dissenting.
Today, the Court upholds the imposition of two consecutive life sentences, each subject to a parole ineligibility period of 25 years, for two murders. I believe that the sentence imposed is illegal under the law in effect at the time of the offenses and must be vacated.
Defendant, Christopher Serrone, was convicted of two counts of murder in the first degree in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 a(3). N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5 a(3) expressly prohibits the imposition of consecutive sentences for extended terms. The essential issue is whether the Legislature intended a life term for murder to be an extended term within the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5a(3), which prohibits the imposition of more than one extended term. See State v. Maguire, 84 N.J. 508 (1980) (task of Supreme Court to effectuate legislative intent). The majority believes that the policy of the sentencing statute indicates a legislative intent that a life term for murder is not an extended term. I disagree. I find the language of the relevant statutes *29to be clear in disallowing the imposition of consecutive life sentences, and the legislative intent to be ambiguous at best.
The plain and unambiguous language of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 b in effect when these crimes occurred establishes that the Legislature intended life imprisonment imposed for a murder to be an “extended” term.
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 b provided, in part:
b. Murder is a crime of the first degree but a person convicted of murder may be sentenced by the court (1) to a term of 30 years of which the person must serve 15 years before being eligible for parole, or (2) as in a crime of the first degree except that the maximum term for such a crime of the first degree shall be 30 years. Nothing contained in this subsection shall prohibit the court from imposing an extended term pursuant to 2C:43-7 for the crime of murder (emphasis added).
It is difficult to conceive of any more specific language the Legislature could have used to hold that life imprisonment for murder was not an ordinary sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 b, but was an “extended” term.
Further confirmation of the Legislature’s intent is found in the equally plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7a(1), referred to in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b), which before it was amended in 1982 provided, in part:
2C:43-7. Sentence of Imprisonment for Crime; Extended Terms
a. In the cases designated in section 2C:44-3 or 2C:11-3, a person who has been convicted of a crime may be sentenced to an extended term of imprisonment, as follows:
(1) In the case of a crime sentenced under 2C:11-3 for a specific term of years which shall be between 30 years and life imprisonment * * * (emphasis added).
Given the unambiguous language of these statutes and the specific reference to each other in the statutes, it is difficult to understand the majority’s position that the legislative intent in some fashion twists these statutes so they mean the opposite of what they plainly state.
In view of the specific reference in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b to life imprisonment for murder as an “extended” term, and the prohibition against such terms in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a)(3), there is no room for tortured judicial interpretation. As this Court said in State v. Maguire, supra, 84 N.J. at 528: “It is a settled rule of *30statutory construction that if the language chosen by the legislature is plain and the result is not contrary to obvious legislative intent, ‘the sole function of the court is to enforce it according to its terms.’ Sheeran v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., Inc., 80 N.J. 548, 556 (1979), quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 194, 61 L.Ed. 442, 452 (1917).”
I am convinced from the clear and unambiguous language of the applicable Code provisions that a life sentence for first degree murder constitutes an extended term within the scope and meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5 a(3). By enacting these provisions, our Legislature unquestionably intended to preclude the imposition of consecutive life sentences for multiple murders and thereby overrule the holding in State v. Maxey, 42 N.J. 62 (1964), that such sentences were not illegal. That such was their intent is apparent from the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission’s Final Report on the New Jersey Penal Code. That document stated in part that, “State v. Maxey, supra, which allows consecutive life sentences and allows a term of years consecutive to a life sentence is inconsistent with Subsections (3) and (4).” II Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Commission, the New Jersey Penal Code, Commentary to § 2C:44-5, at 335-336 (1971). In this sentence the Commission was referring to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5a(3).
