for sale, stands in marked contrast to the intimate knowledge of a property that an occupant acquires from actually residing in it.
Our holding in Hopkins did not suggest an intent to require that a realtor provide an ongoing guarantee of a property’s safety, nor was it designed to protect occupants of a property from personal responsibility for awareness of their surroundings and the dangers inherent in those surroundings. Rather, Hopkins established the proposition that realtors owe a duty of care to protect invited visitors to a marketed piece of property from physical conditions that the nature and duration of their visit might not afford them an opportunity to recognize for themselves.2 See Hopkins, supra, 132 N.J. at 444-45, 625 A.2d 1110. As noted, the Reyes family lived in the shore rental home for more than a week before the injury-causing accident occurred. A nine-day *422actual occupancy offered ample opportunity to the occupants to inspect and discern physical defects in the property. The facts of this case simply do not compel an extension of the Hopkins duty of care to plaintiffs’ cause of action.
Finally, we take issue with the suggestion of our dissenting colleagues that an extension of the Hopkins duty to inspect under the circumstances presented would not impair the short-term rental market in New Jersey. See post at 432-33, 991 A2d at 224-25. To the contrary, we cannot help but conclude that so broad an extension of Hopkins, with the expected increase in insurance premiums for real estate agencies that would follow, would impact the cost of short-term rentals. We cannot imagine that those increases would be borne by anyone other than the renters—the families, friends and individuals—who vacation in New Jersey each year. On the facts presented, we find no compelling reason to subject the rental industry to the chilling effect of such an extension of the Hopkins duty of care.
II.
In sum, we would affirm the grant of summary judgment to the real estate agent, substantially for the reasons stated by the Appellate Division and as augmented in this opinion.
Chief Justice RABNER and Justice RIVERA-SOTO join in this opinion.
In this opinion, we use "plaintiffs" to refer collectively to Hermes Reyes, who died during the pendency of these proceedings, and his wife, Leonor Reyes, who has asserted a per quod claim based on his injuries, with reference to their cause of action against Prudential Fox & Roach Realtors. Notwithstanding the Appellate Division's affirmance of the award of summary judgment in favor of Prudential, the panel’s decision expressly permitted the plaintiffs' cause of action against the homeowners, Harry C. Egner and Holly Egner, to proceed. Reyes v. Egner, 404 N.J.Super. 433, 462, 962 A.2d 542 (App.Div.2009). This opinion addresses only plaintiffs’ cause of action against Prudential and is not intended to address or limit any other viable cause of action that may exist as between any party involved in this case.
We note that the licensing body for real estate agents, the New Jersey Real Estate Commission, has promulgated regulatory requirements recognizing a realtor’s obligation to engage in a "reasonable effort to ascertain all material information concerning the physical condition of every property for which he or she accepts an agency or which he or she is retained to market....” N.J.A.C. ll:5-6.4(b). That "reasonable effort” must include, at least, "[a] visual inspection of the property to determine if there are any readily observable physical conditions affecting the property.” N.J.A.C. 1 l:5-6.4(b)(l)(ii). Although we are uncertain of the extent of the duty that the Commission means to impose by that regulation, we are satisfied that that regulatory duty does not extend to the imposition of liability in the scenario presented in this matter, where a tenant has, for nine consecutive days, been in possession of and in residence at the rental property.