Baird v. Jones

MOORE, J., Dissenting.

I disagree with the majority’s reliance on the comparative equitable indemnity doctrine to support its conclusion that Baird was entitled to indemnification by Jones and RE/MAX for any damages he paid to Samee. The majority relies heavily on American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578 [146 Cal.Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899] and Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804 [119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, 78 A.L.R.3d 393]. Yet, neither of those cases dealt with the situation here where an intentional tortfeasor seeks indemnification from a concurrent intentional tortfeasor with whom he has been found jointly and severally liable.

It has long been the law of this state that “the law will not aid a wrongdoer.” (See, e.g., Dow v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co. (1912) 162 Cal. 136, 139 [121 P. 379].) The reason for the rule is that “the courts will not aid one tortfeasor against another because no one should be permitted to found a cause of action on his own wrong.” (Herrero v. Atkinson (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 69, 74 [38 Cal.Rptr. 490, 8 A.L.R.3d 629].)

The majority recognizes that the doctrine of comparative equitable indemnity cannot be applied contrary to public policy. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 692.) *694(Platt v. Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Services (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1439, 1444-1445 [266 Cal.Rptr. 601].) However, the majority’s broad allowance of indemnification violates public policy. Both Baird and his agent were found by the trial court to be guilty of fraud. This case does not involve an act of innocent stupidity. An action for damages for fraud is of common law origin. (Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 105, pp. 727-728.) The right to recover damages for fraud has been codified in Civil Code sections 1709 and 1710, which were first enacted in 1872. Public policy has always frowned on fraud and deception.

The opinion is also contrary to other public policy proscriptions. Civil Code section 1668 invalidates contracts purporting to exempt one for causing willful injury or violating the law. Insurance Code section 533 bars an insurer’s liability for loss caused by an insured’s willful act.

In addition, the majority glosses over Code of Civil Procedure section 875, subdivision (d) which unambiguously states, “There shall be no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally injured the injured person.” There is no reason why an intentional tortfeasor should be entitled to indemnity, but not contribution, from a concurrent intentional tortfeasor. But such would be the result under the majority’s opinion. My colleagues suggest there is a difference between contribution and indemnity. The Supreme Court disagrees. It has noted, “. . . the dichotomy between the two concepts is more formalistic than substantive . . .” (American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 591), and pointed out Judge Learned Hand observed years ago that “ ‘[Indemnity is only an extreme form of contribution.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 591, fn. 3.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 875, subdivision (b) provides that the “right of contribution shall be administered in accordance with the principles of equity.” Awarding indemnity to an intentional tortfeasor is contrary to those principles.

The majority concedes that no court has applied comparative equitable indemnity to concurrent intentional tortfeasors (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1127 [252 Cal.Rptr. 122, 762 P.2d 46]), but nevertheless concludes that comparative fault principles should be applied. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 690.) However, “As a general rule an implied right of indemnity does not exist among tortfeasors where the parties are in pari delicto . . . .” (Herrero v. Atkinson, supra, 227 Cal.App.2d at p. 74; see also Byron Jackson Co. v. Woods (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 111, 783 [107 P.2d 639].) “The basis for indemnity is restitution . . . .” (Rest.2d Torts, § 886B, com., at p. 345.) Under the law of restitution, an indemnitee is not entitled to *695indemnity “if his tort involves seriously wrongful conduct.” (Rest., Restitution, § 88, subd. (b), at p. 394.) “Public policy prevents restitution in favor of a person who . . . has committed a seriously wrongful act. . . . Normally consciously criminal conduct including dishonest conduct involving fraud would be considered to be seriously wrongful.” (Id., com. c, at pp. 395-396.)

The majority acknowledges that federal courts, citing Allen v. Sundean (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 216 [186 Cal.Rptr. 863], have held that under California law an intentional tortfeasor is not entitled to indemnification from a concurrent intentional tortfeasor (see Riverhead Sav. Bank v. National Mortg. Equity Corp. (9th Cir. 1990) 893 F.2d 1109, 1116; In re Nat. Mortg. Equity Corp. Mortg. Pool Cert. (C.D.Cal. 1987) 682 F.Supp; 1073, 1089), but seeks to distinguish those cases on the ground that they are “securities fraud cases.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 691.) However, the holdings of those cases are not so limited. For example, Riverhead Sav. Bank holds that “[u]nder California state law it is clear ‘that a securities wrongdoer or anyone who has committed an active fraud cannot escape loss by shifting his responsibility to another party.’ ” (893 F.2d at p. 1116, quoting Stewart v. American Int'l. Oil & Gas Co. (9th Cir. 1988) 845 F.2d 196, 200, italics added.) In re Nat. Mortg. Equity Corp. Mortg. Pool Cert., supra, 682 F.Supp. 1073 noted that, under California law, “. . . it is well-established that an intentional tortfeasor cannot seek either total or partial equitable indemnity.” (Id. at p. 1089, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 875, subd. (d) and Allen v. Sundean, supra, at p. 216.) There is no basis in law or logic to expand the doctrine of comparative indemnity to include intentional tortfeasors. There has been no support for such an expansion in this state, other states, among the commentators, or in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. (See Allen v. Sundean, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d at pp. 226-227.)

To arrive at its conclusion, the majority ignores the common law, Code of Civil Procedure section 875, subdivision (d), the Restatements of Torts and Restitution, and the Supreme Court’s implication in both Li and American Motorcycle that intentional torts are to be excluded from the comparative fault system.

In Li v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 13 Cal.3d 804, the court stated that, “It has been persuasively argued . . . that a comprehensive system of comparative negligence should allow for the apportionment of damages in all cases involving misconduct which falls short of being intentional.” (Id. at pp. 825-826, italics added.) Similarly, in American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d 578, the court concluded that Li’s rationale applied to the allocation of responsibility between negligent defendants and required *696modification of the common law equitable indemnity doctrine. However, the court concurred in the observation that “ ‘[t]here is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were . . . unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone ....’” (Id. at pp. 607-608, quoting Prosser, Torts (4th ed. 1971) § 50, p. 307, italics added.)

By virtue of his intentional acts, Baird should be precluded from indemnification by his concurrent intentional tortfeasors. It is neither equitable nor just for the courts to become involved in allocating loss between intentional tortfeasors, and I would not have the courts become involved in creating causes of action for intentional tortfeasors based on their own wrongs. Creating a right of indemnification in favor of an intentional tortfeasor will simply add another unnecessary burden to an already overburdened judicial system.

Appellants’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied March 24, 1994.