The majority argues that the statement of the Commission does not refer to murder, since at the time of the comment 2C:11-3b referred to life imprisonment as the ordinary sentence to be imposed in the case of a murder conviction. This argument should be turned around; at the time that the Commission Report came out, the prohibition against consecutive life sentences was predicated upon the draft language:
SECTION 2C:44-5. MULTIPLE SENTENCES: CONCURRENT AND CONSECUTIVE TERMS.
a. Sentences of Imprisonment for More Than One Offense. When multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant for more than one offense, including the offense for which a previous suspended sentence or sentence of probation has been revoked, such multiple sentences shall run *31concurrently or consecutively as the Court determines at the time of sentence, except that:
(1) a term to a State penal or correctional institution and a definite term to a county institution shall run concurrently or consecutively as the Court determines at the time of sentence, except that:
(2) the aggregate of consecutive terms to a county institution shall not exceed eighteen months; and
(3) the aggregate of consecutive terms shall not exceed the longest extended term authorized for the highest grade and degree of crime for which any of the sentences was imposed; and
(4) not more than one sentence for an extended term shall be imposed.
The commentary therefore concluded: “State v. Maxey, supra, which allows consecutive life sentences and allows a term of years consecutive to a life sentence is inconsistent with subsection a(3) and (4).” Commentary to § 2C:44-5, supra, at 335-336. After the Commission Report was issued, the Legislature deleted subsection a(3), set forth above, which prohibited aggregate consecutive terms longer than the longest extended term authorized for the highest crime, and changed life imprisonment to a permissible “extended” term for murder. At the same time the Commission retained the prohibition of a(4) against consecutive extended terms. From this sequence of amendments, one can argue that the Legislature specifically addressed this issue and, having eliminated the ban on any consecutive terms longer than life, included murder within the N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5a(3) multiple extended term prohibition.
Further, I can find nothing in either the statutes or the legislative history of the Code that indicates an intent to have the extended term provisions apply only when such a term is imposed pursuant to the N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3 enhancement criteria.1 Rather, it is clear from the language of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7a and *32from this Court’s opinion in Maguire, supra, that 2C:44-3 and 2C:11-3 were intended to be alternative routes to the imposition of extended terms under the Code.
The fact that the Code was amended in 1982, eliminating the reference to life imprisonment for murder as an extended term and deleting the reference to sentencing for murder under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7, sheds no possible light on this case. The intent of a new and different legislature may not be imputed to a prior legislature’s acts.
It is axiomatic that penal statutes are to be narrowly construed to protect defendants’ rights. See Neeld v. Giroux, 24 N.J. 224, 229 (1957) (Weintraub, J.) (penal statutes to be strictly construed and not to create liability when words of statute not clear in fixing it); see also State v. Carbone, 38 N.J. 19, 24 (1962) (Weintraub, C.J.) (criminal statute not to be extended by tenuous interpretation beyond fair meaning of its terms).2 Today’s decision imposes liability through tortured construction of a statute that the majority admits has resulted in confusion. Such construction is in direct conflict with past efforts of this Court not to punish defendants under a statute that does not *33fairly apprise them of the applicable law or provide officials with guidelines sufficient to prevent arbitrary enforcement.
In conclusion, I would affirm the Appellate Division because the language of the statutes herein concerned is too plain and unambiguous to allow the majority’s interpretation. In the absence of any clear, contrary legislative intent, I would not impose a criminal sentence that is significantly harsher than that which the plain wording of the statutes allow.
Justice O’HERN joins in this opinion.
For reversal — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER, HANDLER and POLLOCK — 5.
For affirmance — Justices GARIBALDI and O’HERN — 2.
Footnote 9 in In re Trantino Parole Application, 89 N.J. 347, 375 n. 9 (1982), states, “[s]ince Trantino was guilty of two murders, he might also have received a second sentence, to run consecutively, of either life imprisonment or 30 years with a minimum term of 15 years before becoming parole eligible. See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b); 2C:44-5(a).” This note, although in agreement with the majority opinion in the present case, was mere dictum in Trantino and adds nothing to the current analysis.
The rules of construction incorporated within the new code do not alter these rules of statutory interpretation. See
2C:l-2. Purposes; principles of construction
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b. The general purposes of the provisions governing the sentencing of offenders are:
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(5) To give fair warning of the nature of the sentences that may be imposed on conviction of an offense;
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c. The provisions of the code shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms but when the language is susceptible of differing constructions it shall be interpreted to further the general purposes stated in this section and the special purposes of the particular provision involved. The discretionary powers conferred by the code shall be exercised in accordance with the criteria stated in the code and, insofar as such criteria are not decisive, to further the general purposes stated in this section.